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Managed retreat is an important strategy for natural hazard risk reduction 
and climate change adaptation, but its operationalisation brings many 
challenges, even when it is compelling. With significant built, cultural and 
infrastructural assets sited on low lying coastal land, and settlements traversing 
fault lines, flood plains, volcanic fields, and debris flow fans, remedying 
unsustainable land use patterns is essential to building societal resilience. To 
progress managed retreat from rhetoric to reality, however, New Zealand’s 
governance framework must be fit for purpose. 
The decision-making challenge for managed retreat in New Zealand rests 
predominantly with environmental planning and the mandated promotion of 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources. The focus of this 
research is to examine the role of environmental planning in enabling managed 
retreat in New Zealand, identify and analyse the potential mechanisms available, 
and consider opportunities to improve practice. Quantitative and qualitative 
methods are applied to investigate the function and effect of the various 
instruments able to influence the practice of managed retreat, identify significant 
barriers and enablers, ascertain public perceptions towards policy, and consider 
governance constraints and the prospects to build institutional capacity.  
The research finds that the term ‘managed retreat’ incorporates a broad 
array of regulatory and financial mechanisms, with the potential to reduce 
exposure to a range of natural hazards and disruptive environmental changes 
across space and time. Although the current institutional framework has 
elements that can address future managed retreat of new development, 
instruments and support for managing legacy land uses are weak. Policy learning 
is occurring nationwide, but fragmentation and a lack of strong and consistent 
direction hinders effective management of risk. Important contributions of the 
research include a detailed interrogation of managed retreat in policy, analysis 
of the significant constraints hindering its application and acceptance in New 
Zealand, and the development of new opportunities to pursue managed retreat 
in a more effective, equitable, responsive, and robust manner. A governance 
framework provides a foundation to better examine and consider the various 
types of ‘managed retreats’ which align to the nature of the problem. It also helps 
shed light on the areas where research, law, and policy is currently lacking, in 
order to continue to answer the difficult questions of managed retreat by whom, 
how, when, and who pays? 
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Overall, this research exposes the complexities inherent in a diverse array 
of managed retreats, which at present are constrained by a range of socio-
political-cultural, economic, and institutional barriers, requiring new 
arrangements of the law, planning, and funding mechanisms, and potentially, 
alternative governance modes. Retreat is inevitable in certain local and global 
environs—how it is delivered will determine the success of its outcomes and 
ultimately, the resilience of current and future generations. Bridging the gap 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Rationale 
Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) is celebrated for its breathtaking landscapes 
and features. These spectacular attributes, formed by the positioning of the 
country upon two of Earth’s major tectonic plates, situated within the Pacific 
Ring of Fire and intersecting the Roaring Forties, are landmarks of a nation 
highly susceptible to natural hazards (Campbell, 2012). In 1990, Rt. Hon. Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer made a fitting comment about the hazardscape of New Zealand, 
stating, “If you want drama—you’ve come to the right place” (as cited in 
McSaveney, 2012, p. 11). Today, in a constantly changing, uncertain and complex 
environment, with the effects of climate change exacerbating risk, the need to 
build resilience to nature’s challenges is more pressing than ever. 
According to Campbell and Hicks (2012), New Zealanders will face at least 
one natural hazard in their lifetime simply by living in this country. New Zealand 
is shaken on a daily basis by earthquakes, home to a large number of volcanoes, 
and subject to climate hazards due to its long, mountainous form and vast 
maritime surrounds (Crozier, 2007). Although natural hazard risks are actively 
managed in New Zealand, the reality of the hazardscape, combined with an 
increasing population, land use intensification, and the influences of climate 
change, suggests that societal risk is likely to be increasing at a rate faster than it 
is being managed (Lawrence, 2016; Local Government New Zealand, 2019; Willis, 
2014). For example, exposure to natural hazards is increasing due to 
demographic and land use changes, coupled with the projected impacts of 
climate change (Reisinger, 2014). ‘Significant work’ is required across New 
Zealand public and private sectors to effectively adapt to the impacts of climate 
change (CCATWG, 2017). Of increasing concern is compounding risk in “areas 
adjacent to coasts, estuaries and harbours, because of the rising frequency of 
coastal hazard impacts and the increased exposure of people and assets as areas 
are developed and property values increase, together with legacy issues from 
past decisions” (Ministry for the Environment, 2017a, p. 11). 
New Zealand’s Ministry for the Environment (2016) (MfE) affirms the 
anticipated impacts of climate change as including: more frequent and intense 
winter rainfalls, which will increase the potential for river and flash floods; 
greater storm intensity and sea level rise increasing the risk of erosion, salt water 
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intrusion and coastal flooding; more frequent droughts, small-scale wind 
extremes and thunderstorms; and stronger ex-tropical cyclones.  
Loss of life can be a devastating consequence of natural hazard events. Due 
to the unpredictable nature of geological and meteorological processes, people 
can be exposed at any time, often with little warning. Losses may occur in both 
the short-run (from a few months-years) and the long-run (three to five years) but 
can sometimes span decades (Noy & duPont IV, 2016). Psychosocial recovery 
following any disaster can take a long time, due to the secondary impacts of the 
event that continue into the longer term. These impacts can be wide ranging, 
including stress, anxiety and depression, isolation, loss of community facilities, 
and community separation, reduced air quality affecting health, material loss, 
and hardship (Dorahy & Kannis-Dymand, 2012; Potter, Becker, Johnston, & 
Rossiter, 2015). 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand has recorded the insurance costs of 
natural hazard events in New Zealand since 1968 (including floods, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, frost, severe weather, and coastal erosion). With inflation 
adjustments, it has been recorded that over a 50-year period (from April 1968 to 
August 2018), approximately $27 billion has been claimed for damage caused by 
natural hazard events (Insurance Council New Zealand, 2018). While these costs 
are substantial, they do not paint a full picture of the financial burden. For 
example, a report commissioned by Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) 
stated that the 2004 Manawatu floods insurance pay-out was $112 million. 
However, the estimated cost to the agricultural sector for uninsured losses 
amounted to $185 million, and emergency service and infrastructure repair costs 
were calculated at approximately $90 million (Willis, 2014). Overall, these costs 
totalled $387 million, approximately 0.3% of the annual GDP at this time (Easton, 
2016). This single cost represents just one form of natural hazard damage in just 
one of 67 districts in New Zealand.  
In contemplation of the severe social, economic, and environmental impacts 
that natural hazards can cause, and recognising the limits of human control over 
natural processes, the concept of resilience has emerged as compelling in both 
literature and planning practice. Resilience planning evolved as a tool to reduce 
risk and increase the capacity of societies to stabilise, adapt, and transform when 
disturbance is experienced (White & O'Hare, 2014). “Managing for resilience 
enhances the likelihood of sustaining development in a changing world where 
surprise is likely” (Folke et al., 2002, p. 440). Our uncertain and complex world 
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calls for increased resilience of social-ecological systems, whether to cope, adapt, 
or transform. Using uncertainty to postpone action, particularly where 
irreversibility is present, is not an acceptable alternative (Lawrence, Bell, 
Blackett, Stephens, & Allan, 2018; United Nations, 1992). 
Resilience planning can produce a more sustainable direction for society by 
working to build the capacity of people and communities to adapt to change, 
learn from experiences, and avoid or mitigate risk. In terms of natural hazard 
planning, a resilience perspective provides a more proactive, adaptive, and 
flexible approach for managing risk. Such an approach has become favoured by 
scientists and policy makers, as it prepares people and communities to cope with 
and adapt to the impacts of environmental change, rather than attempting to 
resist or control adverse effects, as has framed past efforts to address natural 
hazard risk. (Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 
2005; Mees, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2014). Subsequently, new approaches have 
arisen in both literature and practice, reflecting the principles of resilience and 
adaptive management. In particular, managed retreat has evolved as a proactive 
adaptation strategy, to reduce exposure to the impacts of natural hazards and 
climate change. Managed retreat is expected to be increasingly required due to 
the levels of current and future risk that many communities and ecosystems face 
(Bardsley and Niven, 2013). 
Managed retreat is defined as the strategic relocation of people, assets, and 
activities to reduce natural hazard risks and adapt to the impacts of climate 
change. This approach has emerged following a dominant history of hard 
engineering practice, where humans have altered the physical environment to 
mitigate the impacts of natural processes. Managed retreat is an adaptive form of 
resource management, aiming to work with nature to reduce physical exposure 
and resulting adverse effects, rather than working against it, and ‘holding the 
line’. Experience reveals the limits of reliance on protection measures, which 
entrench existing use rights and expectations about ongoing development and 
protection, often generating adverse effects on natural character and amenity 
values, and limiting opportunities for adaptive and transformational change 
(Burby, 2006; Cooper & McKenna, 2007; Cooper & McKenna, 2008; Gesing, 2016; 
Jackson & Mcilvenny, 2011; Jha, Stanton-Geddes, & Stanton-Geddes, 2013; 
O’Donnell, Smith, & Connor, 2019; Reisinger et al., 2014; White, 2013). White 
(2013) explains that while using public money in this way can be politically 
attractive, it can enhance longer-term risk via the ‘escalator effect’ (Parker, 1995) 
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or the ‘safe development paradox’ (Burby, 2006), where defences cause the area 
behind them to seem safe and therefore attract new capital and new exposures. 
Managed retreat is an advantageous approach as it has the potential to avoid 
natural hazard exposure to life and infrastructure, increase resilience of 
vulnerable communities, protect environmental and amenity values, and 
provide a cost effective, long-term option for hazard risk management, with one-
off costs and avoidance of future maintenance and emergency management 
expenses (Abel et al., 2011; Alexander, Ryan, & Measham, 2012; Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; DEFRA, 2002; Turbott & Stewart, 2006). Managed retreat broadly captures 
planned relocation in the disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change 
adaptation (CCA) fields, and managed retreat or realignment, in coastal 
management and environmental planning practice. Distinct from migration and 
displacement, it is strategically planned and will need to (and is beginning to) 
occur in anticipation of, and response to, the slow-onset effects of climate change, 
as well as sudden-onset disasters. Managed retreat is becoming a more viable and 
tested strategy—albeit a controversial one (O’Donnell et al., 2019).  
The relocation of people, assets and sometimes, entire settlements, is 
challenging to accept, especially for those directly impacted, and in some 
circumstances for the receiving community. People are intrinsically connected 
to their personal spaces, and attachment to the home, community and land is tied 
to human identity, history, culture, psychology, livelihoods, and property rights. 
As a consequence, managed retreat has often been seen as a last resort option as 
it can result in significant public opposition, despite its potential to avoid and 
reduce significant risks (Dahm, 2003, p. 29; Stewart, Leonard, Johnston, & Hume, 
2005, p. 43). 
Recent publications have recognised the need to further investigate this 
strategy. A 2015 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment report 
presented the following questions to be addressed for New Zealand’s future, 
highlighting the merit of further research on managed retreat, for example: 
“Where should beaches be left to retreat inland? And when does the retreat of a 
whole community become inevitable?” (Wright, 2015, p. 72). Similar questions 
were presented in a LGNZ report on natural hazards: “When does retreat 
become the most viable option and how can this be given effect to?” (Willis, 2014, 
p. 57). An article by Rouse et al. (2016, p. 30) also considers that practical and 
aspirational research for the next decade could include engaging with 
communities to map out options for flexible, adaptive pathways, and integrating 
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CCA with DRR. Finally, as stated by Turbott and Stewart (2006, p. 57), “there is 
little or no New Zealand research on the acceptability of retreat as an option.” 
While research has advanced recently, these statements highlight the need to 
develop ways to plan for managed retreat, providing justification for further 
research in this field, and recognition of key gaps. With a focus on aiding 
resilience through the concept and practice of managed retreat, this thesis aims 
to interrogate its principal barriers and enablers, and investigate opportunities 
for building resilience by critically analysing how to plan for and enable 
managed retreat. Increasing resilience to adapt to the challenges of natural 
hazards and climate change is vital to governing the current and future 
hazardscape of New Zealand. Further, exploring the role and function of 
environmental planning, and broader governance actors and modes, is 
fundamental in achieving this principal aim. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
This research is part of a wider project, driven by the demands of The 
National Science Challenge: Resilience to Nature’s Challenges. The overall aim 
is to:  
Critically analyse the functions and practices of environmental planning 
in enabling managed retreat in New Zealand.  
Underpinning this aim are the following research objectives: 
1. To interrogate the links between resilience, governance, planning, and 
managed retreat. 
2. To analyse how managed retreat is facilitated in New Zealand resource 
management policy and plans.  
3. To identify principal barriers and enablers for realising the benefits of 
managed retreat in planning policy and practice. 
4. To ascertain public perceptions towards managed retreat policy and 
principles. 




1.3 Research structure  
This thesis consists of nine chapters (see overview in Figure 1). Chapter 1 
introduces the motivation for the research and its associated aim and objectives. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review and international analysis of managed 
retreat interventions. The chapter examines the concept of resilience, 
recognising the importance of adaptive and transformative action. Governance 
literature is also introduced, to provide a foundation for assessing opportunities 
and principles for enabling managed retreat in practice. Chapter 3 describes the 
research design, setting out the rationale for the research process, methods, 
limitations and the analytical strategy. Chapter 4 examines the formal New 
Zealand institutional framework that provides the decision-making context for 
Chapters 5-8. Chapter 5 comprises an extensive analysis and critique of New 
Zealand planning instruments, to determine the application of, and direction for 
managed retreat. Subsequently, the focus narrows to New Zealand’s most recent 
attempt to apply managed retreat under the planning system, within the case 
study of Matatā. A significant focus here is identifying and analysing the barriers 
and enablers of the planning procedures, and the social implications of managed 
retreat. Chapter 6 delves into current planning practice, based on thematic 
analysis of the empirical data collected from interviews, site visits, and from 
document analysis of the case study. Developing upon the policy and practice 
findings, Chapter 7 returns to the national scale, consolidating public 
perceptions towards managed retreat policy, key barriers, and potential cost 
allocation principles. Common threads of governance capacity concerns emerge 
throughout the core chapters, leading to analysis of governance frameworks in 
Chapter 8, where opportunities are considered to better govern managed retreat, 
taking into account the research findings and international practice. A 
governance continuum, emerging from the literature review in Chapter 2, frames 
the scope for change. Chapter 9 summarises the contribution to scholarship, 
research findings and recommendations. The thesis concludes by discussing 
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Chapter 2 Resilience, governance, and 
managed retreat: Analysis of theory and 
practice 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 begins with a critical analysis of the key concepts, resilience and 
governance. A governance framework is introduced to examine governance 
modes, elements, and orders across a spectrum of state intervention and 
autonomy. DRR and CCA fields are subsequently explored, followed by an 
enquiry into the role of environmental planning in managing risk. At the core of 
this research is the concept of managed retreat, which is analysed in relation to 
its development, nature, and scale, with international examples informing 
significant barriers and enablers for implementation, and revealing the current 
state of practice and theory. This review works to provide the foundation for the 
thesis, recognising gaps in literature and practice, and developing a framework 
to guide the empirical chapters. 
2.2 Resilience 
The future is uncertain, and in some cases the complexity and severity of the 
challenge appears too great, or the tools, resources, and capacities of authorities 
too limited for meaningful action (Boston, 2014). Nevertheless, it is not ethical, 
nor sensible to be frozen in fear or overwhelmed by difficulties. Humans have 
moral obligations to consider how actions today will affect the wellbeing of 
current and future generations (Ibid). Walker, Lempert, and Kwakkel (2012) 
recognise that not all uncertainties can be eliminated, but ignoring them could 
limit the ability to take corrective action in future, resulting in lock-in, missed 
opportunities and path-dependency. Natural hazards, disasters, and exogenous 
shocks will undoubtedly occur, increasing resilience to their impacts is critical 
(Boston, 2014).  
Human and ‘natural’ systems are intrinsically connected. Pisano (2012) 
argues that humans exist within social systems that are intimately linked with 
the ecological systems in which they are embedded; social-ecological systems are 
complex, adaptive systems that change in an unpredictable and non-linear 
manner. Resilience thinking offers a framework for understanding how a social-
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ecological system operates over connected scales in time and space, in relation to 
coping with and adapting to disturbance (Ibid). Using a perspective of resilience 
shifts the focus from controlling change in systems, to managing a system’s 
capacity to cope with, adapt to, and transform with change (Berkes, Colding, & 
Folke, 2003; Pisano, 2012; Smit & Wandel, 2006). Possessing these principles, 
resilience is considered to be a useful concept for managing unpredictability and 
disturbance, one of the reasons it has come to the forefront of natural hazard and 
climate change adaptation (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004).  
Resilience stems from the Latin root resileri, meaning to spring back 
(Davoudi, 2012). The term was first used in relation to a metal spring, but it was 
introduced to the field of ecology, established by Crawford Holling, who made a 
distinction between engineering and ecological resilience (Ibid). Holling deemed 
engineering resilience to be the ability of a system to return to a steady state after 
disturbance (Holling, 1973). In contrast, he defined ecological resilience as the 
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed by a system before its structure 
is changed (Holling, 1996). The concept of ecological resilience recognises that 
there are many possible states of equilibrium, therefore, a system may not 
necessarily ‘bounce-back’ to its previous state, but bounce forward, into a new 
state of stability (Davoudi, 2012). This perception can be represented by the 
‘adaptive cycle’ which illustrates that there are four stages of change within a 
system: growth and exploitation, conservation, release or creative destruction, 
and reorganisation (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). The adaptive cycle illustrates 
how systems mature, but with vulnerabilities, eventually resulting in decline or 
creative destruction, which at the same time, can open new doors for 
transformation of the social-ecological system. Davoudi (2012) critiques this 
model for being too deterministic, maintaining that each stage in the adaptive 
cycle should be understood as a tendency of a system, not an absolute outcome. 
A third model of resilience, named as evolutionary or transformative 
resilience, challenges the notion of an equilibrium and contests that all systems 
can change over time, whether there is disturbance or not (Scheffer, 2009). 
Evolutionary resilience is based upon the idea that rather than returning to a 
previous state of stability after an event, a system can change, alter itself and 
adapt to stresses in a way that is “complex, nonlinear, and self-organising, 
permeated by uncertainty and discontinuities” (Berkes & Folke, 1998, p. 12). This 
form of resilience is based upon a different way of viewing the world, where 
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instead of imagining space and society as being structured and ever-constant, it 
is understood as being multifaceted and uncertain (Davoudi, 2012). 
While resilience is becoming high profile, its definition is somewhat 
ambiguous. For clarity, in this thesis resilience is conceptualised as comprising 
three characteristics, informed by literature (Brand & Jax, 2007; Carpenter, 
Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 2001; Folke, 2006; Lawrence, White, Glavovic, & 
Schneider, 2017; Walker et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2004): 
Absorptive capacity: Resistance to change whilst retaining the same 
structure and processes  
Adaptive capacity: Learning from experience in a self-organising 
manner, to adjust to impacts and incrementally transition to less 
vulnerable states 
Transformative capacity: The capacity to create a fundamentally 
new system when cultural, moral, economic, political, technological 
and environmental conditions make the existing system untenable  
Resilience with a focus on absorptive capacity, where systems persist and 
‘bounce-back’ dominates practice due to multiple meanings of resilience 
allowing for ‘business-as-usual’, a lack of attention towards politics, power and 
agency, the propensity to engineer solutions to support persistence over change, 
and decision-making processes best suited to address problems simply, but not 
necessarily sustainably (Davoudi, 2012; White & O'Hare, 2014). Resilience as 
absorptive capacity is appropriate in some circumstances, for example, the use 
of insurance to spread the cost of hazard events, however, a focus on persistence 
can make adaptive and transformative resilience less achievable, as people attain 
a false sense of security, and further investment in risky spaces makes systemic 
change expensive and politically problematic (Lawrence et al., 2017, p. 2).  
“Adaptive capacity is sometimes seen as the ‘ability to be resilient’; at other 
times it refers to ‘learning’ in response to disturbance in systems” (Bahadur, 
Ibrahim, & Tanner, 2010, p. 2). One strand of literature frames adaptive capacity 
as the ability of systems to cope with change, determined by social-ecological 
characteristics (Plummer et al., 2018; Smit, Pilifosova, & Burton, 2001; Vincent, 
2007). In this way, adaptive capacity is often referred to as stocks of capitals (such 
as social, human, financial, built, and natural) that are critical to sustain 
livelihoods (Plummer et al., 2018). However, as recognised by Thomsen et al., 
(2012) this notion of adaptive capacity aligns more strongly with ‘manipulation’ 
or absorptive capacity (described above), focused on undertaking external 
adjustments which address the symptoms of stress rather than the causes of it. 
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Therefore, adaptive capacity in this manner is more likely to permit external 
change “to better suit the existing predisposition of certain individuals or social 
groupings with the intention of avoiding change within these entities” (Ibid, p. 3). 
In contrast, adaptive capacity in this thesis is considered a process of social 
learning, using the collective capacity of human actors and knowledge to manage 
resilience by adjusting to impacts and incrementally transitioning to less 
vulnerable states (Hudson, 2010; Walker et al., 2004). Rather than attempting to 
control external factors, it is focused on internal adjustment within human 
systems, reassessing ‘how we should behave’, as opposed to ‘how life should be’ 
(Thomsen et al., 2012, p. 3). Protective strategies to manage risk reflect absorptive 
dimensions of resilience, whereas managed retreat has a greater propensity to 
trigger adaptation of systems’ social elements (Ibid).  
The third dimension of resilience is transformation. A transformative 
system must be able to move and restructure with change, whilst maintaining its 
vital functions. The ability of a system to transform is dependent on the ability of 
people to imagine and implement alternative futures to create a less vulnerable 
society. To steer towards a more resilient, sustainable future, changes in human 
values and associated governance regimes will be required (Pelling, 2010). 
Transformation, with its focus on addressing the systems that drive vulnerability 
and risk, helps to identify routes towards significant, sustainable change 
(Bahadur & Tanner, 2014, p. 211). Transformative change may require a paradigm 
shift, altering fundamental attributes of socio-ecological systems (IPCC, 2014b).  
These conceptualisations of resilience are intertwined with the key concepts 
of absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity. As 
recognised by Miller (2010), building and enhancing resilience is a 
multidimensional problem requiring a range of expertise and resources of 
multiple groups. Resilience thinking alters perspectives aiming to control change 
in systems that are presumed to be stable, to managing the capacity of social–
ecological systems to cope with, adapt to, and shape change (Berkes et al., 2003; 
Pisano, 2012; Smit & Wandel, 2006).  
Dimensions of resilience can be applied in multiple ways, however 
absorptive resilience to maintain system functions and rebound from external 
shocks dominates practice. White and O’Hare (2014) highlight that resilience 
actions are predominantly hard engineering techniques, to ‘build back stronger’ 
following inevitable crises, rather than transforming underlying social-political 
systems and institutional frameworks. Coaffee and Clarke (2015) challenge the 
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usefulness of resilience planning to date, due to its emergence as a ‘buzz word’ 
and implementation gaps, where theory is seldom (or slowly) grounded within 
everyday planning practice. Closure of the ‘implementation gap’ is challenged 
by ever-increasing socio-economic problems, risks, limited resources and 
decision-making practices, and tools predominantly suited to non-dynamic risks 
and straightforward issues (Coaffee & Clarke, 2015). Davoudi et al., (2012) also 
argue that the broad, encompassing nature of resilience hinders its ability to 
effect change, allowing continuation of the status quo, with its definition 
arbitrarily moulded according to corporate and political agendas. In this regard, 
distinguishing the dimensions of resilience (absorptive, adaptive, and 
transformative) reduces ambiguity and strengthens its potential application. 
Resilience, with its view that “humans are inextricably entwined within, 
produced by and productive of ‘natural’ processes means that it is no longer 
possible to act as if humanity was separate to, above or controlling, separate 
forces” (Grove & Chandler, 2017. p. 85). Evans and Reid (2014) consider that 
resilience notions of human immersion into nature removes potential for 
freedom and political action, by focusing on adaptation to a pathological earth. 
However, as elucidated by Grove and Chandler (2017), Grosz (2011) argues that 
‘renaturalising’ politics offers opportunities. Beyond binaries of ‘Man’ and 
‘Nature’, notions of resilience can change thinking to focus on contingency as an 
opportunity rather than a constraint (Grove & Chandler, 2017). Resilience is not 
based on human obedience to nature and loss of human agency, but a systems 
approach to enable sustainability. By refraining from controlling nature and 
working towards understanding and respecting its functions, managed retreat is 
an important opportunity to work towards resilience. In light of implementation 
concerns, the greatest challenge for resilience planning is to use the concept to 
help communities navigate change; altering decision-making norms, practices, 
and systems to achieve this. This thesis addresses the implementation challenge 
for managed retreat, with a view to enhance the capacity for adaptation.  
As such, resilience demands new ways of governing to provide for learning 
and the development of capacity to cope, adapt, and transform with change 
(Folke, Hahn, Rockstrom̈, & Os̈terblom, 2009). To progress beyond absorptive 
resilience and towards more naturalised, adaptive outcomes associated with 
managed retreat, an examination of the governance of decision-making in this 




Governance concerns the organisation and guidance of society via collective 
action to achieve common goals (Healey, 2006; Torfing & Ansell, 2016). 
Governance perspectives emerged in response to an ‘overload of government’, 
tensions between civic expectations, limited public resources, and low public 
sector productivity growth, contributing to a legitimacy crisis for the modern 
state (Torfing & Ansell, 2016). The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ that 
has since taken place in many western societies (Arts, Leroy, & van Tatenhove, 
2006; Ostrom, 1990; Rijke et al., 2012) exhibits a movement away from strictly 
hierarchical and institutionalised control implemented by governments, to less 
formal approaches where power is distributed amongst many actors (Rijke et al., 
2012). As a process, Kooiman (1993, p. 2) determines governance to be “those 
activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as 
purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage (sectors or facets of) 
societies.” Governance relates to the way in which social order is created and 
sustained, and can be considered as the patterns that arise from the governing 
actions (Rijke et al., 2012). 
In environmental sectors, early conversations were focused on the need to 
address externalities stemming from the ‘public good’ nature of environmental 
resources and processes (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). In addressing these concerns, 
state action was seen as an imperative. However, in the late 1970s debates about 
shifts from government to governance emerged. For example, Ostrom (1990) 
advanced arguments about governing the commons, identifying opportunities 
for self-governance by people and communities (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006), later 
revealing the false dichotomy between states and markets (hierarchy and self-
governance) (Ostrom, 2010). Recently, attention has been drawn to more 
nuanced arguments regarding hybrid forms of interactions, joining markets, 
states, and communities (Driessen, Dieperink, van Laerhoven, Runhaar, & 
Vermeulen, 2012; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
Environmental governance faces increasing challenges due to western 
production and consumption trends, which has produced claims of a new 
geological epoch, where human activity has become a geological force (Grove & 
Chandler, 2017). Burdens of the Anthropocene are composite, dynamic, and full 
of uncertainty. Given escalating environmental degradation, it is argued that 
contemporary governments are not well suited to, or capable of, meeting these 
challenges (Armitage, de Loe, & Plummer, 2012; Duit & Galaz, 2008; 
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Meadowcroft, 2009). To provide insights into the varying challenges presented 
by absorption, adaptation, and transformation, insights from governance theory 
are revealing.  
A review of literature reveals that governance can be conceptualised as 
encompassing a range of: modes situated on a spectrum delineated (not 
necessarily in opposition) by ‘hierarchy’ and ‘self-governance’ (Hysing, 2009; 
Treib, Baḧr, & Falkner, 2005); elements, the instruments which enable governing 
action, and; orders of governance, including interactions between actors, rules 
and procedures, and principles required for effective governability—the 
capacity for governance (Kooiman, 2003; Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009). Here, first-
order governance deals with day-to-day affairs aimed at solving societal 
problems. Second-order governance focuses on the institutional arrangements 
which first order governing takes place within, and the third-order involves 
debate on underlying values and principles, feeding into the entire governance 
exercise (Kooiman, Bavinck, Cheuenpagdee, Mahon, & Pullin, 2008; Kooiman & 
Jentoft, 2009). 
The review also uncovered archetypical governance modes, elements, 
orders, and the constructive and limiting aspects of each mode. Structurally 
informed by Driessen and others’ (2012) conceptual framework, Kooiman, 
Bavinck, Cheuenpagdee, Mahon and Pullin’s (2008) interactive governance 
model, and Hysing’s (2009) governance continuum, Figure 2 provides an 
indicative horizontal continuum, summarising the principal governance modes 
found within the literature, across a spectrum of state intervention and societal 
autonomy. Its fluid nature reflects the hybridity of modes present in reality 
(Driessen et al., 2012; Lemos & Agrawal 2006). Elements and orders of the modes 
are illustrated, in particular, the instruments, interactions, institutional 
arrangements and guiding principles across the notional governance spectrum. 
Institutions denote the agreements, rules, rights, laws, norms, beliefs, roles and 
procedures applied to make decisions (Kooiman et al., 2008, p. 7). Institutions also 
create the framework for governance to take place, comprising the structure to 
support formal and informal interactions, procedures and programmes for 
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Figure 2 provides a useful, simplified, and concise illustration of how 
different modes of governance may have tendencies towards certain elements 
and orders. Each mode can be appropriate depending upon the type of problem 
being addressed, and the required dimension of resilience. The framework 
represents what Bovens & ‘t Hart (1996) argue to be ‘optimist’ and ‘realist’ 
governance philosophies, delivering a frame to analyse both functional and 
procedural governance barriers, and help reveal broader tensions and power 
struggles that may restrain action.  
 
  
Figure 2: Governance modes, elements and orders 
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2.3.1 Modes, elements, and first and second governance orders 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchy delivers a top-down structure based on a chain of command, with 
a clearly identified leadership authority, steering society in a routinised and 
repetitive manner (Stephenson, 2016). Examples of hierarchy can be present in 
indigenous cultures, where power resides exclusively with a chief, and under 
state control. Under hierarchical government, power is held by a central 
governing authority and its empowered organisations. Formal instruments and 
interactions ‘direct’ society via regulation, norms, and procedures. Due to high 
sunk costs invested in institutional structures, the rearrangement of rules and 
practices to enable adaptation and deal with information deficits can be difficult. 
Therefore, hierarchal tendencies can be rigid, reactive, and prone to path 
dependencies (Duit & Galaz, 2008; Ostrom, 1999). Hierarchy can also function in 
a de-centralised manner. De-centralised government is structured via vertical 
intergovernmental relations where central and local government actors take the 
lead, and civil society is the recipient of governing elements and orders 
characterised by formal rules, regulations, policies and procedures developed for 
the public good (Driessen et al., 2012). While there is still strong top-down 
direction, this mode brings decision-making closer to those affected by 
governing actions, promoting public participation, considering time-and-place 
specific knowledge, allowing jurisdictional competition, and facilitating 
innovation and experimentation (Driessen et al., 2012; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; 
Marks & Hooghe, 2004). De-centralised governance can be greatly constrained if 
it does not have the capacity to make decisions, and it can result in a complex 
operating environment with reduced democratic accountability (Bache, Bartle, 
& Flinders, 2016, p. 488). 
Network  
Moving along the indicative spectrum, power becomes more dispersed and 
governance less authoritative. Network, or interactive governance is structured 
as a polycentric system of several centres of decision-making that are formally 
independent of each other (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). These systems 
have been defined as complex, integrated and variably sized units with different 
purposes which, together form a largely self-organised regime (Pahl-Wostl, 
2009). Numerous forms of networks exist, for example ‘global or virtual 
networks’ (Holton, 2008) and ‘policy networks’ (Rhodes, 1990). First-order 
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interactions often include a combination of formal and informal rules, norms 
and procedures, with action to achieve aims commonly delivered via 
instruments of strategy, negotiated agreements and incentives. Networks are 
transdisciplinary, often including both government and non-government actors 
(second-order governance). Power is shared and social, political, and ecological 
change is harnessed by the flexible multi-actor, multi-level, and multi-sectoral 
coordination possible within this mode, and the diverse sources of knowledge 
and adaptability to cope with uncertainty (Folke et al., 2004; Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997). Lower transaction costs from an absence of central 
government coordination, and a high learning capacity make this mode more 
viable under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, and crisis (Ibid). Another 
benefit is a network’s tendency to have more accessible and flexible forms of 
governing (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005). Despite these benefits, network governance 
is not suitable for all conditions. It can face challenges in achieving 
representative membership which may lead to legitimacy disputes (Pahl-Wostl, 
2009), with potential for the creation of norms becoming a ‘law unto themselves’ 
triggering transparency issues and accountability concerns (Keast, 2016; Rhodes, 
2000). Network governance also requires considerable investment of time and 
effort to build and sustain interactions and trust (Driessen et al., 2012; Keast, 2016), 
as well as “judicious network leadership and management, to navigate the 
complex sets of relationships and agendas and bypass or overcome blockages to 
ensure public value is delivered” (Keast, 2016, p. 449). It is important to recognise 
that network governance is not independent of hierarchical arrangements, 
acting in concert with these as a component of a broad hybrid assembly (Ibid, p. 
446). 
While it is not ‘archetypal’, a secondary governance mode of note uncovered 
in the literature is public-private governance or ‘closed co-governance’ (Arnouts, 
van der Zouwen, & Arts, 2012), which refers to the joint actions of partners in 
public and private sectors. Positioned near network governance on the spectrum, 
but moving closer to self-governance, it is incentive based with government 
acting as a facilitator, however private actors decide autonomously about 
collaborations within top-down, pre-determined boundaries (Driessen et al., 
2012). Under this mode, power is diffused and relationships are voluntary and 
cooperative. Public-private governance is useful where there is less trust in 
governing authorities, however parties must rely upon each other to cooperate 
and achieve shared goals. The key difficulties of this mode include inability to 
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attract cooperation to achieve outcomes, (Glasbergen, 1998), which could be 
relationship or resource based, triggering negotiation failure, and ensuring the 
interests of civil society are not side-lined by relationships between governments 
and the private sector.  
Self-governance 
Finally, at the far end of the continuum, representing high societal 
autonomy is self-governance, where non-governmental actors manage their own 
affairs. In practice, pure self-governance does not exist, as actors are influenced 
by a world of formal and informal constraints. Governmental actors are likely to 
be involved ‘in the background’ but keep their distance (Kooiman, 2003; 
Kooiman & van Vliet, 2000). Elements to achieve action can include voluntary 
price-based contracts and reporting, undertaken via informal interactions (first-
order governance). Development of industry norms and practices, such as code 
of conducts to regulate behaviour, is also a form of self-governance (Isailovic & 
Pattberg, 2016). This governance mode affords far-reaching autonomy based on 
contracts, competition, and transactions, in a self-organising, bottom-up 
direction. A constraint of this mode can be its inability to deal with complexity 
due to the tendency to ignore intended and unintended consequences of 
behaviour on others (Kooiman, 2003). Isailovic and Pattberg (2016) also recognise 
that self-governance or ‘private governance’ often privileges business-as-usual 
practices, can weaken representation of the less privileged, and effectiveness may 
be compromised by profit seeking behaviour. A significant limitation of self-
governance is that it is typically self-interested and focused on the short-term, 
meaning it is susceptible to failing to address underlying causes of social and 
environmental problems (Ibid).  
While indicative modes have been drawn out to illustrate difference, it is 
important to note that the governance modes exist along a fluid continuum, 
representing hybrid forms of authority, and approaches which will be applicable 
under diverse conditions.  
2.3.2 Third-order governance 
Archetypical modes and associated elements and first and second 
governance orders have been discussed, but governance also involves both the 
structure and capacity for governability, which may be referred to as third-order 
governance. This includes the underlying principles required for governability, 
which feed into any governance exercise (Kooiman, 2003; Kooiman & Jentoft, 
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2009). Governance arrangements are an important factor in the enablement or 
hindrance of effective environmental management (Armitage & Plummer, 2012; 
Lockwood et al, 2010; Ostrom, 1999). As such, useful principles for environmental 
governance theory have developed in a range of areas, including under ‘adaptive 
governance’, ‘anticipatory governance’, and ‘good governance’ to name a few 
relevant subfields (Bennett & Satterfield, 2018). The following discussion 
examines the principles of adaptive, anticipatory, and ‘good’ governance, to 
provide insights into the kinds of questions that governance approaches are seen 
to address, and to begin to develop a framework by which to interrogate 
managed retreat policy and practice. 
As argued by Djalante, Holley, and Thomalla (2011), there is not one model 
of adaptive governance as such, but a range of literature emphasising key 
principles, relating to polycentric and multi-layered institutions, participation 
and collaboration, self-organisation and networks, learning and innovation. 
Adaptive governance is derived from a range of theories, in particular adaptive 
management, cooperative management, and collaborative governance (Djalante 
et al., 2011; Hurlbert, 2017). It is a useful concept as it aims to manage uncertainty 
and integrate decision-making across multiple groups involved in fostering 
resilience, applying reflexive and experimental techniques to prepare for and 
adapt to change.  
Whilst adaptive governance focuses on collaborating with communities and 
continually learning from and evolving policy and decision-making, anticipatory 
governance attempts to address bias towards the present, in the face of 
challenges and vulnerability, now and in future. Boston (2016b, p. 49) considers 
that attention bias towards the present has resulted in a focus on policy problems 
of the present over the future, a failure to anticipate future problems and a policy 
agenda dominated by immediate or urgent issues, displacing the resources and 
time available to address major long-term concerns. Boston further argues that 
to build resilience and ensure a better, less vulnerable, and more sustainable 
tomorrow, we must anticipate and prepare for foreseeable challenges, regardless 
of their conceptual, analytical, and political difficulties (Boston, 2016b, p. 3). 
Anticipatory governance uses a range of possible futures to anticipate and 
monitor adaptation strategies (Quay, 2010), seeking robust and flexible 
democratic institutions and processes in the face of presentism, path 
dependence, and vested interests (Boston, 2016a, p. 12). To mitigate these 
challenges, Boston (2016a) suggests tools, policy frameworks, and ‘commitment 
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devices’ (mechanisms designed to bind individual, organisations or governments 
to a particular course of action) to ensure long-terms costs, benefits, risks and 
opportunities are brought into the short-term focus. Anticipatory governance is 
proactive and precautionary, seeking prevention of harm rather than response 
to it, aligning with the aims of managed retreat. It welcomes the holistic notion 
of resilience and does not expect the future to be clearly mapped, instead 
recognising the requirement for dynamism and flexibility, advanced by 
anticipatory planning and adaptive management (Boston, 2016a). While this 
offers potential, it leads to further questions about implementation, particularly 
in the midst of the existing structures, biases, power asymmetries, and vested 
interests of the present. Boston and others provide some high level 
considerations for this, including requiring policy makers to have the best 
available science, ensuring transparency in decision-making, using analytical 
frameworks that capture the full range of likely costs and benefits (e.g. direct, 
indirect, long-term, short-term, tangible, intangible) and applying commitment 
devices that require the policy regime and those subject to it to conduct foresight 
exercises and long-term forecasts, applying precautionary decision-making and 
risk consideration over long timeframes (Boston, 2016a, p. 17; Lawrence, 2016, p. 
36). However, overcoming the constraints of political myopia on long-term 
decision-making remains a challenge.  
Another subset of third-order governance is ‘good governance’, with 
established principles applied in codes of the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme and Ostrom’s (1990) common resource property 
design principles (Lockwood, Davidson, Curtis, Stratford, & Griffith, 2010). 
Lockwood et al., (2010) examined international and Australian codes to present a 
suite of natural resource governance principles relevant to the multilevel 
context. Eight common principles were identified: legitimacy, transparency, 
accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, functional and structural integration, 
capability, and adaptability.  
In recognition of the broad sentiments of ‘good governance’ across these 
subfields, the biases of existing good governance frameworks, (for example 
inclusion of equity but not effectiveness (Graham, Amos, & Plumtree, 2003; 
Lockwood et al., 2010)), and an absence of adequate capture of the entirety of 
potential aims and attributes of governance, Bennett and Satterfield (2018) 
undertook a comprehensive literature review to formulate governance 
principles relevant to environmental problems. They garnered principles from 
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diverse areas of theory to characterise key features of good environmental 
governance relevant to environmental policy makers and practitioners. Their 
framework suggests that environmental governance has four principal 
objectives: to be effective, equitable, responsive, and robust.  
Whilst having many attributes in common with the other governance 
literature (e.g. flexibility, anticipation, adaptability, legitimacy, transparency, 
accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, functional and structural integration, 
capability, polycentricity, participation, networks, learning, and innovation) 
their framework is applicable to broad environmental problems and modes of 
governance at a range of scales. Effective governance is defined as supporting the 
maintenance of system integrity and functioning, requiring direction, 
coordination, capacity, information, accountability and efficiency. Equitable 
governance ensures inclusive processes and fair outcomes, requiring 
recognition, participation, fair distribution of benefits and burdens, and access 
to justice. Responsive governance enables adaptation and anticipatory action with 
learning, innovation and flexibility. Finally, robust governance ensures that 
functioning institutions persist, maintain performance, and cope with 
perturbations and crises, being legitimate, connected, nested and polycentric 
(Ibid, p. 7). Table 1 links the principles to the attributes to help provide more 
detailed insights into how New Zealand may better enable effective, equitable, 












• Direction: Scope, goals and aims of managed retreat are 
comprehensive, clearly articulated and communicated to 
stakeholders. Clear boundaries on action and scope exist. 
• Coordination: The roles, functions, and mandates of 
intervening governments, agencies and organisations are 
coordinated  
• Capacity (including capability): Skills and resources are 
sufficient to plan and deliver managed retreat. Capable and 
visionary leadership is present. Mechanisms are present to 
resolve conflicts between authorities and communities, and 
within communities. 
• Information: Planning and management decisions and actions 
for managed retreat are informed by best available information 
and integration of a diversity of knowledge types and systems. 
• Accountability: Procedures are present to hold governors 
accountable for performance of the strategy and process. 
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that means and rationales 
for managed retreat decisions are transparent. 
• Efficient: Efficacy guides decisions regarding management 
actions and deployment of resources. Timeframes are 
reasonable. Economic costs and actions taken are 










• Recognition: Managed retreat strategy, policies and processes 
acknowledge and respect incorporation of diverse perspectives, 
values, cultures and rights. Views of marginalised and 
vulnerable groups are included. 
• Participation: Spaces and processes to enable community 
participation and choice are present, with representation and 
engagement of all stakeholder groups. 
• Fair: Mechanisms are in place to ensure socio-economic costs 
and benefits of managed retreat are just and fairly distributed. 
Rights and responsibilities are shared and assigned fairly. 
Unequal circumstances are considered. 
• Just: Laws and policies are present to protect local rights, and 










• Learning: Monitoring, evaluation, reflections and 
communication of managed retreat process and 
implementation performance is institutionalised. Processes and 
platforms are in place to co-produce knowledge and enhance 
social and institutional memory. 
• Anticipatory: Long-term planning and foresight thinking are 
institutionalised. Known and unknown risks and opportunities 
are considered, analysed and strategically planned for. 
• Adaptive: Spaces for reflection and deliberation are 
institutionalised. Processes exist to revisit and evolve policies 
and adapt long-term actions. 
• Innovative: Innovation and experimentation are encouraged, 
and success and failures are monitored. A higher risk tolerance 
is embodied. 
• Flexible: Managed retreat policies are adjusted to fit local 
realities. Efforts are taken to understand and document the 
diverse contexts where policies are applied and to deliberate on 
necessary adjustments. 
 




It is recognised that in practice, engaging with all four objectives and 
corresponding attributes will be difficult, but these principles provide a set of 
guidelines to inform theory and practice, with synergies and trade-offs 
inevitable. Integrating principles from a range of relevant subfields in this way is 
designed to provide a framework that is applicable to differing strategies and 
contexts, including those relating to this study. This flexibility is important as 
managed retreat interventions will inevitably vary across space, time, and risk 
contexts. Together the governance framework (Figure 2) and Bennett and 
Satterfield’s (2018) holistic principles provide a clear foundation to better 
understand and interrogate managed retreat governance and contribute to 
understanding the key barriers, enablers, and opportunities to improve practice 
(Objectives 3, 4 and 5). As such, the thesis will draw upon the framework to help 
identify and analyse managed retreat governance modes, elements 
(instruments), and orders (interactions, actors, power, and guiding principles). 
Further, to work towards resilience, consideration of such governance devices is 
required to deliver ‘good’ outcomes in the face of the increasing exposure, 
complexity, and uncertainty germane to the fields of disaster risk reduction and 
climate change adaptation. The following sections now turn to examining the 
development and goals of DRR and CCA and the role of environmental planning 

















and cope with 
perturbations 
and crises 
• Legitimate: A collective vision shapes managed retreat policies 
and guides actions at all scales. Institutional legitimacy is 
conferred (e.g., in policy) and perceived (e.g., by constituents). 
Governors act with integrity and consistency. Institutions are 
transparent. 
• Connected: Networks of relevant organisations and actors are 
linked vertically and horizontally. Processes are in place to 
support network development, mutual learning, and develop 
social relations. 
• Nested: Tasks are assigned to appropriate levels. Managed 
retreat decision-making authority and responsibility are 
conferred to the lowest level possible. Authority and 
responsibility are supported by adequate state or other outside 
support and oversight 
• Polycentric: Decision-making and action taking centers in 
multiple places, across jurisdictions and at multiple scales 
interact and cohere towards a common goal. Institutions are 
present that are diverse and redundant - that serve similar 
purposes and have overlapping jurisdictions and functions. 
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2.4 Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation  
Disaster risk reduction emerged following a growing international 
awareness of the significant impacts that natural hazards exude on societies and 
the need to reduce human exposure and vulnerability (Ireland, 2010). The 1990s 
were declared the international decade for DRR (Ibid) but its development began 
much earlier, with White’s notions of ‘human adjustment’ in response to 
flooding (White, 1945). White’s concepts of undertaking adjustments such as land 
use change, rather than relying on protection works could be seen as prophetic, 
only recently being incorporated into public policy (Macdonald, Chester, 
Sangster, Todd, & Hooke, 2012). At present, commitment to the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 requires an increased focus on proactive 
management of disaster risk through active intervention, including a priority to 
strengthen disaster risk governance by formulating public policies aimed at 
addressing the issues of managed retreat (UNISDR, 2015, p. 171). The Sendai 
Framework recognises growing vulnerabilities to natural hazards and climate 
change impacts worldwide, and asserts that prevention and reduction of disaster 
risk is a primary role of signatory governments, New Zealand included. 
UNISDR (2015) states that there are two key elements that create risk; 
hazards and vulnerability. Risk represents the possibility of future adverse 
effects, emerging from interactions between social and environmental processes. 
It is a contested and subjective concept, as perception of risk varies across space 
and time, and between individuals. Risk is never fixed, but continually evolving, 
much like vulnerability. 
Conceptualisations of risk have advanced over time, with more complex 
definitions emerging, for example, depicting risk as the combination of natural 
hazards and vulnerability—including the exposure of people and assets to the 
hazard, and the resilience of the people and assets that are exposed. In the past, 
the New Zealand planning approach for addressing risk has focused on 
responding to the hazard, resulting in concentration on the likelihood of an event 
occurring, with little consideration of the consequences of such events 
(Saunders, Beban, & Kilvington, 2013). This approach has meant that many 
developments have been approved which increase the risks (or potential risks) to 
people and property (Ibid).  
International trends in risk management and communication are placing 
increasing emphasis on providing good opportunities for public engagement in 
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risk assessment (Saunders et al., 2013). This departs from the technocratic 
approach traditionally applied, recognising the importance of local and 
indigenous knowledge, and that risk management and land use planning 
fundamentally require value judgements about the costs and benefits of different 
margins of safety (Ibid). Collaborative, risk-based approaches are emerging in 
New Zealand planning documents, however ‘consequence’ predominantly 
remains to be framed by quantifiable impacts such as building damage and 
fatalities. At present, little attention is focused on the drivers of social 
vulnerability which often correlate to significant adverse consequences of hazard 
events. 
Vulnerability is a similarly widely used and often contested concept. The 
term is used in numerous contexts and disciplines, from economics, to 
psychology, engineering and risk (Adger, 2006). It is a widely generalised term, 
often used to describe the elderly, children, or women as ‘vulnerable,’ without 
any indication as to what these groups are actually vulnerable to (Cardona et al., 
2012). Vulnerability has been referred to as the opposite of resilience, however 
this over-generalises both concepts and results in the interpretation that a system 
is vulnerable because it is not resilient and it is not resilient because it is 
vulnerable (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003; Manyena, 2006). The key 
concepts of exposure and capacity to cope are also found in the definition of 
vulnerability within the CCA field. Vulnerability to climate change is defined as 
the “degree to which geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems are 
susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts of climate change” 
(Adger et al., 2007, p. 27). Three key components of vulnerability include 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. This is slightly distinct from DRR 
definitions because the rate and magnitude of climate change is considered 
(Cardona et al., 2012). Exposure is associated with proximity to hazards or 
environmental change. This aspect of vulnerability is physical, connected to 
space and place. Sensitivity is the physical predisposition of humans, 
infrastructure, and the environment to be adversely affected by a natural or 
anthropogenic phenomenon due to a lack of resistance or as a consequence of 
their intrinsic condition (Ibid). Adaptive capacity is the ability to anticipate, 
respond, and adapt with change, learning from experience and incrementally 
transitioning to new, less vulnerable states (Ibid). 
The DRR field provides a subtly different framing of vulnerability, linked to 
social construction of risk. The term is deconstructed by Pelling (2012) into key 
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aspects: exposure (location relative to hazard and surroundings) and resilience 
(absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacity). Figure 3 synthesises Pelling’s 
depiction of risk with the dimensions of resilience applied in this research, 
illustrating how a range of factors comes together to form risk. Vulnerability can 
be considered as the degree to which an individual or group is susceptible to 
harm, which is dependent on physical exposure and the three dimensions of 
resilience. Changes in climate (from anthropogenic actions and natural 
variability) will impact upon the likelihood and consequences of hazards, much 
like contextual dimensions will impact upon the exposure and resilience of 
systems (IPCC, 2014a). 
Vulnerability is multi-dimensional, varying across space and time, among 
and within social groups, in an ever-changing state (Vogel & O’Brien, 2004). In 
summarising the DRR and climate change scholarship, Cardona et al., (2012) 
emphasise that vulnerability is significantly bound to the social, economic, and 
environmental dimensions of a locality. Environmental dimensions include 
physical, geographical, and developmental elements, and economic dimensions 
include work and livelihoods (Cardona et al., 2012). Social dimensions are 
diverse, consisting of demography, migration and displacement, social groups, 
education, health and well-being, culture, institutions and governance (Ibid, p. 
80). While context specific, broad factors such as poverty, risk communication 
deficits, weak social networks and support mechanisms, and maladaptation can 
affect vulnerability levels (Ibid, p. 70). Maladaptation is “an adaptation that does 
not succeed in reducing vulnerability but increases it instead” (McCarthy, 
Canziani, Leary, Dokken, & White, 2001, p. 990). Institutional factors are critical 
here (Adger, 2000), influencing the social distribution of vulnerability and 

















(likelihood &  
consequence) 
 












govern society help determine vulnerability, influencing power relations, risk 
perceptions, and in deciding how vulnerability, risk reduction, and adaptation 
are managed (Ibid). 
Whilst exposure is increasingly integrated in risk-based decision-making, 
social aspects of vulnerability are often overlooked. For example, O'Hare and 
White (2017, p. 393) assert that despite recent academic developments in social 
vulnerability for flood risk management, these dimensions are yet to influence 
practice, as they open debates beyond technical considerations, entering into 
wider policy fields and political economy debates. Vulnerability offers a critique 
of existing power relations and the status quo, making it a powerful concept, but 
like adaptation and resilience, it can be subverted by the neoliberal agenda 
(Bankoff, 2018). For example, relocation strategies for development purposes can 
be renamed and justified by governments as adaptation (Mortreux et al., 2018). 
Bankoff (2018) argues that only through continuous emphasis on the root causes 
of vulnerability, how power relations place some people more at risk than others, 
and on how there is opportunity for radical, systemic change, can human 
societies undertake transformation. 
DRR and CCA have largely emerged as parallel but distinct discourses, 
however, convergence between the two has begun to emerge (IPCC, 2012; 
Lawrence & Saunders, 2017). Their differences largely relate to rates of change 
and the global scale of projected climate impacts, but both must function under 
conditions of uncertainty and change (Ibid). These conditions add scale and 
frequency challenges for both DRR and CCA and put pressure on institutions of 
planning and their practice (Ibid). Although humans have been adapting to risks 
and change for millennia, current society exists in an increasingly complex and 
highly developed social-ecological system. As such, planning for resilience to 
work towards DRR and CCA goals is no simple task, being logistically, physically, 
and scientifically complex, in the face of vast social, political, cultural, 
environmental, economic, and governance challenges, amplified by conditions 
of uncertainty. 
2.5 Planning for resilience 
Environmental planning is the activity of “purposeful anticipation of and 
provision for the future” (Selman, 2000, p. 1). The term ‘planning’ is used to 
describe land use planning, asset, infrastructure and services management, 
housing and economic development, and transport, health and safety, resource 
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and spatial planning. The purpose of planning is to form the scope and nature of 
resource use and development, identifying present and emerging needs, and 
developing plans to ensure these needs will be met, to foster resilient societies 
that thrive, reproduce, and revitalise themselves (Ericksen, Crawford, Berke, & 
Dixon, 2001, p. 8). Ideally, it is expected that with the development and 
implementation of policy and plans, built environments become more efficient, 
liveable and vibrant, ecosystems flourish and the benefits of these improved 
conditions are more equitably distributed within and between current and 
future generations (Ericksen et al., 2001). However, planning operates within an 
increasingly complex system where conflict arises between competing priorities 
(e.g. ‘The Planner’s Triangle’ (Campbell, 2016)) and contested interpretations, not 
to mention the issue of uncertainty that is inherent (O'Hare, White, & Connelly, 
2015). 
Environmental planning has long been established as an important tool for 
avoiding and reducing natural hazard (and now climate change) risk in 
communities. As reasoned by Glavovic, Saunders, and Becker (2010), the 
potential of natural hazard planning is its role in assisting decision-making that 
fosters identification, avoidance and reduction of risk, facilitation of community 
understanding, and governance to develop resilient, sustainable communities. In 
this regard, CCA and DRR can be practically achieved in three primary ways: 
- Protect: allowing the continued use of at risk areas via defence 
measures 
- Accommodate: continue living in vulnerable locations by adjusting 
lifestyle and management habits  
- Retreat: strategically withdraw from risky localities and prohibit new 
development in the previously occupied area  
The ‘protect, accommodate, retreat’ (PAR) logic emerged in the context of 
sea level rise management with the first Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Dronkers et al., 1990; 
Thomsen, Smith, & Keys, 2012). This logic has developed in parallel to natural 
hazard thinking around avoidance and reduction of risk. Figure 4 presents the 
adaptation categorisation, depicting examples of the various techniques that 
may be implemented within each category. Although it presents standalone 
examples of each approach, these can be applied in combination, and as part of 
long-term adaptation pathways.  
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Given the uncertainty of decision-making under environmental and 
socio-economic change, strategies for adaptive risk management need to be 
applied in practice. Adaptation pathways are dynamic decision strategies 
which provide a long-term vision and sequence of steps for the entity at risk, 
triggered by “‘adaptation tipping points’—the points in time when adaptation 
actions cease to be effective and new actions are required” (Barnett et al., 2014, p. 
1103). ‘Dynamic Adaptive  Policy Pathways’ (DAPP), a new planning approach for 
making adaptive decisions under conditions of deep uncertainty (Haasnoot, 
Kwakkel, Walker, & ter Maat, 2013), often integrates PAR approaches into long-
term strategies. Particularly for slow-onset risks, DAPP enables the creation of 
proactive, dynamic strategies that can respond to change by following a series of 
pathways, developed with pre-determined trigger points and monitored to adapt 
with environmental change, unlike traditional static policies which have a 
‘design life’ (Lawrence & Haasnoot, 2017). At the local level, Lawrence and 
Haasnoot (2017) detail the socialisation, testing, application, and policy 
integration of DAPP in the New Zealand local government context, to inform the 
exercise of statutory planning functions and powers. Barnett et al., (2014) also 
provides empirical evidence of the proposed development of a local coastal 
adaptation pathway in south-eastern Australia. 
Although a range of management approaches exists, environmental 
planning faces many challenges in achieving its DRR and CCA functions. People 
Figure 4: The suite of hazard management approaches 
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tend to resist change, hence there exists a global proliferation of protectionism 
to maintain development in hazardous locations. In the United States of America 
(USA) Schechtman (2014) surveyed climate-adaptive practices in coastal 
communities from Maine to Virginia. This study found that just three per cent of 
adaptation actions included managed retreat, whereas accommodation and 
protection accounted for 46% of actions (the remaining actions being provision 
of information). In Australia, Young (2015) notes that the few managed retreat 
schemes have been limited to government buyouts, and consideration of 
potential schemes in response to coastal hazard risk is limited. Managed retreat 
is not an easy solution, hence it is often considered a last resort, however this only 
continues the trend of bias towards the present, at the cost of future species, and 
human populations who must maintain alternatives such as protection works, or 
respond reactively to significant system failures (White & Haughton, 2017). There 
are likely to be property value and scalar thresholds where managed retreat is 
not viable, but in places where it is uneconomical to maintain defences compared 
to the value of assets at risk, managed retreat may be economically advantageous 
in the long-term (Cooper, 2003; Hinkel et al., 2018). In these circumstances, to be 
effective, managed retreat must progress from its position of political ‘last resort’, 
to a viable strategy that is considered and facilitated alongside the traditional 
DRR and CCA regime, without causing extreme social conflict and inequity. 
2.6 Managed retreat  
At the global scale, humans have settled in dangerous locations. Human 
induced environmental transformation has allowed societies to improve living 
standards, expand, and progress, but intensive land use activities and 
modification of the natural environment have resulted in increased exposure to 
potentially devastating perils. Humans have drained, deforested, re-claimed, and 
sealed land, diverted and constrained natural water courses, carved out roads 
and railways and built for the masses, altering ecological functions, processes, 
and landforms (Goudie, 2013; Goudie & Viles, 1997). In the process, historic and 
some contemporary decisions about the location and nature of human 
settlements has resulted in people exposed to extreme events and environmental 
change.  
Natural hazard risk is escalating in New Zealand and abroad due to climate 
change, land use change and intensification, and newly exposed legacy 
development, resulting in communities that are susceptible to harm with 
potentially limited coping capacity (Lawrence, 2016; Local Government New 
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Zealand, 2019; MfE, 2017a; Willis, 2014). Given the imminent risks to human lives, 
infrastructure, assets, and social investments, managed retreat is inevitable in 
certain locations, to avoid and reduce social, economic, and environmental costs 
of natural hazard events. The challenges of environmental change have 
significant implications for property owners, communities, ecosystems, and the 
economy. Property owners and dwellers may not only be exposed to potential 
loss of life, but declining property values, which will also impact the rating base 
for districts, reducing funding availability for key services and infrastructure. 
Property owners with large mortgages may find the value of at-risk homes to be 
lower than what they owe the bank, or they may own homes that are uninsurable 
or uninhabitable (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). This will not only affect 
the economic welfare of individuals, but of banks holding mortgages on 
devalued properties.	 Particularly at the coast, where property values are 
generally inflated in New Zealand, once market risk perceptions ultimately 
reflect reality, the reduction of property values could have wide ranging impacts, 
affecting banks, insurers, investors, developers, and taxpayers, with the potential 
to trigger regional, and even national housing market crises, depending on the 
scale of change (Ibid). Humans cannot control natural processes, but we can 
shape vulnerability by reducing exposure to harm and building resilience of 
people and communities. Managed retreat may be a radical approach for 
reducing human and asset exposure to harm, however, it is a reality of the land 
use legacies and extreme environments that some New Zealander’s inhabit.  
New Zealand is a hazardous country, and human exposure has increased 
due to settlement decisions to locate close to river mouths and fertile soils, and 
desires to live with a view of the sea. Land management practices such as wetland 
drainage and vegetation clearance have contributed to increased exposure. 
Traditionally, to manage the adverse interactions between development and 
environment, the predominant approach has been to control nature, building 
structures to hold the line against the perils of seas, rivers and debris. However, 
experience reveals the limits of reliance on protection measures, and the need to 
focus on more sustainable, long-term risk reduction measures (Burby, 2006; 
Cooper & McKenna, 2007; Cooper & McKenna, 2008; Gesing, 2016; Jackson & 
Mcilvenny, 2011; Jha et al., 2013; White, 2013).  
Managed retreat offers an alternative to traditional approaches, and in 
theory, it is a sustainable form of risk management. It avoids exposure to 
potentially irreversible harm to human life and assets, builds long-term 
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resilience of communities, protects environmental and amenity values, and can 
be a cost effective option for hazard risk management, with one-off costs and 
avoidance of future emergency management expenses (Abel et al., 2011; 
Alexander et al., 2012; Bardsley & Niven, 2013; DEFRA, 2002; Turbott & Stewart, 
2006). Managed retreat aims to avoid and reduce natural hazard risk for the long-
term, rather than mitigating it via physical controls. Bardsley and Niven (2013) 
posit that managed retreat strategies reflect a change in attitude towards the 
environment, where humans refrain from altering nature and work towards 
understanding and respecting it. There are, however, varying terminology, 
principles and policy drivers between and within nations.  
Unlike displacement and migration, managed retreat is a deliberate strategy 
to reduce exposure to harm and make space for natural processes. The term 
‘managed retreat’ emerged in coastal engineering, signifying a shift from the 
traditional hard protection legacy (Neal, Bush, & Pilkey, 2005). It has evolved to 
be applied in natural hazard planning more generally, from natural hazard 
setbacks and relocatable buildings to strategic removal of people and assets at 
risk. In the United Kingdom (UK) managed retreat is synonymous with ‘managed 
realignment’, with the aim of increasing natural flood and storm buffering 
capacity, reducing defence costs, and increasing natural habitat, or providing 
replacement habitat to compensate for coastal squeeze (DEFRA, 2002). While 
sustainable flood risk management was the original motivation, pressure to 
enhance nature conservation and dynamically adapt to climate change 
contributed to this shift in focus (Esteves, 2014). Managed/planned/strategic 
retreat are the dominant terms used in the USA, Spain, Australia, and New 
Zealand, but terms de-embankment and de-polderisation may be found in 
northern Europe, particularly for the creation of intertidal areas (Esteves, 2014). 
Figure 5 draws from the literature to summarise key terms, highlighting the 
differences between managed and unmanaged retreat and their corresponding 




The focus of the thesis is managed retreat at property, community and 
regional scales. However, it is recognised that there is much literature and 
practice on larger scale resettlement of people and communities for development 
purposes (The World Bank, 2004) and in the face of environmental change; 
human displacement as a result of extreme events, and migration in response to 
extreme events or slow-onset changes (Barnett & Webber, 2010).  
Akin to the deliberate, strategic nature of managed retreat, the term 
‘planned relocation’ is also found in the literature. Whilst part of the managed 
       Managed retreat 
       Strategic relocation of people, assets, and activities 
to reduce natural hazard risk and/or adapt to the impacts of climate change 
 
  Managed realignment: 
A planned process of establishing new defence lines for river corridors or 
coastlines, often set back from the existing position, with the aim of improving the 
long-term sustainability of the defence, or contributing to other aims such as 
habitat creation (DEFRA, 2005). 
 
 Planned relocation: 
Coordinated process in which people and communities are assisted to relocate 
from places of residence and settle in new locations with the necessary conditions 
to rebuild their lives (Ferris, 2017, p. 6). 
 
Resettlement: 
Component of planned relocation, which enables people and individuals to re-
establish in  a new location, supported with adequate housing, resources, utilities, 
opportunities to recover assets, livelihoods, land, and living standards, in a safe 










                                           Managed retreat and realignment 
 
    Unmanaged retreat, displacement, and migration 
 










      
         Unmanaged retreat 
  Autonomous and involuntary relocation or abandonment under the 
influence of risk, economic, insurance and regulatory factors  
   
 Displacement: 
Reactive, forced (by physical or social drivers) movement which may be temporary 
or permanent (Weerasinghe et al., 2014). 
 
Migration: 
Voluntary or forced movement in response to environmental change and/or socio-
economic conditions (Weerasinghe et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 5: Retreat terminology and scales 
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retreat discourse, planned relocation is a fully integrated, coordinated process in 
which people and communities are assisted to relocate from their homes or 
places of residence and settle in new locations with the necessary conditions to 
rebuild their lives (Ferris, 2017, p. 6). In a broad sense, managed retreat may 
include resettlement, but it does not necessarily do so by default. Planned 
relocation generally takes place within national borders, at individual and 
community scales, but it can be implemented at the international level. 
Policymakers are beginning to consider cross-border planned relocation for 
CCA, however this is limited by lack of political will and national government 
responsibilities to manage risks internally (McAdam & Ferris, 2015). In 
exceptional circumstances, international planned relocation (for example, of 
small island states) may be required if a significant portion, or an entire country 
of origin is rendered unfit for habitation (Ibid). Even so, McAdam and Ferris 
(2015) argue that migration is likely to be more common at this level. 
Resettlement, as a component of planned relocation, can be defined as the 
“process of enabling persons to establish themselves permanently in a new 
location, with access to habitable housing, resources and services, measures to 
restore/recover assets, livelihoods, land, and living standards, and to enjoy rights 
in a non-discriminatory manner” (Weerasinghe et al., 2014, p. 10). Concepts of 
planned relocation are not new, resonating with deliberations of previous 
centuries about surplus population and resource scarcity (McAdam, 2015). For 
example, during the 19th to the mid-20th century, relocation was theorised as a 
proactive solution to anticipated overpopulation and resource scarcity. Yet, in a 
similar vein to what we are currently witnessing with managed retreat, history 
shows that the translation from rhetoric to reality proved difficult in practice 
(Ibid., p.97). 
The nuances of terminology are important. For example, managed retreat is 
a broader term than managed realignment, encompassing risk reduction and 
adaptive management of a range of natural (and socio-natural) hazard and 
climate change risks, not exclusive to water sourced threats or strategic removal 
of protection works. However, while there are differences, there are 
commonalities. Managed realignment, planned relocation, resettlement, and 
managed retreat all encompass principles of allowing natural processes to 
persist, by removing people and assets away from threatening areas, providing a 
potentially environmentally sustainable and precautionary approach to risk 
management and planning for the long-term (Bardsley & Niven, 2013; Esteves & 
 45 
Thomas, 2014; Fletcher et al., 2013; Neal et al., 2005; Rupp-Armstrong, 2007). 
There is also unmanaged retreat, which can be self-governed in response to risk, 
regulation, and insurance retreat (where insurance becomes less attainable or 
unavailable) and drives behaviour and market adjustments, but it also captures 
human migration at broader scales and alternative land tenure arrangements, 
distinct from private property rights. Migration occurs on a continuum of 
voluntary to forced movement in response to environmental change. 
‘Displacement’ is reactive, forced movement which may be temporary or 
permanent (Weerasinghe et al., 2014).  
Reflecting upon the literature, much discussion relates to managed retreat 
from coastal inundation and erosion (Abel et al., 2011; Alexander et al., 2012; 
Bardsley & Niven, 2013; Cooper, 2003; Dyckman, St. John, & London, 2014; Gibbs, 
2016; Harker, 2016; Harman, Heyenga, Taylor, & Fletcher, 2015; Klarin & 
Hershman, 1990; Kousky, 2014; Linham & Nicholls, 2010; Neal et al., 2005; 
Reisinger, Lawrence, Hart, & Chapman, 2015; Rupp-Armstrong, 2007; Ryan et al., 
2012; Titus, 1986; Young, 2018). However, it can be applied to a range of hazards 
and risk contexts, incorporating an array of techniques, which may differ 
according to distinct locales and riskscapes. Managed retreat (and unmanaged 
retreat) may be anticipatory or reactive. Anticipatory retreat is the relocation of 
communities and assets prior to the impacts of a major hazard event, or just 
before significant environmental change as a result of incremental impacts. For 
example, Gibbs (2016) highlights rolling easements as a flexible, anticipatory way 
of managing anticipatory retreat, by requiring that in coastal areas, public access 
is maintained along the dry beach, even if it migrates inland, that property 
owners avoid hazard protection or elevation of the grade of their land, and that 
once a certain trigger is reached the land use is required to change, or buildings 
are to be relocated. Reactive retreat occurs following a disaster or extreme event 
and can be implemented via regulation to prevent rebuilding within the 
impacted area, land acquisition of affected properties, and resettlement. Despite 
the benefits of managed retreat, its social and economic costs are often significant 
barriers to implementation, particularly when dealing with existing 
development. Managed retreat of private property can be plagued with 
challenges, which may vary according to resourcing, levels of risk and citizen 
engagement, cultural ties, political will, local leadership, agency, and 
institutional frameworks (Sipe & Vella, 2014). The following section pulls 
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together insights from the international literature to summarise broad enablers 
and barriers of managed retreat, and lessons from practice. 
2.7 Managed retreat in practice: Governance elements, orders, 
and lessons 
The literature review uncovered over 30 international managed retreat 
interventions (see Appendix 2), including elements of incentivised retreat, formal 
policy and regulation attempts, and strategic planning processes, exhibiting 
managed retreat instruments across the governance spectrum. The examples 
examined next (Section 2.7.1) were selected based on availability of in-depth 
information, relevance to the scalar focus of this thesis, prominent challenges 
and opportunities, contemporary nature, and local examples for their relevance 
to the New Zealand institutional context, helping to provide a foundation for 
Chapter 4. These examples, and the associated scholarship, are designed to 
reveal broad challenges and opportunities for the implementation of managed 
retreat, and, by applying the governance framework, to help reveal the 
instruments, institutional arrangements, and guiding principles applied in 
practice. The enablers and barriers within these examples correlate with many 
of the third-order governance principles outlined in Figure 2 (and Table 1), 
reinforcing their relevance to the effective governance of managed retreat. As 
will be demonstrated, while it is gaining some traction internationally, managed 
retreat remains shackled by a range of socio-political-cultural, environmental, 
economic, and institutional barriers. 
2.7.1 International interventions  
The following examples represent interventions taken in the USA, England, 
and Australia, where incentives are applied to encourage managed retreat, or 
property is compulsorily acquired and land use is regulated by government. 
Property purchase can be voluntary or compulsory, in anticipation of, or in 
reaction to hazard events, but it is typically reactive (for example in the USA and 
Australia). Buyout programmes are well established in the USA, and in England 
for managed realignment, however, incentivised retreat is generally applied in 
an ad hoc manner in Australia (and New Zealand).  
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United States of America: Buyouts 
Managed retreat governance instruments in the USA are predominantly 
rebuilding regulations and negotiated buyouts, often enacted immediately 
following a major natural hazard event, where authorities introduce laws that 
prevent high-risk areas being resettled, or apply buyout programs. Buyout 
programmes in the USA are generally funded by the federal or state government, 
but are managed at state or county levels, enabling residents who no longer wish 
to live in high-risk zones to sell their properties and move to safer locations 
(Freudenburg, Calvin, Tolkoff, & Brawley, 2016). The federal government 
guidelines for the buyouts recommend governance actors (state agencies, tribal 
agencies, federally recognised tribes and local governments who are the eligible 
sub-applicants) designate priority acquisition areas to target residents for the 
programmes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages a 
voluntary buyout programme where home-owners can opt to sell their homes to 
government if they have been damaged by inundation events and are expected 
to be repeatedly exposed such events (Gibbs, 2016). This demonstrates the 
sharing of power between the governing authorities and individuals under the 
incentivised, voluntary approach. While the buyouts can be an effective 
instrument, they are often hindered by funding constraints, and may limit 
responsive governance due to their reactive nature (Freudenburg et al., 2016). 
Managed retreat, in the form of planned relocation and resettlement has 
also commenced for some small communities in the USA, due to coastal erosion, 
river flooding, sea level rise threats and melting permafrost. Relocation of 
communities has been planned in Shishmaref, Kivalina, Isle de Jean Charles and 
Newtok due to imminent risks in the environment (Davenport & Robertson, 2016; 
Lowlander Center, 2016; Mele & Victor, 2016). In the case of Isle de Jean Charles, 
a grant of $48m (USD) from the government has been provided to assist with 
relocation, however, it has not yet been decided where exactly the community 
will be moving to. 
The relocation of Shishmaref, a traditional Inupiaq Eskimo village, with 400 
years of settlement (Agyeman, Devine-Wright, & Prange, 2009) has been through 
a 40-year process to approve a resettlement plan. In Shishmaref, although 
relocation would result in significant disruption to the community, the majority 
of residents were not opposed to the plan, voting 89 to 78 to leave (Mele & Victor, 
2016). It has been noted by Agyeman et al. (2009) that due to strong political and 
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expert involvement with the Shishmaref community over a long period of time, 
and the impending threat of the rising tide, a democratic decision was able to be 
made. Agyeman et al., (2009) and Burley et al., (2007) argue that local knowledge 
of place is an essential component for successful managed retreat strategies. 
Where public acceptance is concerned, managed retreat interventions have a 
higher likelihood of being accepted when they are interpreted by those involved 
in and affected by it as a process that is fair, transparent, and inclusive, and that 
the strategy results in positive and fair outcomes for those involved (Agyeman et 
al., 2009). This case highlights the relevance of equitable governance outcomes 
for public acceptance of managed retreat. 
Furthermore, Burley, Jenkins, Laska, and Davis (2007) consider that places 
and spaces are socially constructed manifestations of ‘the self’ and that change in 
these arenas (whether organic or enforced) will catalyse forms of psychological 
reactions. Place attachment is the emotional bond between individuals or groups 
and their environment, including both dependence and identity elements 
(Dandy, Horwitz, Campbell, Drake, & Leviston, 2019; Masterson et al., 2017). Place 
attachment influences the meanings of place and the imagery it conveys, 
producing a ‘sense of place’ (Dandy et al., 2019).  Burley et al., (2007) note that 
many managed retreat interventions have failed to recognise how communities 
relate to their spaces and places, and how this understanding can result in less 
conflict between local officials, experts and communities, allowing for more 
successful outcomes. Attachment to place may be both a hindrance and an 
enabler, as communities are more likely to be involved in a managed retreat 
process if there is attachment to place and an understanding that this place is 
under threat (Ibid). However, what is necessary for managed retreat to occur is 
‘place-detachment’ where the community individually and collectively 
understand and negotiate the future consequences of remaining in the affected 
place, and slowly loosen ties to the present attachment and form new 
attachments in safer locations (Agyeman et al., 2009). This process of place 
detachment is considered significant for managed retreat, where people work 
towards stability through change in both loosening and creating ties to place and 
space. Place attachment is a social barrier to implementing managed retreat, and 
as highlighted by Agyeman et al. (2009), more research is needed to further 
understand the process of detachment to place and space and the ways in which 
policy interventions can effectively nurture detachment without provoking 
resistance to change.  
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Revealing governance constraints based on research in Alaska, Bronen (2015) 
highlights the importance of institutional instruments to facilitate managed 
retreat in response to climate change, and to determine where, when, and how 
relocation must occur. While ties to place have been loosened in Shishmaref, 
relocation steps are unclear, and the lack of an overarching institutional 
relocation framework and funding for climate change adaptation present 
significant barriers to operationalising managed retreat (Bronen & Chapin, 2013). 
These barriers are a result of limits to third-order attributes and ultimately, 
effective governance. In particular regarding direction, capacity, and 
coordination.  
England: Managed realignment property acquisition 
In England, the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) manages the development of flood and coastal erosion risk policy, and 
the Environment Agency develops planning instruments, such as Shoreline 
Management Plans (SMPs) to implement DEFRA’s policies (Esteves, 2014). The 
policy “Making Space for Water” was introduced by DEFRA in 2005 to reduce 
erosion and flooding risks, identifying managed realignment as the preferred 
strategy for rural areas (Ibid). The majority of managed realignment schemes in 
England has been undertaken for coastal flooding and erosion management, 
with a strong focus on creating a positive environmental outcome (Rupp-
Armstrong, 2007). In England, managed realignment schemes have been 
undertaken at a range of sites, involving the alteration of existing defence lines 
or the widening of flood plains with additional aims of recreating natural 
habitats to act as a natural form of defence. The key objective of these strategies 
is to create more sustainable estuarine, riverine or coastal forms that are better 
equipped to cope with natural riverine processes, surge tides, and heavy rainfall 
events (Tinch & Ledoux, 2006). In turn, this approach makes space for nature, 
resulting in significant conservation benefits. Examples of managed realignment 
in England can be found at Medmerry, Wallasea, the Blackwater Estuary, 
Orphlands and Thorngumbald (later renamed Paull Holme Strays) (McAlinden, 
2015; DEFRA, 2002; Esteves, 2013; Rupp-Armstrong, 2007; ABP, 2004). Each of 
these cases was susceptible to flooding and coastal storms and has subsequently 
become a managed realignment project initiated and funded by the 
Environment Agency. In the majority of these cases, agricultural land was 
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purchased or leased to allow for the realignment of defences and the creation of 
a natural barrier to flooding and erosion.  
Medmerry has been classed as Europe’s largest realignment scheme, costing 
£28 million for the realignment of seven kilometres of land with new defences, 
producing 183ha of new intertidal habitat area and a nature reserve (McAlinden, 
2015). While the upfront cost of this scheme appears to be high, the maintenance 
costs of continuing the previous protection measures as well as the damage 
caused by storm events are much greater. Furthermore, the Environment 
Agency argues that the scheme provides 1000 times improved flood protection 
as well as wider ecological benefits. At first, residents doubted the scheme would 
work and were worried it would damage the local economy, but a stakeholder 
group was developed to improve public acceptance and foster local decision-
making, including people in the setting of project objectives, and design of key 
access routes and facilities of the nature reserve (Ibid). To ensure fair and 
extensive community involvement, representation included local authorities, 
parishes, businesses, landowners, recreational interests, and community and 
environmental groups, contributing to the success of the project (Blunkell, 2017; 
McAlinden, 2015).The enablers of this strategy can be attributed to the presence 
of third-order governance principles including: the strong institutional (land 
acquisition instruments) and resourcing capacity of the Environment Agency, 
effective leadership, coordination, inclusive community engagement with local 
stakeholders, and local involvement in the planning and decision-making 
process. Furthermore, significant local economic benefit (approximately £90m 
of direct economic benefit) and green tourism has boosted the project’s success, 
generating income and jobs (McAlinden, 2015). 
Grantham, Australia: Land swap 
Incentivised managed retreat in Australia is less common, but there is a 
locally driven intervention commonly referenced in the adaptation literature. 
Following disastrous floods in January 2011, the town of Grantham in 
Queensland suffered 12 deaths and significant public and private asset damage 
costs. Up to 87% of the total housing stock was damaged, ten homes were 
completely destroyed and 19 beyond repair (Sipe & Vella, 2014). Due to repeated 
floods and loss of life, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council decided to relocate 
the flood affected areas of the town. To implement this the Council purchased a 
377ha site to enable private landowners to take part in a land swap. Standard 
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planning regulations were temporarily discounted to enable a fast process. 
Grantham was declared a Reconstruction Area under the Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority Act 2011, enabling a master plan for the rebuild to be 
transferred into a Proposed Development Scheme to allow a fast-tracking of the 
process (Reddish, 2015). The community was heavily engaged throughout the 
process and was included in decisions on the master plan. Participation in the 
land swap was voluntary, demonstrating power sharing between actors to 
incentivise retreat, with eligible residents being given the opportunity to indicate 
their top preferences for the land swap (similar to their existing land) and final 
land allocations being carried out by ballot. The first relocation took place 11 
months following the flood event in January. General planning costs were 
waived and residents could apply for grants ($35,000 AUD) from the state 
government to supplement the costs associated with resettlement (Okada, 
Haynes, Bird, van den Honert, & King, 2014).  
As discussed by Okada et al. (2014) and Sipe and Vella (2014), the success of 
this community relocation was largely due to the community focus, strong local 
leadership, flexible and adaptive governance, and the readily available land 
nearby. It is considered that the very recent flood event contributed to the success 
of the project as social memory of the devastation would have undoubtedly been 
strong. In this case, the networked governance framework removed the 
constraints of long-held formal rules, streamlining managed retreat via 
incentives and negotiation, supported by interactions reflective of third-order 
principles, demonstrating attributes of effective, equitable, responsive and 
robust governance. 
Byron Bay and Fleurieu Peninsula, Australia: Policy and regulation attempts 
Australia’s national assessment of coastal climate change risks promotes 
managed retreat (Australian Government, 2009), however limited 
implementation guidance is provided, and little action has been successfully 
undertaken to date. The first council in Australia to implement a policy of 
planned retreat was the Byron Shire Council in 1988 (Bardsley & Niven, 2013). 
This policy was in response to a report revealing the high erosion rate of the coast 
following a series of storms in the mid 1970s. Following community consultation, 
a relocation policy was accepted, and the local environment and development 
plans were updated to reflect new rules. These rules required that any buildings 
of a relocatable nature must be relocated when the erosion escarpment 
encroached within 20m of the structure, and non-relocatable buildings must be 
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removed once the erosion escarpment encroached 50m of the structure (Bardsley 
& Niven, 2013). Property owners who purchased prior to 1988 were to be 
compensated with  public funds, but landowners who purchased after 1988 were 
to bear their own losses (Frohlich et al., 2019). However, the policy was not 
consistently applied and resulted in litigation issues and negative publicity due 
to equity concerns. The ‘legal storm’ that subsequently emerged in Byron Bay 
highlights the limited capacity to manage existing use rights which in this case, 
produced legal legacies, entrenching hard protection path dependencies (Ibid). 
Among monitoring and enforcement inconsistencies, ignoring the ‘elephant in 
the room’ represented by legacy land uses to avoid costly compensation for 
regulatory takings or land acquisition, meant that some property owners were 
subject to a ‘just-in-time’ retreat policy and others to reactive retreat (Ibid).  
Significantly, the presence of power, in the form of access to substantial legal 
support, (combined with the lack of local government capacity to manage 
existing use rights), enabled wealthy individuals to successfully challenge 
managed retreat decisions, eventually resulting in the council abandoning its 
retreat policy.  
Another example in the South Coast of the Fleurieu Peninsula, South 
Australia reflects a similar result to the Byron Bay example. Coastal risks are 
increasing in this area, presenting an increase in conflicts between stakeholders 
regarding the management options to implement. Seawalls, groynes and 
breakwaters have continuously been erected along the beaches to address 
erosion and rising sea levels, signifying a preference by governments and 
communities for hard or soft protection structures rather than adaptive 
approaches (Bardsley & Niven, 2013). In a study carried out by Bardsley and 
Niven (2013), the hard protection approach was supported in all interviews with 
the Alexandrina District Council, City of Victor Harbour Council, the Fleurieu 
Natural Resource Management Group and with a senior planner from the 
Coastal Protection Branch of Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR). It was further stated by a DENR representative that “people 
won’t give up their patch without a hell of a fight or demand compensation” (as 
cited in Bardsley & Niven, 2013, p. 204).  
Alexander et al. (2012) and Bardsley and Niven (2013) identified that although 
managed retreat may be the only feasible or the most appropriate option for risk 
management, it is highly likely to result in significant costs for the community, 
such as increased market uncertainty and loss of property values with the 
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majority of these costs falling on individual property owners. These costs are 
likely to result in political contention and a degree of unwillingness, creating 
difficulties relating to private investment, equity, and political acceptance 
(Bardsley & Niven, 2013). As further noted by Bardsley and Niven (2013), the wider 
implications of managed retreat must be considered prior to developing a 
scheme. These can range from impacts on community networks, psychological 
wellbeing, and livelihoods. Successful managed retreat strategies protect people 
and assets from harm, but they must be socially, politically, and economically 
acceptable to be effective. Due to the complexity of implementing managed 
retreat in Byron Bay and the South Coast of the Fleurieu Peninsula, protective 
structures remain a favoured risk management option. This is affirmed by the 
recently commissioned Coastal Hazard Management Study—Byron Bay 
Embayment which determines the coastal management options for Byron Bay, 
and the case study analysis by Frohlich et al., (2019). Although retreat was one of 
the six options explored, it was not recommended due to “high economic cost, 
low economic viability, social disruption and unresolved funding, equity and 
logistical issues” (Carley, Coghlan, Drummond, Dean-Jones, & Anning, 2016, p. 
vii). Instead, improvement of the status quo was recommended for Main Beach, 
an ‘adaptive option’ of seawalls, groynes and sand nourishment for Belongil, and 
minor retreat of the Captain Cook carpark (by 2050) was recommended for Byron 
Shire. These examples highlight the importance of consistency and equitable 
governance for managed retreat instruments of policy and regulation, but also 
that managed retreat will not be applicable in every circumstance, particularly at 
the coast, where levels of investment reach certain thresholds (Abel et al., 2011). 
At these higher investment thresholds, access to legal resources may present a 
significant challenge. 
2.7.2 New Zealand interventions  
Kāpiti: Hazard notification and retreat policy failure 
Managed retreat may be viewed as a re-structure of development and land 
use patterns to remedy unsustainable settlement decisions. Hence planning 
policy and regulation is one of the strongest mechanisms available to achieve this 
change. A notorious New Zealand policy attempt at coastal managed retreat 
occurred in Kāpiti Coast District. Between 2006 and 2014 Kāpiti Coast District 
Council (KCDC) engaged Coastal Systems Ltd (CSL) to undertake coastal erosion 
risk assessments to inform the revision of its District Plan. CSL’s erosion 
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assessment report was released in August 2012 and KCDC (as legally required) 
sent letters to owners of the 1800 affected properties, (those within 50 and 100 
year erosion prediction zones) informing them that the new zones would be 
notified on Land Information Memorandum (LIM) reports forthwith (Coastal 
Systems Ltd, 2018). KCDC publicly notified its Proposed District Plan (PDP) 
which included development restrictions for properties within erosion zones. 
Under Policy 4.8, the risk management approach included managed retreat of 
buildings and activities from areas where hard protection structures fail or are 
no longer able to be sustainably managed. Three Coastal Hazard Management 
Areas (CHMA) set restrictions for the coast: No-build urban CHMA, Relocatable 
build urban CHMA, and No-build rural CHMA, to prohibit further subdivision of 
land, but permit new development, provided it be relocatable. The PDP 
discouraged hard protection structures and required development strategies to 
reduce reliance on such structures over time, ensuring costs and benefits of 
maintaining such works were affordable when considering climate change and 
sea-level rise (Policy 4.9). For existing development within the no build urban 
area, KCDC intended to work with the community to enable a form of managed 
retreat for existing uses, or ‘adaptation strategy’ as they termed it. 
There was immediate public outcry following the public letters and PDP 
release, resulting in the formation of the high-profile group, Coast Ratepayers 
United (CRU) which set out to block implementation by relentless challenge of 
the CSL assessments (Ibid). Due to significant criticism, KCDC commissioned an 
Independent Review which resulted in a decision to withdraw all new plan 
provisions for Coastal Management Hazard Areas (among others). The 
Independent Review highlighted a range of issues and two key problems became 
apparent in the context of the managed retreat provisions. Firstly, there 
appeared to have been ‘reduced opportunities’ for community input in the plan 
drafting process, particularly since a draft plan was not circulated prior to 
notification (Allan & Fowler, 2014). Although there is no statutory requirement 
to circulate a draft plan (Schedule 1, RMA), it is considered best practice, and may 
have led to an improved PDP. Secondly, there were concerns regarding the 
communication of the policy evidence base. The reviewers found that the 
discussion document on natural hazards and managed retreat (released prior to 
the PDP) did not promote a range of mitigation options, focusing mainly on 
managed retreat (Allan & Fowler, 2014). This meant that the full suite of 
mitigation options was not presented to the community from the beginning, 
 55 
resulting in what many considered a lack of fair, transparent and participatory 
community engagement (limiting equitable governance). Although, according to 
Allan and Fowler (2014, p. 49) little comment was actually received on the initial 
discussion document and the responses were mainly supportive—it was not until 
the PDP provisions became a reality that members of the community raised 
alarm.  
Baer (1997), Ericksen et al. (2001), Berke et al. (2006), and Godschalk and 
Berke (2009) argue that a strong factual basis is a key element in plan quality. The 
Independent Review found that the recommended hazard lines were not 
“sufficiently robust for incorporation into the PDP” (Allan & Fowler, 2014, p. 50). 
The coastal hazard assessment reviewers considered that “differences in the 
immediacy of the hazards could be reflected in the management approaches 
adopted to minimise human impacts; for example, in the degrees of restrictions 
placed on residents” (Carley, Komar, Kench, & Davies, 2014, p. 54). This is an 
important distinction for coastal hazard risk management where long-term 
impacts progress slowly and may not require the same immediate policy 
approach as short-term impacts. Carley and others (2014) recommended that a 
range of management options be developed and considered with the community 
prior to introducing hazard lines and regulation into the District Plan. While the 
adaptive approach of the plan was endorsed by Allan and Fowler, they raised the 
need to fully evaluate the quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of the 
provisions before including them in the PDP (Section 32 RMA). It was noted that 
when using an adaptive approach to coastal hazard risks, consideration of the 
potential effects of a more comprehensive range of impacts including coastal 
inundation, changes in floodable areas and ground water changes due to sea 
level rise should also be considered. The unsatisfactory evidence base, narrow 
hazard focus and lack of early, effective community engagement let the Kāpiti 
Coast provisions down, and ultimately limited opportunities for ‘good’ retreat 
governance and outcomes. 
To fulfil its responsibilities, KCDC will have to amend the PDP once it 
becomes operative (and is currently working on this) to incorporate new coastal 
hazard provisions though a plan variation process the literature suggests should 
be effective, responsive, robust, and equitable. However, this will likely be a 
social and political challenge given the reduced legitimacy and organisational 
trust caused by the limits to good governance in this first attempt at managed 
retreat. Inequitable processes and outcomes are a significant barrier to 
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implementation of managed retreat, which can also undermine its legitimacy 
and impact its effectiveness. These cause-effect relationships of limited ‘good’ 
governance orders help reveal further barriers to operationalising managed 
retreat. 
Urenui: Managed retreat failure 
In an entirely different circumstance, coastal erosion threatened a popular 
section of a golf course in Urenui, Taranaki. The District Council employed a 
consultant to work with the community to determine the best outcome to 
manage the area (Blackett, Dahm, & Hume, 2007). Managed retreat was deemed 
the best option, however, a lobby group opposed it, using political power to apply 
for resource consent to build a seawall, illustrating representation concerns for 
equitable governance and power. Eventually the lobby group succeeded, and the 
$800,000 seawall was constructed (Blackett et al., 2007). Similar situations have 
occurred in other locations in New Zealand, such as at Waihi Beach, Wainui 
Beach (Gisborne District Council) and Mōkau Spit (Waitomo District Council) 
where protective works have been chosen over long-term solutions (Turbott & 
Stewart, 2006). These cases demonstrate the strong appeal for protection works 
in New Zealand (Blackett et al., 2007) and the influence of power and vested 
interests to maintain the status quo. However, recent council projects (Greater 
Wellington Regional Council, 2019a) are demonstrating greater consideration of 
alternatives (see, Section 2.7.2 and Chapters 5-6).  
Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy 2120, Hawke’s Bay: DAPP 
Managed retreat necessitates a strategic planning process which is likely to 
encompass a range of enabling mechanisms. The four ensuing examples detail 
comprehensive, strategic interventions, including use of DAPP, adaptive 
management, and integrated growth and natural hazard planning.  
For the most developed area of the Hawke’s Bay coastline, a collaborative 
strategy has been established by Hastings District Council, Hawke's Bay Regional 
Council, Napier City Council, mana whenua and tangata whenua 
representatives, with independent researchers from the Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges National Science Challenge, ‘Living at the Edge’ research 
programme acting as critical friends of the process. The Clifton to Tangoio Coastal 
Hazards Strategy 2120 is a first in New Zealand, comprehensively assessing the 
risks associated with coastal hazards over a 100-year period, to understand and 
identify them, determine key management methods for the long-term and 
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Unit Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
- Clifton Sea wall Managed retreat
- Haumoana Renourishment + Managed retreat
control structures
- Clive Status quo Renourishment + Managed retreat/
control structures retreat the line
implement selected short-term options in a coordinated and planned manner. 
Applying the DAPP approach with guidance from ‘The Edge’ researchers, this 
strategy seeks to encompass the tremendous complexity of natural hazard and 
climate change adaptation, infrastructure provision, growth and resource 
management, and community desires, aligned with the recently released 
national guidance on coastal hazards and climate change (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017a). The Strategy is supported by key decision-making tools, 
Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) to assess multiple objectives and alternatives 
within a DAPP framework, applying Real Options Analysis (ROA) to address 
future coastal hazard risk uncertainties (Lawrence, Bell, & Stroombergen, 2019).  
Significant resourcing has been required for the project, which is split into 
four stages: stage one the establishment of a risk framework via hazard 
evaluation, risk assessments and consultation with key stakeholders; stage two, 
the formation of the decision-making framework including two assessment 
panels to represent the interests of tangata whenua, communities, and agencies 
exposed to coastal hazard risks and; stage three entailing 11 workshop 
programmes to present risks, confirm priority units, present social impact and 
cultural values assessments, identify potential responses, receive community 
and cultural values feedback, determine MCA criteria, refine pathways, and 
evaluate, confirm and test these with communities (Bendall, 2017). The 
community based assessment panels produced a series of recommendations for 
the Joint Committee and decisions have been endorsed by each council to 
commence stage 4, to develop and test the planned actions for the priority units 
(Corbett & Bendall, 2019). The key actions were categorised as pathways for the 
short, medium, and long-term with three out of nine unit areas working towards 






Following agreement of the actions, stage 4 has been initiated, including 
implementation planning and policy framework review (Bendall, 2017). While 
this process has greatly progressed long-term, strategic risk management by 
providing a framework for collaboratively assessing coastal hazard risks and 
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management options over the long-term, it is not yet clear how managed retreat 
will be realised (e.g. the decision trigger values, intervening/incentivising 
mechanisms, and funding support). This potentially limits the applicability of 
the strategy, as the implementation challenge remains nationwide. Issues 
connected to this will be examined further in the thesis. 
Summarising key lessons of this case, Lawrence et al., (2019) outline the 
complexities of planning over the long-term and aligning a hybrid of decision-
making tools. Important lessons include the impact of simplification in the DAPP 
process, which reduces policy flexibility and responsiveness by applying a single 
sequence of actions, rather than many possible options and pathways to 
dynamically adapt to environmental fluctuation (Ibid). The early inclusion of 
consentability assessments (and affordability) of DAPP actions and pathways is 
necessary to deliver legitimate options that will secure the necessary resource 
consents, statutory plan changes, and coastal permits to warrant implementation 
of the strategy (Ibid). Finally, as recognised in Section 2.3.1, the modes of network 
governance similar to these requires monitoring systems and ongoing political 
leadership to deliver a robust approach that spans the life of the strategy.  
Key enablers of the process included the clear decision framework, 
transparent process, an overarching governance group (the Joint Committee), 
the support of the ‘Living at the Edge’ research programme increasing the 
knowledge diversity, capability, and credibility of the strategy, regular evaluation 
of the governance process, and a collaborative approach with strong community 
engagement (Lawrence, 2019). Some of the lessons learnt highlight procedural 
gaps and limitations for robust, networked, anticipatory managed retreat 
governance, but testing and evaluating new ways of making decisions requires 
innovation, learning, and adaptation—vital principles to deliver responsive 
third-order governance. Under the mode of network governance, this example 
demonstrates the long-term enablement of managed retreat, applied using 
instruments of DAPP and associated decision-making tools, supported by third-
order governance attributes of strong resourcing, technical, and organisational 
capacity, undertaken in a collaborative, strategic manner. All of which, produce 
valuable lessons for future application. 
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Riverlink, Upper Hutt: DAPP and urban revitalisation  
A significant urban renewal and flood risk management project in Hutt City 
is underway to deliver a more resilient, accessible and liveable city. Due to high 
flood risks of the Hutt River, Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC), Hutt 
City Council and NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) collaborated to integrate urban 
renewal and transport enhancement with flood risk management. The New 
Zealand Climate Change Research Institute, Victoria University of Wellington 
(NZCCRI), assisted with incorporating new knowledge of climate change effects 
and tools, including DAPP (Lawrence, Haasnoot, et al., 2019). 
A knowledge broker from NZCCRI undertook workshops with council staff 
and politicians to frame the problem and help them understand the changing 
risk (Lawrence & Haasnoot, 2017). Further awareness was raised by introducing 
the ‘Sustainable Delta game’ to provide staff with a simulated experience of 
making decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Lawrence & Haasnoot, 2017; 
Lawrence, Haasnoot, et al., 2019). This work catalysed demand for an associated 
‘pathways generator’ to develop alternative pathways and stress test these 
against divergent future scenarios, applying IPCC projections (Lawrence, 
Haasnoot, et al., 2019). The pathway generator created six feasible flood risk 
management pathways for the project team to analyse using ROA and MCA, to 
help analyse pathway(s) selection (Ibid). Alongside this work, concept design 
was undertaken to integrate the city centre flood protection options with 
opportunities for urban revitalisation, roading, transport, environmental, visual 
and recreational improvements (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2015b). 
Following analysis of adaptation pathway alternatives, the councils 
consulted the community on two options (and other aspects of the project) before 
making a decision on a preferred flood management pathway: 
Following consultation, a public survey deemed Option B as the preference. 
The councils agreed to this option in their final decision, which was subsequently 
(Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2015a) 
 
 
Option A - One step: 
Provide 1:440 year return period flood protection that includes allowance for climate 
change, by enlarging and realigning stopbanks, requiring purchase of properties on 
Pharazyn and Marsden streets 
or 
Option B – Two Steps, Staged approach:  
i) Initially building flood protection within existing corridor to a slightly lower standard, 
requiring no property purchases but,  
ii) In ~20 years, move to the higher Option A flood protection standards for completion in 
around 30 years to allow for increased river flows caused by climate change 
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communicated to the affected properties directly, via the local media and the 
Council’s formal decision record (Lawrence, Haasnoot, et al., 2019). Lawrence et 
al., (2019) note that the Councils’ decision to commit to land purchase under 
Option A provided certainty for affected property owners. Property owners 
preferred the near-term certainty of Option A rather than waiting ten years for 
the land purchase to take place. Certainty was a stronger motivator than cost for 
both directly affected property owners and the wider community (Ibid). 
Riverlink is not only adaptive and innovative, but strategic, integrating a 
range of opportunities and organisational functions to form a significant project 
with wide ranging benefits. Project team members discussed the success of the 
property negotiations process to date, which were all based on a ‘willing-seller, 
willing-buyer’ approach, with early engagement of those directly affected (Baily, 
Campbell, & Lawrence, 2019). In this case, the intervention taken is more 
appropriately deemed managed realignment, and the presence of a stopbank (as 
a public work) allowed for compulsory property acquisition under the Public 
Works Act 1981 (PWA). In the community consultation information sheet, 
Greater Wellington Regional Council (2015d) made it clear to property owners 
that: 
 
While this is an effective approach where council funding and legal powers 
are available, there are social implications, discussed in the following examples. 
Much like the previous case, important lessons from this project include the 
presence of a trusted ‘knowledge broker’ and facilitator for transfer of new 
knowledge and tools, and building Council staff capability under conditions of 
uncertainty (Lawrence & Haasnoot, 2017). Leadership of Council staff and 
politicians enabled uptake of the adaptive approach, with political certainty 
being an important factor (Lawrence, Haasnoot, et al., 2019). The DAPP approach 
provided sufficient progress required to satisfy local short-term political cycles, 
for a project extending over longer timeframes. Certainty of decision-making 
was a preference for the community (even at a higher cost) with immediate action 
selected over staged action (Ibid). This highlights the need to consider how to 
What happens if I don’t want to sell? 
It is Council’s strong preference to acquire property by agreement 
through good faith negotiations with property owners. If Council is 
unable to acquire by agreement and the property is essential to the 
effective delivery of the project, ultimately Council would need to 
revert to is powers to acquire your property compulsorily under the 
PWA 1981. 
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deliver adaptive planning in a way that communities can trust that the planning 
approach and decisions made will persist amongst changing political settings, 
wildcards, governance arrangements, and economic conditions (Ibid).  
Funding availability for managed realignment and associated property 
purchase was vital for the success of the project, enabled by the collaborative 
nature of the project and integrated approach to deliver multiple outcomes and 
flood damage savings (estimated at $1billion for a single flood bank breach, not 
including social and cultural impacts (GWRC, 2015)). Riverlink was physically 
constrained by the Hutt River, but broader spatial strategies with a wider 
variety of risks, communities, and jurisdictions will express different 
opportunities and constraints. Overall, Riverlink demonstrates key attributes 
of third-order governance principles, including the benefits of boundary 
organisations to overcome barriers to governance effectiveness, learning and 
innovation to build institutional capacity, integrated connections between 
actors and project aims, and adaptive, flexible policy that can deal with 
uncertainty, providing choices, but also assurance of the immediate future to 
directly affected people and the wider community. 
Muriwai: Adaptive management 
An earlier example of an adaptive strategy is at Muriwai Beach in Auckland, 
involving a large proportion of publicly owned land. Since the 1960s, Muriwai 
Beach has experienced coastal erosion threatening public car parks, the local surf 
club and road infrastructure (Turbott & Stewart, 2006). In 2006, coastline erosion 
was occurring at a rate of 1-1.5 metres per year, which was initially managed with 
a seawall, however this was not effective (Tinker, 2013; Turbott & Stewart, 2006). 
Following robust engagement with the community, adaptive management was 
recommended by coastal scientist Jim Dahm, and an anticipatory managed 
retreat strategy was adopted. This was termed an adaptive management process, 
where the assets at risk were progressively relocated to accommodate the coastal 
processes.  
Mandated by the Reserves Act 1977, the Auckland Regional Parks 
Management Plan 2010 sets out the implementation of the adaptive management 
strategy. Map 8.1 of the Management Plan identifies the new surf club location, 
parking, and surf club beach access, and the assets to be relocated. It also includes 
clear policies that emphasise avoidance of risk rather than protection. Relevant 
policies include avoiding permanent facilities in hazard zones, removing existing 
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structures when practicable, treating coastal erosion as a natural process thus 
avoiding structural interference, retreating infrastructure at risk where coastal 
erosion occurs, revegetating and restricting access, progressively removing 
engineered stormwater systems, and reinstating natural waterways wherever 
practicable (Auckland Council, 2010). Further policies include ensuring the 
likely impacts of climate change are considered in long-term planning and 
decision-making, including managed retreat of infrastructure (Policy 8.1.2 c). 
These policies strongly reflect good managed retreat principles. The adaptive 
management strategy is considered to have resulted in a positive outcome, 
increasing trust between the community and the local authority, and avoiding 
damage from erosion (Blackett et al., 2007). In this case, the absence of residential 
property (and resultant absence of public-private tensions), robust community 
engagement efforts, effective planning mechanisms, and the socio-ecological 
benefits of preserving the natural character and amenity values of the coast were 
contributors to the success of the project. With positive social and environmental 
benefits and an absence of significant public-private tensions, this example 
demonstrates the strong capacity of de-centralised government in New Zealand 
to deliver managed retreat of public assets where people are effectively engaged.  
Tasman: Avoidance and staged retreat 
Another strategic planning approach that has been documented is the 
Tasman District Council coastal planning process. In the late 1990s, detailed 
planning for Mapua and Ruby Bay began due to coastal development pressures. 
A key objective involved directing future growth away from low-lying land, 
particularly the coastal inundation and erosion prone areas between Mapua and 
Ruby Bay. The Coastal Risk Area was revised to include coastal erosion, coastal 
and freshwater inundation, climate change, sea-level rise, and activities that 
could increase risk. Plan provisions were developed limiting subdivision, 
development and hard protection structures, and a Residential Closed Zone was 
established at Ruby Bay which prohibited further subdivision, infill, new 
habitable buildings, and extensions or replacement of existing buildings close to 
the shore. Following statutory plan processes, Tasman District Council was 
successful in seeking a declaration from the Environment Court to enable the 
subdivision and land use regulations to have immediate effect (s 86D RMA). The 
Court granted the immediate legal effect on the basis that the changes promote 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources, and avoid a ‘rush of 
applications’ to subdivide or develop land that may occur under the typical plan 
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change process (Tasman District Council [2011] NZEnvC 47) further cementing the 
status quo (Lawrence, 2015). Tasman District Council successfully implemented 
the planning controls with minimal contention, partially due to its effective 
governance arrangement (being a unitary authority) with strong coordination 
and connections, strategic direction for addressing climate risk, and experience 
of repeat climate events (Ibid).  
Canterbury: Red zone property acquisition 
In 2010 and 2011, the Canterbury region experienced devastating 
earthquakes. Damage was severe, and Parliament passed the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) to respond to the disaster. This Act 
required the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA) to plan and coordinate a Recovery Strategy (prevailing over existing use 
rights and planning mechanisms). The CER Act gave the Minister powers to 
compulsorily acquire land and to suspend, amend, cancel or revoke any council 
plans and policies (s 27(1)) and to suspend or cancel, in whole or in part, any 
resource consent or existing use rights protected or allowed under the RMA (s 
27(2) CER Act). This legislation was radical, with significant powers, which in 
some cases were applied. 
As part of home insurance cover in New Zealand, policy holders have cover 
for damage to land through the Earthquake Commission (EQC), but without 
Government intervention, it was expected that Canterbury property owners 
would face significant delays in resolving insurance claims. The Government 
was considering a range of policies to aid those living in areas where risk to 
human life was unacceptable, but was concerned that compulsory acquisition 
(enabled by the CER Act) could prejudice insurance between the loss from the 
earthquake or the government action, and if land were purchased at a value 
above present market value it could be seen as an ‘intervention’ by the Crown 
(Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2016). Therefore in June 2011, 
Cabinet determined a zoning approach in combination with voluntary purchase 
offers to insured residential red zoned properties (Ibid, p. 4), ultimately affecting 
8,060 properties and over 16,000 people in Christchurch (MacDonald & Carlton, 
2016). Key objectives of the policy response were as follows: 
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Following the zoning announcements, community meetings and workshops 
commenced, to explain the rationale and the process (Nielsen, 2016). Between 
June 2011 and July 2015, The Government delivered a series of offers to property 
owners based on the 2007/08 rateable value of their properties (higher than the 
post-earthquake market value, but approximately equivalent to pre-earthquake 
values) (Ibid, p.7). Some owners did not feel that the valuation was a true 
reflection of their property’s value, however Ministers’ views were that 
individual negotiations would not have met the Government’s objectives of a 
simple process with certainty to property owners, and that the process avoided 
lengthy insurance negotiations for property owners (Ibid).  
The Government spent $1.9 billion purchasing property from insured 
property owners, recovering some costs from the insurance payments on the 
purchased land and buildings. Lower offers were made for un/underinsured 
properties due to their lower value to the Government, on the principle of 
fairness to insured owners who had paid for insurance premiums, and to avoid 
moral hazard risk (Ibid, p.8). This was appealed by a group of property owners, 
and in March 2015 it reached the Supreme Court, where both the decision made 
to carry out the ‘voluntary’ property acquisition of the red zones, and the lower 
value offers to un/underinsured properties were deliberated. 
Initially, in Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery v Fowler Developments 
Ltd [2013] NZCA 588 at [127] the Court of Appeal had determined that the June 
2011 decisions to make offers to affected landowners by the Minister were an 
action authorised by ‘residual freedom’ as it did not consider that people’s legal 
rights were affected, and therefore did not require specific statutory 
authorisation. Residual freedom (often referred to as the third source of 
authority, non-statutory powers, or de facto powers) is the concept that the 
Executive is free to do anything that is not prohibited by law (statute or common 
law). It is named the third source to distinguish it from Executive powers granted 
Table 2: Red zone policy objectives (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2016) 
Agreed policy objectives 
Certainty of outcome for property owners as soon as practicable 
Create confidence for people to be able to move forward with their lives  
Creating confidence in decision-making processes (for home-owners, 
business owners, insurers and investors)  
Using the best available information to inform decision 
Having a simple process in order to provide clarity and support for 
landowners, residents, and businesses in [residential red zone] areas 
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by statute (the ‘first source’) and prerogative powers—powers unique to the 
Crown (the ‘second source’) [76]. Residual freedom does not allow government 
officials to act in conflict with the legal rights and liberties of citizens (for 
example, common law rights or the RMA) and it cannot be used for Executive 
action where the field of that action is covered by statute [79]. On that point, the 
Supreme Court in Quake Outcasts v Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
[2015] NZSC 27 at [138] was in disagreement with the previous judgement, and 
held that (at the least) the outline of the purchase decisions should have been a 
part of the Recovery Plan (CER Act) as an integral part of the red zoning being 
the encouragement of those living there to retreat. The Court further stated at 
[140] that while the Crown did not use its powers of compulsory acquisition 
under the CER Act, it is “unrealistic to describe the transactions that occurred as 
voluntary” as the red zone inhabitants had “no realistic alternative but to leave, 
given the damage to infrastructure and the clear message from the government 
that new infrastructure would not be installed and that existing infrastructure 
may not be maintained and that compulsory powers of acquisition could be 
used.”  
The Court made it clear that just because the mechanisms of the CER Act 
were not perfectly aligned with the desires of the Executive, that statutory 
procedures should not be bypassed, especially when Parliament can amend 
legislation that is not fit for purpose [131]. The Court went on to state that the role 
of the CER Act involves safeguards which hold importance due to many powers 
of the Act being ‘highly coercive’ and that: 
[137] This intention to facilitate and encourage voluntary 
withdrawal reinforces the link between the red zone decisions, the 
purchase offers and recovery from the earthquake and also reinforces 
the significant character of the decisions. It also highlights the need 
for such measures to have been the subject of a Recovery Plan. This 
would have required at least the minimum consultation provided for 
by s 20 of the Act. Indeed, given the significance of the decisions made 
for all of Christchurch and in particular for those in the red zones, it 
may be that further consultation, albeit expedited, would have been 
required. 
The Court did not consider that the CER Act and its safeguards (especially 
participation of affected communities [118]) should be circumvented by acting 
outside of the legislation. It held that decisions of that magnitude should have 
been made under the Act and through the Recovery Plan processes. Acting 
around the guiding legislation “undermined the safeguards, community 
participation and reviews mandated by the Act” [146]. The Human Rights 
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Commission (granted leave to intervene) argued that measures put in place by 
Parliament should not be “side-stepped by executive action under the guise of 
‘residual freedom’ or the ‘third-source’” [98]. 
The findings of the Supreme Court raise a range of considerations for 
managed retreat by incentivisation, or in this case, coercion. The conclusion of 
the Supreme Court that the voluntary offers were not in fact, realistically 
voluntary, is important to consider when presenting such policies. It is indeed 
arguable whether this form of retreat can be labelled ‘voluntary’ when affected 
persons are presented with what Judge Panckhurst in Fowler Developments Ltd v 
Chief Executive of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority [2013] NZHC 2173 
described at [93] as ‘Hobson’s choice.’ Questions around the use of ‘residual 
freedom’ recognise the requirement to implement significant recovery tasks such 
as managed retreat within the ambit of the relevant recovery legislation. Had 
managed retreat occurred under CER Act (or the RMA) public consultation 
would have been required. Clear concerns were voiced in the 2010/11 financial 
review of the CERA and the Earthquake Commission, citing insufficient 
consultation founded on unclear criteria which proved divisive of communities. 
The report further highlighted concerns due to the long-term effects of the 
decisions, and in contrast with “normal council processes, which would involve 
advertising and public submissions, information flows had been confusing and 
poorly managed” (Finance and Expenditure Committee (2012) as cited in Fowler 
Developments Ltd v Chief Executive of the CERA [2013] NZHC 2173 at [62-3]). The red 
zone decisions made outside of the relevant legislation can be described as 
undemocratic. 
Although the Supreme Court held that red zone measures should have been 
introduced under a Recovery Plan, it was not considered practical to make a 
declaration as to the unlawfulness of the decision with it already being 
implemented. The Supreme Court did declare, however, that the Crown offer of 
50 per cent of the rateable value to vacant, commercial and uninsured red zone 
properties was not lawful, as the well-being purposes of the CER Act had not 
been considered, along with consultation failures, and the very difficult living 
conditions of the red zones [197-9] highlighting key equitable governance 
concerns. Following this decision, the Crown offered revised purchases of red 
zone properties. 
Nielsen (2016) conducted a study on behalf of CERA to determine the extent 
to which the Crown’s policy objectives had been met, and to understand the 
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wellbeing outcomes of red zone property owners who accepted the voluntary 
buyout. This study surveyed a sample of 2,038 (42%) former red zone owners who 
accepted the offer. Of these participants, 79% believed the outcome provided 
certainty and 82% considered that having the offer was better than not having 
one (Ibid, p.10).  
However, confidence in the agencies involved was not high, with 38% having 
confidence and 33% not. With regard to the final objective, 68% found the offer 
process clear and 73% considered they were given sufficient time to make a 
decision (Ibid, p.11). Perceptions of the fairness of the value of the offer were 
measured, 43% believed the offer was fair or more than fair, yet 54% felt it was 
less than fair. Respondents were also asked what the overall financial impact of 
accepting the Crown offer had been, with polarised results indicating the overall 
impact as 41% negative and 38% positive (Ibid, p.83). The majority of those who 
indicated a negative response lost money due to discrepancy between actual 
property value and the pay-out, with new or bigger mortgages, and difficulty in 
purchasing in an overheated and shrinking property market. Additional costs 
incurred included legal fees, relocation costs, independent reports, 
accommodation, and additional building and purchase costs for new properties. 
Groups most affected, and more likely to describe negative experiences, were 
those living with a health condition or disability, lower household incomes, those 
who felt the overall financial impact had been detrimental, and those who were 
unhappy with their new property type and/or location (Ibid, p.17). While many 
expressed a positive view of the process, some respondents experienced high 
stress and difficulty.  
In 2016, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission (NZHRC) published a 
report assessing the red zone policy with a focus on the ~ 300 remaining residents 
who did not retreat. Key messages of the report were that human rights must be 
front and centre in disaster recovery, prevention and preparedness, that property 
rights in New Zealand are fragile, that community engagement is paramount, 
and the need to act swiftly must be carefully weighed against the need for 
community engagement in the design and implementation of solutions (Ibid, 
p.9).  
Key reasons for respondents remaining in the residential red zones were 
financial (affordability/costs of moving/uneconomical to take offer), attachment 
to property, attachment to location/community/lifestyle, perception of safety, 
perception of property remaining liveable, unresolved insurance claims, and 
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others such as lack of consultation. While in theory, insured owners were 
entitled to a new build on land purchased with the Government offer, this was 
not financially viable for all claimants due to the offer at the 2007/08 rateable 
value, in comparison to sections at the present market rates, and land not being 
available on a like-for-like basis. Comments from the surveys indicate that age 
and/or employment status factored into people’s decision to remain living in the 
residential red zones:  
Financially we could not accept theGovt. offer as our only income 
was the Superannuation and we would never be able to afford to 
move to a location similar to this area (MacDonald & Carlton, 2016, 
p. 70).  
Findings from the Human Rights Commission showed that place 
attachment was the most powerful reason for respondents staying, followed by 
financial reasons and a perception of safety (MacDonald & Carlton, 2016, p. 68) 
In terms of place attachment, the length of time they had been living in the home 
or neighbourhood was a factor in their decision to stay (Ibid, p. 70). As made clear 
in the report, dislocating people from their homes after a disaster appears to have 
had strong impacts on people’s wellbeing and ability to recover (Ibid, p. 73). This 
provides additional reasoning to act before disaster strikes (if knowledge of the 
risk is available), when stress, trauma, and recovery pressures are absent. The 
aftermath of the earthquakes had far greater implications for people’s stress 
levels than the events themselves, highlighting the need for post-disaster 
mechanisms that alleviate rather than exacerbate the stress of the disaster (Ibid, 
p. 136). There was widespread “disillusionment and dissatisfaction among those 
who participated in the survey with regard to participation, engagement, 
collaboration and decision-making” (Ibid, p.100). The discrepancy between 100% 
and 50% offers and the length of time between revisions caused considerable 
stress. MacDonald and Carlton (2016, p. 157) stated that the “most significant 
barrier to recovery faced by people affected by the red zoning has been the lack 
of certainty in their situations.” 
Key lessons include the need for flexibility to consider individual cases 
rather than a blanket policy (Ibid p.158), the importance of meaningful, equitable 
engagement and legitimate decision-making “…[r]ather than a dictatorial 
approach” (Ibid, p. 153), the social implications of reactive retreat, and greater 
acknowledgement that life risk is something individually assessed rather than 
imposed. Many of these social concerns relating to human rights, livelihoods, 
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place attachment, and a need for policy flexibility are expressed throughout the 
thesis, particularly in Chapters 6-7. The Canterbury Red Zones illustrate the 
limits of hierarchical managed retreat governance, where decisions are not 
conferred to the lowest level possible, and governance interactions result in 
inequitable outcomes as a result of coercion and ineffective engagement.  
Franz Josef: Property acquisition  
Smaller scale managed retreat via land acquisition occurred in Franz Josef, 
following a risk assessment for a motel, lodge, and campground adjoining the 
Waiho River, identifying a high likelihood of river flooding, and sudden floods 
produced by geological hazards, estimated to have a 2-4% annual likelihood, with 
limited warning and a high fatality likelihood for anyone present (Taig, Webb, & 
Massey, 2012, p. 20). The risks to life were considered intolerable by the Ministry 
of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) and in 2003, following 
consultation with the affected property owners, central government agreed to 
provide financial assistance to relocate the businesses, in combination with local 
authority support. The CDEM Minister stated that the government 
“contribution followed the 2002 ‘Milligan’ report, which found significant risk to 
life…Although flooding at Franz Josef remained the responsibility of the 
Westland District and West Coast Regional Councils, given the extent of the risk 
the Government would assist” (Hawkins, 2003, p. 1). A 2003 Cabinet paper set out 
the government rationale for its “financial intervention” including maintaining 
the image that New Zealand is a safe place to visit, the intolerable level of risk, 
the lack of resources and powers of the district and regional councils to 
adequately deal with the risk, previous government funded river control works 
that may have aggravated riverbed aggradation, and government interest in 
maintaining a viable community at Franz Josef (Office of the Minister of Civil 
Defence & Office of the Minister for the Environment, 2003). Central 
government contributed $862,000 towards relocating businesses, Westland 
District Council $234,000 for land purchase as well as a further $300,000-
$500,000 each from Westland DC and West Coast Regional Council (WCRC) in 
loan finance to assist with relocation costs, (the majority to be borne by 
landowners) (Ibid). The Glacier Gateway Motel was to receive $350,000 plus all 
available loan finance (up to $1m). The owners and leaseholder of the motor 
camp and lodge formed a consortium and were to receive $650,000 to assist 
relocation (Ibid). WDC agreed to assist relocation by meeting all building and 
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resource consent fees up to (but not including) Environment Court proceedings. 
MfE was to ensure restrictions were placed on the titles of the land to prohibit 
future residential or commercial accommodation. Property owners were 
required to reach agreement with existing leaseholders to enable transfer to the 
relocated businesses.  
Due to the significant residual cost for owners in re-establishing their 
businesses, the settlement process provided a year to leave the sites with WDC 
applying temporary risk mitigation measures. A 2015 report by WDC confirmed 
that negotiated settlements had been reached with all businesses except the 
motel, and the majority of buildings had been relocated or demolished 
(Westland District Council, 2015). Efforts to reach settlement with the motel had 
failed until ownership changed in 2012. The remaining funding ($300,000) from 
central government was used in combination with $100,000 from West Coast 
Regional Council’s Franz Josef Rating District and $300,000 from NZTA for river 
and road management purposes (West Coast Regional Council, 2015a). A 
Memorandum of Understanding was agreed to specify that the land on the south 
side be for road and river management purposes only (Ibid). Demolition costs 
were shared by WDC and WCRC. In this case, presence of third-order 
governance attributes: direction, information, cross-government coordination, 
organisational support, flexibility, and funding capacity enabled an effective, 
responsive and robust process which delivered equitable outcomes for affected 
parties. 
Project Twin Streams, Waitakere: Property acquisition 
At a similar point in time, Waitakere City Council (WCC) undertook a 
voluntary retreat strategy named Project Twin Streams (PTS) to address flood risk 
and stormwater management challenges caused by urbanisation in the Lower 
Oratia catchment and climate change impacts. The stormwater concerns had 
ascended in the 1990s, with Auckland Regional Council warning of a moratorium 
on development if they were not addressed (Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 
2011). In 2002, following comprehensive flood modelling, PTS commenced in line 
with WCC’s ‘Eco City’ mandate and Agenda 21 principles, favouring 
participatory processes and restoration of natural ecosystem processes over hard 
engineering works (Smith, Leitch, & Thomsen, 2016, p. 24). PTS was a 
comprehensive 10-year strategy involving the purchase and removal of houses in 
the flood plains and the restoration of 56 kilometres of riparian margins. (Atlas 
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Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 3). Key drivers included WCC’s Eco City 
Status and desire to ‘work with nature’ creating natural flow paths for 
stormwater and improving sedimentation and water quality issues (Atlas 
Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 4). Protection and accommodation 
interventions had previously been considered, however, these were discarded in 
favour of managed retreat. The project was successful in receiving a significant 
grant of $39 million from Infrastructure Auckland (now Auckland Council). 
Ninety-eight full property purchases and 83 part-purchases were identified as 
necessary for the project.  
WCC undertook a voluntary retreat approach, although it could have 
invoked compulsory acquisition under the PWA (Smith et al., 2016). While 
compulsory acquisition under the PWA was not applied, its key principles were 
used as a baseline guide in combination with a conciliatory and educative 
approach to buy properties in a way which “respects property owners’ rights, 
avoids coercion and is fair” (Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 6). PTS 
was designed to produce equitable outcomes, ensuring both the affected and 
wider communities understood the issues, allowing property owners to reach 
their own understanding of how managed retreat was the most practical option, 
considering health and safety, environmental and technical aspects of the flood 
risk (Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 6).   
In recognition of the challenges that come with managed retreat, WCC 
developed an engagement process and key consultation materials prior to 
commencing any communication with affected property owners. An external 
consultant, council and project staff developed the engagement plan, with 
weekly staff meetings during implementation to ensure a coordinated, consistent 
approach (Smith et al., 2016). Following this, affected owners were individually 
informed by technical experts and mediators to address any concerns. Flexibility 
(responsive governance) was a key principle applied: 
…there was no ‘one solution fits all’ approach. In some instances, 
owners had ideas as to how the flooding could be addressed...Each 
idea was treated with respect; in some instances they had potential 
and were investigated further. Each owner was given feedback on 
their suggested options, and reasons for accommodating or not 
pursuing them. (Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 9) 
Sale and purchase negotiations were undertaken on a case-by-case basis 
using a wide range of engagement approaches, including briefing all professional 
stakeholders, initial letters to affected people (to ensure notice across the board 
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at one point in time), media briefing and regular press updates to avoid 
inappropriate information leaks, appointments and phone calls with property 
owners, face-to-face visits with all owners and local drop in days. All owners were 
informed that after contact had been made Council, their LIMs would be 
updated, showing the flood zone, and that council was discussing purchase with 
the owners for stormwater management purposes. This is a particularly 
important measure to ensure that any parties to private sales would be aware of 
the retreat process underway to avoid having to deal with new owners. For 
community support, local Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) managers were trained 
to give accurate, independent advice and support to residents, sometimes 
accompanying elderly residents to visit real estate agents and lawyers. Vacant 
houses were made available to affected families as temporary accommodation, 
to make the transition easier.  
According to Atlas Communications & Media Ltd (2011) a large flood in the 
Henderson Valley occurred just before the property purchase launched. Due to 
this, the project received considerable support and initial uptake from residents 
in Henderson Valley, which helped set the scene for other areas (Ibid, p. 10). 
‘Family A’ (interviewed by Atlas) stated that they now enjoy the recreational 
benefits of the project, frequently using the walk and cycle way. “They readily 
admit they might not have been so ready to sell if it hadn’t been for that big flood. 
But having experienced a major flood first-hand, they had no reservations about 
selling.” (Ibid, p.16). Interview respondent ‘B’ on the other hand (a 70-year-old 
retired widow) had only experienced one minor flood in her family home of 30 
years and was very reluctant to sell her house, calling the original price offer 
“disgusting”—“where can you buy a house for $159,000?” (Atlas 
Communications & Media Ltd, 2011, p. 17). She changed lawyers and managed to 
negotiate a better deal but “it still wasn’t enough to buy a house. Houses were 
selling for $300,000 and there’s no way at my age I was going to take out another 
mortgage” (Ibid).When asked why she finally decided to leave, she stated: “I 
didn’t decide; I felt I had no other option” (Ibid). Similar to the Christchurch red 
zone residents, age appears to be a factor for some experiencing a strong 
attachment to home and reluctance to leave, for sentimental and financial 
reasons. Whilst being able to temporarily rent a vacant PTS house from WCC, 
she was unhappy with her living situation and the lack of security in the retreated 
neighbourhood. In some cases, WCC attempted to work with landowners to 
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foster detachment from their homes such as relocating buried placentas and 
special trees or placing a plaque to mark an ancestral family farm. 
Overall, 78 properties were removed or relocated, 78 part-properties were 
purchased, and 67 covenants were created to ensure access for riparian planting 
(Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 2011). PTS achieved many of its objectives 
including engagement with the community and the purchase of affected 
properties without recourse to compulsory acquisition under the PWA, avoiding 
lengthy legal negotiations. It is important to note, however, that the fundamental 
principles of the PWA were relied on, and it was made very clear to property 
owners that the Council could apply the PWA if voluntary purchase could not 
be negotiated (Atlas Communications & Media Ltd, 2011). While PTS 
demonstrates that voluntary retreat can occur if it is a well-designed and 
thorough process, it falls into the same territory of Canterbury as being 
notionally voluntary, as the recognition of compulsory acquisition powers can be 
seen as coercive (something the Council aspired to avoid in initial goal setting), 
particularly as experienced by persons such as Respondent ‘B’ who felt she had 
no choice but to sell. However, in this case, the flexibility of terms, strong 
engagement, significant support streams and case-by-case negotiations allowed 
for a more mutual, cooperative approach. Key enablers in this case include 
guiding principles to provide policy direction, the careful selection of capable 
project team members, sufficient time, training and financial resources to build 
capacity and capability, the importance of being aware of the diverse impacts 
upon affected persons, the efficacy of an approach grounded in building the 
knowledge of those people, quality engagement, and flexible decision-making to 
negotiate equitable and individualised outcomes (Smith et al., 2016, p. 25) In 
addition, engaging with those who influence or advise the target audience is 
important to implementation effectiveness. These enablers are illustrative of 
many of the third-order governance principles, demonstrating their value to 
managed retreat governance frameworks and application.  
2.7.3 Overview of managed retreat interventions 
The international and New Zealand examples reveal key enabling and 
disabling factors of managed retreat governance modes, elements, and orders 
illustrated in Figure 2. Third-order governance issues were particularly 
important to acknowledge, as they comprised the underlying values and 
principles which feed into the entire governance exercise (Table 3). It is clear that 
where managed retreat has been implemented, various attributes of effective, 
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equitable, responsive and robust governance principles are present. Moreover, 
where these principles are limited or absent, particularly attributes of equitable 
governance, implementation has faltered. For example, perceptions of unfair 
processes and outcomes in Kāpiti and Byron Bay. In these cases, overall 
robustness was limited by legitimacy concerns, triggered by inadequate capacity, 
participation, recognition, fairness or information. Consolidating their relevance 
to the evaluation of managed retreat governance, the principles are also 
pertinent to the broader barriers and enablers uncovered in the international 
and grey literature, discussed next. It is also recognised that substantial access to 
resources and in particular, legal support, can hinder managed retreat 
implementation, particularly where there is a presence of existing use rights for 
land use activities and associated protection works. 








2.8 Governance insights 
Looking across the literature reviewed allows a better appreciation of the 
range of barriers and enablers to implementing managed retreat. Governance 
elements and orders across the spectrum have been examined, including formal 
and informal interactions, and corresponding instruments of policy and 
regulation, strategy and incentives. Diverse institutional arrangements have 
been reviewed, with varying degrees of power sharing between governing 
authorities and individuals. With regard to third-order governance, which 
permeates throughout the governance framework, the literature review has 
revealed that managed retreat barriers and enablers are often representative of 
limits to, or realisation of, good governance principles.  
The research thus far demonstrates how managed retreat has a higher 
likelihood of being accepted when it is interpreted by those involved in and 
affected by it as an equitable process; being fair, transparent, and inclusive 
(Agyeman et al., 2009; Vandenbeld, 2013). In a similar vein, applying parties’ 
motivations for managed retreat within a conceptual model, Hino, Field, and 
Mach (2017) mapped international case studies on horizontal and vertical 
continuums according to residents’ willingness to move and the implementing 

























party’s motivation to support it. Their framework created four quadrants 
representing different managed retreat drivers: ‘mutual agreement’ with 
residents initiating retreat and governing authorities supporting it; ‘greater good’ 
where managed retreat is imposed on residents and broader society benefits; 
‘hunkered down’ where residents do not support retreat and broader societal 
benefits are minimal, and; ‘self-reliance’ where residents support managed 
retreat but have no implementation assistance. Much like the examples 
examined in this chapter, the quadrant highlights the importance of community 
empowerment and agency, political will, and organisational support, with 
institutional power sharing arrangements of ‘mutual agreement’ being more 
likely to succeed (for example Grantham, Australia).  
The examples and literature all highlight the importance of good 
governance principles. Documented failures reveal the pitfalls of flawed science 
and science communication, ‘late’ or ineffective community engagement, and 
inconsistent strategies, resulting in public contention and litigation. Key lessons 
include the need for community involvement in the design of solutions, respect 
and knowledge of local place and space, flexibility in implementation, and 
effective, robust institutions to support interventions. Local leadership, 
transparency and credibility are essential, and bridging organisations can foster 
learning, innovation and adaptation, particularly under conditions of 
uncertainty and limited organisational capability. Where ‘good’ governance 
principles of effective, equitable, responsive and robust managed retreat are 
limited, implementation may reflect the same fate. 
It is clear that existing use rights present a significant barrier to managed 
retreat, often addressed with governance instruments of incentives where there 
is high risk to human life. However, as numbers of people living in exposed areas 
increase and property values grow (particularly at the coast), governments are 
more likely to succumb to political and legal pressure to build and maintain hard 
defences, with managed retreat becoming less economically and politically 
viable (Abel et al., 2011). Additionally, lack of nearby available land can deter or 
constrain the ability to relocate without significantly disrupting attachment to 
place, livelihoods and identity.  
Managed retreat literature is generally centred upon the exposure and 
vulnerability of people, but in practice, it also requires attention towards the 
infrastructure and utilities required to service receiving settlements, public lands 
and ecosystems at risk, and growth and development patterns to plan for changes 
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in land use and allocate new space for relocation. Integrated, strategic planning 
is crucial at city, regional and national scales—factors not exclusive to managed 
retreat. In short, managed retreat may protect people, ecosystems, and assets 
from harm, but it must be effective, equitable, responsive, and robust to be 
realised in a manner that is socially, politically and culturally acceptable, and 
practically achievable.  
Table 4 summarises the primary enablers and barriers raised in both 
literature and practice. To aid interpretation, these are grouped into four primary 
categories that drive and deter the implementation of managed retreat: socio-
political-cultural, environmental, economic, and institutional. The issues should 
be seen as integrated, for example, institutional issues can have cause-effect 
relationships with barriers of trust and legitimacy concerns within communities. 
The enablers and barriers listed may not be present in all cases, and local 
contexts will bring unique hurdles and co-benefits to consider, but as managed 
retreat imposes trade-offs between costs now and those in the future, there will 
inevitably be opposition. The art of effective governance is in balancing these 
tensions in a responsive and robust manner, where communities are thoroughly 
engaged, empowered and supported to detach from their places of habitation, in 
a way that delivers equitable outcomes. The governance framework (Figure 2) 
has provided a useful means to reveal the often hidden governance issues, and a 
practical way to examine the structure and operationalisation of managed retreat 
interventions, including how to deliver ‘good governance’ and evaluate its 




Table 4: Socio-political-cultural, environmental, economic and institutional enablers and barriers of 
managed retreat 
Enablers      Barriers Sources 
Socio-political-cultural (Abel et al., 2011; 
Agyeman et al., 2009; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; DEFRA, 2002; 
Esteves, 2013; Fazeya et 
al., 2016; Fletcher et al., 
2013; Fried, 1963; 
Harman et al., 2015; 
Hayward, 2008; Hino 
et al., 2017; Hogg, 
Kingham, Wilson, & 
Ardagh, 2016; Lei, 
Finlayson, Thwaites, & 
Shi, 2015; Linham & 
Nicholls, 2010, 2012; 
Mortreux & Barnett, 
2009; Ryan et al., 2012; 
Townend & Pethick, 
2002; Turbott & 
Stewart, 2006; 
Usamah & Haynes, 
2012; Wenger, 2015)  
 
Examples: 
• Urenui, NZ 
• Byron Bay, AUS 
• Kāpiti, NZ 
• Hawke’s Bay, NZ 
• Muriwai, NZ 
• Waitakere, NZ 
• Tasman, NZ 
• Canterbury, NZ 
• Medmerry, UK 
• Grantham, AUS 
• Riverlink, NZ 
Prevention of risk to life and 
assets 
May be viewed unfavourably by 
affected property owners and 
politicians 
Can increase adaptive capacity 
and resilience of communities 
Disruption to attachment of 
place, culture, and sense of 
identity 
Opportunity for collaboration 
between community and 
decision-makers 
May result in community 
division (for receiving and 
retreating communities) and 
political contestation 
Protection of wider 
community values (access, 
amenity, urban renewal, 
reduced maintenance/ 
emergency management costs) 
May result in loss of social 
networks, distress, feelings of 
lost control and may increase 
vulnerability  
Can be a flexible option for 
managing uncertainty, action 
may not be required until a 
certain threshold is met (e.g. 
DAPP) 
Existing use rights and the 
expectation of permanent use of 
land when land may not be 
permanent. This is worsened by 
increasing property values, 
particularly in coastal areas.  
Reduction of social discomfort 
from emergency 
People directly affected may 
have a sense of loss 
Community empowerment 
and agency 
Visible and hidden power 
within the community can 
influence decisions (e.g. wealthy 
property owners exerting 
political and legal pressure to 
protect properties) 
Recent social memory of 
disasters 
Efficient strategy for reducing 
risk with potential for 
anticipatory risk reduction Cultural heritage 
Incremental protection 
measures can decrease the 
feasibility of retreat – path 
dependency, escalator effect, 
safe development paradox, 
levee effect 
Livelihood incompatibilities or 
inadequacies 
Enablers Barriers Sources 
Environmental (Abel et al., 2011; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; DEFRA, 2002; 
Linham & Nicholls, 
2010; McNamara & 
Jacot des Combes, 2015; 
Sipe & Vella, 2014) 
Examples: 
• Muriwai, NZ 
• Medmerry, UK 
• Waitakere, NZ 
• Grantham, AUS 
• Riverlink, NZ 
Protection of environmental 
and amenity values including  
carbon sequestration benefits 
of wetlands (managed 
realignment). 
Abandonment/relocation 
resulting in low-quality 
environment if restoration is not 
staged and adequately funded, 
or the institutional enablers are 
not in place Prevention of coastal squeeze 
and habitat loss 
Nearby, available land for 
resettlement Lack of accessible/useable land 
for resettlement 
Economic (Abel et al., 2011; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; Cooper, 2003; 
Cooper & McKenna, 
One-off cost with limited 
maintenance expenditure 
Potentially significant costs; risk 
assessment, strategic planning, 




There are many challenges for operationalising managed retreat. Although 
some of the cases denote success in relocating people and assets away from 
danger, they are rare in the literature, due partially to the fact that managed 
retreat is only recently gaining recognition, but also because it fails to emerge 
beyond initial scoping processes. Both the real and the perceived costs of 
managed retreat present difficulties for decision-makers, and more often than 
not, protection structures are preferred as they hold a legacy, are less publicly 
and politically contested, and they allow people to remain, preserving certainty 
engagement, collaboration, 
relocation, funding and 
restoration 
2008; DEFRA, 2002; 
Gibbs, 2016; Hino et al., 
2017; Linham & 
Nicholls, 2010; Roca & 
Villares, 2012; 
Townend & Pethick, 




• Waitakere, NZ 
• Kāpiti, NZ 
• Hawke’s Bay, NZ 
• Muriwai, NZ 
• Franz Josef, NZ 
• Medmerry, UK 
• Riverlink, NZ 
Reduction of future 
emergency management and 
hard protection expenses 
 
Potentially higher risk 
management costs for individual 
property owners directly 
affected than other methods 
(but long-term, public benefits).  
Potential for reduced property 
values, equity and market 
uncertainty 
Authorities who re-zone land to 
afford space for ecosystems may 
become liable for consequent 
decrease in property values, 
even if risks to properties are 
expected to increase on that 
land in future. 
Numbers of coastal residents 
and value of properties at risk 
may have thresholds where 
retreat becomes less likely.   
Moral hazard and precedent 
risks of incentivisation  
Institutional (Bronen, 2015; Bronen 
& Chapin, 2013; 
Linham & Nicholls, 
2010; McNamara & 
Jacot des Combes, 2015; 
Sipe & Vella, 2014) 
Examples: 
• Riverlink, NZ 
• Hawke’s Bay, NZ 
• Shishmaref, USA 
• Grantham, AUS 
• Franz Josef, NZ 
• Kāpiti, NZ 
• Canterbury, NZ 
Local leadership Insufficient institutional and 
funding support 
Respect and knowledge of local 
place and space 
Ineffective/absent/late 
community engagement   
Flexible, adaptive governance Flawed science and science 
communication 
Organisational support and 
capacity building 
 (i.e. NZCCRI for Riverlink, 
National Science Challenge 
Edge Team support in Hawke’s 
Bay, Department of Fisheries 
support in Vunidogoloa village, 
Fiji & MCDEM support Franz 
Josef). 
 




transparency and legitimacy 
Political certainty – 
demonstrating short-term 
progress of long-term strategies 
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and the status quo. However, as recognised by Bardsley and Niven (2013), 
managed retreat is going to be increasingly required due to the levels of future 
risk that many communities and ecosystems face. It will need to (and is beginning 
to) occur in anticipation of, and response to the slow-onset effects of climate 
change and sudden-onset disasters. 
Resilience theory resists the notion that humanity is separate to, or 
dominant over nature. However, socio-political resistance to managed retreat is 
somewhat derived from ideological concerns which correlate retreat with defeat 
in a military sense, as ‘giving up’ to nature (Koslov, 2016). Desires for economic 
growth, often at the expense of environmental values, contribute to negative 
perceptions towards managed retreat, as it reduces potential for traditional 
development opportunities, which are often at the centre of social aspirations 
and political influence. Transforming away from the Man v Nature binary is a 
fundamental challenge to gaining traction on more naturalised planning such as 
managed retreat (Grove & Chandler, 2017). The literature and examples explored 
demonstrate that contexts and challenges are diverse, and that, as demonstrated 
in Figure 2, the modes, elements and orders available are varied and context 
specific. Interventions vary in approach, and by way of the governance modes 
applicable to local conditions. That said, it is also clear that in realising managed 
retreat, ‘good’ governance principles are often held in common. 
Chapter 2 has set the basis for resilience planning, justifying the need for 
risk reduction; the role of governance modes, elements and orders in managing 
and delivering ‘good’ outcomes and in overcoming the socio-political-cultural, 
economic, environmental, and institutional barriers of managed retreat; and the 
relevant literature and lessons from practice which foreshadow the analysis and 
conclusions made later in the thesis. This conceptual foundation integrates 
insights from resilience and governance scholarship, shaping the themes that 
will be used to structure and guide the thesis, being the investigation into New 
Zealand institutions, practice, and perceptions, significant barriers and enablers 
and ultimately, the governance of managed retreat. With an understanding of 
the theory, approaches, and broad international barriers and enablers, a review 
of the New Zealand institutional context is required to assess local managed 
retreat elements and orders, and answer Objectives two and three of this 
research. Chapter 3 provides the research design and methods used and Chapter 
4 begins with the New Zealand context. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 provides the research approach and justifies the methods and data 
analysis employed to respond to the research aim and objectives. It also 
addresses limitations of the research and ways in which these are overcome. The 
interdisciplinary nature of managed retreat requires research of breadth and 
depth. The aim and objectives of this thesis necessitate understanding of theory 
and practice, institutional frameworks, barriers and enablers, social values, 
guiding principles, and perceptions towards managed retreat. Therefore, the 
research strategy employs a range of qualitative and quantitative methods to 
deliver both culturally rich and technically detailed insights required to develop 
this broad field. 
In accordance with the ethical principles set out by the University of 
Waikato, a mixed methods approach was undertaken. Ethical approval was 
obtained from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee on 17 July 2017 and minor amendments to the application accepted 
on 18 September 2017 (Appendix 1). The research was carried out with careful 
consideration, sensitivity and commitment to ensuring consistency with the 
spirit and intent of Te Tiriti O Waitangi, the Treaty of Waitangi. Due to the 
sensitive and ongoing nature of the case study, confidentiality of participants was 
maintained, it was made clear to all participants that their involvement in the 
research was entirely voluntary, and participants were able to request interview 
transcripts to check and confirm their statements.  
3.2 Research strategy 
What is defined as knowledge, and how it can be discovered  is subjective. A 
paradigm is a shared world view that is informed by ontological assumptions 
about the nature of social reality, and forms of ‘knowing’ (epistemology). 
Qualitative approaches are generally associated with the interpretivist paradigm, 
with an emphasis upon the way in which the world is socially constructed and 
understood (Blaikie, 2000; McEvoy & Richards, 2006). Quantitative methods are 
broadly associated with a positivist paradigm where theories are tested to 
determine objective facts that can be generalised to a wider population (McEvoy 
& Richards, 2006).   
Qualitative and quantitative research address different research questions, 
 81 
employing distinct methods. For empirical research, qualitative methods such as 
case study analysis and interviews provide a depth and richness of experience 
that cannot be easily matched by quantitative methods (Jay, 2004). On the other 
hand, quantitative methods provide detached data that can be used to identify 
patterns and trends within groups, allowing researchers to draw conclusions and 
create future scenarios by calculating their probability (Davies, 2007; England, 
2006).  
Since the “communicative turn” (Healey, 1996) planning has seen a greater 
emphasis on process rather than measurable outcomes, with issues discussed 
and compared qualitatively as opposed to being exclusively quantified (Næss, 
2015). However, planning is highly interdisciplinary, and in certain facets 
(notably transportation planning and risk management) positivist approaches 
still dominate (Ibid). Planning often incorporates both ontological perspectives 
of intangible and tangible realities associated with interpretive and positivist 
paradigms. The research problem of this thesis is centred within the planning 
system, aiming to increase understanding of more tangible realities such as 
managed retreat policy and legislation, and intangible realities impacting its 
social and political acceptance. Given the research problem, a mix of qualitative 
and quantitative methods have been selected, to examine managed retreat 
within theoretical, practical, and institutional settings, to interpret the meanings 
surrounding it, the meanings people attribute to it, and to identify patterns with 
regard to policy application and acceptability. 
By combining methods, researchers can attempt to counteract biases 
associated with ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of 
social reality and ways of knowing. The logic of a mixed methods approach is 
based on the recognition that neither quantitative or qualitative methods are 
sufficient to develop our knowledge, but when used in combination they can 
complement each other (Creswell, M.D, & Ivankova, 2004). The research strategy 
for this thesis predominantly represents the interpretivist paradigm, where 
meaning is inductively developed through patterns and themes throughout the 
research process (Creswell, 2003). Quantitative data is utilised to support and 
expand upon the qualitative data, to deepen, triangulate and consolidate the 
broad concepts developed to help validate, broaden, and make sense of the 
research findings.  
A review of managed retreat literature and associated methodological 
approaches assists in informing the methodological selection, due to the 
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complex and multi-disciplinary nature of managed retreat. Following a search 
for ‘managed retreat’ on the Waikato University Library database, the top 20 
articles, book sections, theses and technical reports (focused specifically on 
managed retreat), applied the following methods, in order of most common to 
least common: literature review, interviews, case studies, policy reviews, surveys, 
workshops, questionnaires and site visits. The top four methods are applied in 
the majority of the literature and have presented a useful basis for determining 
key method selection for this study. The following sections justify and detail the 
methods selected to address the research aim and objectives: literature reviews, 
textual analysis, a questionnaire, site visits, and semi-structured interviews.  
3.3 Literature reviews 
A literature review is necessary to provide a comprehensive and critical 
review of existing works relevant to the research topic, supporting the 
development of the research position and the means to justify further 
exploration within the field (Berg, 2007). The review outlines the theoretical 
framework for the thesis and contextualises the topic. This is a conventional 
method used in several research fields, including environmental studies 
(Frohlich, Jacobson, Fidelman, & Smith, 2018; Plummer, de Loë, & Armitage, 
2012). 
The purpose of the literature review is to understand the theoretical links 
between resilience, governance, planning, and managed retreat. Searches for 
peer-reviewed literature (in English language) were undertaken on the Waikato 
University Library website (including e-copy and hard copy resources), Scopus, 
and Google Scholar, using the key words, ‘resilience’ (singularly and in 
combination with ‘natural hazards’), ‘adaptive management’, ‘managed retreat’, 
‘managed realignment’ and ‘community relocation.’ The top 200 results of each 
search (sorted by relevance) were reviewed. Where the key words were present 
in the title or abstract of resources, the works were imported to Endnote to be 
critically reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 2. References listed in selected 
papers were investigated to broaden the literature review and identify additional 
case studies of managed retreat.  
To supplement the academic literature, Google internet searches were 
undertaken of the underlined search terms (above) to broaden the evidence base. 
Due to the large volume of results (>29,000,000 for managed retreat alone) the 
top 200 results of each entry was reviewed. The grey literature found, such as 
 83 
technical planning and hazard management reports supplement the literature 
review, providing practical knowledge on the application of managed retreat, 
nationally and internationally. For the key terms underlined above, results were 
filtered based on fulfilment of the following criteria: resources theorising 
managed retreat (and related terms), and resources analysing managed retreat 
case studies. Resources that did not provide theoretical or practical evidence of 
managed retreat such as GIS analysis of potential managed retreat sites were not 
included in the review. 
To identify cases where managed retreat has been implemented, 
international case studies were documented throughout the course of the 
literature review. This process provided insight to the global application of 
managed retreat, the differences in approach and terminology and significant 
barriers and enablers to its implementation. Appendix 2 provides a summary of 
the cases found between July-December 2016 and this informs the selection of 
key terms for the textual analysis.  
In addition to the review of resilience and managed retreat literature, a 
review of governance theory and frameworks was undertaken to extend 
understanding of governance theory, and develop a framework to examine 
managed retreat governance. Key terms, “governance theory” and “governance 
conceptual frameworks” were searched on the Web of Science Core Collection 
and the Waikato University Library database, peer-reviewed and published in 
English, between 2000-2018. The results were ordered by relevance and the top 
200 results of each search were reviewed (due to the significant number of 
results; >300,000). This involved scanning the titles and abstracts for governance 
theory (modes, elements and orders) and conceptual governance frameworks 
which synthesised the range of modes found in practice and theory. The content 
of works selected were reviewed and tabulated according to the governance 
modes and elements discoursed. Driessen and others’ (2012) conceptual 
framework, Kooiman and others’ (2008) interactive governance model and 
Hysing’s (2009) governance continuum provided the foundation for tabulation 
of the modes.  
For the literature reviews, to overcome the limitation of searching the top 
200 results of each code, snowball searches (pursuing citations in the tabulated 
literature) were undertaken and included to supplement the data found. 
However, it is acknowledged that the search terms and selection criteria may 
have excluded relevant publications, including peer-reviewed and non-peer-
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reviewed literature from alternative sources, as well as non-English research 
articles. 
3.4 Textual analysis 
The focus of the textual analyses is managed retreat discourse present in 
New Zealand planning instruments. Healey (1997, p. 277) summarises policy 
discourse as systems of meaning embodied in a strategy for action. In the context 
of this study, the instruments for action are resource management policy and 
plans, long-term plans, management plans and strategies discursively produced 
and decreed governable by law, expert evidence, decision-making and public 
consultation processes (Feindt & Oels, 2005). These instruments, produced in 
social settings, are regarded as collective social products which form a field for 
research in their own right, not to be considered as mere props for action (Prior, 
2003, p. 26).  
To fulfil Objective 2 of this research, an analysis of managed retreat 
discourse in New Zealand planning documents was required. Due to the 
significant scale and detail of the document sample groups, focused textual 
analyses (rather than a broad discourse analysis) were carried out to uncover 
meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights most relevant to the 
research objective (Merriam, 1988). While it is understood that it is important to 
look beyond the text (to encompass the wider meaning of discourse), the textual 
analyses are targeted at the national, regional and district scales, resulting in a 
significant number of documents to review. Analysis of wider discourse, 
including media, non-resource management instruments and interview data is 
undertaken in subsequent chapters (6-8). 
Textual analysis of RMA planning instruments was carried out in December 
2016-March 2017 to fulfil Objective 2 of this research. A summary of the 
methodological approach is provided in Figure 6 and discussed in detail next. 























Six key steps structured the textual analysis of New Zealand planning 
instruments. The purpose of the analysis was to determine how managed retreat 
is treated within New Zealand RMA planning documents, to discover the 
approaches used and the extent to which planning documents are enabling 
managed retreat in New Zealand. Before collecting the documents, key search 
terms were established. The international literature review revealed significant 
variation in managed retreat terms and approaches. Appendix 2 provides the 
range of terms used to describe practices for moving at risk populations and 
assets away from high risk locations. For each of the international examples, the 
key terms used to describe the process were documented to inform the textual 
analysis. Terms ‘migration’ and ‘rollback scheme’ were not included as they were 
outliers, with ‘migration’ being focused at national-international scales and 
‘rollback scheme’ used to describe a single programme. As the sample group 
comprises policy instruments, a test analysis was carried out on 40 resource 
management plans to gain a base understanding for the regulatory terms and 
plan formats. The terms found in the international examples were searched in 
the policy review test, with relevant regulatory provisions recorded to determine 
the key regulatory terms. These two methods resulted in the compilation of key 
terms (Table 5) as indicators for managed retreat policies in New Zealand 
planning documents. Two relevant terms (italicised) not present in the 
international examples were added to the list as they had emerged out of the 
broad literature review (Barnett et al., 2014; Rouse et al., 2016) in Chapter 2.  
      Table 5: Key search terms 
Managed retreat terms (literature) Regulation terms (policy test) 
1. Managed retreat/retreat/planned retreat 1. Relocatable 
2. Managed realignment/realign 2. Rebuild 
3. Relocate/relocation 3. Reconstruct/ion/Re-construct/ion 
4. Setback/set back/set-back 4. Replace 
5. Adaptation/Adaptive management 5. Damage/d 
6. Abandon 6. Alter/Alteration 
7. Purchase offer/purchase 7. Addition/s 
8. Acquisition/acquire 8. Protection 
9. Buy/buy-out 9. Extension/s 
10. Resettlement 10. Setback/set back/set-back 
11. Pathway 11.     Remove 
12. Strategy 
*Unique terms found during the analysis 
13. Exit strategy 12.    Transported 




Once the key terms were developed, analysis was carried out using O’Leary’s 
(2010) process of collecting, reviewing, interrogating and analysing the relevant 
documents, with the use of a general inductive approach to develop principal 
findings (Thomas, 2006). The sampling frame for the data collection included 
operative and proposed regional policy statements (RPS), regional plans, 
regional coastal plans (RCP) and district plans. Table 6 provides a breakdown of 
the number of plans reviewed by document type. In total, 150 documents from 17 
regional councils and 67 territorial authorities were reviewed, interrogated and 
analysed within a conceptual framework. During the data collection process 
(December 2016-January 2017), the legal status of each plan was recorded, and 
proposed/draft plans were included.  
      Table 6: Sampling frame breakdown 




17 Operative and 4 Proposed 
Regional Plans  18 Operative & 5 Proposed/Draft – These plans included 
land & water plans, freshwater plans and regional resource 
management plans. There are 18 Operative Regional Plans 
due to the Operative Wairau/Awatere & Marlborough 
Sounds Resource Management Plans being separated into 
two documents. 
Regional 
Coastal Plans  
18 Operative & 5 Proposed/Draft – There are 18 Operative 
Regional Coastal Plans due to the Operative Wairau/Awatere 
& Marlborough Sounds Resource Management Plans being 
separated into two documents. 
District Plans  68 Operative & 15 Proposed/Draft – Out of 67 Territorial 
Authorities, there are 68 Operative District Plans due to the 
additional Franklin, Wairau/Awatere and Banks Peninsula 
District Plans and the Wairarapa Combined District Plan 
(combining the Masterton, Carterton & South Wairarapa 
Districts’ regulation under one plan). 
 
Once documents were collected, reviewed and tabulated, they were 
interrogated with four key questions, illustrated in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Content interrogation 
As depicted in Figure 7, the review was commenced using both discrete term 
searches and qualitative analysis of relevant document chapters. For all 150 
instruments, each of the key terms were searched and where relevant policies 
were found, these were recorded in full. Documents were checked twice for 
accuracy and where no results could be found, a full investigation of the text was 
carried out to mitigate the limitation of using key terms. In a couple of cases, 
unique terms* were found during the broad analysis and these were identified 
and added to the search list (exit strategy, withdrawal, soft-engineering, 
transported and shift). All documents reviewed prior to the finding of the new 
terms were re-reviewed. To document the findings, a spreadsheet format was 
used to enable analysis and data reduction. To carry out the data analysis, the 
original dataset was reduced into explicit spreadsheets, using analytical codes 
based on interpretative themes (Hay, 2010) including terminology, policy and 
regulation categories, and natural hazard and climate change risk influences. 
Due to the absence of empirical literature on managed retreat policy, a ‘general 
inductive approach’ was employed to identify the relevant and frequently 
occurring themes and categories (Pila, Mond, Griffiths, Mitchison, & Murray, 
2017; Thomas, 2006). This approach allows research findings to emerge from the 
“frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the 
restraints imposed by structured methodologies” (Thomas, 2006, p. 238). The 
reduced datasets enabled specific analysis of provisions, and the ability to 
compare between instruments. The inductive data evaluation process allows 
theory to emerge by way of themes or categories, to develop a framework of the 
1: Are the key terms present?                                                                                                
YES = Enter provision(s) in 
spreadsheet and continue 
questioning
NO = Interrogate relevant 
chapters for certainty  
2:  Is a definition of the key 
term provided?
YES = Enter text in spreadsheet 
and continue questioning
NO = Note in spreadsheet and 
continue questioning
3: Which risk (natural hazard 
and/or climate change) does 
this provsion apply to?
Note in spreadsheet
4: What is the policy/ 
regulatory  approach?
Code by colour in spreadsheet 
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underlying structure or processes evident in the raw data (Thomas, 2006). With 
the policy categories (1-6) coded (Table 7), a framework was developed as the 
basis for deeper analysis and further coding was applied to determine the level 
of direction for managed retreat within each category. Quantitative content 
analysis was carried out to determine the terminology, definition, hazard type 
and climate change influences, and document date counts. 
   Table 7: Policy codes 
Category 1 Natural hazard policy for existing development 
Category 1 includes policies that identify managed retreat as a natural hazard risk 
'mitigation’ option. 
Category codes: 
Consider managed retreat as an option or simply note it as a potential approach.  
Assess/have particular regard to managed retreat as an option 
Encourage managed retreat as an option 
Prioritise managed retreat above other options 
Category 2 Regulation of new and re-development 
Category 2 includes provisions requiring relocatable design of new buildings and 
the regulation of new and re-development in vulnerable locations.  
Category 2a is tiered from the use of guiding policy, to assessment criteria in plans, 
to policy areas that specifically require relocatable building design and finally, to 
relocation strategies that facilitate relocation with trigger points, consent conditions 
and monitoring.  
Category 2b is tiered from the use of policies requiring to the use of permissive or 
restrictive activity statuses to regulate re-development and in some cases, prohibit it. 
Category 3 Regulation of hard protection structures 
Category 3 comprises the regulation of hard protection works  
Category codes: 
Consider managed retreat as an alternative 
Assess alternatives such as managed retreat 
Refuse resource consent applications or prohibit hard protection structures 
Category 4 Infrastructure management 
Category 4 entails the management of infrastructure assets  
Category codes: 
Consider ‘appropriate mechanisms’ to manage infrastructure risk (including 
managed retreat) 
Promote strategic withdrawal of infrastructure in hazard prone areas,  
Avoid or prohibit further infrastructure investment.  
Category 5 Regulation of the rebuilding of materially damaged or destroyed 
buildings as a result of a natural hazard event 
Category 5 includes regional plan provisions that do not allow rebuilding of 
damaged or destroyed buildings as of right, to encourage managed retreat over-
time.  
Category codes: 
The activity status of regulatory provisions determines the direction of provisions in 
Category 5, with permissive to restrictive controls. 
Category 6 Distinct approaches 
Category 6 encompasses unique approaches found within the analysis.  
Category codes: 
Consider mitigation options such as managed retreat (when working with 
landowners to identify and implement adaptation measures) 
Promote plan changes to encourage voluntary relocation  
Facilitate identification of when it is appropriate to require managed retreat  




The results of the RMA analysis highlighted the need to broaden the scope 
to general planning instruments, to capture the full range of policies, such as 
instruments specifically addressing infrastructure retreat. Therefore, a second 
textual analysis was carried out (April-June 2017) of non-RMA instruments with 
the potential to enable managed retreat, including management strategies, asset 
management plans, long-term plans, spatial plans, structure plans and resilience 
plans. The same process of collecting, reviewing, interrogating and analysing 
(O'Leary, 2010) the relevant documents was carried out using the key search 
terms. The collection process resulted in much fewer documents (25) containing 
managed retreat provisions, with the majority taking the ‘consider’ approach. 
Therefore, the following framework (Figure 8) was developed to encapsulate the 
ways in which managed retreat is treated in non-RMA plans. This framework is 
condensed as the approaches have greater commonalities and less detail than 
those found in RMA plans. Documents were coded according to the four 
categories inductively developed; consider, promote, facilitate and require. The 
analytical codes were developed to capture the documents along a spectrum of 
limited to active direction according to the level of stringency applied to enable 
managed retreat. At one end of the scale, there is an expectation to consider 
managed retreat, whereas at the other end, it is a legally binding requirement.  
 
Figure 8: Non-RMA instrument direction setting framework 
Table 8 provides examples of how the coding was applied. For the code 
consider, documents that recognised the need to consider managed retreat, or 
simply recognised managed retreat as a possible risk reduction approach were 
captured. Promote characterises documents that go further than consideration, 
endorsing managed retreat as a risk mitigation approach and prioritising it over 
other approaches—particularly hard protection structures. Documents which 
facilitate retreat are actively setting the direction and process for the retreat of 
assets or the withdrawal of protection interventions. Finally, at the most active 
level of direction setting framework is require. This includes documents which 
command and deliver action on managed retreat. 
Limited Consider Promote Facilitate Require
Active
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Table 8: Coding analysis  
The textual analysis was undertaken systematically, with checks in place to 
avoid oversights. A limitation of this approach is its focus on key terms, however, 
broad plan reviews were undertaken to mitigate this. Furthermore, 





“Where possible, consider promoting the retreat of 
development from areas currently at risk from natural 
coastal hazards is a priority.” (New Plymouth District 





“Eastern Christchurch, perhaps more than any other part 
of urbanised Greater Christchurch, is exposed to multiple 
hazards. The level of risk from those hazards will vary 
from sudden and extreme inundation from relatively rare 
tsunami events, to very real projections of sea level rise 
expected in the next 50-100 years. The level of risk able to 
be managed through different building standards and 
mitigation, the level of insurance that people have access to, 
or areas we may need to retreat from are all issues that will 
shape the future for the area.” (Christchurch City 





“7. Adopt a ‘hierarchy of options’4 to manage risk from 
coastal hazards. This will require a Variation to the 
Proposed Wairoa District Plan, and should include the 
following assessment options (1=most preferred, 4=least 
preferred): 1. Activities (e.g. beach accessways) and land use 
practices to protect natural barriers such as sand dunes, 
gravel ridges, cliffs, salt marshes and other vegetation. 2. 
Management of land use to avoid areas of coastal hazard 
(e.g. location of development away from coastal hazards, 
retreat or relocate infrastructure)….(Wairoa District 







“Policy 109 Council will aim to limit the potential for 
erosion on reserves by giving preference to ‘soft’ engineering 
solutions, such as the strategic planting of appropriate 
plant species and managed retreat (where costs of 
protection outweigh the benefits to the community), and 
these options will be identified in Council-approved concept 
plans for reserves development.” (Waitaki District 










“e) The reserve will be managed according to a policy of 
managed retreat from river erosion. As such, no 
management intervention will be undertaken to address 
erosion except to protect significant public assets such as 
the road. Future vegetation and structures will be placed 
away from the river banks. Changes in the riverbank will 
be monitored and assessments made of implications for 
local infrastructure.” (New Plymouth District Council, 








supplementary documents were found and documented during the collection 
stage that did not fit within the document sample group—they represented local 
projects implementing managed retreat in unique forms. Although these 
documents were not in the initial scope of the analysis, and have not been 
captured by the quantitative assessments, they are useful as they help to uncover 
the broader status of managed retreat implementation in New Zealand.  
3.5 Case study research 
The use of a case study was chosen to explore the application of managed 
retreat in New Zealand. Case studies provide an in-depth analysis of the subject 
through the collection of detailed information. It is this depth of learning that is 
relevant to the research aim and linked strongly to Objectives 2, 3 and 4. Case 
studies are defined by Yin (2003, p. 13) as a form of inquiry which “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.” To examine the 
practical enablement of managed retreat, and the ways in which communities 
react to it, it is necessary to develop a thorough understanding of social 
experiences, perceptions, and values where it has been tried and tested, to use 
this as a basis for improving future practice. Flyvbjerg (2006) recognises that case 
studies are particularly useful in the social sciences, as they make learning 
possible when hard evidence is difficult to come by. Although a case study can 
provide a great depth of knowledge and learning, it is understood that there is a 
risk of generalisation through its use. This limitation is mitigated through the use 
of more than one research method to compare the barriers, enablers and lessons 
uncovered, as well as consolidation and triangulation of the data collected in the 
literature review, questionnaire, and in the textual analysis.  
The case study of Matatā was selected based on the unique planning process 
local authorities were undertaking to facilitate managed retreat, informed by the 
policy review (Chapter 5). The only place in New Zealand progressing managed 
retreat in sufficiently advanced state was Matatā, hence the selection of this as 
the primary case. Other local authorities, in Mōkau and the Hawke’s Bay were 
progressing managed retreat as part of adaptation pathways, and in Tauranga 
and Northland in separate risk management projects. However, councils were 
not yet facilitating the managed retreat process yet. Because members of the 
public could not be interviewed as key stakeholders in a similar way in these 
additional locations, they are not comparable case studies as such, but their 
experiences supplement the case study data via semi-structured interviews of 
local authority staff (Chapter 8), consolidating and validating the institutional 
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findings uncovered in Matatā. 
When undertaking case study research, Yin (2003) notes that it is necessary 
to design the research approach so that it meets the four tests of empirical social 
research. To ensure the quality of the research when using case study 
methodology, Yin states that construct validity, internal and external validity and 
reliability are vital. Construct validity is based upon ensuring that the correct 
measures for researching the case are used to ensure accuracy and that subjective 
judgment during information collection and analysis is avoided. Yin (2003) 
provides that this can be overcome by using a range of evidence sources and 
establishing a chain of evidence. In this research, the case study was researched 
via a range of methods, including analysis of local documents, semi-structured 
interviews and a site visit to maintain a clear evidence chain. The second test, 
internal validity is based upon relationships within findings (Yin, 2003). Internal 
validity was upheld by the consistent use of methods for analysis. External 
validity relates to the ability of the findings to be applied externally to the 
research, in other words, whether they can be generalised. For this research, it is 
understood that a singular case study presents unique findings, however, the 
questionnaire and supplementary interviews (Chapters 7 & 8) act to consolidate 
these findings at the national scale. While each location has distinct locales and 
circumstances, the issues faced are similar and the institutional context is 
common, meaning the approaches to resolving these issues provide learnings 
that can be used nationally. Finally, research reliability is important to ensure 
that the study can be replicated with the same results drawn if it was to be 
undertaken again. To provide reliability, research procedures have been carried 
out consistently, with the support of triangulation to validate data through 
multiple sources (O'Leary, 2010).  
A benefit of examining a range of locations across New Zealand (case study 
and supplementary locations) is that lessons could be shared immediately. For 
example, research findings from Matatā were reported on and provided to 
planning staff in Mōkau to help clarify the issues other localities were 
experiencing. The lessons learnt in Matatā were taken into consideration in 
Mōkau to help inform the retreat process and avoid the difficulties encountered.  
 93 
3.5.1 Site visits 
 
As the basis of case study research is to build an in-depth understanding and 
analysis of a particular location, site visits are an important aspect of 
understanding local spaces and places. Site visits were conducted to get a sense 
of the case study locations and to capture this on camera, recognising the 
character and identity of each place, the visual representation of risk and 
attachment to place and space, as a photo can often provide a better sense of this 
than words. The walking component helped to ‘make sense of place’ in a way 
that cannot be narrated or told, allowing for a better understanding of the 
immediate geographies of the case study and supplementary locations (Davies & 
Dwyer, 2007).  
3.5.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are advantageous as they provide the setting for 
flexible conversation in a manner where the participant is given the chance to 
explore issues they consider to be important (Longhurst, 2003). Interviews are 
discussions with a purpose of collecting information and Yin (2003) declares 
them one of the most valuable sources of information for case study data 
collection. For the case study, 17 semi-structured interviews of approximately 60 
minutes in length were conducted. Five additional semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken with planning professionals who had emerging planning 
projects involving managed retreat, analysed in Chapter 8. 
Key themes guided the structure and content of the interviews, with specific 
questions posed depending on the roles and experiences of participants 
Figure 9: Site visit context (Hawke's Bay, Matatā and Mōkau) 
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(Appendix 3). The semi-structured approach allowed participants to talk freely 
about their experiences of the managed retreat strategy to explore views on the 
development of the approach, key barriers and enablers and lessons learned. 
Participants included environmental planners, project managers, politicians, 
community members and kaumātua. Case study participants were chosen based 
on the following matters: location (i.e. property owners in Matatā within the 
high-risk zone); snowball selection (Creswell, 2009) via the council project 
manager and policy team following their community consultation efforts; 
governance roles, for example, consensus development groups, regional and 
district council staff and politicians, technical expert involvement (found within 
public documentation), and members of the community mentioned in media 
releases. Prior to conducting the interviews, the aims of the research, its scope, 
and ethical considerations were discussed with participants. The interviews were 
carried out in convenient places for respondents and run via a set plan, however 
there were open-ended questions to allow for flexibility and expression of 
thought by the interviewee, which is noted as being necessary to the success of 
case study data collection (Yin, 2003).  
The purpose of the study was described on the information sheet which was 
emailed to participants ahead of the interview and discussed at the beginning of 
each interview. Where consent was given, interviews were digitally recorded, 
and notes taken. Throughout the process, I worked to clarify, pursue expansion 
or bring discussion back to the key themes, as appropriate. Digital interview 
recordings were transcribed either the day of interviewing or the following day. 
A coding approach was employed to analyse the interview data, where each 
document and interview transcript was organised and coded relating to key 
words, phrases, concepts and topics relating to managed retreat. An example of 
these themes is the social and procedural barriers and enablers organised into 
topics following consistent references by interviewees. The interview questions 
themselves provided a clear structure for analysing the data and comparing 
participants’ answers. Quotations used in this thesis reflect consistently raised 
issues and help to capture real life experience of managed retreat, including the 
raw emotions connected to it.  
3.6 Questionnaire  
To collect general perceptions from a large population, a questionnaire is an 
appropriate method (Denscombe, 2001). Questionnaires aim to produce 
comparable answers to questions from participants (Flick, 2015) and this method 
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was applied to produce an understanding of public perceptions towards 
managed retreat in New Zealand, and fulfil Objective four of this research, using 
both closed and open-ended questions. A limitation of questionnaires is that they 
cannot provide the full amount of detail and depth required (Denscombe, 2001). 
This limitation was overcome by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
questions. Whilst discovering public perceptions towards managed retreat 
policy, the questionnaire solidified the social barriers found in the case study. 
Waters and Barnett (2018, p. 4) argue that to discuss ‘a’ public perspective is 
a “somewhat crude simplification of the heterogeneous nature of individual and 
group perspectives on collective issues within society.” Publics can be socially 
constructed, resulting in marginalisation or bias towards certain groups. 
Potential bias from the questionnaire is overcome by diversifying the data 
collection sources and approaches, however, its exclusively online access creates 
limits. The questionnaire targeted a varied selection of ‘publics’ with different 
interests in managed retreat outcomes. 
Participants were recruited online to take part in the questionnaire which 
was advertised via email, social media, a magazine article and organisational 
newsletters. Respondents were recruited across New Zealand over a nine-month 
period in September 2017-May 2018. Community board members of New 
Zealand (110 community boards and 21 local Auckland boards) were emailed, 
requesting them to distribute the questionnaire to their members. A link (with 
an explanation) was posted on local community board and community 
organisation Facebook pages and groups. Facebook is New Zealand’s second 
favourite leisure activity, with 2.9 million	New Zealanders holding an active 
account (and 2.3 million New Zealanders accessing Facebook everyday) 
representing approximately 61%	of the population (as of 2017) (Fyers & Cooke, 
2017). This high use and ability to share posts heightened the exposure of the 
questionnaire. Emails were sent to companies and government organisations in 
New Zealand, requesting that they distribute the questionnaire to staff or 
members. Further to the email and social media exposure, the Property Council 
advertised the questionnaire in its November 2017 newsletter and the link was 
provided in an article published in Build Magazine (December 2017). Appendix 
4 provides the primary sample group for the questionnaire, however, its reach is 
much wider, with the snowballing approach used, where community members 
and professionals shared the emails and social media links to other individuals 
and parties in New Zealand.  
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The questionnaire was exploratory in nature, aimed at gaining a general 
understanding of public perceptions towards managed retreat, supporting case 
study findings, and uncovering competing interests and tensions of retreat 
interventions. The method has some limitations due to the self-selection of 
participants, meaning that the responses are not representative of the New 
Zealand population. While the data is not representative, the questionnaire 
enabled the collection of a wide range of views on the topic from computer-
literate members of the community who were interested in voicing their opinion 
about managed retreat policy in New Zealand. As approached by Abel et al. (2011) 
in a similar study on sea-level rise and managed retreat in Australia, the 
limitation of self-selection is addressed by classifying responses into key groups 
to compare results against. Chapter 7 provides comparative data analysis to 
uncover the relationships between the findings and participants’ attachment to 
their property/place of residence, their age, and ownership of property. Due to 
the non-representative sample of the questionnaire, care should be taken when 
determining the implications of the results, however, this approach has enabled 
the collection of a wide range of perceptions towards managed retreat from 
individuals with access to technology and an interest in expressing their opinions 
about natural hazard risk reduction in New Zealand. A final limitation of the 
questionnaire is the focus on natural hazards, with less reference to the impacts 
of climate change (with the exception of Question 7). While many responses 
referenced the influences of climate change regardless, it would have been more 
useful to have made reference to climate change as influencing natural hazard 
risk, especially for Question 11. As reference to climate risk profiles was noted by 
respondents in this question (and throughout the questionnaire), it is not 
considered to have had a significant impact on the reliability of the analysis. 
3.7 Summary  
This chapter has set out the research design and analysis, providing detail of 
the ethically approved and delivered research, based on reliable methods. 
Utilising the methods outlined in Chapter 3, the following chapters realise the 
research aim and objectives in a robust and reliable manner. Chapter 4 sets the 
foundation for the New Zealand context, providing a review of the institutional 
framework for managing natural hazard and climate change risks and facilitating 
managed retreat in New Zealand.  
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Chapter 4 Managed retreat 
instruments: New Zealand’s 
institutional framework 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 analyses the formal institutional context, including the legislative 
architecture supporting natural hazard and climate change risk management in 
New Zealand, and the governance instruments available to implement managed 
retreat, responding to Objective two of this research. Integral to the research aim 
is understanding decision-making problems and opportunities for managed 
retreat, the institutional framework being a key source of these. This chapter 
provides an analysis of New Zealand legislation and case law, introducing the 
regulatory and non-regulatory context for the management of risk and the 
enablement of managed retreat. It finds that managed retreat appears well 
supported, however, difficulties lie in the ability to operationalise powers and 
intentions within the institutional context. 
4.2 Institutional framework 
Institutions are the agreements, rules, rights, laws and decision-making 
procedures and programmes. Institutions include both formal rules and 
procedures and informal rules such as norms and culture. Historic tendencies of 
relying on protecting communities from risk stems from informal social norms 
where “economic growth, corporate interests and ‘new development’ are viewed 
as pre-eminent societal imperatives, and private property rights are held 
virtually sacrosanct” (Glavovic et al., 2010, p. 683). While these norms endure, 
local experience, international scholarship, and sustainability imperatives have 
highlighted the need to move beyond protection, to reduce exposure or avoid the 
impacts of natural hazard events (Ibid). In New Zealand, the introduction of the 
RMA created a formal framework in which sustainable management of 
resources takes priority over property rights, providing opportunities to re-shape 
risk culture, with greater attention upon avoiding and reducing natural hazard 
risks. Māori cultural norms influence the management of risk, with customs, 
environmental and historical insights, and philosophies existing ‘in the 
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background’, gaining broader prominence of late, although formal recognition 
and support remains incomplete (Lambert, 2015).  
The formal institutional framework for natural hazard management in New 
Zealand is not strictly linear, as multi-level roles and responsibilities build upon 
a hierarchy of de-centralised government applying formal and informal rules. 
Central government, via the creation of legislation, national policy statements, 
national environmental standards, and non-statutory guidance sets the decision-
making framework, devolving powers to local government. Among other 
functions, the management of natural hazard and climate change impacts, land 
use planning, and civil defence emergency management are the responsibility of 
local government. In addition to the development of regional policy, plans and 
rules, regional (and unitary) authorities set the policy framework and direction 
for the development of local rules, administered by territorial authorities via 
district plans. Regional councils may also extinguish existing use rights, a power 
unavailable to territorial authorities despite their responsibilities under s 31 
RMA. The institutional framework includes the procedures, regulations and 
responsibilities codified in key statutes, namely The Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA), Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act 2002 (CDEM), Building Act 2004 (BA), Local Government 
Official Information Act (LGOIMA) 1987, Public Works Act 1981 (PWA), Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (SC&RCA) and The Land Drainage Act 
1908 (LDA). Each of these pieces of legislation devolve power and responsibilities 
to authorities to contribute to the management of natural hazards and climate 
change adaptation through the development of procedures and regulation.  
Organisations are the “formal arrangements that embody the social norms 
of the actors who use the institutional frameworks through the disciplinary 
practices relevant to their functions set out in statutes” (Lawrence, 2015, p. 2). 
Organisations with statutory functions and instruments for the management of 
natural hazards include regional councils, territorial authorities (and unitary 
councils), the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) 
and civil defence emergency management and engineering lifeline groups. Co-
operation between each of these agencies is fundamental to providing an 
effective and integrated national approach for natural hazard planning 
(Saunders et al., 2013). As recognised by Glavovic et al. (2010), the legal regime for 
natural hazards planning in New Zealand is grounded in a robust institutional 
framework, significantly driven by the demands of the RMA.  
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4.2.1 Resource Management Act 1991 
The Resource Management Act is New Zealand’s primary planning 
legislation, containing mechanisms for managing natural hazards and adapting 
to the impacts of climate change. The purpose of the RMA is to promote the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources. This purpose sets the 
framework by which natural hazards are to be considered when making 
decisions. It identifies expected outcomes, (social, economic, and cultural well-
being, health and safety of communities, and the preservation of the life 
supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems) and extends this beyond 
current generations, to the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations. 
The RMA encourages public participation via nested decision-making to ensure 
equitable, robust and effective governance outcomes. Effects under this Act are 
to be managed by avoidance, remedy or mitigation. The RMA defines effects as 
any positive or adverse, temporary or permanent, past, present, or future effect, 
any cumulative effect, any potential effect of high probability, and any potential 
effect of low probability which has a high potential impact (RMA s 3). As 
indicated in Table 10, the definition of natural hazards refers to the many sources 
of effects and their recipients. The reference to the risk management language of 
probability and level of impact within the definition of effect under the RMA 
demonstrates that the effects-based approach of the RMA is a risk-based 
approach (Tonkin & Taylor Ltd, 2016).  
Section 6(h) of that Act requires that all persons exercising functions and 
powers under the RMA shall recognise and provide for the management of 
significant risks from natural hazards (a result of the Resource Legislation 
Amendment Act	2015) and further under s 7(i) they must have particular regard 
to the effects of climate change. The management of significant risks is an 
important amendment as it explicitly introduces the concept of risk into the 
RMA, requiring planners to consider both the consequences and likelihood of a 
natural hazard event when making decisions (Saunders et al., 2013). This 
amendment enables a greater emphasis on the consideration of the risks from 
natural hazards in all resource management decisions. The Courts have confined 
s 7(i) to consideration of climate change adaptation as opposed to mitigation 
(Harker, 2016, p. 74).  
Under the RMA, power and responsibilities are devolved to local authorities 
to contribute to sustainable management of natural and physical resources, 
implemented through policies, plans and consent process. Resource 
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management is focused on the regulation of activities which use and develop 
natural and physical resources, mandated by the RMA, via a three-tier 
governance hierarchy of policy and regulation instruments (Palmer, 2012, p. 773). 
As shown in the first level of the RMA hierarchy (Figure 10), central government 
may create national policy statements (NPS) and national environmental 
standards (NES) among other policy and regulations. The Minister for the 
Environment is to have regard to a range of guidelines to determine whether it is 















Section 45A of the RMA requires NPS to “state objectives and policies for 
matters of national significance that are relevant to achieving the purpose of this 
Act”. National policy statements may state matters that local authorities must 
consider, achieve or provide for, objectives and policies that must be included in 
local plans and other directions for monitoring, plan methods and 
implementation of the NPS (ss 45A(2)). To date, no statement or standard has 
been created specifically for natural hazards, but there has been much 
expectation that central government release an NPS for natural hazards. 
However, the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010 (NZCPS), 
administered by the Minister of Conservation, applying a precautionary 
approach, provides guidance on coastal hazards. Objective 5 of the NZCPS aims 
to “ensure” that coastal hazard risks (taking account of climate change), are 
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managed by avoiding areas prone to such risks, and responses to be considered 
include managed retreat for existing development, and protection or restoration 
of natural defences to coastal hazards. In areas potentially affected by coastal 
hazards in the next 100 years, Policy 25 of the NZCPS requires that for 
subdivision, use, and development,	 change in land use (including managed 
retreat), and design for relocatability is encouraged to reduce adverse effects 
from coastal hazards. Policy 25(d) encourages the location of infrastructure away 
from areas of hazard risk, where practicable. Policy 27 requires that in areas of 
significant existing development which are likely to be affected by coastal 
hazards, a range of options for reducing risk are assessed, including the 
promotion and identification of long-term sustainable risk reduction approaches 
(such as managed retreat). Local authorities must give effect to the NZCPS 
through their policies, plans and resource consent decisions. 
While no NPS for natural hazards has been produced to date, there have 
been recent legal clarifications regarding the strength of the NZCPS. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Environmental Defence Society Incorporated v New 
Zealand King Salmon Company [2014] NZSC 38 (King Salmon) gives strong 
weighting to the directive policies of the NZCPS. In this decision, a Board of 
Inquiry used the overall broad judgement in its decision to grant consent to a 
proposed aquaculture development, asserting that applying the primacy of s 5 of 
the RMA over the NZCPS is correct. The Supreme Court on the other hand, held 
that by taking this approach, there is no provision for an environmental bottom 
line, meaning the NZCPS becomes a mere list of requirements to consider when 
making decisions. The Court held that this approach is not correct, as the 
purpose of the NZCPS is to assist in achieving the purpose of the RMA, giving 
substance to Part 2. The NZCPS is an arm of the RMA, and to cherry pick which 
policies are adhered to not only undermines the NZCPS but the function and 
integrity of the RMA. Giving effect to the NZCPS in general is not adequate. ‘Give 
effect to’ is a strong directive which cannot be evaded by a general approach [80]. 
There are a range of implications borne from King Salmon affecting RMA 
decision makers, policy drafters, and applicants. As strongly expressed by Nolan 
and Gardner-Hopkins (2014, p. 3) “the doctrine of precedent requires the King 
Salmon decision to be followed.” Ensuing the precedent set by King Salmon, in 
Gallagher v Tasman District Council [2014] NZEnvC 245 the Environment Court 
declined a plan change appeal that was advocating for residential development 
on land subject to coastal erosion and inundation. In this decision, the Court 
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applied King Salmon, determining that the development should not be permitted 
as it would “increase the risk of social, economic and cultural harm from coastal 
hazards in conflict with NZCPS Objective 5 and Policy 25” (Harker, 2016, p. 78). 
King Salmon has implications for managed retreat, ensuring that policies of the 
NZCPS must be given effect to, and therefore, greater avoidance of risky 
development and stronger direction for relocation or withdrawal of assets and 
infrastructure at risk, with regard to plan making. 
To enable formal recognition of Māori interests, the Minister for the 
Environment must seek and consider comments from iwi authorities when 
preparing NPS and NES (s 46 RMA). Local authorities must consult local tangata 
whenua when preparing policy statements and plans, and take into account any 
relevant iwi planning document that has been lodged with the council, to the 
extent that its content has a bearing on the resource management issues of the 
district or region (ss 61(2A)(a), 66(2A)(a), and 74(2A) RMA). According to Saunders 
(2017) a ‘relevant iwi planning document’ refers to an iwi management plan, a 
statutory document applicable at regional and district planning levels, and to 
non-statutory planning mechanisms. The plan may detail how iwi and hapū 
expect to be involved in resource management and their expectations for 
engagement and participation in planning processes (Ibid). In particular, IMPs 
may include preferred hazard management options, risk reduction techniques 
and engagement processes to assist with the transfer of natural hazard 
knowledge (Ibid). Recognition of Māori interests is important to achieving 
equitable governance. 
The RMA mandates the functions of local authorities, requiring regional 
councils to control land use for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards (s 
30 RMA) and territorial authorities to control actual or potential effects of the 
use, development or protection of land, including for the purpose of avoiding or 
mitigating natural hazards (s 31 RMA). Sections 30 and 31 of the RMA do not 
require local authorities to remedy natural hazards, but to manage the use of 
land and the effects of the use of land, to avoid or mitigate natural hazards. Local 
authorities can avoid or mitigate natural hazards via policies, plans and consent 
processing. In terms of dealing with uncertainty, the precautionary principle, 
which the promotion of sustainable management under the RMA is immersed 
in, but not explicitly referenced, highlights that uncertainty is not a valid 
justification for inaction, especially where potential consequences are high or 
irreversible, and the timing and magnitude of effects are unknown (United 
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Nations, 1992). RMA s 32 (2)(c) reflects the precautionary principle, stating that 
the evaluation of plans and statements must “assess the risk of acting or not 
acting if there is uncertain or insufficient information about the subject matter 
of the provisions.” 
Regional policy statements and regional plans set the basis for which district 
plans are developed to control land use activities. Pursuant to s 61 RMA, regional 
councils must prepare and update their RPS in accordance with their functions 
under	s 30 and the provisions of	Part 2 of the RMA, among other obligations. 
Regional policy statements integrate and guide the management of natural and 
physical resources within each region, specifying objectives, policies and 
methods (but not rules). They are influential documents as regional and district 
plans must 'give effect to' them (ss 67(3)(c) and 75(3)(c) RMA). Regional plans 
contain provisions addressing issues relevant to council functions including 
coastal hazards, floodplain management, land stability, and geothermal hazards. 
Under s 10(4) of the RMA, regional councils (unlike district and city councils) can 
include rules in their regional plans for controlling land (for the purposes of 
avoiding or mitigating natural hazards) that may impinge on existing use rights. 
If resource consent is required due to new rules in a proposed plan, activities 
regulated under the operative regional plan may continue until the proposed 
plan becomes operative, but resource consent must be applied for within six 
months of the provisions becoming operative (Palmer, 2012, p. 808). This 
provision makes regional plans an instrument for managing hazard risk in areas 
where there is existing development, potentially providing an opportunity to 
overcome the significant barrier of existing use rights (Chapter 2). However, 
there remains a lack of clarity as to the legality of this approach and the 
application of s 85 RMA, to be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
Pursuant to s 31 of the RMA, territorial authorities (district and city councils) 
control the effects of the use of land for the avoidance or mitigation of natural 
hazards. Territorial authorities are required to prepare a district plan and ensure 
it gives effect to the relevant RPS. Territorial authorities have the	authority to 
control subdivision under s 31(2) of the RMA and under s 106 have the power to 
refuse subdivision consent or impose conditions (s 220) if there is a significant 
risk from natural hazards. Amendments to the RMA in 2017 resulted in changes 
to ss 106 and 220 to broaden the range of natural hazards to be considered, 
ensuring that all natural hazards are considered in decisions and conditions on 
subdivision consent applications. Previously, these sections did not require a risk 
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management approach, which resulted in decisions where low-likelihood and 
high-consequence hazards were excluded from consideration, for example, 
Kotuku Parks Ltd v Kāpiti Coast District Council EnvC Ao73/00 (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017c). Further amendments introduce a risk-based approach for 
subdivision applications, guided by s 106(1A), which includes a combined 
assessment of: 
 (a) the likelihood of natural hazards occurring (whether individually 
or in combination); and 
(b) the material damage to land in respect of which the consent is 
sought, other land, or structures that would result from natural 
hazards; and 
(c) any likely subsequent use of the land in respect of which the 
consent is sought that would accelerate, worsen, or result in material 
damage of the kind referred to in paragraph (b). 
The amendments require decision-makers to consider the magnitude of 
hazards, including those with a high impact but low probability of occurrence, 
aligning assessments with the definition of ‘effect’ under the RMA, and providing 
for the management of significant risks from natural hazards (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017c). The current framing of risk in the RMA is predominantly 
technocratic, focused on likelihood and effects. The LGA on the other hand has 
historically had a focus on the ‘four well-beings’ which were removed in 2012 but 
have recently (in 2018) become a focus again.  
4.2.2 Local Government Act 2002   
The RMA and LGA recognise and make provisions for the connections 
between sustainable management and the reduction of natural hazard risk. The 
LGA outlines the key functions, obligations, restrictions and powers of local 
authorities and enables the engagement of the community in decision-making. 
The Local Government (Community Well-being) Amendment Bill 2018 is 
seeking the reinstatement of the promotion of social, economic, environmental 
and cultural well-being to the statutory purpose of local government. The Bill 
acknowledges the role of local government in promoting the well-being of 
citizens and communities rather than simply providing core services, thus 
providing opportunities to consider dimensions of vulnerability and take action 






Table 9: Relevant Local Government Act 2002 provisions 
Section 10 “(1) The purpose of local government is— 
(a) to enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on 
behalf of, communities; and` 
(b) to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality 
local infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory 




Section 10 amended (Purpose of local government) 
(1)Replace section 10(1)(b) with: 
“(b) to promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-
being of communities in the present and for the future.” 
Section 11A “In performing its role, a local authority must have particular regard to 
the contribution that the following core services make to its communities: 
… (d) the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards…” 
Sections 145 & 163  Gives local authorities the power to make bylaws, including for the 
purpose of protecting,	promoting, and maintaining public	health and 
safety and specifies powers in relation to the removal of works in breach 
of bylaws. 
Sections 93-97 Provide for Long Term Plans that describe the activities of local 
authorities. This can include descriptions of local authority activities as 
well as the management of natural hazards. 
Section 101B  
 
 “(1) A local authority must, as part of its long-term plan, prepare and 
adopt an infrastructure strategy for a period of at least 30 consecutive 
financial years… 
 (3) The infrastructure strategy must outline how the local authority 
intends to manage its infrastructure assets, taking into account the need 
to—… 
 (e) provide for the resilience of infrastructure assets by identifying and 
managing risks relating to natural hazards and by making appropriate 
financial provision for those risks...” 
 
Palmer (2012) concludes that the ‘participatory democracy’ model 
highlighted in s 10 of the LGA suggests that elected decision makers, committees 
and officers have a function to implement the wishes of the community via 
adequate enquiry and consultation. Present and future community needs are to 
be met by local government in a cost-effective manner and in performing their 
roles, local authorities must have particular regard to the avoidance or mitigation 
of natural hazards. Section 93 of the LGA necessitates the development of a long-
term plan (LTP), to provide the vision and activities for communities within a 10-
year timeframe. An LTP sets the strategic direction for a local authority over a 10-
year period, including an infrastructure strategy to dictate the management of 
infrastructure assets over a 30-year period. Asset management plans guide the 
maintenance, improvement and growth of Council owned assets. These assets 
are generally community facilities, roads and parking, rubbish and recycling, 
stormwater, wastewater and water supply facilities and recreation/open spaces. 
LGA Schedule 10, cl 1 provides “A long-term plan must, to the extent determined 
appropriate by the local authority, describe the community outcomes for the 
local authority’s district or region.” LTP are intended to provide integrated 
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decision-making and co-ordination of local resources, a long-term decision-
making focus and a basis for accountability (LGA s 93(6)). As part of this, an 
Annual Plan supplements the LTP, by defining the financial contributions 
required to achieve the vision.  
As managed retreat interventions require financial support for planning and 
risk assessment processes (let alone implementation costs) LTP processes are 
vital for allocating project funds. However, as illustrated by Campbell’s (2016) 
‘Planner’s Triangle’, due to competing social, economic and environmental 
values and priorities, funding allocation is never guaranteed. Lawrence et al., 
(2019, p. 196-197) recognise this as a barrier for long-term river flood adaptation 
planning: “This funding system, with its focus on structural investments for 
“protecting” communities from floods, as opposed to reducing future risk, will 
affect how reviews at trigger points can be implemented.” Long-term, dynamic 
adaptation pathways to enable managed retreat may be limited by static funding 
processes, familiarity and preference for structural investments, and competing 
projects, values and vulnerabilities.  
4.2.3 Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 
The	 CDEMA is administered by the	 Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management. This Act aims to achieve management of hazards, risk 
and disaster response and recovery through policy, planning and decision-
making practices. The purpose of the CDEMA is explicitly focused on risk 
management (Table 10). Unlike the RMA and LGA, the CDEMA is more 
specifically focused on building resilience to all hazards, guided by the 
emergency management concept of the 4Rs: reduction (of risk); readiness (for 
an event); response (during an event); and recovery (following an event). 
Vallance and Carlton (2015) conclude that the 4R’s, as represented in NZ disaster 
management, are part of a mutually reinforcing cycle. Reduction, is focused on 
ascertaining risk and where possible, avoiding or reducing it. This phase of the 
cycle is predominantly carried out under the RMA, through land use planning. 
Readiness, involves the use of community and organisational based capabilities 
and programmes prior to a disaster, such as training emergency services or 
obtaining food, water and essential supplies for three days (Vallance & Carlton, 
2015). Immediately following a disaster is where the response phase clicks into 
gear, involving the necessary actions to save lives, protect properties and restore 
key services. Following a disaster is the recovery phase, which is often an 
extended period, involving political, social, economic and environmental 
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complexities for decision-making. Resilience thinking should be intertwined 
within each of the 4R’s, where in ‘peace-time’, efforts are made to build resilience 
and adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems in an anticipatory manner. 
During and following disasters, the resources to cope with and adapt to change 
within the system must be available. 
4.2.4 Other legislation 
The Building Act and Local Government Official Information and Meetings 
Act support sustainable management of natural hazard risk by ensuring safe 
building standards and enabling public availability of official information held 
by local authorities. When building consent is applied for on land that is subject 
to one or more natural hazards, or the building work is likely to accelerate, 
worsen or result in a natural hazard on that land or any other property, a building 
consent authority must refuse consent, unless adequate provision has been made 
to protect the land from the natural hazard(s) (BA 2004 s 71(2)). Where building 
consent is issued pursuant to	 s 72 of the BA, it is given a s 74 notification 
particularising the consent and the natural hazard is registered on the Certificate 
of Title by the Registrar-General of Land. This notification alerts future 
purchasers or those with an interest in the property (i.e. lenders and insurers) 
that the land is subject to natural hazard(s).  
Land information memorandums are prepared under the LGOIM Act. They 
provide a summary of information that a local authority holds in relation to 
property. Hazards registers are kept by local authorities so that hazard 
information from LIMs are able to inform the preparation of plans (The RMA 
Quality Planning Resource, 2016). LIMs are a key method for communicating 
hazards and risk, providing a responsive means for keeping information up to 
date, and delivering that information to property owners (Saunders & 
Mathieson, 2016). According to Saunders and Mathieson (2016) LIM reporting 
must include all information held about a natural hazard and therefore can be 
utilised by councils to convey hazard information without going through a 
formal district plan review. Under s 44A(2)(a) of the LGOIM Act, a LIM can 
include information identifying special features or characteristics of the subject 
land, including potential natural hazards or likely hazardous contaminants 
which includes, but is not limited to: 
(a) potential erosion, avulsion, falling debris, subsidence, slippage, 
alluvion, or inundation, or likely presence of hazardous 
contaminants, being a feature or characteristic that— 
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(i) is known to the territorial authority; but 
(ii) is not apparent from the district scheme under the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1977 or a district plan under 
the	Resource Management Act 1991: 
Terms ‘potential’ and ‘likely’ were discussed in Weir v Kāpiti Coast District 
Council [2013] NZHC 3522. The court concluded that ‘potential’ is to be 
distinguished from	‘likely’; “‘[l]ikely’ unquestionably refers to probability — 
specifically a state of facts that is more probable than not” [50]. Potential was 
discussed in relation to physical effects on the land (erosion, avulsion, etc.) that 
have not yet and may never occur, meaning it is unfeasible to attach probability 
to potential. The court found “Instead, there is an obligation to refer in the LIM 
to information held by the Council and relating to such future events only if there 
is a	possibility	that they may occur in the future. By possibility, I mean a 
reasonable possibility, objectively determined” [51]. Fundamentally, the purpose 
of a LIM is to provide notice of facts that may affect the physical state and 
potentially the value of land, information in the district plan does not need to be 
included in the LIM (Saunders & Mathieson, 2016).  
Sections 131 and 132 of the BA require territorial authorities to adopt a policy 
on Dangerous and Insanitary Buildings. Councils respond to information 
regarding potentially dangerous or insanitary buildings, inspect and take action. 
If an on-site wastewater system is affected by rising groundwater or salt-water 
intrusion causing leakage/overflows there would be implications for regional 
discharge regulations and potential breaches of subdivision or land use consents 
where provision of sanitary services is specified as a condition. Councils may 
apply RMA or BA enforcement processes. Where there is no ability to address 
the issue and provide effective sanitary services, territorial authorities can use 
their powers under BA s 129 to undertake any actions to fix insanitary conditions 
such as prohibiting occupation of the building or demolishing it. Whilst reactive 
and possibly contentious, this is both a measure and trigger to enforce managed 
retreat. 
Compulsory land acquisition is enabled in New Zealand under the Public 
Works Act 1981. Under ss 4A and 16 of the PWA, the Minister of Lands is 
empowered to acquire any land required for government work if it is for a public 
purpose. Section 2 defines government work as “a work or an intended work that 
is to be constructed, undertaken, established, managed, operated, or maintained 
by or under the control of the Crown or any Minister of the Crown for any public 
purpose.” As will be discussed in Section 4.3.3, the use of the PWA is currently 
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limited for managed retreat, however it can enable managed realignment where 
properties are purchased to realign public works such as engineered protection 
structures and infrastructure. The PWA may be used by requiring authorities 
(and potentially community-based organisations) as part of the RMA designation 
process for public works (Part 8 RMA) (MfE, 2017a, p. 229). 
Flood and erosion control is administered under the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Act 1941 by regional (and unitary) councils, to prevent damage by 
floods, prevent and mitigate soil erosion, and manage land to achieve this 
(Lawrence, 2015). The Land Drainage Act 1908 is administered by all local 
government authorities to maintain watercourses and drains. Both the SC&RCA 
and the LDA govern and facilitate the funding of flood risk management in New 
Zealand (Ibid).  
In accordance with the Reserves Act 1977, Reserve Management Plans 
identify the management approach, use and development policies for local 
reserves. This could include approaches such as managed retreat where natural 
hazards are present. 
4.2.5 Legislative summary 
Resilience planning in New Zealand is supported by the mandated 
promotion of sustainable management under the RMA, and the functions and 
powers of local authorities to avoid and reduce the effects of natural hazards and 
climate change, make democratic decisions on behalf of communities, fund risk 
management activities, and register hazard information. Whilst ‘managed 
retreat’ is not explicitly referenced in the legislation, it is recognised as a 
legitimate planning approach under the NZCPS, and local authorities have 
mechanisms available to apply it. Whether or not it is enabled in planning 
practice is the subject of Chapter 5. 
Table 10 provides a summary of the key purposes of the primary acts, the 
definition of natural hazards and climate change (demonstrating the scope of 
each piece of legislation), the responsibilities of governance actors, and specific 
mechanisms to manage natural hazard and climate change risks. This 
summation provides a broad depiction of the wide range of mechanisms 
available to the empowered groups who have responsibilities and functions 
under these acts. Visible concepts from the literature review are highlighted, 
demonstrating formal institutional associations with risk, resilience, and 
governance principles. For example, the devolved, participatory, and directive 
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nature of the RMA is illustrative of good governance attributes: nesting, where 
decision-making authority and responsibility are conferred to the lowest 
possible level; recognition and respect of diverse perspectives and values and; 
direction and coordination, where aims are clear, functions are coordinated and 
governors accountable.  
Other than the mechanisms provided in Table 10, planners and 
environmental managers can draw on other instruments for risk management, 
including non-statutory plans and guidelines, hazard contingency plans, growth 
and management strategies, asset and infrastructure management plans, 
financial enticements/deterrents, hazard registers, easements, land swaps, 
structure plans, emergency management training, warning and evacuation 
planning, education, research and advice (Glavovic et al., 2010; The RMA Quality 
Planning Resource, 2016b). Structure plans and growth strategies act to 
comprehensively plan and manage a set area, with consideration to mitigating 
the effects of natural hazards. Guidance or requirements established in these 
plans are often implemented through district plan provisions. Management 
strategies aim to deliver policy direction for the management of resources of a set 
area and are commonly used in coastal and riverine environments. Non-
statutory strategies are beneficial as they can integrate and provide direction for 
a wide range of council functions, including risk management (examined further 
in Chapter 5). Table 10 provides the general context for the formal planning 
instruments available for natural hazard and climate change risk management. 
In the following section, Table 11 expands upon this framework, exploring 
specific mechanisms for enabling managed retreat, including the provision of 
information, regulation, incentives and risk transfer. 
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Table 10: Legislative aims, definitions, responsibilities and instruments for managing natural hazard and  climate change risks in New Zealand 
Statute and purpose Definitions  Responsibilities  Visible concepts Instruments  
Resource Management Act 
1991: Promote the 
sustainable management of 
natural and physical 
resources, including natural 
hazards and the effects of 
climate change. 
Section 2(1)  
Natural hazard: any 
atmospheric or earth or 
water related occurrence 
(including earthquake, 
tsunami, erosion, volcanic 
and geothermal activity, 
landslip, subsidence, 
sedimentation, wind, 
drought, fire, or flooding) the 
action of	which adversely 
affects or may adversely 
affect human life, property, 
or other aspects of	the 
environment 
Climate change:	a change of 
climate that is attributed 
directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters 
the composition of the global 
atmosphere and that is in 
addition to natural climate 
variability observed over 
comparable time periods 
Ministry for the Environment/ 
Department of Conservation/ 
Governor General: NPS, NES, 
national guidance 
• Risk (technocratic- s 6 and 
natural hazard provisions) 
• Resilience (intrinsic value 
of ecosystems) 
• Effective governance 
(direction, coordination 
and accountability) 
• Equitable governance 
(participation and 
recognition)  
• Robust governance 
(nesting and legitimacy) 
• Responsive governance 






Regional councils: Control use 
of land for avoidance of 
hazards; monitor and keep 









Control effects of land use for 
avoidance of hazards; monitor 
and keep records of 
information 
-District plans  
-Resource consents 
(and conditions e.g. 
easements & 
covenants) 
-ss 106 & 220 RMA 
-s 229(a)(v) RMA 
-Designations 
Local Government Act 
2002: To enable democratic 
local decision-making and 
action by, and on behalf of, 
communities; to meet the 
Section 5(1)  
Natural hazard has the 
meaning given to it in s 2(1) 
of the Resource Management 
Act 1991 
Territorial authorities: 
Set strategic direction and 
having regard to core services, 
including avoidance or 
mitigation of natural hazards (s 
• Risk (infrastructure 
planning) 
• Four wellbeing’s – 








Statute and purpose Definitions  Responsibilities  Visible concepts Instruments  
current and future needs of 
communities for good-
quality local infrastructure, 
local public services, and 
performance of regulatory 
functions in a way that is 
most cost-effective for 
households and businesses. 
*Wellbeings amendment 
11A(d)); determine hazard 
management actions, flood 
protection and control works; 
financial planning for risk 
reduction, taking into account 
the foreseeable needs of future 
generations.  
(infrastructure) 




• Equitable governance 
(participation and 
recognition)  
• Robust governance 
(nesting and legitimacy) 
• Responsive governance 
(anticipatory – long-term 
planning) 
strategy (s 10) 
CDEMA 2002: To improve 
and promote the 
sustainable management of 
hazards to contribute to the 
four wellbeings, encourage 
and enable communities to 
achieve acceptable levels of 
risk (by identifying risks and 
applying risk reduction), 
provide planning and 
preparation for emergencies 
(readiness, response and 
recovery), integrate local 
and national CDEM 
planning and activity across 
the range of empowered 
agencies and organisations. 
 
Section 4 
Hazard means: something 
that may cause, or 
contribute substantially to 
the cause of, an emergency.  
Ministry of Civil Defence 
Emergency Management/ 
Dept. of Internal Affairs 
Sustainable management of 
hazards, identification of 
hazards of national 
significance, planning and 
preparation for readiness, 
response and recovery. 
Reduction of risk is predominantly 
carried out under the RMA and 
LGA.  
• Resilience 
• Adaptive capacity 
• Four wellbeing’s – 
drivers of vulnerability  
• Risk (explicit) 




• Equitable governance 
(participation)  
• Robust governance 






-NEWM Group Plans 
-Directors Guidelines 
Local Authorities 
Form a CDEM Group 
Identify and manage hazards 
and risks 
Consult and communicate 
about risks to the community 
-CDEM Group Plans 






Statute and purpose Definitions  Responsibilities  Visible concepts Instruments  
Carry out emergency responses 
and recovery activities 
Plan and prepare for 







Building Act 2004: To 
provide regulation and 
standards for building work 
to ensure that people can 
safely use buildings and so 
buildings are designed, 
constructed, and are able to 




hazard: Erosion (including 
coastal erosion, bank erosion, 
and sheet erosion); falling 
debris (including soil, rock, 
snow, and ice); subsidence; 
inundation (including 
flooding, overland flow, 
storm surge, tidal effects, and 
ponding); and slippage. 
*(Definition does not include 
active faults, liquefaction, 
lateral spreading/tsunami). 
Department of Building and 
Housing 
Establish licensing regime 
Building performance 
standards 
• Risk (technocratic)  
• Effective governance 
(direction) 
• Robust governance 






Identify and provide 
information about hazard 
prone land 
Resrtrict buildng construction 
of hazard prone land 






-PIMs (s 31-35) 
-Building consent 
processing and 
conditions (s 71-74) 
Local Government Official 
Information and Meetings 
Act 1987: To increase public 
availability of official 
information held by local 
authorities and to promote 
open and public transaction 
of business at meetings of 
local authorities for more 
effective public 
participation in decision-
making and accountability 
of local authority officials. 
No definitions Local authorities 
Make local authority 
information publicly available 
and provide natural hazard 
information to be included on 
LIMs where this information is 
not shown within the District 
Plan (s 44A(2)(a)(ii)).  





4.3 Managed retreat instruments 
Managed retreat is likely to require some form of regulatory control, but it 
can rely on a range of instruments for its enablement. As evident in Chapters 2 
and 4, retreat (including managed and unmanaged) mechanisms can be 
categorised into four key groups: provision of information; regulation; incentives 
and; risk transfer. Information is necessary to educate current and potential 
property owners of risk, to catalyse a strategic retreat process, or to allow 
residents to retreat voluntarily. Regulation and incentives can be applied as a 
combination of ‘carrot and stick’ tools, and the insurance sector spreads risk, with 
insurance retreat likely to provide market signals resulting in reduced property 
value and eventual investment decline. Table 11 details the primary forms of 
interventions and corresponding instruments and actors, illustrating the diverse 
sources of power and influence of the governance of managed retreat.  












SECTOR & CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
• National guidance documents 
• International standards   
• Technical science reports and papers 
• Research outputs (e.g. National Science Challenges)  
• Public meetings/workshops to provide evidence of 
natural hazard and climate change risks  
• Science communication tools (e.g. Waikato Coastal 
Inundation tool) 












• Central government has some potential to regulate 
managed retreat under s 360(1)(i) of the RMA 
• Public Works Act 1981 
• CER Act 2011 (see Chapter 2) 
• RMA ss 6(a)(d)(h) and 7(i) 
• National environmental standards 
• National policy statements 
o New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010  
 
• Regional policy statements 
• Regional coastal plans 
• Regional plans  
• District plans  
• LIMs 
• Notices on Certificate of Titles under the BA 
• Structure plans 
• LTPs (funding and infrastructure strategies) 
• Iwi management plans 
• Special rating area, or pre-paid fund targeted at those 
receiving benefits from hazard protection to 




Information is critical to managed retreat as it is knowledge of risk that 
fundamentally drives the need to adapt. Risk information can come from a range 
of sources, but certain forms, especially technocratic risk assessments currently 
have greater legitimacy and impact in the formal institutional framework. 
Technical risk information can include national government guidance 
documents and standards, science reports and papers. These are often 
disseminated online, at community workshops, via interactive communication 
tools, and regulation (Section 4.3.2). Once derived, risk assessments ‘become’ 
accurate, rational reflections of the world, however, they are in fact, socially 
constructed (Tierney, 1999). Political and economic power determine the ability 
to impose risks on others, shape risk discourse and its acceptability, forming the 
basis for state interventions such as managed retreat (Ibid). Risk creation and 
allocation is connected to broader political and economic contexts and measures 
of control. As it will be examined further (Chapters 6-8), risk tolerability differs 
greatly according to local contexts, vulnerability, and individual perceptions, 
making the provision of risk information complex and contested. While 
provision of ‘rational’ information is beneficial to managed retreat decision 
makers to provide direction and create legitimacy, information from a diverse set 
of actors, including local and indigenous knowledge, is vital to ensure equitable, 
context specific decision-making and inclusive risk assessments. Provision of 
information is not sufficient to enable managed retreat alone, but it is an essential 
prerequisite to assessment of options and strategies for decision-makers, and it 
acts to inform individuals to avoid investment in risky localities, and to enable 



















STATE & LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
 
• Land acquisition under residual freedom/general 
competency powers of the LGA followed by either: 
o Leasing property back to the previous 
owner/unrelated tenant 
o Rehabilitation and conversion to reserve 
o Covenant property and re-sell 
• Relocation subsidy to incentivise uptake of retreat 
• Land swap 
• Deferred zoning to open up new land for relocation 
Transfer risk 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
• Insurance retreat resulting in reduced property values 
and eventual decline of habitation. 
• Insurance offsetting losses by sharing or spreading the 
losses post-event and providing compensation which 
could support relocation to other sites.  
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4.3.2 Regulate 
Local authorities have responsibilities to identify natural hazards and 
provide this information to the public. Hazard information can be provided via 
district or regional plans, LIMs and notices on titles under the Building Act giving 
it regulatory status. However, as noted by Harker (2016, p. 79) “[d]espite statutory 
and common law obligations to provide coastal hazard information, local 
authorities have faced legal and political challenges when attempting to include 
coastal hazard notifications on property notices.” 
For example, concerned Kāpiti property owners sought judicial of a district 
council decision after it referenced 50 and 100-year coastal hazard lines on 
property LIMs. As a result of the review, the notifications were removed, partially 
due to concerns regarding the accuracy of the hazard lines (Chapter 2). Similarly, 
Dunedin City Council undertook mapping of coastal hazards and indicated a 
‘red line zone’ where extreme risk is present in Brighton (Strack, 2016). The 
assessment caused distress to Brighton residents as they were concerned that the 
hazard zone would affect property values and make insurance more difficult. 
Strack (2016, p. 5) noted, “The council conceded that the ‘Red Lining’ was 
unfortunate given the same terminology used for Christchurch earthquake 
zoning, and they moderated their stance by suggesting that nothing would be 
finalised until widespread community consultation was completed.” The 
reactions of the public to the notification of hazard information and the 
concomitant concern over property values creates sharp political pressures for 
local authorities seeking to manage hazards, and ultimately, tensions between 
private and public interests. These difficulties highlight the utility of national 
standards which could accommodate local nuance, as well as recognition of the 
political struggles that local government will encounter when providing such 
information independently (Harker, 2016). Harker considers that climate-risk 
statements could be made mandatory by central government to remove political 
pressure from local governments. In 2018, Dunedin Mayor and Local 
Government New Zealand president Dave Cull called on central government to 
require councils to make public any risks faced by climate change: 
At the moment, if a council identifies a risk and records that on the 
land information memorandum we get immediate pushback—
understandably—from the property owner, who will claim that 
we've devalued their property. To some extent … council is liable for 
that…So what we need is central government, I think, to require local 
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government, councils, to identify risks and make it public (Cull, D as 
cited in Harris (2018)). 
Hazard notification is often considered a blunt tool which causes shock to 
property owners, and early and effective community engagement is required for 
managed retreat interventions, including the provision of information. 
Identification of hazard prone and at-risk areas is vital to ensure that owners and 
potential purchasers of private property understand the risks at hand and can 
make educated decisions about their investments.  
The RMA provides opportunities for guidance and regulation on managed 
retreat, via national policy statements and national environmental standards. 
Although these mechanisms are not currently employed, the NZCPS, as 
discussed in Section 4.2.1 provides some regulatory direction on managed retreat 
in the coastal environment. NES and NPS (including the NZCPS) are binding at 
the regional and district levels, requiring local authorities to impose planning 
controls to give effect to them through their policies, plans and resource consent 
decisions. The Minister of Conservation has functions under the Reserves Act 
1977 and the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 which have an indirect effect on risk 
management (Turbott & Stewart, 2006). Central government has some ability to 
make regulations under s 360(1)(i) of the RMA however the application of this 
approach, to enable managed retreat requires further investigation: 
(1) The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in 
Council, make regulations for all or any of the following purposes: 
(i) Providing for any other such matters as are contemplated by, or 
necessary for giving full effect to, this Act and for its due 
administration.  
Local regulation is one of the strongest instruments currently available for 
managed retreat interventions. Territorial authorities, using district plan control 
over land use activities have the greatest potential to limit new development in 
areas subject to natural hazards. District plans can regulate land in affected zones 
to limit, setback or avoid subdivision, use and development. Section 106 of the 
RMA empowers territorial authorities to refuse applications for subdivision 
consent if: 
(a) the land in respect of which a consent is sought, or any structure 
on the land, is or is likely to be subject to material damage by erosion, 
falling debris, subsidence, slippage, or inundation from any source; or 
(b) any subsequent use that is likely to be made of the land is likely to 
accelerate, worsen, or result in material damage to the land, other 
land, or structure by erosion, falling debris, subsidence, slippage, or 
inundation from any source;  
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Territorial authorities also have powers under s 71 of the BA to refuse 
buildingconsent where the land is subject to or likely to be subject to one or 
more natural hazards, or the building work is likely to accelerate, worsen or 
result in a natural hazard on that land or any other property. However, these are 
unplanned responses which do not enable a strategic approach or consistent 
policy to be adopted and pursued (Berry & Vella, 2010). 
Local authorities may decline resource consent applications for hard 
protection works. This is a particularly important planning mechanism in the 
coastal environment where there is legacy development and expectations of 
works to protect properties although they impact upon natural character and 
amenity values of the coast and can result in adverse effects on coastal processes 
(Berry & Vella, 2010). In the coastal marine area, regional coastal plans have the 
ability to control such works. Due to the restrictive nature of regional coastal 
plans, where no plan provision sanctions coastal protection works, resource 
consent is required. This was demonstrated in Falkner v Gisborne District Council 
[1995] NZRMA 462 where property owners wished to construct protection works 
to avoid further encroachment by the sea. The appellants argued that at common 
law, the Crown had a duty to protect property from inroads of the sea and as land 
owners they had a right to protect their land. The High Court held that these 
common law rights, if established, were subject to the RMA and therefore the 
right of land owners to protect their land from the sea was inconsistent with the 
resource consent procedure of the RMA (Harker, 2016, p. 76). This decision 
provided a useful method for authorities to control hard protection works in 
favour of longer-term adaptation methods (Harker, 2016). 
Although there are opportunities to regulate new land uses, where 
development already exists in New Zealand, territorial authorities have limited 
control over this. Requiring relocation of existing structures is not possible where 
activities have existing use rights. Section 10(1)(a) of the RMA enables 
continuation of an activity if it was lawfully established under the planning 
regulations which applied at the time, on the basis that the effects of the land use 
are the same or similar in character, intensity and scale to those that were 
originally established. 
 However, existing use rights present less of a barrier to managed retreat 
under regional planning instruments as s 20A of the RMA allows the 
continuation of existing use rights until the new regional plan rules become 
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operative. Therefore, if it is within the scope of the regional council’s functions, 
it may be possible to apply regional rules under s 20A to extinguish existing use 
rights. As noted by Berry and Vella (2010), McKinlay v Timaru District Council 
[2001] NZRMA 569 (EnvC) confirmed that for coastal hazards, regional councils 
have the authority to control the use of land including the extinguishment of 
existing use rights. A matter of legal interest at present is the application of s 85 
RMA in extinguishing existing use rights to enable managed retreat. Previously, 
if the Environment Court agreed that a plan provision leaves land incapable of 
reasonable use, and places an unfair and unreasonable burden on the person 
who has interest in that land, the Court could direct the local authority to change, 
delete or remove the plan provision. This meant that even if there was a high 
level of public interest in applying the provisions, councils could not retain them 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2017d). The 2017 Resource Amendments 
introduced an alternative remedy if the threshold of s 85 RMA is met. The 
Environment Court can now direct councils to acquire the land, part of the land 
or an interest in land from the affected landowner under the Public Works Act 
1981 (PWA) instead of changing the provision (Ibid). This amendment is aimed at 
providing flexibility for when a council would prefer to keep the plan provisions 
in place, however, as discussed in Section 4.3.3, managed retreat is not included 
as a public work under the PWA and therefore further clarity is required for this 
amendment. Berry and Vella’s (2010) analysis of coastal hazard regulations in 
New Zealand regions highlighted that regional councils have been reserved in 
the use of their power to extinguish existing use rights, however, as will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the use of this power for the enablement of 
managed retreat is gaining traction.  
Control over the use of land makes for contentious decision-making, even 
when it is in the interest of the health and safety of communities and the quality 
of the environment. Falkner v Gisborne District Council verified that the RMA 
creates a system in which sustainable management takes priority over property 
rights. The Court dismissed the land owners’ argument that managed retreat 
from coastal erosion is essentially a ‘seizure of property’ in terms of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (BORA), because any land lost to action of the sea would be 
vested in the Crown (Berry & Vella, 2010, p. 15). The Court stated: 
The whole thrust of the regime is the regulation and control of the use 
of land, sea, and air. There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about 
this. It is a necessary implication of such a regime that common law 
 120 
property rights pertaining to the use of land or sea are to be subject to 
it ...  
The effect of all this is simply that, where pre-existing common law 
rights are inconsistent with the Act’s scheme, those rights will no 
longer be applicable. Clearly, a unilateral right to protect one’s 
property from the sea is inconsistent with the resource consent 
procedure envisaged by the Act; accordingly, any protection work 
proposed by the residents must be subject to that procedure ...  
[T]here is nothing in the scheme of the Act to suggest that the 
common law right cannot be infringed – quite the reverse. The Act is 
simply not about the vindication of personal property rights, but 
about the sustainable management of resources.  
As has been acknowledged both academically and judicially, the 
statutory implementation of integrated planning and environmental 
regimes represents a clear policy shift towards a more public model 
of regulation, based on concepts of social utility and public interest. 
Private law notions such as contract, property rights and personal 
rights of action have consequently decreased in importance.” 
(Falkner v Gisborne District Council as cited in Berry and Vella 
(2010, pp. 15-16). 
In short, there is “no constitutional guarantee of property rights in New 
Zealand” (Berry & Vella, 2010, p. 16) and land may be moderated or affected by 
environmental regulation without compensation. As further confirmed by 
Barton (2003, p. 1): 
 “…it is legal, constitutional, principled and ethical to regulate the use 
of land. Land use regulation cannot be dismissed if we are to make 
progress on amenity, natural character, ecological integrity, 
biodiversity, and sustainability. Policymakers should remain 
undeterred by the possibility that RMA regulation will affect the 
rights of property owners.”  
However, while policymakers may regulate without compensation to 
achieve sustainable management, “whether they should as a matter of policy or 
principle, is a different question” (Berry & Vella, 2010, p. 21). The tensions 
between private property rights, regulation, and compensation are rooted deeply 
in the managed retreat debate, to be unearthed further in the thesis. These issues 
are connected to the following category, which is often required in support of 
regulatory measures, to improve acceptability of managed retreat, particularly 




The RMA empowers environmental regulation over private property rights 
to deliver public and environmental protections. While restrictions on new 
development are not as difficult to apply without compensation, the 
extinguishment of existing use rights creates concerns for equitable governance. 
Under all circumstances, there is a need to consider how managed retreat will be 
funded and who bears the costs of this (Boston & Lawrence, 2018). The cost of 
managed retreat will be significant in many cases, but so too is the cost of leaving 
people in unsafe and uninsurable buildings, passing on legacy costs to future 
generations and diminishing intrinsic ecosystem values.  
Land acquisition is a financial instrument for avoiding risk to life and assets. 
Properties faced with significant risks from natural hazards can be acquired and 
converted to reserve or restored to a functioning natural ecosystem that delivers 
mitigating benefits. Compulsory land acquisition is enabled in New Zealand 
under the PWA. As recognised by Harker (2016, p. 81), in most circumstances, 
land acquisition by agreement should be attempted before commencing the 
compulsory process, but there is disagreement about whether for the purpose of 
reserves, land can be compulsorily acquired under the PWA, or whether it is only 
able to be purchased by agreement. For example, planners at Whakatāne District 
Council received legal advice that the PWA could not be used for managed 
retreat and subsequent reserve conversion (Chapter 6). While there is no set 
process for acquiring land for managed retreat under the PWA, central 
government may potentially use its powers under this Act as such land is 
‘undeniably public’ and local government could potentially acquire land for 
reserve purposes (Harker, 2016, p. 82).  
Fee simple titles are a significant barrier to managed retreat, as market 
values do not reflect the potential transience of land (Turbott & Stewart, 2006, p. 
43). To overcome this, where risk to life is not imminent, but expected to increase 
over-time, the change of use rights to a fixed term would enable precautionary, 
long-term, managed retreat. To implement this, property would first have to be 
acquired by local or central government, then rented or leased for a fixed term, 
allowing adaptive management of the risk. While this option is less likely to be 
feasible with short-term risks, it has some potential where ‘lease-for-life’ terms 
would be available (Ibid). 
 122 
Covenants could be used in combination with land acquisition, where 
provisions are registered on property titles, requiring owners to carry out certain 
actions or restricting them from such. Covenants can be registered through the 
resource consent regime or in the circumstance that local or central government 
acquires, covenants and re-sells or leases a property. For managed retreat, 
covenants can include requirements that buildings are relocated/removed when 
a certain level of risk is reached, prohibition of protection works (including 
resource consent applications) and no complaints of adverse effects (Ibid). 
Easements are another potentially useful instrument for protecting public 
access in coastal areas subject to erosion, to ensure that the wider community can 
still access the beach, even as it migrates inland. In the United States, rolling 
easements have been discussed to provide the public with rights to walk along 
the dry beach, even if it migrates inland (Titus, 2011). The disadvantages of 
covenants and easements is that it will often require the willingness of a property 
owner to implement them, the resource consent process, or acquisition of the 
land at risk. In many cases, properties in New Zealand will continue unchanged, 
holding existing use rights for long periods of time and therefore the opportunity 
for applying easements and covenants on properties is low. 
Although there are advantages to acquiring land to enable managed retreat, 
it is expected to be a prohibitive approach in densely developed coastal 
settlements where property values continue to rise. Valuing land that is subject 
to planning restrictions such as natural hazard risk zones carries potential for 
complications, especially if there is no data available on the value of other 
similarly restricted land (Harker, 2016). Whakatāne District Council has formed 
a managed retreat strategy including incentivised retreat in combination with 
planning regulations. Property owners are being offered a buyout based on an 
independently assessed valuation, with further incentives of a relocation subsidy 




Managed retreat instruments generally align with provision of information, 
regulation and financial incentives by empowered authorities, but insurance 
companies and banks have an important function in this space. Property owners 
insure their assets to safeguard themselves against adverse effects of investment 
loss or damage.  In New Zealand,  the Government plays a major role in the 
provision of natural hazard insurance through the Earthquake Commission 
(EQC). EQC is a risk transfer mechanism which spreads the costs of natural 
hazard damage to private residential property and contents caused by 
“earthquake, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity, landslip, tsunami, or fire 
caused by natural disaster”(Storey et al., 2017, p. 4). Damage caused by storm and 
flood hazards (excluding coastal erosion) is covered for land, but not for 
residential structures or contents (Ibid). To spread risk, a flat premium is applied 
across New Zealand. While this distributes the insurance cost, it removes the cost 
signal of the consequences of living in hazardous locations which arguably 
increases investment in such areas, and contributes to pressure for protection 
works (Storey et al., 2017; Turbott & Stewart 2006).  
Property owners insure their assets to safeguard themselves against adverse 
effects of investment loss or damage. Strack (2016, p. 8) considers that “[g]iven the 
inevitability of sea-levelrise and the hazard implications, higher premiums, 
higher excesses, and even withdrawal of cover are legitimate responses that 
should alert property owners of the impermanence of their investment in coastal 
land.” This approach can be applied to all hazards. Provisions in most home 
insurance contracts (and EQC cover) do not provide for ‘betterment’, insurers 
may repair a home which is at risk of future flooding but they will not subsidise 
relocation of the home or the construction of a new home on a safer site (Boston 
& Lawrence, 2018). The insurance sector is highly reactive, only redistributing 
risk, rather than lessening it.  
Strack (2016) notes that banks and lenders are responsible for giving 
appropriate notice to property owners by limiting mortgage finance on property 
subject to natural hazards. Banks can provide information to borrowers, attempt 
to limit their exposure to inflated values, and they could even establisha policy 
to refuse finance for development on land that is regarded as high risk (Strack, 
2016). According to Storey et al. (2017) insurers cover risk where uncertainty 
exists, therefore insurers themselves will retreat their cover from locations once 
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the risks are ‘sufficiently probable.’ Storey et al., (2017, p. 7) warns that “Insurance 
retreat by a single insurer can cause industry-wide retreat” which could decrease 
house prices due to mortgages becoming unavailable (or more costly). In New 
Zealand, insurance is a requirement for residential mortgages, failing to 
maintain insurance may trigger default (Ibid). Furthermore, as mortgage periods 
often span decades, but insurance contracts are renewed annually, insurers can 
exit an insurance market within 12 months, while a lender has years or decades 
of payments to fulfil, potentially leaving them in technical default. It is expected 
that banks will be less likely to lend to high risk property owners and coastal 
property owners in future, or require greater equity or apply higher interest rates 
(Ibid). Although insurance retreat is not a particularly appealing approach due 
its financial and social implications, it may be one of the most effective ways to 
curb investment in hazardous locations. 
4.4 Summary 
There is strong institutional founding for building resilience in New 
Zealand communities. Managed retreat is not only possible under the existing 
institutional framework, but is central to the promotion of sustainable 
management and risk reduction practice. With no constitutional guarantee of 
property rights, and an institutional framework that prioritises public interests, 
and enables regulation to moderate land use activities, managed retreat appears 
well supported. Additional to the enabling regulatory instruments are 
information, incentives, and risk transfer to reinforce this approach. While 
regulation and incentives hold the greatest potential to enact managed retreat, 
information and risk transfer can be integrated as part of a coordinated, strategic 
approach. 
However, managed retreat will not be achievable in all circumstances, for 
social, cultural, economic, and political reasons, and particularly where 
population and investment reach certain thresholds (Abel et al., 2011). But where 
managed retreat is possible, this chapter presents the formal institutional 
framework and opportunities for its enablement. Difficulties lie in the ability to 
operationalise powers and intentions within the institutional context, to 
transform the guiding principles and mechanisms of the Acts and their 
empowered organisations into action. Producing clear objectives, policies and 
rules to give effect to the RMA requires robust information—something that is 
not always available to councils, particularly in relation to future risk. Council 
plan provisions and decisions are subject to intensive scrutiny, especially when 
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policies may have an effect on private property, or constrain economic 
development (Glavovic 2014). Furthermore, local politicians often feel at risk 
countering proposals that provide immediate economic benefit, but expose 
people to future risks (Ibid).  
Many of these difficulties have led to development in New Zealand that is 
not appropriately located or considerate of long-term effects, giving rise to risky 
legacy land uses and structural protection costs. Chapter 4 has revealed the 
opportunities for managed retreat interventions, but it recognises that 
challenges lie ahead for managing existing use rights, regardless of the ability to 
moderate land use activities under the RMA. Chapter 5 continues this line of 
inquiry, delving further into the regulatory enablement of managed retreat, 
analysing local planning instruments to determine the level of direction afforded 
to managed retreat, and uncover the current state of play. Chapter 6 ensues, 
critically analysing the first example of a local managed retreat intervention 
attempting to extinguish existing use rights. Under the current framework, 
pathways towards managed retreat, albeit bumpy, are beginning to be paved. 
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Chapter 5 Managed retreat policy: 
Revealing the terminology, approaches, 
and direction of local planning 
instruments  
5.1 Introduction  
Local policies and plans are instruments of hierarchical, de-centralised 
government, used to manage the issues and contests of regional and local 
environments. These instruments set the basis for making decisions by 
“providing a common set of facts” (Ericksen et al., 2001, p. 11) about an area, as 
well as facilitating the development and dissemination of local environmental 
knowledge, and setting the regulatory framework and vision for the locality. 
Policy and plans are key guiding documents for local authorities. They provide 
direction to elected officials, council staff, property owners, developers, and the 
public on resource management matters, are guided by national resource 
management law and policy, and establish context specific provisions. As 
recognised in Chapter 2, direction is a fundamental attribute of effective 
governance—ensuring scope, goals, and aims are comprehensive and clearly 
articulated to stakeholders. Policy and plans shape reality in response to resource 
problems, and are particularly influential when they provide a clear and 
convincing direction for the future (Godschalk, David, Berke, & Kaiser, 1998). The 
language used within planning instruments is fundamental in forming policies, 
polities, and politics, (Feindt & Oels, 2005) and the level of direction provided for 
solutions to environmental problems is determined by the language used, 
developed by the values and social knowledge underpinning it. To further 
understanding of the application of managed retreat in New Zealand, an analysis 
of the primary planning documents for enabling it is necessary.  
Chapter 4 informed the reader of the formal institutional framework, 
contextualising the RPS, regional plans, and district plans within the RMA 
hierarchy, to reveal their roles in influencing the management of natural hazard 
risk in New Zealand. Chapter 5 explores the regulation of managed retreat and is 
split into two sections: 
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 5.2 Textual analysis of resource management policy and plans  
 5.3 Textual analysis of local government planning instruments 
Section 5.2 introduces the conceptual policy framework of the first textual 
analysis, exploring key terminologies found, followed by detailed interpretation 
of the data to reveal the dominant discourses present, and the RMA policy and 
regulation used to enable managed retreat in New Zealand. This analysis is 
grounded in the conceptual policy framework inductively developed, 
determining the level of direction for managed retreat within resource 
management policy and plans. A summary of findings delivers an overview of 
the analysis and highlights the key themes, approaches and policy gaps that have 
been discovered. With the findings of the RMA policy established, further 
research was undertaken using the same methodology to broaden the scope. 
Section 5.3 analyses the data against a (condensed) policy direction framework, 
cultivating in-depth evaluations and comparisons of the text. Supplementary 
findings compliment this work, to uncover the status of managed retreat projects.  
The principal findings of the textual analyses highlight that planning 
instruments are predominantly providing limited direction to enable managed 
retreat, demonstrating weak policy support for the approach. Where managed 
retreat is present, diverse terminologies are applied, and a lack of interpretation 
support exists. In RMA policy and plans, five approaches dominate the policy 
landscape, but there is an absence of strategic, coordinated provisions to enable 
managed retreat. Among the instruments reviewed, implementation support is 
lacking and a coastal hazard focus is present. The findings highlight that 
managed retreat is emerging via social learning and policy experimentation, 
resulting in an assortment of provisions across the country. Overall, Chapter 5 
provides a detailed examination of the current role of environmental planning 
in enabling managed retreat. To further this understanding, Chapter 6 (and 
aspects of Chapter 8) examine the applied role of planning, and Chapter 7 
uncovers public perceptions towards mechanisms to enable managed retreat.  
5.2 Textual analysis of resource management policy and plans 
RMA policy and plans provide the basis for avoidance and mitigation of the 
effects of natural hazards, and are where the first textual analysis is focused. Plan 
evaluation frameworks suggest that there are key internal and external 
indicators of plan quality, such as plan vision, fact base, internal consistency, 
policy framework, implementation, coordination and influence (Brody, 2003; 
Godschalk & Berke, 2009; Saunders, Grace, Beban, & Johnston, 2015). The textual 
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analysis is more focused than a general plan evaluation or discourse analysis, 
specifically evaluating the enablement of managed retreat within the policy 
framework of New Zealand RMA plans. As stated by Godschalk, Rodriǵuez, 
Berke, and Kaiser (2006, p. 69), a “high-quality plan provides a clear and 
convincing picture of the future, which strengthens the plan’s influence in the 
land planning arena.” Policy frameworks are critical direction setters and 
Godschalk and Berke (2009, p. 233) argue that a weak direction-setting 
framework results in a community that is less likely to exert control over its 
planning agenda to ensure that long-term public interests supersede short-term 
interests and private concerns. Managed retreat will result in significant short-
term costs to bring sustained, long-term gains with resultant public-private 
tensions. The level of policy direction for managed retreat is therefore a key 
determinant in its application.  
Employing a general inductive approach, the textual analysis evaluates the 
level of direction provided for managed retreat using a conceptual policy 
framework. Where managed retreat is identified in RMA instruments, it is then 
categorised into six primary policy and regulation themes (which emerged 
inductively) and assessed against a spectrum of direction, based on the policy 
language used or the regulation rigour adopted (as discussed in Chapter 3). The 
framework is segregated by policy or regulation type (Categories 1-6) to allow for 
comparison between key provisions targeted at: 
1) Mitigating the effects of natural hazards on existing development; 
2) Regulating new and re-development; 
3) Regulating hard protection structures; 
4) Planning for the resilience of local infrastructure and services; 
5) Regulating the re-construction of materially damaged or destroyed buildings; 
following a natural hazard event; and  
6) Distinct approaches found within the policy context 
An analysis is carried out within each category using key examples to 
examine the differing approaches and to determine key themes. This provides 
insight into how managed retreat provisions are applied in resource 
management plans, to fulfil Objective 2 of this research, as well as providing an 
opportunity to learn where improvements could be made (Godschalk & Berke, 
2009). In total, 150 instruments (regional policy statements, regional plans and 
district plans) from 17 Regional Councils and 67 Territorial Authorities were 
collated, reviewed and interrogated using key search terms from international 
managed retreat literature and analysis of New Zealand planning documents. 
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5.2.1 Terminology  
Planning documents are a source of discourse, representing key issues and 
ideas of their time and in this case, key approaches to risk avoidance and 
mitigation. Operative and proposed RPS, regional plans, and district plans were 
interrogated in search of terms relevant of the concept managed retreat. In plan 
vocabularies, the most prevalent terms (in order of the most to least common) 
were: ‘relocate’/‘relocatable’/‘relocation’, ‘abandon’/‘abandonment’ and 
‘managed retreat’/‘retreat’/‘planned retreat’ (Figure 11).  
 
 
 Figure 11: Terminology count for policy and plans 
 
Of 150 instruments, 75 included one or more of the key terms. Where 
‘managed retreat’ terms were present, a count was provided once for each term 
found. Some documents used a range of terms, and the count includes this 
variability. The following table provides a breakdown of the instruments that 
applied managed retreat terms, demonstrating that only ten per cent of RMA 
plans specifically referenced ‘managed retreat’, that there is a very low level of 
recognition for ‘managed retreat’, ‘relocation’ and other key terms in regional 
plans, and a dominance of ‘relocate’ terminology in regional coastal plans and 
district plans. It is anticipated that prevalence in district plans is due to the 
greater number of territorial authorities, and their lack of remit to extinguish 
existing use rights, rendering a stronger focus on managed retreat of new 
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Table 12: Managed retreat terms by instrument type 
Of the 16 operative and proposed RPS that featured the key terms (five did 
not), seven used the term ‘retreat’ and 12 used ‘relocate’ (with three of these 
instruments using both retreat and relocate). Where ‘retreat’ was used (managed 
retreat, planned retreat or just retreat), the majority (57%) became operative or 
proposed in 2016 and 86% were operative or proposed between 2012-2016. Where 
the term or affixes of the term, ‘relocate’, were used, only three instruments were 
produced in 2016, and 58% became operative or proposed between the years 2012-
2016. Therefore, in terms of the RPS, the more recent documents are 
predominantly making use of the use the term 'managed retreat' (or 
'retreat'/'planned retreat'), but 'relocation' remains slightly more popular overall.  
Managed retreat has great potential to be a sustainable risk reduction 
approach, enhancing resilience by reducing exposure to people and assets rather 
than working against nature to ‘hold the line.’ Therefore, as the guiding 
document for regions of New Zealand, it is important that the more recent policy 
statements are referring to managed retreat as an option within the policy 
toolbox. It would be of benefit for the remaining RPS which did not provide 
guidance on any of the key terms, to reference ‘managed retreat’ and provide 
policy to enable it, or at a minimum, to highlight it as an option for council 
officials and staff, developers, and members of the public to consider. 
Nonetheless, it is noted throughout this analysis that even without RPS guidance, 
many plans incorporate forms of managed retreat within their policies, rules and 
assessment criteria.  
Although there was a close split in terminology choice between the regional 
policy statements, at the subsequent levels in the RMA hierarchy, this was not 
the case, with only three regional coastal plans and five district plans specifically 
referring to managed retreat as a risk reduction approach—the majority (32 




















Retreat 7 0 3 5 15 
Relocate 12 2 11 19 44 
Abandon 5 1 9 6 21 
Withdraw/al 1 0 0 1 2 
Setback 1 0 1 0 2 
Exit strategy 1 0 0 0 1 
Soft 
engineering 
1 0 0 0 1 
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'relocate'/'relocatable'/'relocation', with 22 referencing 'abandon'/'abandonment' 
in conjunction with this. Overall, within local authority discourse, the term 
'relocate' represents 47.5% of the terminology, ‘abandon’ 27.5% and ‘retreat’ 17.5%. 
The common use of the words ‘relocate’ and ‘abandon’, represent the approach 
taken in most plans, where ‘relocation’ or ‘abandonment’ are simply recognised 
as risk reduction options on a case by case basis, not necessarily as part of 
adaptive, integrated strategies. Where ‘managed retreat’ is referenced, it is 
expected that a more comprehensive policy would be in place than those that are 
just signalling ‘relocation’ or ‘abandonment’. Although ‘managed retreat’ has 
made its way into the policy arena, there are few circumstances where a 
comprehensive and coordinated strategy is enabled. In most cases, like 
‘relocation’ and ‘abandonment’, ‘managed retreat’ is merely referenced as an 
option with no further explanation or implementation pathway. This is an 
important finding, as ‘managed retreat’ is founded on strategic principles, being 
a deliberate, coordinated process to strategically withdraw from unsustainable 
locations. Without integrated, strategic planning, or follow through, its 
enablement is limited.  
Ad hoc terms found during the review included ‘withdrawal’, referenced by 
a regional and a district plan and ‘setback’, used by Waikato Regional Council in 
their RPS and RCP. Within RMA documents (and international practice) the 
term ‘setback’ is most commonly used to determine a line from where new 
development is prohibited on policy maps. Another distinctive finding is the 
reference to land purchase to reduce natural hazard risk within the Environment 
Southland Operative RPS 1997 (which no longer has legal effect). The 2012 
Proposed RPS, however, does not refer to such an approach. The Hawke’s Bay 
Regional Coastal Environment Plan 2014 also signals the possibility of financial 
instruments to implement managed retreat, however, this is within the policy 
explanation where a range of options are presented.  
The Proposed Otago RPS 2016 applies a unique expression to describe 
managed retreat, that being ‘exit strategy’. This term is somewhat novel within 
the literature, but it is useful that the Council has further defined it as “a means 
of leaving a current situation that is likely to become difficult, e.g. as a result of 
natural hazards or climate change e.g. managed retreat or relocating dwellings” 
(Otago Regional Council, 2016, p. 207). Interestingly, the plan differentiates 
between ‘relocation’ and ‘retreat’. It would be of benefit to further explain the 
differences between the approaches to provide clarity to plan users. Another 
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unique term found is the definition of ‘managed retreat’ as a soft engineering 
technique. The explanation to Policy 52 of the Greater Wellington RPS 2013 
states: “Soft engineering methods may include, for example; hazard avoidance or 
controlled activity zones; setback or buffer distances; managed retreat or land 
retirement; a ‘do nothing’ policy; restoration projects…” (Greater Wellington 
Regional Council, 2013, p. 132). Despite this provision, the Proposed Natural 
Resources Plan 2015 for the Wellington Region (which is required to give effect 
to the RPS) provides a more narrow definition that does not explicitly reference 
managed retreat: “Soft engineering: Works such as beach nourishment and dune 
rebuilding that use non-structural materials (e.g. sand, cobbles, native plants) to 
mimic natural coastal features that can act to mitigate the impacts from natural 
hazards” (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2015c, p. 32). These approaches 
are inconsistent and provide insufficient clarity as to the meaning of soft 
engineering methods. As recognised by The RMA Quality Planning Resource 
(2016c), consistency between plans increases certainty and familiarity and results 
in better experience of users across the board. This is an important 
consideration, particularly in the use of a technical planning term such as 
managed retreat. The definition or glossary chapters within RMA plans are 
critical to interpretation, administration and enforcement and are among the 
most referred-to sections (Nolan, 2011; The RMA Quality Planning Resource, 
2016a). Of the 15 documents that referred to ‘managed retreat’, not one formally 
provides a definition for it (Table 13). 
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       Table 13: Defining managed retreat  
Document Term Definition Informal explanation 
Auckland Regional 
Policy Statement 2016 
Managed 
retreat   
Southland Proposed 
Regional Policy 






Policy Statement 2016 
Managed 
retreat   
Managed retreat by 
relocation, removal, or 
abandonment of structures; 
Proposed Regional 
Policy Statement for 
Otago: Incorporating 






Provided as an example of an 
Exit Strategy 
West Coast Regional 









Provided as an example of Soft 
Engineering 
Draft Nelson Regional 
Policy Statement 











Any strategic decision for the 
co-ordinated removal, 
relocation or even 
abandonment of public and 
private assets at risk of being 
impacted by coastal hazards 
is often referred to as 
‘managed retreat.’ 
Auckland Proposed 
Regional Coastal Plan  
Managed 
retreat   









Provided as an example of Soft 
Protection 
Wairarapa Combined 
District Plan 2011 
Retreat 
  




Moving buildings away from 
danger areas 
Kāpiti Coast District 
Plan 1995 
Managed 
retreat   





Proposed District Plan 




Three documents include the term ‘managed retreat’ as examples when 
defining terms ‘exit strategy’, ‘soft engineering’, and ‘soft protection’ however, no 
explanation is provided as to what managed retreat involves. The Northland RPS 
2016 provides a succinct explanation of managed retreat within its policy, and the 
Waikato District Plan 2013 defines managed retreat as moving buildings away 
from danger areas. Although these attempts go further than many plans, these 
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explanations do not recognise the complex nature of managed retreat, nor the 
strategic approach required. It is important to distinguish that managed retreat 
applies to people, activities, infrastructure and assets, as well as buildings. This 
analysis demonstrates a need for a consistent definition of managed retreat in 
RMA policy and plans, as only one plan (The Hawke’s Bay Regional Coastal 
Environment Plan 2014) clearly provided an explanation of managed retreat (in 
relation to coastal hazards) as: “Any strategic decision for the co-ordinated 
removal, relocation or even abandonment of public and private assets at risk of 
being impacted by coastal hazards is often referred to as ‘managed retreat” 
(Hawke’s Bay Regional Council, 2014, p. 46). Furthermore, the policy explanation 
provided a thorough description of managed retreat, including the various scales 
it can occur within and a range of options for implementation, including 
regulation, covenants, education, financial incentives and insurance (Hawke’s 
Bay Regional Council, 2014, p. 46). 
 The Hawke’s Bay RCP is the only comprehensive example of 
communicating managed retreat to plan users, including implementation 
options, however it does not formally recognise the definition within ‘Section 1.3 
Definitions’ of the Plan, providing it within the policy explanation. The significant 
lack of consistent and clear interpretive guidance on managed retreat in New 
Zealand planning instruments is a limiting factor. Although local variability is 
anticipated in policy and regulation, implementation may be confounded by 
variability or ambiguity in the definition of key terms. Inconsistency in 
terminology reflects the lack of national guidance provided on natural hazard 
risk management in New Zealand. A national standard or guidance defining and 
explaining managed retreat would be of use to practitioners and the public.  
In summary, the terminology findings have highlighted three key messages. 
The first being that managed retreat is beginning to make its way into New 
Zealand policy and plans (particularly in recent RPS and district plans), either by 
formally referring to the term or by referencing relocation of structures. 
Secondly, there are few circumstances where a comprehensive, coordinated 
strategy is enabled or even recognised. It is identified that in most cases, as with 
relocation and abandonment, managed retreat is merely referenced as an option 
with no further explanation or implementation options within the plan 
provisions. This immediately indicates the limited approach taken to enabling 
managed retreat in most of New Zealand planning documents.  
 135 
Finally, large gaps were found in the communication of the term managed 
retreat, with no formal definitions provided, and only one plan delivering users 
a satisfactory explanation of the approach and its potential application. To 
enable clear interpretation of the approach across New Zealand, a conceptual 
definition of managed retreat at the national level is paramount and should be 
included (with further explanation) within national level policy or 
environmental standards. The numerous terms found to describe managed 
retreat reflect the varied approaches nationwide, and the following section 
delves further into the provisions of planning documents, interrogating the 
strengths and weaknesses these (Categories 1-6).  
5.2.2 Policy approaches 
The inductive analysis resulted in the recognition of six approaches for 
enabling managed retreat under local RMA plans (discussed in detail below). 
Policy frameworks are critical direction setters and as shown in red outline, key 
approaches consistently found within RMA documents (categories one, two(a), 
three and four) are using limited provisions to enable managed retreat. This 
means that even where a managed retreat policy (by whichever definition) is 
present, it tends to have weak influence and direction. For example, under 
‘existing development’ policy (category one), managed retreat was 
predominantly a matter for ‘consideration’, rather than being ‘encouraged’ or 
‘prioritised’. In simple terms, to ‘consider’ is not as strong as to ‘prioritise’. On the 
more limited tiers of the spectrum, where managed retreat is included in the 
framework (mostly as something to be considered), it is not supported with 
provisions for implementation or further evaluation. Illustrating the policy 
approaches discovered, the conceptual policy framework (Figure 12) 
demonstrates a hierarchy of provisions, within each category, indicating the 
dominant variations of each approach, according to the strength of direction 
afforded. The following discussion analyses the policy categories using examples 


















Figure 12: Policy analysis framework 
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 1 Existing development policy 
In New Zealand, legacy development in hazardous locations has resulted in 
communities and assets that are at risk from natural hazards and the impacts of 
climate change. Avoidance of development in exposed localities is fundamental 
to enabling low risk communities, however it often conflicts with strong political 
and economic will, resulting in mitigation of adverse effects. Category One: 
Existing development policy incorporates policies that aim to provide for managed 
retreat as an option for managing the effects of natural hazards to existing 
development. Many policies refer to the need to consider the effectiveness or 
appropriateness of any works or activities, including the practicality of managed 
retreat/relocation of existing development. In total, 10/21 regional policy 
statements make use of this policy approach, 2/23 regional coastal plans and 10/83 
district plans. Of the 22 RMA documents which use this approach, nine use the 
term ‘consider’ when referring to managed retreat as a mitigation option. For 
example, the Proposed Otago RPS (Incorporating Council Decisions) provides 
the following:  
Policy 4.1.7: Reduce existing natural hazard risk to people and 
communities, including by all of the following :…c) Considering the 
use of exit strategies for areas of significant risk to people and 
communities (Otago Regional Council, 2016, p. 63)  
Similarly, the Proposed West Coast RPS states that: 
Natural Hazards Policy 4: Consideration should be given to the 
relocation of existing development and infrastructure away from 
areas prone to natural hazards, however it is recognised that this 
cannot always occur. Consequently, those who benefit from the 
works or services should pay for them (West Coast Regional 
Council, 2015b, p. 38). 
Within this category there are clear differences between the approaches, for 
example, the ‘user pays’ principle of West Coast Regional Council. Although not 
uncommon in practice, in the context of Category One, this is the only plan to 
state that the recipients of hazard mitigation work (including managed 
retreat/relocation) are responsible for the costs. These differences highlight the 
spatiality of the policies and plans, where districts and regions may apply and 
fund managed retreat in diverse ways. However, regardless of the specific details 
of each provision, the use of ‘consider’ is important as it reflects the force of the 
policy. To consider means to contemplate mentally or to give attention to a 
matter (Deverson & Kennedy, 2005). In Category One, managed retreat is to be 
‘considered’, among other approaches. Therefore, while its presence as an option 
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for hazard mitigation is highlighted, it is not necessarily enabled if it is only to be 
given attention to. In a similar vein, other policies highlight managed retreat as 
an alternative measure to protection structures, or use phrases such as ‘assess the 
practicality of alternative means’ (mentioning relocation/retreat). In these cases, 
although managed retreat and relocation are being recognised as mitigation 
options, in terms of enabling retreat, they are undemanding, particularly when 
‘considered’ against the more popular and widely established approach of hard 
protection works. This form of terminology may not be strong enough to 
overcome the barriers to implementing managed retreat in New Zealand. In 
saying this, managed retreat will not be appropriate in all locations and 
circumstances, among social and economic factors, the level and nature of the 
risk must inform the strength of enabling provisions.  
Developing upon the former approaches, the Bay of Plenty RPS 2014 takes 
the assessment approach a step further, by requiring that particular regard is 
given to the “environmental and social costs and benefits of a range of long-term 
sustainable coastal hazard risk reduction options over a 100-year time frame, 
including natural defences and relocation or removal of development or 
structures at risk” (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2014, p. 131). This policy is 
stronger than requiring consideration or ‘assessment’ of the options as it 
specifically states that particular regard is to be given to the costs and benefits of 
all options. In Gill v Rotorua District Council [1993] NZRMA 604 (PT) the court 
interpreted the obligation of having particular regard to mean a duty to be on 
enquiry [616]. In Marlborough District Council v Southern Ocean Seafoods Ltd [1995] 
NZRMA 220‘have regard to’ was determined to mean “to take the matter into 
account, recognising it as something important to the particular decision and 
therefore to be considered and carefully weighed in coming to a conclusion” [228] 
(Salmon & Grinlinton, 2015, p. 122). In Foodstuffs South Island Ltd v Christchurch 
City Council [1999] 5 E:RNZ 308, having particular regard to a matter is considered 
to be stronger than having regard (Salmon & Grinlinton, 2015). These 
interpretations disclose the relative strength of the term 'particular regard', 
however, in comparison to a phrase higher in the resource management 
hierarchy (s 6 RMA), ‘to recognise and provide’ for managed retreat would be the 
height of enablement. This terminology is reserved in the statute for matters of 
national importance, although could be appropriately employed in connection 
with areas where managed retreat is necessary for human health and safety. 
Another important strength of the Bay of Plenty policy is the reference to time. 
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Over a 100-year period, managed retreat may have a higher chance of presenting 
more benefits and less costs than a mitigation option such as a sea wall. 
 Among the typical approaches already discussed, there are three RPS and 
one RCP that stand out within Category One, due to their choice of terminology 
and approach to hazard risk mitigation. Firstly, the Auckland RPS (December) 
2016 requires encouragement of managed retreat and avoidance of hard 
protection structures when replacing or modifying existing development: 
B10.2.2. Policies—Management approaches 
(9) Encourage activities that reduce, or do not increase, the risks posed 
by natural hazards, including any of the following: 
 (b) managing retreat by relocation, removal or abandonment of 
structures; 
(c) replacing or modifying existing development to reduce risk 
without using hard protection structures (Auckland Council, 2016, 
p. 3).  
The Northland RPS (May) 2016 also makes use of the word encourage when 
referring to mitigation measures, including managed retreat: 
7.1.4 Policy – Existing development in known hazard-prone areas  
In 10-year and 100-year flood hazard areas and coastal hazard areas, 
mitigation measures to reduce natural hazard risk to existing 
development will be encouraged. These may include one or more of 
the following: … 
(d) Managed retreat by relocation, removal, or abandonment of 
structures (Northland Regional Council, 2016c, p. 120). 
Policy 25 of the NZCPS expects that in areas potentially affected by coastal 
hazards over the next 100 years, that there is encouragement of redevelopment 
or change in land use, including managed retreat by relocation, removal or 
abandonment of existing structures, and designing for relocatability or 
recoverability from hazard events. It is progressive to see these RPS giving effect 
to Policy 25 and taking it further than this, broadening the policy practice to flood 
hazard areas (Northland) and in Auckland’s case, to land affected by all natural 
hazards and climate change.  
Following on from these strengths is the Greater Wellington RPS (April) 
2013 which within the explanation of Policy 52 Minimising adverse effects of hazard 
mitigation measures states, “non-structural and soft-engineering methods should 
be the first option for hazard mitigation” (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 
2013, p. 132). The explanation continues, describing managed retreat as a possible 
soft-engineering method. This is a stronger policy than those previously 
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mentioned as it prioritises managed retreat and ‘soft’ methods above protection 
works. However, as mentioned earlier, there are some issues with the definition 
of soft-engineering between Wellington policy and plans. Clarity issues aside, it 
is pragmatic that there is direction from the RPS as to which hazard risk 
mitigation methods are preferred.  
The Hawke’s Bay RCP provides a prioritised guideline to manage coastal 
erosion and inundation risks. The guideline states that coastal hazard risks will 
be proactively managed in the following prioritised ways:  
(a)	avoidance of new development in areas that are, or have potential 
to be, subject to coastal erosion or inundation  
(b)	maintaining and enhancing natural values and features that 
provide a buffer against coastal erosion and inundation  
(c)	relocation and removal of existing uses and development from 
areas at risk of coastal hazards will be evaluated, and implemented if 
appropriate;  
(d)	evaluating, then implementing if appropriate, activities which 
mitigate coastal hazards (for example, beach renourishment); and 
then  
(e)	evaluating, then implementing if appropriate subject to Guideline 
12, permanent structures (for example, sea walls, groynes, artificial 
reefs) to mitigate coastal hazards (Hawke’s Bay Regional Council, 
2014, p. 42). 
This policy is unique in the way that it prioritises the mitigation options. 
Prioritised first is the avoidance of increased the risk, giving effect to Policy 25 a) 
of the NZCPS, and directed at removing the need for mitigation measures in 
future. Secondly, the use of ecosystem services for mitigation services are 
prioritised and third, the relocation/removal of existing uses are to be evaluated 
and then implemented if appropriate. This is the strongest policy within 
Category One as it ensures that managed retreat is given an initial chance to be 
assessed as a mitigation option rather than being assessed alongside hard 
protection structures and other approaches which may be less effective. This 
policy is particularly progressive for its proactive nature where direction is given 
to the process that is to be undertaken for managing coastal erosion and not just 
considered on a case by case basis when resource consents are submitted for 
protection works (Category Three). The use of hazard risk mitigation 
prioritisation is something to be considered for all mitigation provisions, 
particularly at the RPS level where clear guidance is currently lacking.  
The analysis of approaches found within Category One lead to the 
conclusion that the majority of provisions (15/22) are highlighting 
retreat/relocation as an option to be implemented, but are not taking it further 
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than considering, regarding or assessing it. While these are good initial steps, the 
three RPS, one RCP, and three district plans that are encouraging and even 
prioritising managed retreat, represent a small group of local authorities 
working towards enabling this approach in New Zealand. Bearing in mind that 
Category Six of this analysis reveals a few ad hoc policy approaches which are 
uniquely progressive. 
Of the three operative RPS that specifically referenced managed retreat, 
only two plans (the Proposed Auckland RCP and the Operative Kāpiti Coast 
District Plan) consistently gave effect to their RPS by referencing managed 
retreat as management options for natural hazard risk management. Regarding 
Auckland, this consistency demonstrates the benefit of developing a Unitary 
Plan, where RMA policy and plans are developed together, forming a principal 
statutory planning document for the region. As the Northland RPS became 
operative in 2016, there is a lag between when the provisions in regional and 
district plans will be updated to give effect to it. Some regional and district plans 
in Northland use the term ‘relocate’, although others have yet to reflect the 
language of the RPS. This delay creates opportunity for inconsistent policies on 
a regional basis and limits the immediacy of the RPS. However, under s 74 of the 
RMA, when preparing or changing a district plan, the territorial authority shall 
have regard to a proposed RPS or proposed regional plan. Therefore, in the 
circumstance that territorial authorities are carrying out a plan review or change 
when a proposed RPS or regional plan is published, provisions of the relevant 
RPS or regional plan must be considered, thus reducing some potential for lag 
times where the timing is right. Until 2017, the RMA has only had one statutory 
process to prepare and change policy statements or plans, regardless of their 
nature. It can take a least two years to complete plan changes and resolve appeals, 
resulting in processes that are too lengthy to respond to urgent issues (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2017b). The Resource Legislation Amendment Act 2017 
enables councils to make a request for a streamlined planning process for a 
proposed RPS, plan, plan change or variation. This amendment is intended to 
provide greater flexibility for urgent matters, to implement national direction, 
for changes required to meet a significant community need, to combine policy 
statements or plans, manage unintended consequences of an RPS or plan, or 
require an expeditious process for a reason comparable to the former (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2017b, p. 2). This streamlined process could allow for 
greater consistency between resource management plans, where they can be 
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updated more quickly, and even cohesively, to give effect to the direction of 
higher-level instruments in an integrated manner.  
 2 Regulation: New and re-development 
Category Two, regulation of new and re-development, includes 
development constraints that require new structures to be relocatable, as well as 
the regulation of additions, alterations and extensions to existing developments 
(re-development). Provisions requiring relocatable structure design enable 
managed retreat as they encourage risk reduction over time by facilitating 
development that can be relocated, removed or set back when facing imminent 
risk. This policy approach is particularly useful when dealing with uncertainty 
of future risk such as sea level rise and is recognised by Policy 25 c) of the NZCPS 
as a risk reduction tool for coastal areas. Although regulation requiring the 
relocatable nature of structures can only assist decision makers and developers 
of new land use activities, it is a useful tool for balancing social, environmental 
and economic interests, providing flexibility and adaptability for the future. As 
RPS cannot contain rules, they generally provide policy to encourage design that 
facilitates relocation. In this circumstance, 5/21 RPS contain policies that 
encourage relocatable structure design. For example, the Taranaki RPS states 
that authorities should consider the need for consent conditions that require 
relocatable buildings (Taranaki Regional Council, 2010, p. 100). 
District plans are a territorial authority’s principal regulatory instrument for 
managing subdivision and land use. To control development by requiring 
relocatable structures, eight district plans make use of ‘assessment criteria’ for 
new developments to be evaluated upon during the consent process; including 
whether the proposed structure(s) is relocatable or not. Four deliver policies that 
refer to the need for relocatable buildings, but they do not specifically refer to 
this as assessment criteria. Eight district plans take a different approach to the 
former two styles, identifying hazard risk zones where any new structures must 
be relocatable. This approach is advantageous to plan users as it is very clear 
where relocatable buildings must be built, rather than general criteria for all 
applications in hazardous locations to be assessed upon. 
The second approach within Category Two is the regulation of re-
development, such as additions, alterations and extensions to existing 
developments. This approach enables retreat by discouraging re-development of 
existing sensitive land uses, therefore incentivising relocation or change in land 
use over time. For example, the Hamilton City District Plan states that additions 
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or alterations to buildings in the high flood hazard risk zone, which result in 
greater building site coverage or an increase in habitable floor area are a non-
complying activity (Hamilton City Council, 2016, p. 22). The Whanganui District 
Plan also states that the erection, or extension to, any building or structure (other 
than structures for coastal management) in the Extreme Risk Area is Prohibited 
(Whanganui District Council, 2016, p. 11). This is a clear sign from the plan that 
no further development will be considered, let alone sanctioned in the policy 
area. Such a clear statement is an important step in implementing managed 
retreat over time as it recognises that the plan does not provide for further land 
use and development in these areas, serving as both an informative and 
regulatory intervention. In this category, ten plans use this regulatory approach, 
but with differing activity statuses according to the risk. In relation to additions 
and extensions, a range of plans hybridise the activity status approach with 
assessment criteria for relocatable building design.  
Plans using relocation provisions provide little guidance on what constitutes 
‘relocatable’ and important future considerations such as where the building will 
be relocated. It is expected that this will be negotiated via individual resource 
consents. However, some do go into further detail (Mackenzie, Ashburton and 
Waimate District Plans) requiring an assessment on the ability of the proposed 
building to be relocated, the estimated cost of this and the possible destination 
of the building relocation. The Western Bay of Plenty District Plan further 
develops this criteria by requiring information on design, location and materials 
of the structure, access available to remove it and the ability to rehabilitate the 
site (including removal of all parts and services and the reinstatement of land to 
protect both natural character and coastal dunes to act as an erosion buffer) 
(Western Bay of Plenty District Council, 2016, p. 9). These details are vital to 
ensure that future managed retreat is achievable and land is not just abandoned 
and left in an unsatisfactory state.  
To clarify the type of building/structure allowed within the ambit of its rule, 
the Thames-Coromandel Proposed District Plan deems the term relocatable to 
include: “construction on wooden, concrete or other piles in a manner so that the 
building can be lifted and moved by vehicles and re-established in a new 
location” (Thames-Coromandel District Council, 2016, pp. 34-13). This definition 
is useful as it provides detail to plan users. Among the plans, the Proposed Bay of 
Plenty RCP provides the greatest detail on the requirements for relocatable 
buildings, entailing a relocation strategy detailing (as a minimum): 
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(i) The monitoring to be undertaken to determine when relocation is 
required; 
(ii) The process to be used for relocation; 
(iii) Rehabilitation of the site, including removal of services; 
(iv) Timeframes for relocation to be completed; and    
(v) The site for relocation 
(Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2015, pp. 45-46) 
This is a clear provision as it ensures that relocation will occur when 
appropriate (following monitoring), the process for relocation is pre-planned, the 
site will not be left in an unsatisfactory state, there are timeframes for the 
developer to be held accountable to, and a site for the relocatable 
structure/building is pre-determined to ensure the process can go ahead. The 
sole criterion absent in this provision is that relating to design and materials of 
the structure. This approach is the most robust of the provisions described, firstly 
for its detail and secondly because it is embedded within a unique policy of the 
Proposed RCP, which requires the inclusion of rules in district plans to manage 
coastal risks by specifying a relocation trigger for new development on open 
coasts and near river mouths and streams.  
The Tauranga City District Plan 2013 is progressive in the resource 
management plan context as it already fulfils this requirement, taking an 
integrated, comprehensive approach to managing natural hazard risk in coastal 
areas. The Coastal Hazard Erosion Policy Area (CHEPA) identifies areas along 
the open coastline where coastal erosion may or will occur. Within this area, 
three hazard risk zones are identified; the Current Erosion Risk Zone (CERZ), the 
50-year (2060) and 100-year (2110) Erosion Risk Zone (ERZ). These risk zones are 
adjacent to each other, beginning with the CERZ, with the 50-year ERZ landward 
of that and the 100-year ERZ landward of the 50-year zone. In the CERZ 
subdivision is prohibited as the potential for erosion and inundation hazard risk 
is too great. Within all CHEPA zones any new building or structure, including 
additions to or replacement of buildings must be relocatable, with confirmation 
that this can be practicably achieved from a Chartered Professional Engineer. 
Assessment of applications is restricted to whether there is provision for an 
alternative building site (within the same certificate of title), access is maintained 
for relocation to occur and that the alternative site remains vacant until it is 
required for the relocation of the building/structure. The relocation of buildings, 
structures and activities within these zones may be triggered when coastal 
erosion is within ten metres of the building/activity. The Plan states that a review 
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condition (pursuant to s 128 RMA) will be placed on new activities in these areas 
to ensure that the location of: 
buildings, structures and activities within the CHEPA are reviewed 
when the crest of the foredune, or the top of any dune scarp, recedes 
to a point within 10 metres or less to the nearest part of a building or 
activity to assess the risk from erosion and inundation (Tauranga 
City Council, 2013, p. 2).   
This condition strengthens and enables the plan provisions by ensuring that 
relocation (when necessary) is undertaken as required by the Plan. As stated by 
the Council, the review of conditions enables the “actual risk to be considered at 
that time, and appropriate mitigation measures implemented through changed 
consent conditions, should this be deemed necessary, including, but not limited 
to, requiring the relocation of any building, structure or other works to the 
alternative building site and/or further monitoring” (Tauranga City Council, 
2013, p. 9). The review condition enables managed retreat where necessary, but 
provides for decision-making at the required time. It is expected that this review 
will be prompted through monitoring undertaken by the Council to ensure that 
actions are implemented as soon as required. Furthermore, when the crest of the 
foredune or dune scarp top recedes to a point within five metres or less from the 
nearest part of the building, requirement for relocation is triggered. The 
requirement ensures that relocation occurs once erosion is proximate to the 
building or structure. Once the relocation requirement is triggered, all building 
materials must be removed from the CHEPA (e.g. building foundations) and the 
old building site must be restored, to conserve the natural shape of the foredune.  
In addition, a Coastal Protection Area (CPA) in the Plan is applied to future 
urban zoned land adjacent to the open coast that is currently undeveloped. All 
buildings and structures (including additions, minor buildings/structures, 
recreational facilities and structures in the Road Zone) are Non-Complying in 
this area, sending a message that development is not encouraged in this location. 
Within the CPA, the Plan enables future retreat of new public assets, including 
walkways, cycleways, boardwalks and signage, by requiring that they are 
relocatable or easily removed (Policy 8B.3.1.13). The plan restricts both private 
and public assets in the hazard zone areas, whilst simultaneously enabling 
continued access to the coastal marine area. Finally, for all zones within the 
CHEPA and the CPA, hard protection works for protecting private property and 
Open Space Zones are Prohibited. The Plan takes a comprehensive approach to 
applying managed retreat (for new use and development) through its use of risk 
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hazard zones, prohibition of subdivision in the area of highest erosion risk, 
regulations for development requiring relocatable buildings (with supporting 
standards and consent condition requirements), regulation over public and 
private assets, and the prohibition of protection works for private property and 
Open Space Zones within the CHEPA and CPA.  
An interesting finding from Category Two includes the Operative 
Southland District Plan’s stance on relocatable buildings: 
Policy NHZ.11 
To recognise that coastal erosion can be rapid and thus the perceived 
option of relocatable buildings is inappropriate. 
Explanation: Coastal erosion often happens during major storm 
events. Such events are impossible to predict and their speed of 
movement and severity makes the option of relocatable buildings in a 
coastal hazard zone inappropriate (Southland District Council, 
2001, p. 102).  
Policy NHZ.11 is juxtaposed to the policy and plans previously mentioned. 
Although much of the Operative Southland District Plan (including this 
provision) has been replaced by the Proposed District Plan, this provision, or one 
similar does not appear in the Proposed Plan, but there is no provision or 
assessment criteria for relocatable buildings, maintaining the stance of the ODP. 
This position is interesting for its distinct contrast to the approach used by many 
plans in New Zealand and Policy 25 of the NZCPS: 
In areas potentially affected by coastal hazards over at least the next 
100 years: …c) encourage…designing for relocatability or 
recoverability from hazard events (Department of Conservation, 
2010, p. 24) 
Although the explanation to Policy NHZ.11 of the Operative Southland 
District Plan that major storm events are difficult to predict is indisputable, the 
position that relocatable buildings are therefore inappropriate runs counter to 
the perceived utility of relocatable buildings and triggers to anticipate and 
manage risk seen elsewhere in New Zealand. The contrasting positions 
underscore the importance of assessing the nature of the risk prior to 
establishing policy. For example, relocatable buildings may not be appropriate 
in high energy, dynamic, coastal zones. These nuances highlight further 
inconsistencies between New Zealand policy and plans requiring greater 
investigation and alignment. 
Category Two also reveals provisions that regulate new and re-development 
of land. Information gaps exist relating to the meaning of relocatable structures 
 147 
and the process by which relocation will occur, when required. While some plans 
provide a high level of direction as to what a relocatable building comprises, 
when relocation must occur and how it shall be provided for, safeguarded and 
monitored, most are silent on these matters. It is expected that these concerns 
would otherwise be dealt with by consent conditions, however, it is more 
transparent for the requirements to be provided within the assessment criteria 
as part of a relocation strategy, to ensure consistent and clear guidance to both 
developers and the consenting regime. National and regional policy does not 
direct how relocation or removal should occur, under which circumstances it is 
appropriate, nor the need for further coastal management beyond structural 
relocation. This significant gap needs to be addressed by central government. 
The purpose of managed retreat is the strategic withdrawal of people and assets 
from hazardous locations over time, however, without a plan as to how this will 
occur, provisions requiring relocatable design are not strategic, effective or 
particularly enabling.  
 3 Policy and regulation: Structural protection work 
According to Turbott & Stewart (2006, p. 60), to effectively realise managed 
retreat, regulation must include prohibition of hard protection works on land 
and in the coastal marine area. NZCPS Policy 25 requires discouragement of hard 
protection structures and promotion of alternatives in areas potentially affected 
by coastal hazards over at least the next 100 years.	 The textual analysis 
investigated plans that regulate hard protection structures, and specifically those 
which reference managed retreat (or related key terms). Overall, it was found 
that just 2/21 regional policy statements deliver policies which specifically 
reference managed retreat as an alternative to hard protection structures. In 
particular, the Proposed Southland RPS takes a strong stance to discourage hard 
protection structures, stating: 
Policy NH.4 – Management priorities 
Explanation…Physical works should only be undertaken in 
situations where existing development and infrastructure is unable 
to be relocated, i.e. managed retreat…(Environment Southland 
Regional Council, 2012, p. 111).  
Policy NH.4 does not go as far as the recommendation of Turbott and 
Stewart (2006) to prohibit protection works, but it does ensure that managed 
retreat must be evaluated as an option before such works are considered. 
However, as managed retreat is largely untried, and the reference is found within 
the policy explanation and not the actual policy itself, questions remain 
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regarding the strength of the provision and the likelihood of its role in enabling 
retreat. Without an underlying strategy or method by which planners can assess 
whether managed retreat is an option, and whether development and 
infrastructure can be relocated, this policy does little to operationalise managed 
retreat. 
Of the 28 resource management plans that discourage, or control protection 
works and reference retreat, relocation or abandonment as an alternative, half 
state that the alternatives are something to be considered or given recognition to. 
Ten out of twenty-eight require alternatives to be assessed to determine whether 
they are feasible, practicable, or if they do not pose a greater community cost, or 
result in greater adverse effects on the environment. In many cases, managed 
retreat will result in a significant community cost, but it depends on the 
timeframe that is assessed as to how these costs are evaluated, in comparison to 
a rock wall or stop bank that may need maintenance and repair over many 
lifetimes. One regional plan references relocation in the context of discouraging 
protection works: 
POL 6.6.10:  
When assessing resource consent applications for river and flood 
control works, the Taranaki Regional Council will consider:  
(e) the likely effectiveness of the river and flood control works and the 
practicality of alternative means of reducing flood risk, including the 
relocation of existing development or infrastructure away from areas 
of flooding risk (Taranaki Regional Council, 2001, p. 74). 
This is a rare policy as it refers to flooding risk, which unlike most policies 
in this category, is not necessarily tied to the coastal marine area. Even without 
the direction of a NPS, some local authorities are using the NZCPS and applying 
it more broadly. The breakdown of the application of managed retreat provisions 
is further discussed at Section 5.2.3. Another uncommon approach is that of the 
New Plymouth District Plan. ‘Methods of Implementation 13.2b)’ states that 
resource consent for hard protection works will be refused where the developer 
(at the time of development) accepted the risk of the hazard event affecting that 
development (New Plymouth District Council, 2005, p. 83). This method sends a 
clear message that works to protect existing development (where the risk was 
known) are not encouraged and that alternative measures shall be taken.  
The Nelson Resource Management Plan is unique in the way it allows 
temporary coastal protection works (with a duration of less than five years) if the 
works are removable, will result in no permanent adverse environmental effects 
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and are temporary. This allows time to formulate and implement a plan to 
remove or reduce coastal erosion risk without further use of protection works. 
Although this policy does not enable retreat, it ensures that decisions are not 
rushed, which may be beneficial to retreat strategies which need time to gain 
community acceptance. However, as argued by Turbott and Stewart (2006, p. 46) 
once hard protection works have been installed, it is politically and socially 
challenging to remove them, and they can end up becoming the long-term 
option, for example at Waihi and Wainui Beaches in the North Island of New 
Zealand.  
Finally, a robust provision was identified in the Tauranga City District Plan, 
where hard protection works, for protecting private property and open space 
zones are prohibited in the CHEPA and the CPA zones. In the coastal 
environment, Turbott and Stewart (2006, p. 46) recognise that the use of a 
prohibited activity status for protection works sends a clear message about the 
importance of natural character and recreation values as well as the potential 
impermanence of land. This policy is considered the most directive of the 
Category as it prohibits hard protection works at the same time as enabling 
future relocation of new development (see Category One).  
Protection works signify the tactic of holding the line against nature, rather 
than adapting to changing environments. White (2013), Vandenbeld (2013) and 
King (2009) acknowledge that when protection measures are established, 
property owners may be given a false sense of security which can result in 
additional investment in threatened areas, producing an intensification of 
residual risk. Many of the planning instruments only permit the establishment 
of new protection structures where they are the best practicable option for the 
future. From these provisions, it was established that 28 plans reference managed 
retreat (or other relevant terms) as an alternative to hard protection structures. 
This approach aligns with Category One, where managed retreat, is most often 
(14/28) referred to as an option to be considered, with just a few policies actively 
discouraging or prohibiting such works to enable risk reduction. Ten from 
twenty-eight provisions require assessment of alternatives to determine whether 
they are feasible, practicable, or if they do not pose a greater community cost, or 
result in greater adverse effects on the environment. Managed retreat is likely to 
result in significant community costs and adverse effects, but these will depend 
on the timeframe and approach taken. These findings highlight the need to 
further investigate the tools for assessing risk management options, with 
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particular regard to be had toward assessing costs and benefits over the short, 
medium and long-term, ensuring that costs and benefits that are more difficult 
to quantify, are not disregarded. Multi-criteria analysis is recommended by MfE 
(2017a) to avoid such bias. 
 4 Policy: Local infrastructure retreat 
Local authorities have a responsibility for providing good quality local 
infrastructure and local public services to communities under s 10(b) LGA. 
Infrastructure includes assets to be used to provide services by or on behalf of 
the local authority, for activities including; water supply, sewerage and treatment 
and disposal of sewage, stormwater drainage and the provision of roads and 
footpaths. Ongoing viability of residential and commercial development 
depends on infrastructure provision and maintenance—infrastructure removal 
could result in de facto retreat. In certain areas, increasing hazard risk means that 
some local infrastructure will require relocation or significant investment in 
hard protection works. Roads are particularly important, providing connectivity 
within and between settlements, being the main location for key services 
including water, wastewater, electricity and telecommunication supply, and 
their association with pedestrian space and stormwater drainage. The sunk 
investments of existing infrastructure networks calls for strategic management 
to avoid path dependency, taking into account changing risks and long-term 
costs. 
In total, only six local authorities refer to managed retreat specifically as an 
option for infrastructure risk management. In addition to this, ten resource 
management plans included infrastructure with other structures or 
development as a consideration for potential hazard risk mitigation or as an 
alternative to hard protection measures (Categories One and Three). 
The Franklin District Plan 2000 (October 2012 Update), considers the option 
of managed retreat of the Seabird Coast road as a ‘future planning option’ 
particularly in areas where the road is less than 50 metres from the sea (Hauraki 
District Council, 2000, pp. 7-3). No further direction is provided. Objective 3.8.3C 
of the Proposed Gisborne RCP takes a much broader approach to considering 
managed retreat, stating that regionally significant infrastructure must be 
maintained by appropriate protection mechanisms, including the option of 
relocation where feasible (when threatened by natural hazards). This objective 
provides some direction to asset managers and planners, however, like many of 
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the policies discussed, further elucidation is required on how to assess when and 
where retreat may be ‘appropriate’.  
The Proposed Invercargill District Plan 2017 (Appeals Version) provides a 
method for initiating environmental advocacy to include “promoting long-term 
strategic withdrawal of key infrastructure and services from hazard prone areas 
where this is technically viable” (Invercargill City Council, 2017, pp. 2-47). This 
implementation method is in line with the managed retreat literature as it is 
promoting relocation over time and incentivising both public and private asset 
retreat due to the removal of key infrastructure and services from hazardous 
locations. However, it is limited, being non-statutory, simply signalling the 
option of relocation to developers, infrastructure providers, and the public. 
Policy 2.4 of the Draft Nelson RPS 2016 states that infrastructure provision, 
capacity and upgrade in areas subject to high risks from hazards should be 
avoided, unless it is part of a comprehensive plan that addresses the long-term 
resilience of the asset (Nelson City Council, 2016, pp. 46-53). The anticipated 
environmental results of this policy include a combination of planned retreat 
and mitigation measures for infrastructure in high hazard risk areas. It is 
intended that this policy will be implemented through the 30-year Infrastructure 
Strategy, asset management plans, and resource consents. How this occurs is a 
matter for further investigation.  
Finally, the Canterbury Regional Coastal Environment Plan 2005 (updated 
2011) prohibits the construction of a new road or railway within Hazard Zone 1 
and the Palmerston North District Plan 2000 (including Plan Change 15D) deems 
the development of any new Critical Infrastructure within the Flood Protection 
Zone as non-complying. Similar to the development regulations of Category 
Two, these provisions prevent new assets and potentially, activities from 
becoming established within the identified hazard zones, ideally resulting in a 
change in land use over time.  
Overall, this review establishes that there is a low level of direction for 
managed retreat of infrastructure in RMA policy and plans, with very few 
instruments considering, promoting, facilitating or requiring the approach. A 
general lack of direction for managed retreat is appearing as a theme, as well as 
inconsistencies between approaches, and an absence of guidance to support 
policies that recognise retreat but require an assessment of its ‘appropriateness’. 
Nevertheless, further investigation of infrastructure strategies and asset 
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management plans may prove that there is greater provision for infrastructure 
retreat outside of the RMA (see Section 5.3).  
5 Extinguishment of existing use rights: Damaged or destroyed 
structures 
The RMA delegates to district councils the responsibility to control the 
effects of activities on land. Control is exerted through district plan policy and 
methods. As plans are updated and new regulations are applied, some activities 
may no longer be consistent with the provisions of the current plan. However, s 
10 RMA provides for ‘existing use rights’ and allows the continued use of land 
that contravenes a rule in a district plan or proposed district plan, if the activity 
was lawfully established before the rule became operative or before the plan was 
notified and if the effects produced by the activity are the same or similar in 
character, intensity, and scale to those which existed before. Therefore, rules in 
district plans cannot control activities which have existing use rights. This is a 
barrier for territorial authorities attempting to implement managed retreat as 
structures in hazardous zones may remain in place without mitigation controls 
until sufficiently significant changes are made to the structure. 
However, there is still some capacity for local authorities to control existing 
activities where necessary. Under s 20A of the RMA, regional councils can 
extinguish existing use rights through the incorporation of new rules in regional 
plans, using their functions mandated by s 30 of the RMA. Therefore, any 
existing activity that was previously permitted may continue until the proposed 
plan becomes operative if the circumstances provided in sections 20A(1)(a) to (c) 
exist. The first regional council to make use of this power (in the context of 
natural hazard plan provisions) was Canterbury Regional Council, with its 
Regional Coastal Environment Plan 2005. Rule 9.1b) of the Canterbury RCP 
permits the reconstruction or replacement of habitable buildings damaged or 
destroyed by action of the sea, provided the site has not eroded to less than 
450m2, the building is to be replaced/reconstructed with similar specifications, 
the building is not positioned further seaward than before and the floor area does 
not increase (Environment Canterbury Regional Council, 2005, p. 140). This rule 
sends a clear message that compromised buildings may not be able to be rebuilt 
under existing use rights. However, this approach could be seen as maladaptive, 
as provided the land area is not reduced to less than 450m2, no adaptation to 
existing or escalating risk is required to increase resilience against future hazard 
events and the impacts of climate change.  
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Another plan to adopt this approach is the Draft Northland Regional Plan 
2016. Rule C.2.7.1 states that rebuilding of materially damaged or destroyed 
buildings in a high risk coastal or flood hazard area is a restricted discretionary 
activity (resource consent is required and it may be accepted or declined) 
(Northland Regional Council, 2016a). The activity status and matters of discretion 
are different and slightly more stringent than the Canterbury RCP, being the 
ability to design and construct the building to ensure natural hazard risk is 
reduced (compared to before damage to or destruction of the building occurred), 
the potential to exacerbate existing natural hazard risk and the ability to avoid 
increasing risk on other property (Northland Regional Council, 2016a). If space 
allows, the best way to ensure risk is reduced is likely to be retreat. Of material 
interest to this research (but unclear at this point) is the method to be applied by 
the council to assess the rebuild potential to exacerbate existing natural hazard 
risk. 
A regulatory approach mandating rebuilding lacks elements of precaution 
as the provisions come into force following significant damage to assets and 
potential loss of human life. However, these provisions are still important tools 
for enabling retreat, particularly where community acceptance and social 
memory is low. Reactive retreat is not a preferred option but, in some cases, it 
may be the only way to avoid future risk to people and assets (following 
destruction). In saying this, the provisions in these plans may not necessarily 
result in retreat if the standards can be achieved.  
 6 Distinct policy and regulation 
Categories One-Five have referred to provisions that can be collectively 
reviewed and categorised under specific approaches. The following discusses ad 
hoc policies that work to enable managed retreat in unique ways. First is the 
Waikato RPS 2016 ‘Coastal development setback (existing development)’ policy: 
Regional plans shall identify the circumstances when it is 
appropriate to require existing development along the coast to be 
relocated, and shall include provisions for this relocation, to be 
sufficient distance from the coastal edge to allow for the following: 
a) preserving natural character values; 
b) avoiding natural hazards; 
c) protecting the values associated with marine water quality; 
d) maintaining and enhancing public access to public areas; and 
e) natural functioning of physical processes, including the ability of 
natural features such as wetlands, beaches and dunes, to migrate 
inland, and including the projected effects of climate change 
(Waikato Regional Council, 2016, p. 93)  
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This is a unique policy as it is the only RPS to require regional plans to 
identify the circumstances when retreat shall be implemented, potentially in an 
anticipatory manner. While other regional councils have been reluctant to 
extinguish existing use rights, this is a possible outcome of the RPS via 
implementation within the RCP (Berry & Vella, 2010). This is a highly directive 
provision, emphasising the potentially strong role available to regional councils 
in enabling managed retreat. The extinguishment of existing use rights would be 
tested against s 85 of the RMA. In any such contest, the key issue will be “the level 
of risk which is posed to a particular property (supported by scientific 
information) and whether it could be considered ‘reasonable’ to build [or 
continue residential activity] on that property given that level of risk” (Berry & 
Vella, 2010, p. 36). As the Waikato RPS is a new document (2016), the Waikato 
Regional Council has two years (from the operative date) to give effect to this 
provision, a process that remains ongoing in 2019.  
The Bay of Plenty Proposed RCP 2015 requires coastal hazard policy 
implementation to include the Regional Council proactively working with 
territorial authorities and landowners to identify and implement actions (which 
may include managed retreat) to adapt over time to the effects of sea level rise. 
This is a unique non-regulatory approach whereby the local authorities work 
with the community to determine and enact the required actions to combat sea 
level rise. This approach is signalling early consultation with affected parties and 
reflects an inclusive and transparent process which is likely to be more 
acceptable to local landowners, displaying attributes of equitable governance. 
The Timaru District Plan does not provide a comprehensive approach to 
enabling managed retreat, however it does include a policy to encourage 
relocation of household units from the most hazard prone locations. The 
explanation suggests that Council will assist in investigating the options for 
relocation of dwellings or in finding safer alternative sites for landowners. If 
appropriate sites are found, the plan states that the Council shall “promote 
District Plan changes to facilitate obtaining of consent for that land” (Timaru 
District Council, 2005, p. 4). This is a useful approach to facilitating managed 
retreat by ensuring that land is available for people to move to. It is clearly stated 
that the Council will not make direct financial contributions for such relocations. 
This approach is non-regulatory, aiming to provide options to community 
members who are considering moving voluntarily.  
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The Waitomo District Plan does not have retreat policies for natural hazard 
or climate change risks within the Plan, however it features facilitation of 
managed retreat in the Te Maika Zone Structure Plan (Figure 13). Section 14A.6.1 
of Te Maika Zone Structure Plan sets a coastal erosion benchmark line (red 
annotation) to trigger relocation of the existing dwellings on Te Maika Peninsula. 
The Structure Plan states that when any ‘bach’ in Cluster 9 is determined by 
Council as threatened by coastal erosion (with reference to the coastal erosion 
benchmark line), the building shall be relocated to a safe location at the expense 
of the building owner (Waitomo District Council, 2009, p. 56). To facilitate this 
process, the Plan enables permitted activity status (with conditions) for 
relocation within the 
building site or to 
another residential 
cluster within the 
Structure Plan. This 
management approach 
was developed and 
implemented in 
conjunction with the Te 
Maika Trust and the 
owners of the houses, a 
unique approach using a 
Structure Plan.  
In summary, this 
category has highlighted 
some unique 
approaches to enabling 
managed retreat. These 
approaches include 
assisting with privately 
funded managed retreat, 
undertaking community engagement to consider management options, 
facilitating managed retreat by requiring thresholds within a regional coastal 
plan, and setting regulatory triggers to ensure managed retreat occurs, within a 
structure plan. The use of community strategies, investigation of alternative sites 
and the use of a structure plan to enable anticipatory managed retreat are rare 
Figure 13: Te Maika Zone Structure Plan Diagram C Eastern 
Beaches. Source: (Waitomo District Council, 2009). Annotated by 
Hanna, C. 
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approaches identified by the analysis. The Waikato RPS is a bold step in the 
direction of enabling managed retreat, but policy implementation remains under 
development. What is particularly unique about these provisions is that they are 
attempting to enable managed retreat for existing land use activities rather than 
purely highlighting it as an option.  
5.2.3 Provisions by type: Natural hazards and the influences of 
climate change 
Among the policy type and content provision findings, discrepancies were 
also found between the types of hazards and the influences of climate change 
that managed retreat is applied to. Estimates for the global impacts of climate 
change with regard to sea level rise in the near term (mid-century) are known 
with ‘reasonable confidence’, but there remains uncertainty regarding longer-
term sea level rise due to differing future greenhouse gas emission trajectories 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2017a).  In the RMA documents, there is a greater 
focus on hazard events, with just 13 provisions recognising the compounding and 
cascading impacts of climate change (generally), 25 provisions explicitly 
addressing the slow-onset impacts of sea level rise,  and just a few detailing 
expected increases (>) in the frequency and intensity of flooding (six) and erosion 
(three). With reasonable certainty of sea level rise known to mid-century, it could 
be expected that a higher proportion of the provisions are at least considering 
managed retreat as an option to address sea-level rise and the “complex 
interrelationship with weather events” (Ibid, p. 29). However, it is recognised that 
the inclusion of climate change influences may be less explicit than what has 
been captured by the analysis. Some plans include sea level rise in their 
definition of coastal hazards (e.g. Tasman RMP 2014), and others include the 
influences of climate change such as sea level rise projections from IPCC 
assessments in the development of hazard zones (e.g. Hawke’s Bay RCEP 2014), 
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As depicted in Figure 14, most provisions are targeted at managing coastal 
hazard risks. Many plans consider ‘all hazards’ when applying managed retreat 
policy and rules, however it is clear that there is a coastal hazard focus for 
managed retreat in New Zealand, underscored by further recognition that the 
‘all hazards’ approach encompasses coastal hazard risk management as well. 
Particularly within the proactive approaches recognised in Category Six, and the 
relocatable building, and hard protection structure provisions, it was found that 
there is an exclusive coastal hazard dominance. This dominance is likely due to 
references to managed retreat within the NZCPS, which requires that responses 
to climate change such as managed retreat are considered (Objective 5), and that 
changes in land use that reduce the risk of adverse effects from coastal hazards 
(including managed retreat and designing for relocatability or recoverability), be 
encouraged (Policy 25) (Department of Conservation, 2010). Managed retreat 
provisions may predominate in coastal locations due to the slower emergence of 
some coastal risks influenced by gradual sea level rise, where adaptation over 
time allows for actions to be taken as required. However, for event-based hazards 
such as earthquakes, if there is a high probability of a high impact event, retreat 
is most beneficial at the soonest time practicable, to avoid disaster. Therefore, a 
more active strategy is necessary to avoid harm to life and assets. In these cases, 
resource management plans may not be sufficiently dynamic to provide the 
necessary outcomes to achieve this, which helps to explain why non-coastal 
hazard provisions have reduced presence. The disparities found, and limited 
climate change adaptation focus signify the need for further research into other 
avenues for enabling managed retreat in New Zealand. To broaden the RMA 
Figure 14: Natural hazard and climate change influences in managed retreat provisions 
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analysis and address this gap, examination of non-RMA instruments was 
undertaken, discussed in Section 5.3. 
5.2.4 Summary of RMA findings 
Sharp and Richardson (2001) argue that the struggle between different 
economic, social, and environmental discourses often dictate the nature of 
policies. The textual analysis identifies a range of dominant discourses emerging, 
particularly in Categories One and Three. Of the dominant discourses used to 
describe the movement of people, assets and activities away from harm, 
‘relocation’ is the most established and widespread of all the terms investigated, 
with managed retreat dispersed in small numbers across the more recent RPS 
and a few regional coastal and district plans. This may be the result of the lack of 
effective national direction for managed retreat, or its relatively new exposure in 
the policy and planning fields. A further factor that may contribute to this 
position is negative associations with managed retreat and what it means for 
people and communities. Managed retreat is often considered a ‘provocative 
term’ (Reddish, 2015) which elucidates how policies may be side-lined or a softer 
discourse used for public and political communication. The discourse used may 
reflect public acceptance of policy approaches in New Zealand, however 
managed retreat also has the potential to slide under the radar as it is a term that 
is not consistently or comprehensively defined. This gap can be attributed to a 
lack of guidance and resulting confusion as to what managed retreat means, 
particularly as an umbrella term that can be applied across a range of temporal 
and spatial scales, using a variety of instruments.  
The textual analysis made it apparent that although managed retreat has 
made its way into the policy arena, there are few circumstances where a 
comprehensive and coordinated strategy is enabled or defined. In most cases, as 
with relocation and abandonment, managed retreat is merely referenced as an 
option with no further explanation or implementation pathway. There is a 
significant absence of clarity around the key terms searched, firstly due to a lack 
of suitable definitions, and secondly due to the unique terms used. From 150 
documents, it was found that the Hawke’s Bay RCP provided the only clear and 
comprehensive definition of managed retreat which can be adapted to apply to 
all natural hazard and climate induced risks: 
Managed retreat: Any strategic decision for the coordinated removal 
or relocation of public and private assets at risk of being impacted by 
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the effects of natural hazards and/or climate change. (Adapted 
from: Hawke’s Bay Regional Council (2014)) 
This definition recognises the strategic, coordinated nature of ‘managed 
retreat’ whilst explaining that it can occur via removal or relocation of assets. The 
definition separates itself from pure relocation as it is planned and implemented 
in a deliberate, coordinated way, whereas relocation may occur in an impromptu 
or isolated manner. Further work is required to define managed retreat in New 
Zealand policy and plans to enable a clearer understanding of what is expected 
to occur under such a policy. Fundamentally, managed retreat encompasses a 
range of approaches to achieve risk reduction, underpinned by principles of 
working with, rather than against nature.  
Implementation guidance within plans is an indicator of plan quality (Baer, 
1997; Godschalk & Berke, 2009). Such guidance was generally lacking in New 
Zealand policy and plans, with only one plan detailing what the implementation 
of managed retreat would involve. Furthermore, in Category Two, better 
guidance is required to determine what the term 'relocatable' entails (when 
requiring relocatable building design), as well as providing a comprehensive 
strategy and imposing resource consent conditions to ensure relocation is 
achievable, and transpires when required. Continual monitoring of the 
environment and the consented land use activities is vital to ensure that 
adaptation occurs prior to harm to people and assets. This approach is valuable 
in enabling future managed retreat, however, there is still much to be done for 
existing land uses.  
The analysis shows the tendency for relatively weak policy that may not 
provide a strong direction. Progressive examples were found, where managed 
retreat is encouraged, prioritised or facilitated, or alternatives were prohibited, 
and a unique structure plan requiring implementation with environmental 
triggers. The presence of directive provisions (although a minority) highlight the 
opportunity to provide greater direction for managed retreat, where appropriate. 
The limited direction found within resource management plans reflects the 
adaptation deficit that is recognised in New Zealand and abroad, which can 
partly be attributed to institutional and governance barriers including poor 
national leadership, limited local jurisdiction and resource constraints (Harker, 
2016, p. 79), indicative of limits to effective, responsive and robust governance. 
New Zealand’s legislative framework has not been effective in curbing 
expansion and intensification of coastal development and settlement on flood 
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plains (Lawrence et al., 2015, p. 304). Development rights are generally granted in 
perpetuity, resulting in legacy developments which are highly inflexible to a 
changing environment. The responsibility to manage the effects of natural 
hazards and prepare communities to adapt to climate change is delegated to local 
government. However, as argued by Harker (2016, pp. 79-80) many local 
authorities in New Zealand do not have the financial capacity to sufficiently map 
areas affected by natural hazards, let alone fund significant adaptation strategies 
for existing development, particularly when confronted with community 
resistance. Due to this, local authorities may favour responding in ways that 
provide the most cost efficient and beneficial results to private property owners 
in the short-term, rather than longer-term options such as managed retreat 
which can benefit the immediate and wider community as well as future 
generations. White and Haughton (2017) recognise that political propensity to 
privilege present generations over those in the future is a significant challenge 
for longer-term resilience. The consideration of broader temporal scales has 
been highlighted within the analysis, with a few key policies referencing that the 
evaluation of managed retreat and other risk reduction options be given 
particular regard to within a 100-year planning timeframe (Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council, 2014, p. 131).  
On a related note, to determine whether managed retreat/relocation is an 
‘appropriate’, ‘technically viable’ or ‘feasible’ option for implementation, it was 
found that 14 plans referred to the need for an assessment of costs and benefits. 
This alerts us to the fact that the methodologies of cost-benefit analyses used by 
local authorities are significant, as in many cases, they may be the principal 
reason behind why retreat/relocation is or is not implemented. Cost-benefit 
analyses forecast the impacts of a decision in the future and therefore there will 
always be uncertainty surrounding the estimated impacts. To be comparable, 
costs and benefits must be calculated and expressed in the same units of 
measurement and within a common point in time (The New Zealand Treasury, 
2015). As a result, such an assessment may give more weight to dominant human 
values such as economic prosperity, as it is difficult to monetise values such as 
natural character and ecosystem services, resulting in policies that reflect the 
dominant discourse. Thus, cost-benefit assessment methods undertaken by local 
authorities are an avenue requiring further investigation, to assist in determining 
key barriers and enablers to managed retreat. Recently, the Coastal Hazards and 
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Climate Guidance for Local Government provides the following guidance to 
councils to help overcome this limitation: 
Where decisions involve values that are not readily translated into 
monetary terms…it is expected other evaluation methodologies, such 
as multicriteria analyses, will be applied. (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017a, p. 38) 
This guidance, while non-statutory, should assist councils in seeking out 
methodologies that deliver more balanced social, economic and environmental 
outcomes. 
Approximately half of resource management policy and plans in New 
Zealand are applying managed retreat in one or many ways. Within this group, 
there are indicators of strong direction for managed retreat, however many RPS 
and plans are delivering constrained policies and regulation with insufficient 
interpretation and implementation support. The dominant discourse is 
relocation and relocatable design of buildings, but much of the terminology and 
policies are inconsistently defined and applied. Some plans are demonstrating 
more participative processes, developing mitigation strategies, structure plans, 
and facilitating voluntary relocation with landowners. However, the majority are 
simply highlighting managed retreat as an option to be considered, with little 
guidance on how it will be considered, let alone implemented. The need for 
strong and early community engagement in managed retreat processes has been 
recognised by some authorities, and the withdrawn Kāpiti Coast District Plan 
review provides a very real example of this requirement, as well as robust 
scientific evidence in the policy development process. With the understanding 
that discourse and in particular, policy and regulation, work to shape reality, it is 
not surprising that managed retreat has been so rarely implemented in New 
Zealand to date. But these implementation gaps are not a fault of local authorities 
alone, as there is limited guidance from regional and national authorities in a 
space that is socially, politically, and legally contentious. These findings demand 
further research on the application of managed retreat in New Zealand, to 
determine whether it is being promoted or applied under other legislation, or in 
non-statutory instruments. The following investigation broadens the scope, to 
further respond to Objective 2 of this research. 
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5.3 Textual analysis of local government planning instruments  
Other local government instruments for managing natural hazard risk 
include long-term plans, asset management plans, reserve management plans, 
and non-statutory plans and guidelines (The RMA Quality Planning Resource, 
2016b). The second textual analysis entailed a national review of non-RMA 
instruments, using the same process of document collection, review, 
interrogation and reduction applied in the former analysis. The evaluation 
methods differed slightly as many of the instruments are high-level guides to 
direct resource management policy and regulation. Therefore, many require a 
greater level of detail and implementation through a statutory plan (such as a 
district plan). The general inductive approach resulted in a more condensed 
evaluation framework, with just one category emerging (Figure 15) to determine 
the level of direction afforded in non-RMA instruments, delineated on a 
spectrum of limited to active. Documents were coded according to the four levels 
of the framework; consider, promote, facilitate and require. 
 
Figure 15: Non-RMA instrument direction setting framework 
Across New Zealand, it was found that infrastructure strategies, asset 
management plans, structure plans, management strategies, spatial plans and a 
resilience plan reference managed retreat (and related terms). Additional 
documentation found during the data collection phase discovered that some 
local authorities are currently undertaking work to incorporate managed retreat 
into their RMA and non-RMA documents in future. These projects help to 
recognise instruments that are not yet developed and will be further discussed at 
Section 5.3.4. 
5.3.1 Terminology 
Local government plans and strategies were interrogated in search of key 
managed retreat terms. In contrast to the RMA documents, it was found that the 
most prevalent terms were managed retreat/retreat/planned retreat and relocate 
/relocation. In two circumstances, ‘soft-engineering’ was used as a reference to 
‘relocation’ and ‘managed retreat’, and ‘realign’ was used once regarding the 
relocation of stopbanks in an infrastructure strategy. Seventy-nine per cent of the 
Lim
ited
Consider Promote Facilitate Require
Active
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documents referencing ‘retreat’ were published in the last five years and sixty-
two per cent of those referencing the term relocate were published in this period 
(2012-2017). These figures support the assumption that more recent documents 
are using the managed retreat terminology. There is a correlation between the 
common use of ‘managed retreat’ in RPS and non-RMA documents due to their 
more strategic approach, as well as their more recent publishing dates.  
Two documents that referenced the key terms provided definitions. The 
New Plymouth Coastal Strategy 2006 and the Wairoa Coastal Strategy 2004 
provided the following: 
Glossary: Retreat (from hazards) 
This definition is not quite as well formulated as the Hawke’s Bay RCP 
version, however it provides more clarity to plan users on the meaning of 
managed retreat than an absent definition. When reviewing the non-RMA 
documentation, a non-hazard application of managed retreat was uncovered, 
demonstrating the need for further clarification of the term. The South Taranaki 
Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2025 referred to managed retreat as an approach to 
manage investments when experiencing a declining population: “In areas where 
demand is driven predominantly by population which may be declining there is 
no need for growth planning, rather potentially a managed retreat where 
capacities might be reduced when renewal is required” (South Taranaki District 
When a community, infrastructure or property is at risk from a 
coastal hazard (managed) retreat involves moving away from the 
area of risk, as opposed to other hazard management options 
including promoting natural buffers, constructing structural 
defences or designing buildings to minimise the likelihood of damage  
(New Plymouth District Council, 2006b, p. 66; Wairoa District 
Council, 2004, p. 81). 

















Managed retreat terminology in New Zealand local 
government plans
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Council, 2015). With eight different expressions and variables of these (such as 
planned/managed retreat) already located within the textual analyses, this 
finding emphasises that not only is managed retreat inconsistently applied 
within the hazard risk management context, it is used within other sectors to 
describe the withdrawal of service due to population decline, as well as often 
being used to describe natural processes such as shoreline retreat. The fluidity of 
managed retreat terms in both context and application justifies the need to 
provide better clarity by use of definitions.  
5.3.2 Approaches 
Of the 39 documents 
found to reference 
managed retreat, the 
majority (31) provide 
direction to consider the 
option of managed retreat, 
five promote managed 
retreat as a mitigation 
approach and just three 
facilitate its use (Figure 17 
and Table 14). In no 
circumstance is there a requirement to implement managed retreat.  





Wainui Beach Erosion Management 
Strategy 2014 
Promote 
New Plymouth District 
Council 
Coastal Strategy 2006 Consider 
Taupo District Council Lake Taupo Erosion and Flood 
Strategy 2009 
Consider 
Wairoa District Council Wairoa Coastal Strategy 2004 Promote 
Environment 
Canterbury 





Pareora River Floodplain Management 
Strategy 2004 
Consider 







District Council, Selwyn 
Greater Christchurch Urban 
Development Strategy Update 2016 
 
Consider 





           Figure 17: Direction setting breakdown 
Table 14: Level of direction for managed retreat within non-RMA instruments 
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District Council and 
partners 
Otago Regional Council Milton 2060 Flood Risk Management 
Strategy 
for Milton and the Tokomairiro Plain 
2012 
Consider 
Otago Regional Council Learning to Live with Flooding: A 
Flood Risk Management Strategy for 
the communities of Lakes Wakatipu 
and Wanaka 2006 
Consider 
Asset management plans 
Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council 
2014/2015 Rivers and Drainage 
Asset Management Plan 
Consider 





Awanui River Scheme Asset 
Management Plan 2015 
Consider 
New Plymouth District 
Council 
Coastal Reserves Management Plan 
November 2006 (as amended June 2015) 
Facilitate 
Porirua City Council Porirua City Reserves Management 
Plan 2016 
Promote 
Tasman District Council Coastal Structures Activity 
Management Plan 2015 
Consider 










New Plymouth District 
Council 
Oakura Structure Plan 2006 Consider 
Spatial Plan 
Dunedin City Council Spatial Plan 2012 – Dunedin Towards 
2050 
Consider 
Auckland Council Auckland Plan 2012 Consider 
Long-term plan 
Kāpiti Coast District 
Council 
LTP–Parks, open space and wastewater Promote 
Nelson City Council LTP–Tahuna Beach study funding Consider 
Tasman District Council LTP–Coastal protection works Consider 
Far North District 
Council 
LTP–Core risk assumptions Consider 
LTP infrastructure strategies 
Waikato Regional 
Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
Greater Wellington 
Regional Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
Auckland Council LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
New Plymouth District 
Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
Central Hawke’s Bay 
District Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
Western Bay of Plenty LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
Napier District Council LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 Consider 
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 ‘Considering’ managed retreat as an option is the most common approach 
found within the planning instruments. Most infrastructure strategies, resilience 
plans, structure plans and spatial plans recognised the need to consider managed 
retreat as a potential risk management option for the future. As high-level 
documents aimed at guiding development over the long-term, referencing 
managed retreat as a consideration is valuable to broaden the hazard risk 
management toolbox from the dominant legacy of protection and 
accommodation. All local authorities are required to produce 30-year 
infrastructure strategies, but only 14 reference managed retreat (or the related 
terms). This finding is in line with the RMA analysis, where policy providing 
direction for infrastructure retreat is emerging, but in a limited capacity. Many 
management strategies and asset management plans fell within the ‘consider’ 
category, which is promising for managed retreat when considering their ability 
to inform policy, or have an impact on management practices. However, 
consideration rests at the most limited end of the spectrum, and may not have 
much impact in enabling managed retreat in comparison to instruments that 
promote or facilitate its use.  
Instruments that promote managed retreat provide a greater level of 
direction to plan users as they often determine a hierarchy or preference of 
management options. For example, the Porirua City Reserves Management Plan 
2006 (reprinted 2016) states that for coastal reserves, “Relocation or managed 
retreat approaches will be preferred in addressing development in reserves 
subject to coastal hazards. These approaches encourage soft engineering rather 
than seawalls, may involve relocation or phased removal of structures (including 
buildings, facilities or other assets), and discourage new development in those 
reserves” (Porirua City Council, 2016, p. 32). The Waitaki Reserves Management 
Plan 2014 takes a similar approach, however, it states that soft engineering 
techniques such as managed retreat shall be given preference where costs of 
Tararua District Council LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Consider 
Hastings District Council  LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Facilitate 
Whangarei District 
Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Consider 
Westland District 
Council 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Consider 
Nelson City Council LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Consider 
Environment Southland LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Consider 
Environment 
Canterbury 
LTP Infrastructure Strategy 2015–2045 Facilitate 
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protection outweigh the benefits to the community (Waitaki District Council, 
2014, p. 54). Therefore, this approach promotes managed retreat to a somewhat 
lesser degree than in Porirua, as it is considered a secondary option for when 
hard protection does not stack up in cost-benefit analyses. The Wairoa Coastal 
Strategy 2004 provides a similar approach to the Hawke’s Bay Coastal 
Environment Plan (RMA analysis), demonstrating a hierarchy of options to 
manage coastal hazard risk, with managed retreat as the second preference 
behind natural defences. As already discussed, this approach provides clear 
direction to decision makers by providing them with a framework to do so. The 
Wairoa Coastal Strategy goes further than most plans, identifying research to be 
undertaken to promote managed retreat of infrastructure, where required:  
Identify infrastructure at risk (e.g. roading) from natural hazards 
and alternative locations for this infrastructure. This should include 
the feasibility of securing the land so that ‘retreat’ is available as the 
preferred option (Wairoa District Council, 2004, p. 14).  
This approach advocates strongly for managed retreat and demonstrates 
forward thinking by identifying infrastructure that is susceptible and 
determining options for managed retreat in a precautionary manner. Compared 
to the general silence on infrastructure retreat in RMA plans, and the mostly 
limited approach found in infrastructure strategies, this plan recognises the need 
to actively investigate and promote retreat options to enable greater 
infrastructure resilience for the long-term.  
 The Wainui Beach Erosion Management Strategy 2014 promotes managed 
retreat as a response to coastal erosion. This document is distinctive, as a strategy 
developed through an engagement process where multiple stakeholders, 
including a working group have provided input to work through issues. This 
document promotes retreat by triggering the need for refinement of 
development controls in the Council’s resource management plans to better 
avoid and reduce the risk presented by development in the area prone to coastal 
erosion (Gisborne District Council, 2014). Although it is close to facilitating 
managed retreat over the long-term, the strategy does not quite go that far: 
There are locations along Wainui Beach where dwellings could be 
located further landward on property to reduce their exposure to 
coastal erosion. However, over at least the short term (i.e. next 10-20 
years) this work can be left until the owners decide to replace or carry 
out major renovations that increase the existing building envelope, 
particularly with regard to any seaward extension–at which stage 
the development controls should ensure a more safe location. 
However, areas where existing houses are close to the top landward 
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edge of historic erosion scarps are clearly at higher risk in the event 
that a major storm occurs. Careful thought should be given to early 
relocation of these dwellings. (Gisborne District Council, 2014, p. 
11) 
The statement that careful thought should be given to relocation of 
dwellings in the high-risk areas promotes managed retreat, however the strategy 
fails to require action to facilitate this. Again, the following section does the same, 
by mentioning relocation of the surf club as one of two appropriate actions. 
6.6.4 Triggers  
The 8m setback from the crest of the erosion scarp is required to 
trigger consideration of appropriate treatments...The most 
appropriate action will generally be either reinstatement of the 
eroded dune using sand push ups or landward relocation of the surf 
club. (Gisborne District Council, 2014, p. 27)   
Although this strategy does not quite facilitate managed retreat, it promotes 
it actively and delivers options for implementation to allow the facilitation of 
retreat through the District Plan and other instruments. It can be argued that this 
is the underlying purpose of a strategy, to guide management at a high level, 
however it is considered that greater direction on the early relocation of 
dwellings at high risk is necessary to be progressive in reducing natural hazard 
risk.  
Aside from requirement, which is not present at all, facilitation of managed 
retreat is the least common category found within this analysis. The three 
examples found go further than actively supporting or promoting retreat, they 
establish managed retreat as a management approach. Firstly, the Environment 
Canterbury 30-year Infrastructure Strategy 2015-2045 details the major new 
infrastructure required for the life of the plan. This includes retreat of the 
Seadown drain, the extension of pipes inland to avoid coastal erosion impacts 
and realignment of the Hook Beach drain (Christchurch City Council, 2015a, pp. 
14-15). By specifically determining the retreat actions required and stating the 
costs for this, the Council are enabling the process to occur in the future. In the 
national context, this approach is advanced, particularly when direction for 
infrastructure retreat is predominantly silent. The Hastings District Council 30-
year Infrastructure Strategy takes a similar approach, stating that “financial 
provision has been made in the plan for Council assets at Haumoana (particular 
road and water supply assets) which may need to be relocated at some point in 
the future” (Hastings District Council, 2015, p. 200). The third instrument to 
facilitate retreat is at a similar scale, looking at a discrete area of land rather than 
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entire coastal environments like many of the documents already discussed. The 
New Plymouth Coastal Reserves Management Plan November 2006 (as amended 
June 2015) requires that the Urenui Domain: 
 …will be managed according to a policy of managed retreat from 
river erosion. As such, no management intervention will be 
undertaken to address erosion except to protect significant public 
assets such as the road. Future vegetation and structures will be 
placed away from the river banks. Changes in the riverbank will be 
monitored and assessments made of implications for local 
infrastructure (New Plymouth District Council, 2006a, p. 151). 
 This policy directly enables managed retreat by clearly stating the approach 
to be taken. In this case, managed retreat appears as to be fairly different to other 
forms considered or promoted, however it entails the principles of managed 
retreat (and particularly those of managed realignment in the UK) by making 
space for the river, to allow it to function naturally, and avoiding investments in 
its vicinity that will require hard protection or interference. The discrete scales 
being managed within the facilitate category indicate the difficulty of facilitating 
retreat on a much broader scale, and where private investments are at stake.  
5.3.3 Provisions by type: Natural hazards and the influences of 
climate change 
Much like the RMA textual analysis, the type of hazards that are associated 
with managed retreat reveal a dominance of coastal hazard policy, followed by 
inland flooding and ‘all hazards’ (equally) and finally, land instability (Figure 18). 
No faultline provisions were found in the non-RMA analysis. The RMA analysis 
identified hazard disparities that signified the need for further research. In turn, 
the non-RMA analysis follows a similar trend, solidifying the conclusion that 
managed retreat is most commonly applied to manage coastal risks, followed by 
an ‘all hazards’ approach. The non-RMA provisions demonstrated a higher 
proportion of general climate change influences and specific impacts of sea level 
rise, increased flooding, erosion and storm frequency and intensity. This is likely 
due to the more strategic nature of these documents, and their more frequent 
renewal (e.g. long term plans are reviewed every three years, whereas district 
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5.3.4 Supplementary findings 
In addition to the instruments located, several other council documents 
referring to managed retreat were uncovered, including scientific reports, issue 
and options papers and council projects. Although these documents were not in 
the initial scope of the analysis, and have not been captured by the quantitative 
assessments, they are useful as they help to reveal the status of managed retreat 
implementation in New Zealand. In particular, council projects provided 
insights into current work focused on achieving future managed retreat. Firstly, 
the Waikato District Council Sunset Beach Erosion Project 2016 aimed at 
facilitating the relocation of council assets at risk of coastal erosion. An 
assessment of possible adaptation options carried out by GHD consultants 
resulted in the recommendation to implement managed retreat (GHD, 2014). A 
community engagement process functioned to determine the type of retreat to 
be applied and the specific trigger points to initiate this (GHD, 2015). It was 
determined through this process, that if erosion continues at Sunset Beach, the 
community hall will be relocated to the Port Waikato rugby grounds, and beach 
access car parking will be retained (if possible) with new parking constructed as 
close to the existing car park as possible (Waikato District Council, 2016). Actions 
for the short, medium and long-term have been determined within the project 
documentation to advance the managed retreat process.  
Following the catastrophic Matatā debris flow in 2005, Whakatāne District 
Council has been working to prepare a plan to mitigate the natural hazard risk. 
In 2015, Council staff worked as part of a Consensus Development Group to 
investigate risk mitigation options, identifying a voluntary managed retreat 
Figure 18: Natural hazard types and influences of climate change  
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option as the best way forward. The Council is currently progressing the 
voluntary retreat package for debris flow properties (16 occupied and 19 vacant 
sections) exposed to a high-annualised loss of life risk from future debris flows 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2016). This case study is explored in-depth in 
Chapter 6.  
Another council project found during the document search is the Kaeo flood 
risk reduction project. A key initiative here, includes assisting with the relocation 
of people from fourteen high risk homes through financial subsidy, to encourage 
retreat from the floodplain (Northland Regional Council, 2013). In 2010, the 
Department of Internal Affairs approved $500,000 of funding for the entire 
project with $257,000 allocated to Kaeo flood vulnerable homes. By August 2016, 
works had been completed on 8/14 properties, including the demolition of 2 
dwellings, the raising of 4 dwellings, removal of 1 dwelling and the registration of 
an encumbrance on the title of one dwelling to prevent use for accommodation. 
A variation to the funding agreement was applied for in August 2016 to include 
flood vulnerable homes in the Whangaroa Catchment however Northland 
Regional Council was not successful in this request (Northland Regional 
Council, 2016b). A final active project is the Hutt River City Centre Upgrade 
Project, (discussed in Chapter 2: Riverlink), which is at an advanced status in 2019, 
with property acquisitions nearly complete and resource consent procedures 
and ground investigations for the design of stop banks, bridges and other 
structures underway (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2019b). 
The textual analysis found six other council led projects that consider 
managed retreat to address rising sea levels, coastal erosion, river flooding, 
earthquake and rock avalanche hazards (Table 15). These projects are early in 
their respective processes, where initial scoping of a range of mitigation options, 
including managed retreat, is being carried out. Other authorities close to 
developing similar projects are Hauraki District Council and Kaipara District 
Council. Both councils are awaiting further hazard mapping/LIDAR information 
from regional councils to incorporate the data into district plans and develop 
appropriate mitigation methods in accordance with the level of risk. Northland 
Regional Council began a form of managed retreat as a reaction to severe 
flooding in Kaeo, however, it was waiting on the Ministry for the Environment to 
release the latest climate change and coastal hazard guidance to promote the 
development of strategies/adaptation pathways for at risk communities. With 
that information now public, planning and natural hazard staff are expected to 
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seek support to develop strategies for high priority areas. These examples 
provide insight to the status of managed retreat in New Zealand, but also the time 
required to obtain strong evidence, scope options and engage with the 
community before committing to an adaptation strategy or regulation.  
 
   Table 15: Council projects in progress 
Local Authority Project Status 
Waikato District 
Council 
Sunset Beach Erosion Project 2016 Active 
Whakatāne 
District Council 
Awatarariki Fanhead Voluntary Retreat 




Kaeo Flood Risk Reduction Business 
Case 2010 
Active  
GWRC, Hutt City 
Council & NZTA 





Currently developing a Coastal 




Tahunanui Coastal Erosion Study 2016 Scoping 
Western Bay of 
Plenty District 
Council 
Living with the Changing Tides Inner 
Harbour and Coastal Erosion 






& Hastings & 
Napier District 
Councils 
Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards 






Whangaehu Flood Resilience Uplift 
Project (No formal plans—assessing 







Franz Josef Hazard Mitigation Scoping 
Kaipara District 
Council 









5.3.5 Summary of other local government instrument findings 
Overall, a small number (39) of non-RMA instruments were found to 
consider, promote or facilitate managed retreat in New Zealand. In line with the 
RMA analysis, most instruments provide a limited level of direction, considering 
managed retreat as an option, with little guidance on what it entails or a 
definition to explain. Many of the instruments considering managed retreat are 
high-level, strategic documents. It is considered that this level of direction is 
appropriate at the strategic scale, however, for documents managing smaller 
spatial scales, a greater level of detail and direction is necessary. Four documents 
promoted managed retreat above alternative options, with some making use of a 
hierarchical approach to prioritise actions. Two instruments took the direction 
further by determining implementation methods, or setting aside funds to 
facilitate a retreat process.  
Both textual analyses highlighted that there is a lack of formal direction for 
managed retreat/realignment of infrastructure assets. In the non-RMA analysis, 
just 7/78 local authorities included managed retreat terms in their asset 
management plans. There was only a small improvement for infrastructure 
strategies with 14/78 authorities including managed retreat terms in their long-
term plans. These numbers, and the overall number of 39 documents in total 
verifies the low level of attention towards managed retreat in local government 
instruments. Precluding managed retreat as an option for consideration will 
ensure that it remains a marginalised approach.  
The local government instrument analysis resulted in supplementary 
findings that demonstrate the use of managed retreat outside of formal planning 
documents. Project documentation provided insight to the application of 
managed retreat in various council works, uncovering processes that are 
occurring outside of normal planning frameworks, such as land acquisition 
schemes. These findings also discovered projects early in their respective stages, 
being led by working groups to consider the mitigation options. To represent the 
status of managed retreat, Figure 19 synthesises cases where it is being actively 
scoped or facilitated in New Zealand, either by way of a strategy or project, 
combined with known cases of managed retreat implementation in New Zealand 
since 2000 (Chapter 2). Figure 19 does not refer to the RMA policy enablement of 
managed retreat as this is too complex to map, however it highlights the 

































Figure 19: The status of managed retreat projects in New Zealand. Map base layer source adapted from 
Korakys (2017) 







Chapter 5 has examined the regulatory and strategic planning instruments 
of the formal institutional framework for managed retreat. Keeping the 
numerous social, economic and political barriers in mind, and recognising that 
discourse and in particular, policy and regulation work to shape reality, this 
chapter helps to explain why managed retreat has been so rarely applied in New 
Zealand to date. Approximately half of RMA plans consider, promote or 
facilitate managed retreat by way of policy and regulation and very few other 
local government instruments were found to reference managed retreat. 
Direction and capacity for managed retreat is constrained; where it is being 
applied, the majority of planning instruments are delivering limited provisions 
to enable it. This is not a judgment of whether managed retreat should be 
facilitated or more strongly promoted, but a recognition of a barrier to its 
implementation.  
Terminology analysis found that in RMA instruments, ‘relocate’ dominates 
‘retreat’ but in other local government instruments the opposite occurs, although 
to a lesser degree. Further impacting effective governance outcomes (and 
essentially ‘good’ governance) is the lack of interpretive support which exists 
across all instruments, with only one comprehensive definition and explanation 
found amongst a plethora of variables to the term managed retreat. Not only are 
there numerous key terms, but diverse approaches for the enablement of 
managed retreat. Within the RMA analysis, five key approaches (and one 
distinctive category) emerged, all of which may require specific guidance for 
implementation. These policy categories may be of use to other researchers and 
policy makers investigating managed retreat mechanisms to foster learning and 
improve responsive governance. These include: policy to employ managed 
retreat for natural hazard risk management; regulation of new development; 
regulation of re-development/infill; policy and regulation controlling hard 
protection structures; strategic infrastructure policy and regulations; rebuilding 
regulations; and finally; a distinctive category capturing ad hoc methods. Within 
the categories, a wide variance in application and direction exists, but managed 
retreat is predominantly considered at best.  
Amid terminology and interpretation inconsistencies, implementation 
support was also lacking in the RMA plans, particularly in Category Two(a). 
While some plans provided a high level of direction as to what a relocatable 
building comprises, when relocation must occur and how it shall be provided for, 
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safeguarded and monitored, most were silent on these matters. It is expected that 
these concerns would otherwise be dealt with by consent conditions, however it 
is more transparent and efficient for the requirements to be provided within the 
assessment criteria as part of a relocation strategy, to ensure consistent and clear 
guidance to both developers and the consenting regime.  
Across New Zealand, managed retreat is most commonly applied to reduce 
or avoid the risks of coastal hazards, when it could be applied to a wide range of 
hazard risks. Another missed opportunity at present is the lack of attention 
towards infrastructure retreat across RMA plans, long-term plans and asset 
management plans. Overall, very few strategic or focused provisions were found. 
With long life spans and responsibilities to service to the public, managed retreat 
is a potentially significant approach to avoid harm to infrastructure and assets 
and the services they support.  
These findings highlight concerns for the effective, equitable, responsive 
and robust governance of managed retreat, with a lack of direction, 
implementation support, strategic planning, and consistency across the nation, 
potentially affecting the function and legitimacy of institutions, and the fair 
distribution of socio-economic costs and benefits. An absence of anticipatory 
action, and a lack of capacity to deliver ‘good’ outcomes is clear. 
Chapter 5 has critiqued the use of planning instruments to enable managed 
retreat. How directive planning for managed retreat is produced and used is the 
focus of Chapter 6, to examine a unique circumstance where implementation is 




Chapter 6 Institutional deficits, 
uncertainty, and trust: Lessons from 
Matatā, New Zealand 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 begins by 
documenting the context of the 
primary case study, briefly covering 
local Māori history, the 2005 debris 
flow, and an in-depth analysis of key 
events that led to managed retreat in 
Matatā. Semi-structured interviews 
with council staff, experts, and 
politicians, and analysis of key risk, 
response, and planning documents 
examine risk reduction governance in 
Matatā, uncovering institutional, 
economic, socio-political-cultural, 
and environmental barriers and 
enablers to managed retreat. These 
findings correlate to the themes of the literature review (Table 4). Analysis of 
interviews with members of the affected community further interrogates these 
themes, revealing key challenges experienced by those in the retreat zone and 
tensions between institutional constraints and private interests. Appendix 5 
records the documents examined to make sense of the events that have led to 
managed retreat and Appendix 6 provides the interviewee list.  
This case study exposes many lessons for managed retreat interventions, but 
essentially, the opportunity cost and path dependencies of absorptive resilience, 
and the risks of untested engineering solutions. Sipe and Vella (2014) recognise 
the profits of moving quickly post-disaster, including media attention providing 
awareness and donated goods and services. This research has identified that 
overcoming political pressures to rebuild is difficult, but something that strong 
national frameworks could alleviate. In Matatā, the governance network was not 
Figure 20: Case study location map 
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sufficiently managed to avoid the long-term impacts generated by short-term 
decision-making. In the broad scheme, attempts at recovery and risk reduction 
in Matatā amount close to maladaptation. But, for some, the process has 
eventually allowed ‘place detachment’ where individuals and groups have 
considered the negative future consequences of remaining and have begun 
loosening their attachments and forming new ones elsewhere (Agyeman et al., 
2009). However, for others, particularly those living on the debris flow fanhead, 
certain actions have had the opposite effect, due to feelings of alienation, 
uncertainty, and disempowerment, leading to legal challenge to retain property 
rights and resist all efforts to retreat. Fundamentally, the effectiveness of 
managed retreat governance is limited by weak direction, coordination, 
anticipation, and capacity. Stronger national policy frameworks, support, and 
mechanisms are required to avoid inequitable, ineffectual outcomes as a result 
of implementing managed retreat without operative tools, capacity, and policy 
frameworks. 
6.2 Matatā  
Matatā is a rural coastal community in the Bay of Plenty with a population 
of 645 (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). The socio-economic status is low, with a 
deprivation index of 9/10 (Department of Public Health, 2013), and 
unemployment at 13.7%—almost double that of general New Zealand 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2017a). The town has two schools and two 
preschools, three marae, a camping ground and a few shops. Matatā is exposed 
to a range of natural hazards including earthquakes, landslides, debris flows, 
floods, coastal erosion and inundation, with far-sourced hazards including 
tsunami and volcanic eruption from the Taupō Volcanic Zone (Ibid).  
In Matatā, 59.9% of the population identify themselves as Māori and three 
Iwi, Ngāti Rangitihi, Ngāti Awa and Ngāti Tūwharetoa ki Kawerau and the 
Mataatua District Māori Council have ties to the area (Ibid, p.22). As recorded in 
Te	Rangatiratanga o	Ngāti	Rangitihi	Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2009] 
NZEnvC 35 cultural witnesses confirm that local iwi knew of significant debris 
flows in Matatā since Māori occupation of the land. Several major debris flows 
have occurred since the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the last major one in 1939, 
with geological evidence illustrating that there have been events both larger and 
lesser than May 2005 [at 4]. There has been long-term cultural occupation of 
Matatā, and the Awatarariki catchment and fanhead is of considerable cultural 
importance for many reasons. Firstly, the domain of the taniwha on the landward 
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side of Te Awa o te Atua (Matatā lagoon) [at 11]. Secondly, a number of Māori 
battles were fought in Matatā, particularly in the year 1863/4, involving 
approximately 700 warriors, who rampaged in the Clem Elliott Drive area, 
making it of significance due to kōiwi buried there. Finally, the 1939 and 2005 
debris flows brought down further kōiwi, spreading them in the lagoon and Clem 
Elliot Drive areas [at 13 and 52].  
Initial development of the Awatarariki fanhead was strongly opposed by 
local Māori due to the presence of a burial ground, however their appeals were 
disregarded due to no conclusive evidence (Brown, 2008). Participant 7 stated 
that the subdivision happened in the days when Council “didn’t go and consult 
with anyone, especially not Māori.” Participant 7 recalled: 
There was this big hill that we were never allowed to play on and he 
bulldozed that hill out to flat–that was a graveyard…[e]veryone knew 
that’s where the bones were and sure enough they just came up 
everywhere… It was a big mess, but then it just carried on… 
Participant 7 affirmed that the area is wāhi tapu and should not have been 
developed. Following the 2005 event, a Tūwharetoa kaumātua considered that 
the ancestors were angry, with much of the damage being in areas where 
ancestors were killed and buried (Masters, 2005). “A lot of us said, ‘that’s the 
ancestors, even the ones up in the valley, covering over’” (Participant 7). Not only 
is the area extremely sacred due to kōiwi, but the presence of the taniwha holds 
significance. Dr Hikuroa uncovered an indigenous legend in Matatā, known as 
pūrākau, which symbolises the powerful nature of waterbodies in the catchment 
during floods, potentially indicating why Matatā’s three marae were unscathed 
in the 2005 event:   
The lizard is the stream, or resides in the stream, and its head is in the 
headwaters and the tributaries are its limbs. And the tail starts where 
the [Waitepuru] stream enters the flat plain…When you get floods, it 
naturally through centuries and millennia would flick from side to 
side and that was the tail (as cited in Wannan (2015, p. 1)) 
Indigenous knowledge can provide significant indication of environmental 
risks and Hikuroa (2016) argues that the presence of the taniwha is precautionary, 
signifying danger associated with the stream. From a traditional scientific 
perspective, this may be difficult to comprehend, but from a mātauranga Māori 
perspective, the pūrākau codifies local knowledge of the environment, including 
its inherent dangers (Ibid, p. 6-7). Such oral histories would have been useful 
prior to development, but unlikely to have been received. 
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The 2005 debris flow in the Awatarariki stream was catalysed by a 
significant amount of rainfall in the catchment resulting in severe flooding and a 
major debris flow. Rocks up to seven metres in diameter were transported at a 
velocity of 15-30 km/hr, before releasing an estimated 300,000+m3 of rock, wood 
debris, silt and slurry (Ibid, p. 24). The debris flow cut major transport links and 
caused significant damage to properties (Ibid, p. 25). With risk assessment 
modelling indicating a likelihood of five fatalities, it was incredible that loss of 
life was avoided (Ibid, p. 25). The most affected part of the community (on the 
Awatarariki stream fanhead) is located towards the western end of the township, 
consisting of 45 properties; 34 are privately owned and 16 occupied permanently.  
It is expected that long-term disaster recovery can take five to ten years 
(Spee, 2008) yet Whakatāne District Council (WDC) recognise that some 
members of the community remain “severely traumatised” 13 years later 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2017a, p. 3). The effect of a drawn-out process is a 
significant theme in this case study, highlighting increased community 
vulnerability produced by a raft of factors, resulting in a 13 year wait to reach a 
solution. To understand key contributors to the 13 year wait, and eventual 
resolution to implement planning methods, a synopsis of the events leading up 
to managed retreat is required.  
6.3 Key decisions 2005-2012 
Following the devastating debris flow, WDC and central government 
developed a recovery plan with the agreed objectives of providing certainty to 
the community, reducing risk to an acceptable level and identifying long-term, 
cost-effective, sustainable and affordable solutions for current and future 
ratepayers (Turner & Christison, 2005). The Institute of Geological and Nuclear 
Sciences (GNS) determined a probability of around one every 35 years in Matatā, 
but a probability of a similar or larger flow than the 2005 event of approximately 
one every 500 years. GNS acknowledged that once in 35 years is an unacceptably 
high probability, especially considering the added danger of debris, declaring the 
risk to be “at a level widely acknowledged to be unacceptable for dwellings” 
(McSaveney, Beetham, & Leonard, 2005, p. 38).  
 In May 2005, Tonkin and Taylor (T&T) was engaged by WDC to undertake 
a review of responsibilities and identify regulatory risk management options. 
Significantly, its report stated that “recent events at Matatā would suggest that 
hazard identification has not been sufficient” and that in the Whakatāne District, 
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the extents of natural hazards were inadequately identified (Tonkin & Taylor 
Ltd, 2005, p. iii). While both councils had hazard identification responsibilities, 
these were not clearly defined. T&T considered that this lack of identification 
“undermined their ability to effectively manage development in hazard-prone 
areas” (Ibid, p.25)—an unfortunate lesson post-disaster. As later recognised by 
Davies and McSaveney (2008, p. 61): 
Subsequent investigation of Matatā showed that it is sited on the 
debris-flow fans of a number of streams... A cursory inspection by 
anyone knowledgeable of debris flows would have identified the 
hazard if the question had been raised prior to the developments on 
the fans, but this did not occur.  
While Davies and McSaveney recognised the 2005 event was a remarkable 
lesson in the need to identify hazards, they did not consider it the fault of WDC, 
as its officers had not been educated about debris-flow fan characteristics, 
highlighting governance capability deficits. This is an important aspect of 
effective governance, ensuring appropriately skilled staff are in-house to identify 
and manage such risks.  
Further confusion around the responsibilities of the territorial authorities 
was apparent, highlighting governance coordination constraints. WDC sought 
advice on whether Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BOPRC) had a responsibility 
to mitigate the debris flow risk. T&T found it difficult to identify actual 
responsibilities, and from analysis of the RPS, considered that BOPRC had 
limited its responsibilities to existing flood control and drainage schemes, and 
that it largely passed the responsibility of natural hazard risk management to 
territorial authorities. However, they noted that provisions of the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 suggested that the Regional Council’s 
responsibilities lay beyond established schemes, leaving BOPRC with limited 
ability to pass on responsibilities (Tonkin & Taylor Ltd, 2005, p. 20). It was 
BOPRC’s opinion that protection of the urban area of Matatā was WDC’s 
responsibility (Bickers, 2012) and so WDC continued taking the lead. Alan 
Bickers, who independently reviewed the recovery process from 2005-2012 also 
considered that this should have been investigated further: 
Irrespective of which local authority accepted responsibility, the 
estimated costs of the various options were likely to be similar and 
funded from similar groups of ratepayers. WDC sought to provide 
certainty to property owners as soon as possible and, therefore, 
progressed to investigation rapidly (Bickers, 2012).  
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T&T Estimates  Nov 2005 Estimate May 2005 Estimate 
A1 Retreat $1.75m $1.5m 
A2 Debris dam $5.60m $3.7m 
A5 Bund $3.45m $2.8m 
 
In August 2005, T&T identified 11 preliminary engineering and planning 
options to manage the risks from future debris flows, option A1 being managed 
retreat, A1a including additional building floor raising and the remaining options 
comprising engineering protection measures. Following community 
consultation, WDC councillors considered the options proposed. Keeping in 
mind the project objectives, and the “majority” (Participant 1) of property owners’ 
wishes to remain on the fanhead, option A2 was selected, a debris dam in the 
catchment and flood channel based on it having the lowest discounted cost and 
lowest dis-benefits (Bickers, 2012). However, in November 2005, option A2, 
approved in principle, had been revised by T&T (from $3.7m to $5.6m) because 
the volume of the debris flow had been re-estimated, increasing estimated design 
costs (Table 16). T&T’s cost estimates allowed for contingency and risk, 
professional fees and contractor’s establishment, however, they did not include 
GST, escalation, land purchase, consents, operations, financing and project 
management (Bickers, 2012, p. 45).  




In this view, A1–Retreat appears to be a more cost-effective solution ($1.75m), 
however, when presenting the updated costs to Council, WDC’s Recovery 
Manager included some aspects of the factors excluded by T&T in the summary 
of costs (e.g. property purchase), but failed to include the estimates for project 
management, plan changes, financing, legal, sufficient consenting and escalation 
costs (Bickers, 2012, p. 46). The costs provided by the Recovery Manager and a 
summary assessed by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) 
were as follows: 
Table 17: WDC Recovery Manager cost estimates 
 
Table 18: New Zealand Institute of Economic research cost summary 
WDC Recovery 
Manager Estimates 
Capital cost Property purchase  Annual costs 
A1 Retreat Nil $8.092 (2004 values) 1.123m 
A2 Debris dam $4.590 $0.302m $0.845m 
A5 Bund $2.050m $4.215m $1.098m 
 
NZIER Summary Discounted Cost  Discounted Benefits  Net Benefit  
A1 Retreat  $13.86M  $2.28M  $-11.58M  
A2 Debris dam $7.94M  $2.94M  $-5.00M  
A5 Bund  $10.63M  $1.76M  $-8.87M 
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A key barrier to the selection (or further investigation) of retreat is 
recognised by Bickers (2012): 
…notwithstanding legal advice of its lack of any clear obligation to do 
so, WDC assumed that under a “retreat” option that it would be 
required to purchase affected property. That was a significant 
assumption which had a material effect on which of the mitigation 
options was preferred (p. 8). 
If costs of property purchase ($8M) had been excluded from the 
economic analysis, it is clear that Option A1 would have been the 
preferred option on economic terms (p. 47). 
In a post-disaster situation where buildings have already been damaged or 
destroyed, managed retreat is often more achievable, and efficient. The 
possibility for retreat without full compensation clearly existed following the 
event by allowing the EQC and private insurers to manage the majority of 
compensation within the scope of their contracts.  
This is not to say that full compensation is not required for managed retreat. 
However, had further investigation been carried out on the range of retreat 
options and funding agencies, or as to be further examined, better engineering 
risk assessment applied, managed retreat may have been more favourable at the 
beginning, and the 13 year wait reduced. In this circumstance, cost, ‘bounce-back 
resilience’ and an assumption of a fully (council) compensated retreat were 
significant initial barriers to managed retreat. Further to this, Bickers (2012) noted 
that while some of the project risks were highlighted in the Recovery Manager’s 
report to Council, the potential engineering risks of option A2 were not. 
Although T&T outlined the limitations of cost estimates and potential 
engineering risks, these factors were “possibly not fully appreciated by WDC in 
its policy response” (Bickers, 2012, p. 8). As it will unravel further in this story of 
events, in hindsight, these risks are key contributors to extended uncertainty and 
part of the reason managed retreat has emerged as a last resort.  
Following the resolution to go ahead with Option A2, the Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management provided a grant of $2.890 million for 
project costs and WDC budgeted $3.558 million (Whakatāne District Council, 
2017a). WDC considered issuing dangerous building notices to avoid people 
reoccupying their properties and applied to the Department of Building and 
Housing for a Building Act determination to help inform its considerations. 
However, in 2006, Determination 11912 from the Department of Building and 
Housing (DBH) reversed WDC’s intended decision path as it did not consider 
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that the estimated 200-500-year return period for triggering the high intensity 
rainfall event sat outside of the 'ordinary course of events'. This assessment 
became the basis of Council’s subsequent administration of the Building Act 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2017a) meaning that by 2012, six homes had been 
rebuilt on the fanhead, subject to ss 71-74 of the Building Act and under the 
assumption that the risk would be mitigated.  
With the budget approved, T&T began designing a debris earth dam, but 
community and iwi opposition saw that concept reviewed in July 2008. 
Mandated iwi representatives expressed strong opposition due to the potential 
to destroy burial caves, their preference for managed retreat, visual effects, 
increases in rates arising from the structure and ongoing maintenance costs (Te 
Rūnanga o Ngāti Awa, 2009). An alternative ‘flexible ring net’ debris detention 
structure concept was later approved by Council and a resource consent 
application was submitted in 2010. However, in 2011 peer review of the ring net 
raised concerns due to the scale of the project being internationally 
unprecedented, scenario modelling incompatibilities and safety and 
maintenance issues. In January 2012 T&T met with WDC’s Chief Executive to 
express concerns about the maximum life span of the proposal (being only 50 
years), its viability and mounting costs of the project, which by then, were 
estimated as ranging from $5-7 million (Bickers, 2012). Subsequently, CPG New 
Zealand Ltd reviewed the project, concluding that there were inherent risks in 
applying an untested engineering solution, not to mention the cost of removing 
debris, estimated at $5 million on top of the multi-million dollar project costs 
(CPG New Zealand Ltd, 2012, p. 18). With the expectation of reduced risk, new 
development could be anticipated on the fanhead. Should there be an event 
larger than 2005, or the structure underperformed, human life risk could be 
greater with a structure than without (Ibid). CPG concluded: 
As such, with a return period established in the order of 100’s of years 
and a current building property asset value within the unsafe zone, 
being less than half the current projected build and debris removal 
costs ($2.6m vs $5-12M), the proposal to proceed with the scheme as 
detailed, does not indicate a cost benefit incentive to proceed. (Ibid, p. 
19) 
Not only did changes to the engineering solution mean that complete 
construction costs were more than double the initial estimate, but the 
engineering solution was not sustainable, with ongoing maintenance and 
recovery costs and potential for increased risk (Bickers, 2012, p. 26). Bickers’ 
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review provided a wide range of findings and recommendations, including that 
WDC’s financial management had been “less than satisfactory” and that the 
situation the Council found itself in had been “substantially contributed to by 
the lack of project risk management.” Public criticism of poor financial 
management and an absence of solutions were “legitimate” (Ibid, p. 76) as at this 
stage, WDC had spent 91.5% of the project budget ($5.26m), with little to show for 
it. Proceeding with the ring net would have resulted in final costs likely to exceed 
$11m (Ibid). Had there been better estimation of risk and costs, managed retreat 
would have been rated more favourably in the beginning and effective risk 
management would have triggered a project review earlier. Bickers (2012, p. 73) 
could not clarify the extent to which WDC and contractors sought to manage the 
risks which “with the benefit of hindsight, were critical in the development of the 
design solution.” Bickers recommended WDC adopt a formalised governance 
layer to provide a greater level of oversight (2012, p. 69). 
Bickers (2012) recommended that WDC take no further action to progress 
the protection works and in December 2012, it was confirmed that there were no 
viable engineering solutions, leaving WDC to pursue planning options 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2017a). From this point forward, T&T was 
contracted to undertake a Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment which 
concluded an intolerable level of loss-of-life risk (exceeding commonly accepted 
values—there is no specific risk tolerance criteria in New Zealand) from future 
debris flows. WDC claims it did not carry out this risk assessment immediately 
following the event because all efforts were being directed towards engineering 
works (Whakatāne District Council, 2013, p. 11). This emphasis on protection, 
without a comprehensive risk assessment was a barrier to managed retreat. 
With intolerable risk to life ascertained and a new governance structure and 
project staff, WDC began declining building consents in the area, later endorsed 
by MBIE Determination 2016/034. WDC engaged Stimpson & Co to assist in 
gaining consensus between landowners and Council to determine a way 
forward. A Consensus Development Group (CDG) was formed, consisting of six 
landowners, a WDC Councillor and staff, a BOPRC representative, expert 
advisers and the workshop facilitators. Between March and May 2015, the CDG 
attended four full day workshops, considering eight options, from ‘stay’ to ‘full 
retreat’ including; stay and accept risk, do minimum, implement a range of 
collective and site-specific engineering solutions or one of the various forms of 
managed retreat. An initial assessment of the eight options was carried out and 
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results were disseminated to the community. Following the CDG workshops, the 
WDC project team worked to prepare the details of a proposed settlement 
process. The project team identified three remaining options including do 
nothing, status quo and various forms of managed retreat, excluding engineering 
solutions due to cost (Ibid). Four short-listed options were chosen for economic 
analysis, including the following scenarios and ‘do nothing’ as a base 
comparison:    
          Figure 21: Short-listed options for assessment 
By default, managed retreat was selected by WDC, as the do-nothing option 
was not supported by legal advice and the “status quo was viewed unfavourably 
by the CDG which left voluntary retreat with a range of variables as the preferred 
option” (Ibid, p. 6). The CDG believed that successful retreat would largely rest 
upon financial encouragement, referring to full market valuation of 2004 values.   
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) and MCA were used to compare the shortlisted 
options. Overall, option two provided the highest proportion of benefits and was 
calculated as the second least costly option to deliver (between $12.2 and $14.2 
million) recommended by the MCA summary as the preferred way forward 
(Whakatāne District Council, 2017a, p. 9). The initial proposals prepared were for 
all parties (landowners, WDC, BOPRC and central government) to meet 25% of 
the costs. CDG resident members rejected this because it had been over ten years 
since the event, and it would leave them unable to purchase a comparable 
property without incurring a substantial mortgage, particularly when 
considering the age of many residents (Whakatāne District Council, 2015).  
4: Ambitious
Compulsory retreat of all properties in HRZ 450,000m3 by 2020
Delivered by BOPRC or CG and funded by private owners 
and/or Regional Council and CG
3: Less Ambitious
Managed retreat of all properties in HRZ 450,000m3 by 2026 + plan changes
Delivered by WDC, funded by CG and LG
2: Intermediate
Managed retreat of all properties in HRZ 300,000m3 by 2020 + plan changes
Delivered by WDC, funded by CG and LG
1: Do Minimum
Managed retreat of existing dwellings in high risk zone (HRZ) 300,000m3 by 2020 
+ plan changes
Delivered by WDC, funded by CG and LG
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At a similar time, policy was developing at the regional level. In July 2016, 
BOPRC’s ‘Change 2’ was incorporated into the RPS. The variation introduced a 
risk-based approach to natural hazard management, placing responsibility on 
territorial authorities to map, assess and plan for landslide and debris flow risks. 
Significantly, the RPS classifies and defines risk according to likelihood and 
consequence assessments and requires high natural hazard risk to be reduced to 
medium levels (and low, if reasonably practicable) (Policy NH 3B). A public 
engagement process was a core component of establishing the thresholds, 
determining what level of risk the community wished to be safeguarded from 
and when can the risk of a natural hazard be regarded as acceptable, tolerable or 
intolerable. The RPS further cemented WDC’s responsibilities to reduce risk to 
a ‘tolerable’ level. Should the voluntary retreat package be unsuccessful, they 
considered a regional plan change to be the only remaining avenue to meet their 
obligations.  
WDC progressed to adopting the Acquisition Strategy developed by the 
Property Group Ltd which reflected key principles of Public Works Act 1981 
(PWA) acquisitions; equivalence, liberality, ultra vires, and natural justice. The 
Property Group advised that confirmed funding is an essential element of 
meaningful acquisition, presenting WDC with a ‘chicken and egg’ situation (Ibid, 
p. 83). WDC decided that funding agencies would require financial certainty, 
being “unlikely to provide funding support if there is a risk of becoming 
embroiled in an on-going dispute” (Whakatāne District Council, 2015, p. 5). In 
December 2016, preliminary offers were given to property owners at individual 
meetings, including a non-binding registration of interest to indicate whether 
they wished to participate further. The proposal reflected an indicative offer 
based on the current market value of their property without recognition of the 
hazard risk, conditional upon funding support from Government and BOPRC. If 
funding was provided, an updated valuation would be undertaken and presented 
in the final offer. The purpose of undertaking the valuations at this time was to 
define the potential financial envelope to enable meaningful dialogue between 
the proposed funding agencies. This option was deemed as being voluntary, 
outside of a regulatory regime, however, residents were made aware that the 
proposal was on a one-time offer basis and BOPRC had statutory authority to 
extinguish existing use rights without compensation if voluntary retreat was not 
100% successful. In addition to the purchase offer, a $1,200 legal fees 
contribution, relocation subsidy of $2,500 for fanhead residents, and potential 
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for deferred settlement of up to three years for special circumstances were 
included. By February 2017, 23 landowners had provided registrations of interest 
to WDC with 21 in support of continuing, two declining the preliminary offer and 
11 non-responses (Whakatāne District Council, 2017a, p. 122). 
WDC had begun formal engagement with funding agencies, but advice from 
the local MP was that the government wanted to “see some attempt from the 
district council around the plan changes—and so we proceeded with preparing 
our district plan change” (Participant 4). Subsequently, WDC received legal 
advice that the district plan changes would only address future development, not 
existing uses: 
…on its own, the work we were doing wasn’t sufficient to protect the 
council in the future if there was another event and people were 
killed… the advice was that in order to protect WDC, we needed to 
approach the regional council (Participant 4).  
Hence, the liability of WDC became a significant driver of regulatory 
managed retreat. In April 2017, WDC staff formally presented to BOPRC 
councillors on the need for a regional plan change. BOPRC, unwilling to initiate 
the plan change, advised WDC that “a request for a private change to the relevant 
regional plan can be made” (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2017, p. 19). BOPRC 
did not wish to initiate the change, however, their planning staff assisted WDC 
in the preparation of it to ensure integrated management. BOPRC resolved to 
accept the plan change, rather than adopting it, meaning their role would be at 
“arm’s length and process-based with costs shared” (Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council, 2018, p. 6). BOPRC staff recommended limited notification of the plan 
on the basis that “it was not appropriate to open a discrete regional community 
issue up to a national audience for discussion and input...” Members of the 
affected community considered that notification interest was wider than those 
immediately affected given the potential precedent for wider New Zealand. 
Acting on advice from WDC that the limited notification test of the RMA around 
service of documents could not be satisfied, BOPRC subsequently reversed its 
decision, moving to public notification of Plan Change 17 (Awatarariki Fanhead) 
to the Bay of Plenty Regional Natural Resources Plan (WDC also moved from 
limited to public notification for the District Plan Change). In June 2018, Plan 
Change 17 was publicly notified with new objectives and policies to reduce the 
natural hazard risk on the fanhead from high to at least medium risk. A rule 
prohibiting residential activities on identified sites within the high-risk area was 
introduced, having effect after 31 March 2021. Changes to the District Plan to 
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rezone the land from ‘Residential’ to ‘Coastal Protection Zone’, to prohibit 
residential activities and require resource consent for any new activities were 
notified in this process. 
6.4 Institutional barriers and enablers 
With a general understanding of the process to date, one can begin to 
appreciate its complexity and implications for governance. From 2005-2018 
certain actions described have resulted in great difficulty to achieve managed 
retreat in a manner that is acceptable to the community at risk. While some 
property owners are resolved to accepting the buyout, others (mostly those living 
in the high-risk area) wish to remain, at all costs. The following is an analysis of 
key institutional barriers and enablers experienced by project staff, experts, and 
politicians, organised in themes arising from the document analysis and semi-
structured interviews. 
6.4.1 Barriers 
  6.4.1.1 Post-disaster decision-making 
Recovery in Matatā was emotionally and politically charged with “tension 
between normalcy-generated demands, to get things back to pre-disaster and 
mitigation-generated demands, to prevent a reoccurrence of the disaster” (Spee, 
2008, p. 32). As often experienced following such events, there is a desire to 
rebuild as soon as possible, and therefore a focus on mitigation of risk, over 
avoidance. In this case, a speedy recovery was over-prioritised, thorough 
investigations were not carried out for all of the risk management options, 
particularly managed retreat. In hindsight, this was a major flaw. Had managed 
retreat been investigated more carefully, it is likely that the affected community 
could have relocated and recovered by now, not become entrenched in 
remaining on the fanhead, resorting to costly legal challenge, and unable to move 
on as many now find themselves. Participant 6 stated:  
I’ve been led to understand through talking about it with various 
people that when it (the debris flow) happened, the district council 
basically put its hand up and said, ‘we will make sure you can go 
back’. So, people then went back and re-built on the basis that the 
council promised they would be safe and then council spent far more 
money than it could afford to come out at the other end and say, ‘oh 
it looks like we can’t make this safe after all’. So again, part of my 
problem with the retreat package has been why are we even in this 
position in the first place? 
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This view highlights the politically charged rebuild mentality following the 
event and the lack of clarity over who was responsible for developing, leading 
and funding a solution for the affected residents. Participant 2 confirmed the 
rebuild mentality; “[e]veryone wanted progress to be made. People wanted to be 
able to move on with their lives. I think the Council is part of the community, 
they didn’t want that disruption.” As highlighted in Section 6.3, legal 
responsibilities should have been more thoroughly investigated and in 
hindsight, a more coordinated, collaborative approach at the local government 
level could have reduced the risks faced by WDC in depending not only on 
central government, but the regional council for funding and ultimately, 
BOPRC’s powers to extinguish existing use rights.  
In addition to short-termism and political desires to avoid community 
disruption, protectionism was dominant, allowing continuation of the status quo. 
The debris flow dam and subsequent amended designs were significant 
structures that had never been tested at such a scale. Not only does engineering 
innovation present risks in terms of viability, but the planning requirements for 
such structures are not straightforward. A planning expert assessed the range of 
considerations for the structure including post-event maintenance: 
When we were looking at the resource consent for that structure, all 
those things started to play out… consents only go for 35 years, so in 
the life of this thing, we are going to have to renew this consent ten 
times. Do we go and find a piece of land to deposit this material and 
potentially hold a consent for the next 400 years?...The structure 
itself, the materials only had a 50 year design life, so, say over a 400 
year return period, on average you might be renewing that thing 
eight times. So, it’s not just the first build, it’s the maintenance, the 
replacement and having to maintain monitoring and all of the 
mechansims to enable that to be emptied…for hundreds of years. 
(Participant 2) 
Participant 2 questioned whether having protection works that must 
continue for centuries is sustainable: “you’re giving this gift to future 
generations” and in the meantime, you also have increased risk by enabling 
development in the area. “Lack of insight into all of those things (because it takes 
a long time to work through)” (Participant 2) was a key lesson for dealing with 
significant works and the consenting and maintainance legacy they generate. 
The lengthy investigations required for the engineering solution yielded 
extended uncertainty and sunk costs for the community.  
In Matatā, there was a focus on resilience with absorptive capacity, ensuring 
the system persisted and ‘bounced-back’ from its shock. As discussed in Chapter 
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2, such a focus on resilience as persistence can make adaptive (and 
transformative) resilience less achievable, as people attain a false sense of 
security, path dependencies are formed, and further investment into risky spaces 
make change expensive and politically problematic (Lawrence et al., 2017, p. 2)—
the very situation that eventuated. The following barriers, in combination with 
initially uncoordinated, inefficient governance, and a focus on absorptive 
resilience, have thwarted the recovery and resilience of this community.  
 6.4.1.2 Recovery management governance  
Managing disaster recovery is no easy feat, but it is vital that staff have the 
capacity to deal with the complexity of such projects. As recognised in Section 
6.3, initial financial and risk management of the project was flawed, particularly 
in fully appreciating the limitations of cost estimates and the significant 
engineering risks involved. The governance structure lacked sufficient feedback 
loops to manage the various contractors, with a project review only being 
initiated in 2012—seven years on from the event, with nearly all of the budget 
spent. Participant 1 stated: 
When a situation like this arises, and there’s a need for rapid but 
robust decision-making at the early stage, you make sure decisions 
are in the hands of people that have a sufficient level of experience 
and competence. I suspect that there was some of that missing in the 
first instance, it was mostly done within WDC and I think they were 
pretty heavily influenced by Geobrugg and T&T early on…My 
strong personal impression was that there was quite a heavy sales job 
being done.  
This spotlights issues of limited governance capacity in the face of a disaster, 
and the need to have an institutional response architecture in anticipation of 
shocks, to deliver strategic recovery governance. Participant 4 also recognised the 
technical capacity constraints of the initial project team:  
A big issue was that we didn’t have anybody in house in that works 
and services team who had a high level of technical knowledge to 
manage the complexities of the various engineering things. So, what 
happened as a consequence was the team was defaulting to external 
advisors, for parts of it, so there was no holistic perspective 
maintained and it wasn’t until we had the peer review process that 
that happened because we brought in people that looked into the 
whole thing, and then we started to ask questions and the questions 
were being deflected from one person to another…I said, who is 
accountable if it fails? Which is a really fundamental question, but it 
was just finger pointing and that really brought it to light 
(Participant 4). 
 192 
Even in 2009, three years prior to the independent review, the Court in 
Te	Rangatiratanga o	Ngati	Rangitihi	Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2009] 
NZEnvC 47 made the following comment regarding the engineering works: 
[28]…Not unnaturally there is some concern both as to how such a 
system might be designed, constructed and maintained at reasonable 
cost and what the consequences might be if such a structure were 
overwhelmed. 
Why these fundamental questions were not more thoroughly investigated 
following the Court decision is unclear. In dealing with a complex web of 
governance actors, there must be sufficient oversight of the network as a whole. 
Where unprecedented engineering works are being canvassed, their risks must 
be vigilantly assessed, thoroughly managed and clearly illuminated to the public 
and elected members voting on options. Pertinent lessons comprise the 
importance of governance coordination, capacity, efficiency, accountability, 
anticipation, learning, and nesting; where authority and responsibility are 
supported by adequate support and oversight (Bennett & Satterfield 2018) as well 
as the danger of underestimating innovation risk.  
 6.4.1.3 Inconsistent decision-making  
A critical barrier to managed retreat has been the change of approach in 
managing risk, somewhat contributed to the two previous barriers. The change 
from an engineering solution to protect the locality and enable rebuilding, to 
managed retreat 13 years later, raises questions of negligence for residents who 
re-built on the basis that the area would be protected. Building consents were 
granted pursuant to s 72 of the Building Act, which according to Domain 
Environmental Ltd (2012) offers the Council protection against certain civil 
proceedings. Regardless of that, residents were led to believe that the risk would 
be mitigated and re-invested in the area as a result, causing significant stress 
when later told that managed retreat was the only available option. All 
participants have emphasised this change in approach as being a fundamental 
barrier to successful implementation of managed retreat which has “really 
soured the atmosphere between the community and WDC” (Participant 1). As it 
will be discussed in Section 6.6, some state that they would have relocated if 
absolutely required post-event, however as they have re-built, re-established and 
in some cases heavily re-invested, many are unwilling to leave.  
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 6.4.1.4 Science communication 
In 2015 WDC created the CDG to determine the preferred planning solution. 
Essential to gaining acceptance for managed retreat is gaining acceptance of the 
science. Participant 2 acknowledged that “one of the challenges is the actual risk 
assessment work, it’s incredibly complicated, it’s very hard to communicate, you 
know, some people, they just don’t believe it.” It is difficult when there has been 
disagreement between experts, which in the case of the engineering option “sort 
of suspended belief a bit” (Participant 2). Nevertheless, Participant 2 considers 
there are ways around this governance barrier, to build trust in the science and 
the determination of risk: “one of the things I’ve sort of advocated for, for a while, 
is for the Council to provide funding for experts for those residents.” Experts 
could include an independent engineer and planner: 
[s]omeone who can give them independent advice to avoid the 
grievance or suspicion of the process. Someone who can map a process 
and say here’s what this may look like over time, this is where you’ll 
have to be involved and the costs….I mean the Council people can try 
to tell them, but it’s different. I think that if something had been done 
differently, it might have been that (Participant 2). 
When questioned on the cost of that approach, Participant 2 argued that: 
In relative terms, I think that’s very small. The benefit of doing it, I 
think is colossal. To me that would be best practice, if you’ve got a 
community that’s affected by retreat and they’re struggling to 
understand it, and the information is really complicated, there’s got 
to be an upside in the entities dealing with that to help people through 
that. 
This is an important lesson from the case study, particularly when residents 
currently objecting to managed retreat were requesting a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with WDC to carry out independent engineering 
assessments at a late stage in the process (2018), as they do not accept the risk and 
do not consider that all of the mitigation options have been explored.  
 6.4.1.5 RMA jurisdiction and political acceptability 
Elected officials make significant decisions for the communities they 
represent. At the district level, councillors are often embedded in the 
community. In the case of a natural disaster, these decisions come at traumatic 
and chaotic times with significant responsibility attached. Participants were 
asked about the level of political acceptance for managed retreat and how this 
was achieved (the majority of district councillors voted in favour of managed 
retreat). Participants 3 and 4 expressed it as being a journey:  
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It’s fair to say they [WDC councillors] weren’t in favour of much 
early on…A number of the councillors have changed significantly in 
their view of it over time. Even at Council level you need to socialise 
the issue and then build on it and it took a number of years. Which is 
why we have a little bit of understanding for the Regional Council 
because they came into at a later stage and haven’t quite had that 
same journey (Participant 3). 
Participant 4 also recognised the importance of having a tiered governance 
structure (post 2012) with a high-level governance oversight which “brought the 
political element in early.” Whilst WDC councillors had time to come to terms 
with managed retreat, political actors at the regional level were harder to 
convince: 
We went to the regional council initially around joining us on the 
voluntary managed retreat strategy and at that point the regional 
council was sort of undereducated I guess around their roles and 
responsibilities. So, there was some political resistance to the Regional 
Council being involved (Participant 4).  
When later consulted on the need for a regional plan change, BOPRC 
considered it a ‘draconian’ approach and resolved that WDC must prepare a 
private plan change rather than initiating it themselves. Participant 5 affirmed 
that although the RPS states (Policy NH 14C) that BOPRC may exercise its 
function to override existing use rights, “I don’t think the Regional Council has 
ever had any appetite to control existing use rights.” The “lack of engagement at 
the regional council level” (Participant 6) is a barrier to the enablement of 
managed retreat, however BOPRC cannot be too harshly criticised for this 
stance, as the step to extinguish existing use rights is severe and unprecedented 
in New Zealand, subject to legal and public scrutiny. In this case, the key enabler 
to overcome the barrier of political will and limited institutional coordination 
has been the Councils’ liabilities, and the guiding framework and thresholds of 
the RPS. Time, exposure to the issue definition, solution and implementation 
processes have also been important factors in the enablement of political 
acceptance at both levels of local government in this case. Nevertheless, there 
remains a lack of political will at the regional level to fund the voluntary retreat 
package, an essential piece in this managed retreat puzzle: 
…I’m not convinced that the regional council is going to come to the 
party at all...It’s going to be really traumatic if people they think 
they’ve got it [a buyout]and it doesn’t happen. Council have raised 
that. We don’t want to be promising people, so we are clear we 
haven’t promised anything, but you can promise things without 
promising things, if you know what I mean (Participant 6). 
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Participant 6 identifies a significant barrier in this case. Offering an 
indicative buyout that is subject to funding confirmation may give people false 
hope and end terribly if unachievable. Section 6.4.1.7 explores these difficulties.  
Mention of greater collaboration between WDC and BOPRC has already 
been raised, but it is likely that this would have improved the political 
acceptability at the regional level. It is contradictory that the RPS directs the 
reduction of high risk to an acceptable level, yet BOPRC refused to initiate a 
regional plan change to give effect to this. In saying that, it did not reject the 
private request from WDC. While the Awatarariki project had been managed 
solely by WDC up until 2017, the mismatch of responsibility and jurisdiction 
under the RMA, with the district council being responsible for managing the 
effects that arise from natural hazards, without any tools available to manage 
existing uses, is a significant barrier to implementing managed retreat, 
nationwide. Local authorities may have overlapping responsibilities in this area, 
but they have different tools and legislative capacities which require more 
integrated management in future.  
The Waikato RPS (2016) has already anticipated this issue ahead of its time, 
providing a potential solution in the explanation to Policy 13.2 Manage activities 
to reduce the risks from natural hazards: 
Because existing lawfully established activities have some protection 
under the Resource Management Act (section 10), there are 
limitations on how territorial authorities can manage existing 
development…To avoid unnecessary complications due to this 
overlap, the regional council will investigate transferring its 
functions back to the relevant territorial authority (refer to section 33 
RMA). (Waikato Regional Council, 2016) 
Under section 33 RMA, a local authority may transfer any one or more of its 
functions, duties or powers (except this power of transfer) to another public 
authority (including territorial authorities). It could be worth testing the transfer 
of powers before investigating legislative change, but this work-around still 
requires collaboration within local government and political buy-in at both 
levels. Participant 4 questions whether this is a cynical transfer of risk, 
accountability, and funding responsibility from a regional entity to a smaller 
local entity. It must be noted that where an RPS does not specify natural hazard 
risk management responsibilities, the obligation to avoid or mitigate natural 
hazard risk remains with the regional authority and therefore the functions and 
powers remain aligned (s 62(2) RMA). 
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In the case of Matatā, key enablers to overcoming the jurisdictional barrier 
included Councils’ liabilities and the guiding framework and thresholds of the 
RPS which provides a strong directive that must be given effect to. Time, 
exposure to the issue definition, solution and implementation processes have 
been important factors in the enablement of political acceptance at both levels 
of local government in this case.  
 6.4.1.6 National guidance and tools 
As recognised in Chapter 4, New Zealand is deficient in national guidance 
for natural hazard planning. In the case of managed retreat, the lack of a guiding 
policy framework (for all natural hazards) is significant, as it is a contentious and 
complex approach for planners and managers to implement. Participants 
involved in developing managed retreat policy consider that the key barrier to 
implementing it is the “[l]ack of national framework—I think that’s the 
fundamental one…if there had been that we could have just been down this 
track, straight through” (Participant 4). When asked whether a decision for 
Matatā could have been made sooner, Participant 2 considered that in terms of 
the district council, that was unlikely “[b]ecause they don’t have the powers to 
implement managed retreat.” Participant 2 argues that the RMA does not provide 
useful instruments for existing uses: 
…in terms of an area that’s already developed, the tools are pretty 
weak, they are incredibly weak. I would have thought, that when it’s 
the district council making development decisions, they should really 
have the powers to go the other way and revert.  
Not only is there no high-level framework to guide decision-making for 
managed retreat in New Zealand, but as recognised in Chapters 4-6, the 
legislative tools are blunt and constrained for managing existing uses. The lack 
of formal guidance has resulted in policy learning across the country, with 
authorities attempting to progress retreat in numerous ways, including provision 
of information and restriction of new and re-development through zoning and 
plan rules (Chapter 5). In Matatā, due to the intolerable risk to life, WDC has had 
to be creative in its approach, working outside of the statutory regime to develop 
a retreat package that attempts to compensate owners for their loss of property. 
As this approach is non-statutory, WDC cannot enforce it and it has no capacity 
under the RMA to reduce residual risk if people choose to remain. The regional 
council has potential to extinguish existing use rights via the introduction of 
rules into its regional plan. However, this approach has never been tested in New 
Zealand and it is likely that case law arising from this plan change will determine 
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the legality of the approach, and whether RMA s 85 can be applied in defence. 
Leaving confirmation of this mechanism to the courts presents uncertainties to 
authorities attempting to apply it and to affected persons. Work currently being 
carried out by GNS has identified that a land use consent may present a certain 
loophole in the ability to extinguish existing use rights, potentially causing a 
‘rush of applications’ for existing use certificates under s 139A RMA (Grace, 
France-Hudson, & Kilvington, 2018). However, the authority could mitigate this 
risk by seeking a declaration from the Environment Court to ensure new rules 
have immediate legal effect, as demonstrated in Tasman District Council [2011] 
NZEnvC 47 (see Section 2.7.2). When mentioning the potential loophole to the 
regional council, the consequence of an untested framework was quite clear: 
…Hmm I’m not absolutely certain about the interplay between a 
regional rule and a resource consent. Mmm. Geez. Because consents 
are ‘one ring to rule them all’…The existing use rights are protection 
(s 10) against a rule in a district plan you can apply retrospectively, 
it doesn’t say anything about resource consent. So, the subdivision 
would’ve been consented, but those land use consents would have 
been granted in perpetuity. It is a potential loophole—absolutely. 
(Participant 5)  
WDC's legal advice, supported by MfE, contradicts this research (Participant 
4). This currently leaves confirmation of the mechanism to the courts, presenting 
difficulties for authorities attempting to apply it. 
When asked whether there should be more national guidance on managed 
retreat, Participant 5 stated: “Yea. I don’t think central government is any wiser 
in this territory than anybody else. They’re looking to us [Regional Council].” Not 
only is there a lack of a policy framework, tools and clear powers to deliver 
managed retreat, extinguishing existing use rights has its uncertainties in terms 
of timing and enforcement: 
…nobody’s got any appetite to be sending in bulldozers with protesters 
lying on the road... talking to one of our regulatory compliance team 
leaders he asked…‘How do you expect me to get these people out?’ 
That’s so far down the track for me that we just haven’t even thought 
of it yet, we’re a long way from being confident that we’re going to 
get it through (Participant 5). 
Among other details, the timing of the plan change has been carefully 
considered by planning experts and staff to try and ensure voluntary retreat is 
implemented prior to enforcement: 
…it turned out to just be having a stab at when they thought the 
money might be available and nobody knows that – it’s just a guess. 
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That’s a factor that could change through the submission process. 
(Participant 5).  
By the way we have structured the timing, it really is a last 
resort...We looked at various things. One of the suggestions was you 
make it non-complying and it allows people to then seek a resource 
consent to set a departure date, which had a certain amount of 
appeal, but then we thought[what] if someone says, ‘screw you, I’m 
not applying’? (Participant 2) 
These details are relevant not only to this case, but to other councils 
intending on applying this process, regardless of the voluntary retreat strategy. 
As recognised by Participant 2, the RMA is not a retrospective piece of legislation, 
and when asked whether it requires amendment to enable managed retreat, they 
stated:  
Yea definitely. The changes [2017 amendments] to the RMA really 
didn’t make a lot of difference. There was a lot of hoopla about it, so 
councils will be a lot more focused on it—but on what? Finding out 
that there’s a whole lot of problems but having no tools to fix it 
(Participant 2). 
Attempting managed retreat of existing uses in Matatā has highlighted how 
“successive governments and the RMA have provided a high-level policy 
direction around natural hazard risk reduction without providing any 
appropriate tools in the toolbox” (Participant 4). In this case, the project team has 
had to overcome many barriers to arrive at and deliver managed retreat without 
a guiding framework. In saying that, the RPS has been a local enabler in this case, 
somewhat by chance of timing.  
 6.4.1.7 Voluntary retreat? Complications of ‘carrot’ and 
‘stick’ timing 
Since managed retreat eventuated (by default), WDC staff have worked 
towards an incentivised land acquisition package. While it is not legally required, 
WDC considers it has a moral obligation to “invest in retreat from high risk 
natural hazard situations that satisfy certain risk criteria” and that successful 
retreat requires financial incentive (Whakatāne District Council, 2017a, p. 56). 
WDC intended to pursue the voluntary retreat package before using 
enforcement under the regulatory framework, but pressure from central 
government and WDC’s liability in not reducing the risk to an acceptable level, 
forced the timing of the regulatory measures to be brought forward: 
…early on, the feeling was that we would work through the 
acquisition process…and the plan change would only follow if it 
needed to…But that kind of shifted a bit because the other view was 
that the district council needs to do as much as it can do, under its 
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current powers... So, unless it’s exhausted all of those possibilities first, 
why would regional and central government step in? (Participant 2) 
Central government was not willing to step in until WDC had explored all 
of its powers under the RMA. While it may seem a logical argument from the 
top-down, on the ground, presenting a voluntary buyout whilst restrictive plan 
changes are being developed creates a sense of manipulation for affected 
residents. Planning experts who developed the regional plan change attempted 
to allow sufficient time for the voluntary proposal to operate, however it is only 
guess work of when (and if) funding may present itself. Unfortunately, the timing 
of the regulatory process has undermined the principles of the land acquisition 
strategy by giving the sense that it is not voluntary as residents feel trapped, with 
no choice but to take the offer. Clearly representing this view, some members of 
the community appeared at the plan change consultation wearing t-shirts 
exhibiting their version of 
the typical New Zealand Tui 
beer slogan for 
contradictory matters 
(Figure 22).  
Taking a similar position to that of the Matatā residents, in Quake Outcasts v 
The Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery the Court stated:  	 
[140] It is true that the Crown did not use its powers of compulsory 
acquisition under the Act.	However, it is unrealistic to describe the 
transactions that occurred as voluntary. The inhabitants of the red 
zones had no realistic alternative but to leave, given the damage to 
infrastructure and the clear message from the government that new 
infrastructure would not be installed and that existing infrastructure 
may not be maintained and that compulsory powers of acquisition 
could be used. [Emphasis added] 
In Quake Outcasts, voluntary acquisition was used as a tool to reduce risk in 
the Canterbury red zones, but even the acknowledgement of the ability to use 
powers under the CER Act was seen as undermining the voluntary status of the 
acquisition. In Matatā, changes to the Regional Plan to extinguish existing use 
rights have always been implied as a last resort, however, by initiating the 
regulatory process so that residents must appeal the plan change before funding 
is confirmed for the ‘voluntary’ buyout results in a highly fraught situation for 
residents uncertain of their future and the worth of their assets. The parallel 
processes of the ‘carrot and the stick’ are somewhat in opposition, one of which 
is moving faster than anticipated as no external funding had been confirmed for 






the buyout. As recognised by Participant 5, the regional plan change is “on a path 
now, it’s independent of that process.” This leaves affected residents in a tricky 
situation; if they do not submit on the plan change process (because they are 
expecting to accept the buyout) they will effectively be excluded from the 
statutory process of challenging the plan change; their only remaining avenue to 
defend their property rights. It is not necessarily the Council’s fault that this 
situation has arisen—WDC is working to secure funding, however, they have 
landed in difficulty by attempting incentivised retreat with limited capacity and 
resources, leaving forced retreat without compensation to be tested by the law, 
creating significant uncertainty for affected parties. Whether or not managed 
retreat in this form can be realistically deemed ‘voluntary’ is an important 
question for its future application. Many of the Matatā residents’ sense of threat, 
the lack of reasonable, alternative options, and the conclusion of the Supreme 
Court in Quake Outcasts certainly makes one think otherwise.   
6.4.2 Enablers 
 6.4.2.1 Regional planning framework 
In the absence of a framework for dealing with natural hazard risk, and 
particularly for employing managed retreat, the RPS, applying a risk-based 
approach, became operative just in time to support managed retreat 
intervention. The RPS is directive, requiring high risks to be reduced to medium, 
or as low as reasonably practicable. The timing and role of the RPS has 
significantly affected the enablement of managed retreat in Matatā. In 2013, 
WDC commissioned risk assessments and investigations for planning options at 
Matatā. However, the planning work was put on hold until the RPS became 
operative. Participant 2 discussed that a District Plan change was initially drafted 
but that it was important to align the policy amendments according to the RMA 
hierarchy to enable consistent policy frameworks: 
…the RPS was still in a state of flux…That’s quite important I think, 
because they [WDC] thought ‘we are sticking our necks out all the 
time with this stuff, so we’re not going to do this cart before the horse, 
we’ve got changes to the RMA, RPS driving us where we need to go, 
and our district plan can follow that’…Whereas what it would’ve been 
before is a district plan change request before the RMA was changed 
and before the RPS came into effect (Participant 2).  
The RPS timing somewhat decelerated the statutory managed retreat 
regime, but it also strongly supported the cause for managed retreat; “just having 
that policy framework in the RPS has been helpful to WDC, at the project level 
but also their councillors themselves have come along that path.” (Participant 5). 
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The framework of the RPS prescribes a methodology that allows authorities to 
make decisions based on risk and in taking the steps it has, WDC can say it is 
giving effect to it, as well as its statutory responsibilities. When asked how the 
risk-based approach came to fruition, Participant 5 recognised that they had been 
concerned since the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami about the lack 
of attention towards low likelihood, high consequence hazards; 
...in about 2010, we decided to take a risk-based approach…[but] we 
were breaking new ground with that…A critical part of that was 
establishing levels of risk-thresholds for those three categories of risk… 
[and] the community needed to be involved in making calls about 
that. So, we went through a very structured, but very swift 
community engagement process where we got input…and that 
informed the makeup of the matrix that is now in the RPS. 
(Participant 5) 
As it is clear from the evolution of the RPS, policy learning is continually 
occurring, and research such as Saunders’ (2012) risk-based framework is useful 
to enabling more responsive governance through learning and innovation, 
particularly whilst a national policy framework deficit exists. Participant 3 
highlighted how this change in approach impacts how decisions get made:  
…we looked at what we’re used to doing, which is putting a line on it 
[map]…[but] you don’t have any risk profile…if that framework had 
been in back in 2005, I think it would have been handled differently 
(Participant 3). 
While this framework provides clear policy direction, its focus on likelihood 
and potential consequences of risk (Policy NH1B) (and limited use under 
changing climate risk profiles) does not encourage action addressing the root 
causes of vulnerability (Section 2.4), nor the relentless drive of the private sector 
to develop in exposed localities, which remains entrenched. Institutional 
frameworks such as these influence power relations, risk perceptions, and in 
deciding how vulnerability, risk reduction, and adaptation are managed (Adger, 
2000). In New Zealand, risk management continues to be technocratic, and ‘swift’ 
community engagement is unlikely to provide adequate recognition and 
participation (Bennett and Satterfield, 2018) of all stakeholder groups and 
dimensions of vulnerability. 
 6.4.2.2 Local leadership 
Although some members of the community would strongly dispute this 
conclusion, experts who advised WDC recognised the importance of local 
leadership in gaining traction on managed retreat:  
They’ve had a lot of meetings, a lot of quite difficult meetings, I’ve 
been at one or two of them and they’ve got professional people in to 
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run the meetings, they have had the risk analyses checked and double 
checked by outsiders, I think they have absolutely bent over 
backwards to do everything they can...in a very thorough and fair 
manner. (Participant 1) 
In this case, as in many other post-disaster situations, there remain long-
term repercussions of short-term decisions made immediately following the 
event (Sipe & Vella, 2014). Decisions made prior to 2012 have caused considerable 
difficulties for enabling managed retreat, particularly the rebuilding and sunk 
costs of the engineering investigations. Irrespective of that, the project team 
working on the planning solution (post 2012) has endeavoured to provide a fair 
solution, being creative with the few tools and resources available at this late 
stage in the recovery process. Many of the issues associated with managed retreat 
have not been due to a lack of leadership at the local level (post 2012), but a lack 
of guidance on managed retreat and a consequential process of learning by 
doing. As recognised by Participants 1 and 2, the project team has put in a 
significant amount of effort to deliver a sufficiently robust, inclusive, transparent 
and fair process, “relative to what’s involved” (Participant 2).   
6.4.3 ‘Good’ governance deficits 
Institutional deficits are a significant barrier to the enablement of managed 
retreat in New Zealand, hindering effective, equitable, responsive and robust 
governance (Table 1), and favouring absorptive resilience over adaptation. There 
is an absence of strategic response planning to support communities recovering 
from disaster, limited nested support (locally grounded, but externally supported 
action) and capacity to wrestle with inevitable strategic response choices. 
Governance capacity is further limited by the lack of national policy guidance, 
legislative mechanisms, and implementation support to manage existing land 
use activities. Apart from broad guidance from the NZCPS on risk reduction 
measures by development type (new and existing) (MfE 2017a, p. 32) there are no 
standard national risk assessment methodologies to determine the level of risks 
at which reduction actions are necessary. Furthermore, the process for funding 
managed retreat is ad hoc and uncertain, with potential to undermine the 
legitimacy of incentivised retreat. Whilst ‘voluntary retreat’ is the only tool 
currently available to territorial authorities to achieve (incentivised) managed 
retreat of existing uses, (where the Public Works Act 1981 cannot be applied) it is 
not perceived as being ‘voluntary’ by people and communities if it is combined 
with regulation to remove existing use rights or withdrawal of service. This 
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perception undermines trust in actors governing managed retreat, reducing its 
legitimacy, and emphasising the need for instruments that people consider fair.  
Governance coordination and connections are weak due to a mismatch of 
responsibilities and jurisdiction in the management of existing land uses 
between territorial and regional authorities under the RMA. Clearer 
identification of governance roles, and greater integrated management are 
necessary to overcome this barrier. Early political alignment and collaborative 
policy development may help the political acceptability of managed retreat 
within local government. While regional councils are generally considered to 
have the ability to extinguish existing use rights, there is still legal uncertainty 
regarding the application of s 85 RMA, and the presence of existing resource 
consents as highlighted by Grace et al. (2018). It is likely that any case law arising 
from the Bay of Plenty Regional Plan Change 17 will provide legal clarity on these 
matters.   
Policy learning is occurring across New Zealand, driven by local leadership. 
In the absence of a national framework, RPS may assist in the enablement of 
managed retreat where they provide a policy framework, including a community 
tested, risk-based approach with key risk thresholds and direction to reduce risk 
to ‘acceptable’ levels, however, addressing and assessing broad dimensions of 
vulnerability remains hidden. 
6.5 Economic barriers and enablers  
 6.5.1 Funding and precedent 
At the heart of managed retreat are questions of whether compensation is 
required, to what extent, and who carries the cost? WDC determined that while 
not legally required, it had a moral obligation to compensate owners for their loss 
of property under voluntary retreat, as well as the view that successful managed 
retreat entails financial incentive. Barriers exemplify governance gaps, 
particularly capacity to deliver on responsibilities. The lack of funds available to 
implement or offer a voluntary retreat that is not indicative has been a barrier, as 
the community do not see it as a ‘real’ offer and are reticent to accept something 
that is subject to confirmation by regional and central government. Complicating 
matters further is that local ratepayers have not yet been consulted on their 
contribution to the fund, escalating legitimacy concerns.  
Questions arise with regard to setting a precedent, “[t]he worry I have is that 
the government see it and say, ‘well we are hearing more and more of this now, 
 204 
we don’t want to set a precedent’” (Participant 2). However, WDC has 
distinguished the business case to avoid this, stating that it only sets a precedent 
of a moral obligation to compensate where there has been a risk-based approach 
with community engagement to manage a situation that has no viable risk 
reduction solutions available, the risk to human life is intolerable and the costs 
to manage the risk are beyond the fiscal capability of the local authority to 
manage (Whakatāne District Council, 2017a). While the media has rapidly linked 
managed retreat in Matatā to the coastal climate change context, Participant 2 
concurs that it is different: 
I think it’s really different to say, coastal erosion, where the real risk 
is to property not to people. Here we are talking about risk to life, it’s 
quite a different package and I see that central government might 
have a role where there is a life risk. But…if it’s just a property risk 
there will always be time to plan for that. For example, Councils 
might become active in acquiring land as it cycles through. 
(Participant 2).  
Questions of funding and precedent are important, as not only do they 
present a barrier to managed retreat, but they are part of a wider governance 
debate relating to how managed retreat could be applied across New Zealand, 
and who pays? In considering precedent for land acquisition, the issue of moral 
hazard also arises. Participant 5 argued this stating: “I’ve got a sort of niggling 
concern of moral hazard, that the people become accustomed to being bailed out 
and then they’ll just keep on taking risks.” In addressing this issue, it is important 
that land acquisition processes are clearly distinguished to avoid assumptions of 
compensation across the board. While it may be difficult to avoid all moral 
hazard risk, prerequisites, such as whether property owners knew of the risks 
associated with their location before purchasing can be imposed. This approach 
was applied in the funding model for Matatā to avoid speculative buyers 
profiting from the retreat package, sending a signal that the buyout is discreet, 
based on specific criteria.  
A further avenue for precedent setting, which central government may view 
more favourably, relates to the collaborative contribution model proposed in 
Matatā. As reviewed in Chapter 2, previous buyout examples have been 
initiatives largely driven and funded by Government. The land acquisition 
process in Matatā is a multi-agency solution that was developed at the local level. 
Should there be a precedent set for funding managed retreat, Matatā prescribes 
a funding model that is spread across local and regional ratepayers and national 
taxpayers.  
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6.5.2 Property valuations 
The Property Group (2016) developed a framework for the valuation process 
to be based on a combination of the three following values: 
1. Pre-event market values 
2. Market value as at 1 July 2016 ignoring the event 
3. Market value as at 1 July 2016 based on the future planning provisions  
Properties were valued by Telfer Young Limited and independently peer 
reviewed. Table 19 below provides recent media statements by landowners 
regarding their valuations and information voluntarily provided by participants:  
Table 19: Property valuation statements 
 
Owners unhappy with the offers consider the valuations are not correct: 
When they gave us the house offers, there was a thing to say, ‘yes 
you’ll carry on talking to them’. Eleven of us said ‘no we’re not going 
to carry on because you’ve basically insulted us and its bulls**t’ 
(Participant 8). 
Those 11 property owners did not respond to the indicative offer because 
they felt disrespected by it and decided to work as a group to employ legal action 
against the plan changes. Whilst Participant 8 is not willing to move at all because 
their family does not accept the risk, they consider that other members currently 
rejecting the offer might be prepared to “[i]f they come in with [a] fair and 
reasonable package from the get go, then people would be more inclined to work 
with them.” Many use the term ‘like for like’ and consider that they should be 
able to purchase a similar property in order to move on. However, the fact that 21 
property owners have indicated their interest in continuing with the buyout is a 
sign that those owners do consider it to be a fair enough amount to retreat. The 
majority of those fighting the process are people residing on the fanhead, not the 
empty section holders, highlighting an enabler for buyouts where land is 
undeveloped (or was not re-developed following a disaster). 
1. Before the 2005 event “this place was valued at around $390,000” Participant has 
been offered $280,000.  
2. …purchased their home for $305,000 and WDC offered $305,000 (Shand, 2017).  
3. …was offered $280,000 for their home that is insured for $600,000 (Fleming, 2017). 
4. …was offered $200,000 which is what the section is apparently valued at back in 
2004 (Campbell, 2017a). 
5. …has been offered $600,000 – ‘It cost us more to build the house, and I think they 
have deliberately devalued knowing they were going to go down this path’ 
(Campbell, 2017b). 
6. “We don’t believe their valuations; their valuation of our place was $700,000. Which 
is less than what it was worth in 2005, before the event” (Participant). 
7. “Their indicative offer, we thought was fair” (Participant). 
8. “Well it was enough for us to go, it may not necessarily be the final remuneration 
that I expect, but it’s in a ballpark enough to go ‘I’ll work with this process’” 
(Participant). 
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6.6 Socio-political-cultural barriers and enablers  
6.6.1 Barriers 
 6.6.1.1 Uncertainty  
Inconsistent decision-making in Matatā has generated long-term 
uncertainty and taken its toll on the community. Many of the current residents 
experienced the 2005 event and some remain traumatised 13 years on. Those 
living on the fanhead feel trapped in houses that hold their life savings, unable 
to sell and move on. Property values have dropped and many still have 
mortgages, which for bare section owners requires payment (plus rates) for 
uninhabitable land. Between 2006 and 2012 six houses were rebuilt on the basis 
of a mitigation solution which did not ensue, with many upgrading their 
properties in the years that have passed. Some of the improvements have 
included sealing driveways, landscaping, installing a lift for elderly parents, new 
garages, decks and kitchens to name a few: 
…they waited until they could see what was happening and then they 
put all of their insurance money into rebuilding… It was hundreds 
and hundreds of thousands, millions of dollars gone back into 
rebuilding … then they say oh we’re not going to do it now, you can 
get out. So that’s why people are digging their toes in. (Participant 8) 
Those who re-built had to manage their insurance pay-out, obtain building 
consent, prove the stability of the land with expert assessments, and ensure that 
their new house would be insured. With those hoops jumped, a sense of certainty 
and security was regained for a short while. However, that all changed in 2012 
when mitigation was no longer viable and managed retreat eventuated in years 
to come. Participant 10, dismayed at the change in approach said, “we wouldn’t 
have put our insurance money back into this if we knew—we’re not that thick!” 
Participant 13 purchased their property in 2009 and spent $140,000 in 
renovations between 2012 and 2015. As others are, they are angry that in 2012 
council approved their additions and others’ building consents “… all the new 
houses over there, they were all built in 2011/2012... they were still allowing people 
to build. So, how can they just overnight go ‘oh sorry get outta here?’” The 
ongoing uncertainty and change in approach have resulted in a continued state 
of stress and trauma for many, and for those who rebuilt and re-invested, an even 
greater intensification of financial stress.  
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 6.6.1.2 Enduring trauma 
The 2005 event was like nothing the residents had ever experienced. Some 
families were home when the debris flow came roaring down the catchment. A 
house was lifted off its piles and one family sailed a treacherous slurry of silt, 
mud, boulders, and logs. They climbed up into their roof as their house plunged 
back and forwards, holding on for dear life. Others escaped their homes just in 
time, and some watched from second storeys as the currents of debris swept 
through.  
Some residents were displaced for periods of nine to 18 months, living out of 
suitcases, in a state of limbo (Spee, 2008, p. 17). Two years after the disaster, many 
had no certainty, and felt more stressed, frustrated and upset than in the first few 
weeks following the event (Ibid, p. 18). Psychological impacts recorded were 
sleeplessness, stress, anger, anxiety, vulnerability, sadness, isolation and 
depression (Ibid, p. 19). Spee described the impacts as reflective of a community 
that felt overwhelmingly powerless, stuck in a cycle of agitation, tension and 
sadness, a festering wound of anger and hurt (Ibid).  
Many residents who experienced the event still display these impacts, 13 
years on. Participant 11 says she has post-traumatic stress disorder and feels 
extreme anger towards WDC; “What I feel, is they have minimised what 
happened to us all along, it’s been minimised and swept under the carpet–‘oh 
you fullas are all right now, get over it, move on.’” Participant 10 says “it’s been 
stressful the whole time” holding a strong sense of anger and disappointment at 
the way they have been treated. Others recognise the ongoing stress that has 
been inescapable for everyone, “you’re under stress...You can’t sort of get away 
from it” (Participant 9). One resident who recently passed away was a 
representative for the community: 
I’m sure that was from stress, because he was helping a lot of people 
out ...[they] started to call him the Mayor of Matatā, but it just got 
too much for him. He had cardiac arrest. (Participant 9) 
Look I’ve watched people have heart attacks … [people] taken, put into 
rest homes that they didn’t want, marriages split up, because it’s 
constantly there, it’s always there. (Participant 10) 
The impact of this extended stress is not only health and resilience related. 




 We’re being dictated to…I won’t move because this is where I chose 
to live out my life. We’re all happy…nobody wants to leave... If offers 
had of come out in 2005 and were reasonable, people would’ve taken 
it. But it’s 13 years down the track. (Participant 14) 
 Many feel they have not been able to recover from the event, finding the 
added burden of the planning process and impending loss of property rights 
extremely stressful:  
The thing is, it’s on your mind all the time. Because it takes your time, 
because you’re constantly fighting them, constantly looking up things 
to find out about it, it’s your family home, it’s everything you’ve got, 
invested in it. (Participant 8) 
…I’m on the pension, I haven’t got any other money, it’s all here. If I 
get kicked out with nothing, where am I going to go, what am I going 
to do? I don’t get enough money to rent a place and survive, I can’t get 
a mortgage... (Participant 9) 
I’m stressed to buggery, I drink like a fish, I’ve put on that much 
weight you know… I don’t sleep. (Participant 13) 
After being in this situation for over a decade, for many, a resistance to the 
process develops, a ‘digging in of the toes’ somewhat triggered by a serious 
erosion of trust and a feeling of disempowerment. 
 6.6.1.3 Trust and legitimacy 
Myatt, Scrimshaw, and Lester (2003) confirm that where there is trust in 
governance actors, a more positive perception towards adaptation policies such 
as managed retreat can be expected. For policies to be perceived as legitimate, 
organisational trust is required, something that takes time to develop, but is 
easily lost. Residents who do not accept managed retreat in Matatā also do not 
trust WDC, being very strong in their opinions: “no, not at all… They give us the 
right to live here and then they take it away. This is why there is no confidence 
in the Council” (Participant 8). Participant 10 recognises that this trust was 
“gradually eroded” stating, “there’s just so many lies. The trouble is people have 
changed… the ones that are in there now have no idea of what they had done 
prior.” Among uncertainty, staff turnover, and the change of approach 
contributing to the lack of trust, the participants cited informing the banks and 
insurance sectors of the retreat strategy as damaging to their trust in Council: 
…that’s manipulating the system, so they can get the houses cheaper, 
because they’ll say well you can’t sell them and you can’t get loans on 
them so they’re not worth that much … if that was the stock market 
you’d be in jail (Participant 8). 
I feel more and more ripped off, they’ve backed us into a corner, they 
have gone and seen the banks and the insurance companies. 
(Participant 10).  
 209 
A recent report on managed retreat engagement (New Zealand Society of 
Local Government Managers (2016)) recommended involving these agencies in 
the process, which is what WDC did. This is a difficult barrier to overcome as 
many residents perceive it to be WDC overstepping its boundaries and 
manipulating residents into retreat, further degrading their trust.  
The chicken and egg situation WDC faced with the funding application and 
indicative offers eroded faith in the Council with regard to the legitimacy of their 
intentions;  
It’s bogus! Because there’s no money to back it up!!…You don’t go 
around making bogus offers (Participant 10).  
There’s no trust there at all... I mean they made us all these offers for 
the houses, but they’ve got no money. So, they’re not really offers at 
all (Participant 9). 
In addition to these perceptions are the beliefs of some that WDC 
contributed to the risk by not rehabilitating a quarry in the catchment: 
…the council owned a mine, and apparently when the quarry closed, 
the council just packed up and walked away and left it. When the 
2005 event happened the boulders that came down, everyone said, 
they’re from the quarry, they should have been removed…So what 
could happen now is if you wanted to you could … say well 
technically… you’ve caused all this problem by not clearing out the 
quarry (Participant 14). 
Essentially, for rejecting participants, their trust has been eroded because 
they do not perceive the process to be fair, transparent, inclusive, or legitimate 
(equitable, effective, and robust governance). This perception has developed 
significantly as a result of effective governance deficits (Section 6.4), which has 
resulted in a damaging snowball effect on the delivery of equitable and socially 
acceptable outcomes. In particular, procedural inconsistencies do not engender 
trust, particularly when changes appear to benefit the process, further feeding 
the lack of confidence in actors and organisations. For example, further loss of 
trust occurred when WDC changed their policy regarding the thresholds for 
uptake of voluntary retreat. In 2015, WDC determined a 90% acceptance 
threshold would be required to approach external funding agencies, but in 2017 
it was decided that “a threshold should not apply as it could potentially 
disadvantage property owners who wanted to relocate” (Whakatāne District 
Council, 2017b, p. 13). This was considered a deliberate manipulation of the 
process as WDC had initially placed high significance on the threshold.  
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Other participants who are more accepting of managed retreat, have trust in 
WDC staff and consider that the key staff and experts have “acted in good faith”, 
but they are not so trusting of councillors, at both WDC and BOPRC, feeling 
disappointed that some have not shown stronger leadership to get the issue 
resolved. Regardless of their trust in the staff, they too are beginning to have 
doubts, stating that they think the process has been mostly fair and transparent, 
but the timing of the regional plan regulation makes it difficult: “are we being 
naive, are we trusting them too much?” (Participant 16). Even those who have 
maintained a trusting relationship with the authorities are beginning to feel 
nervous about the potential extinguishment of their rights without fair 
compensation—or compensation at all.  
 6.6.1.4 Perceptions towards community engagement  
Residents on the fanhead have been consulted; their input has been sought, 
but they have little control over the goals and process. The six members of the 
CDG had the opportunity to provide input and ideas, with WDC making the final 
decision. This representation of the community amounts to placation, a step 
above consultation, but not quite empowerment. While WDC did work to 
independently engage the community to a higher degree than consultation, 
managed retreat was eventually selected by default, causing difficulty for some 
in accepting this: 
They had all these scenarios across the wall and they talked us 
through it and we all discussed different options and stuff, but the 
writing was on the wall sometimes … It’s now been suggested to me 
that we were manipulated in that CDG. There seems to be this really 
strong feeling of conspiracy…I do tend to try and think we 
participated in good faith… I know you have to start with a template, 
so it’s not about how are you going to manipulate me to give you 
information?…It’s that I need some structures so when I come here 
we have something to work with. So that’s how I felt the process was 
and I thought [the facilitators] did a very good job, they did bring in 
some very excellent people (Participant 16). 
Participants 10 and 11 hold a different view, feeling that the process was not 
genuine, and the outcome already determined: 
I just felt like it was a game, it was a process that they had to go 
through, but they weren’t listening to anybody…We never chose it… 
But all of a sudden, it just turned out that that was the option and 
that was it. It was never voted on (Participant 10). 
...on the third day when they said, ‘well there’s no funding for any of 
it so we’re not going to do a thing, so we’re looking at implementing a 
plan change.’ Which is when the PLAN to kick us all off our land 
started. That’s what made me so angry, why the F**K did you waste 
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my time? You could’ve just said to me in the beginning, actually we’re 
not gonna f*****g do anything. (Participant 11) 
While Participant 16 believed the process was robust, there was recognition 
it could have been perceived in two ways: 
If you wanted to keep an open heart, you could say I understand this 
process, there were options, there was some logical kind of 
conclusions. If you wanted to think negatively of that whole 
environment, you could say ‘oh they set us up, they came up with 
these options, they knew what they wanted’… and it might be the 
case, but I would like to think that [the facilitators] had nothing 
personally to gain from the outcomes other than the fact that they 
were being paid by one of the parties.  
The use of independent facilitators and experts in this case has been an 
enabler in some instances, however many of the barriers already discussed have 
undermined the perception of the engagement for some. Damaged trust, 
legitimacy concerns, and the default selection of managed retreat significantly 
factored into perceptions of the engagement process and the decision to 
implement managed retreat. Participant 16, trusting of the process and staff, 
mostly believes that the process was fair and understands that retreat was a 
logical conclusion, but not everyone sees it that way:  
The CDG came up with all options, from do nothing to retreat. The 
trouble is, they came up with that, but that’s where the residents’ 
consultation and input stopped. We never got a say in which one they 
were going to do, why they were going to do it, or anything else. 
(Participant 8) 
As recognised by WDC, “more touchstones along the way” (Participant 4) 
would have been useful, and stronger engagement with the entire community. A 
key turning point for many has been the development of the plan change to 
extinguish existing use rights of those who do not accept the voluntary offer. Up 
until that point, many, including those who are still accepting of the process, 
considered that if they were not happy with the indicative offer, they would just 
stay anyway. The regional plan change has left many people feeling ‘powerless’, 
calling it ‘dictatorial’, leaving them without any choice in a matter that deeply 
affects them. Participant 10, 8 and 14 sum this up:  
…when they threaten to cut your power and take your water and 
back you like a cornered rat, you’re going to come out fighting alright. 
(Participant 10) 
It’s the constant battle because you’re not part of the process. Council 
is doing it to us not with us…But the thing is if that relationship is just 
push down push down all the time, you get to the point where you’re 
like f**k it I’m going to fight and fight dirty. (Participant 8) 
 212 
If we keep pushing and pushing and resisting they may weaken their 
stance (Participant 14) 
The lack of trust and agency felt by those on the Awatarariki Residents 
Incorporation has ultimately resulted in their challenge of managed retreat.   
 6.6.1.5 Belief in science and risk tolerability 
Those with a lack of trust in the Council have a corresponding lack of trust 
in the science that determines an intolerable risk to human life. Participants in 
the Awatarariki Residents Incorporation do not trust WDC, do not believe that 
all of the mitigation options have been thoroughly explored and do not consider 
themselves to be living in a high-risk location. When asked if there was trust in 
the scientific evidence, Participant 10 stated: 
No, I don’t and for the simple reason that we’ve had so many reports 
that supersede, and you can just model anything to get the desired 
effect, the answer you want…To me it’s a land grab. I don’t believe it’s 
a high-risk area at all. I think there’s a plan somewhere. Railways is 
one that sticks with me. In that CDG I asked if you take our properties 
what are you going to do with the houses that can’t move? [One of 
the Councillors] said ‘oh well we’ll probably have to rent them out to 
recoup some money’. I was so wild.  
The inconsistencies experienced with the engineering solution and lack of 
trust in WDC have translated into a lack of trust in the science with a belief by 
some that there is a hidden agenda to use the land for other purposes. Whilst the 
Councillor who made the comment was later corrected, it still triggered 
questioning of the legitimacy. Careful consideration of the implications of such 
discussions is necessary when engaging with the community. Participants 8 and 
9 do not necessarily have a conspiracy theory, but they consider managed retreat 
as “ass covering” to avoid liability of both BOPRC and WDC, holding the belief 
that with the correct monitoring and maintenance of the river bed and 
catchment the risk could be mitigated: 
… it’s only high risk if we have significant rain, soil moisture content 
that reaches a certain saturation point and if it blocks up. So, we’re 
saying, yes, it’s high risk if you’re in the middle of a debris flow but at 
any other time, It’s very, very low risk. If it’s a 200-500-year event, 
then where’s the significance of it? (Participant 8) 
For three of the residents rejecting managed retreat, they do not consider 
that a fair amount of compensation would make them prepared to move, “no, 
because we don’t think it’s a risk. The thing is, if it was a risk and we thought it 
was a risk we would be gone” (Participant 8). Participants 16 and 17 hold a 
different view. Firstly, they consider “[t]here’s evidence to say that it’s happened 
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three times of significant size and we’re telling you that 7 years ago a little mini 
one went through. We know in the last 100 years what has happened.” 
(Participant 16). They believe that “if it’s happened once, twice, it’s going to 
happen again” and are “accepting the fact that there are educated people feeding 
us information” (Participant 17). Although they are trusting that there is risk, 
Participant 17 considers that the assessment determining intolerable risk to life 
“is a bit overstated” and they [WDC] are “covering their ass. So, they’ve got to 
take an extreme view. A precautionary approach. It may be right, it may be 
wrong.” Whilst happy to live with the risk, Participant 17 recognises the economic 
pitfalls of doing so: 
… if the regional council carry on and remove our existing use rights 
we have no value here. Personally, I’m not prepared to give up that 
value… that we’ve worked all our lives for… so I see the out here, the 
way I can recoup some value is to be part of this process. 
Whilst they are not absolutely convinced about the degree of risk on the 
fanhead, they recognise that there have been and are likely to be future events 
and “trust the academics who are trained in that field” as well as Council staff 
that this is the right approach to take, even though they have a strong attachment 
to their property.  
The quantitative risk assessment stated that “the risks to some properties in 
Matatā are considered to be moderate to very high and therefore in excess of the 
levels commonly adopted as being tolerable” (Tonkin & Taylor Ltd, 2013, p. ii). 
T&T stated that loss of life risks associated with the landslide and debris flow 
hazards in Matatā are greater than the 10-4/annum level often adopted as the 
tolerable-unacceptable boundary. For comparison, the 10-4/annum value is 
approximately equal to the risk of death in a road accident in New Zealand (Ibid, 
p.77). Loss of life risk levels calculated for areas in moderate to high hazard zones 
are classified as moderate to very high according to the Australian Geomechanics 
Society (2007) (AGS), where the risk level is moderate or higher, AGS consider 
risk reduction measures should be undertaken. From the outside looking in, it 
may seem obvious that the risk to life is too high to justify residential activity on 
the fanhead. However, the difficulty for residents in this situation is having 
someone else determine their toleration of risk. This is something Participant 6 
was also uncomfortable with: 
I am concerned about something which will essentially force people 
from their homes…Are we going to send police officers in to evict 
people forcibly from their houses?....Some of the people are really 
adamant they’re not moving. They’re going to challenge the Council 
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in court, and I suspect that some will have to be forcibly removed if 
they lose. Is that what we think our role is? To forcibly remove people 
from their homes? My point of view is that people do have a right to 
decide their own risks. We decide risk all the time. Every time we get 
in a car…cross the road, step on a plane—risk is a part of life and we 
all develop our own strategies to manage risk. Some people are more 
risk taking than others. I don’t believe it is the role of any government 
or crown agency to decide for people what their own level of risk for 
themselves is…Risk is part of the flavour of life.  
The lack of nationally consistent risk assessment methodologies makes it 
difficult for planners and managers to determine (with the community) when it 
is appropriate to require managed retreat. From a more civil-libertarian point of 
view, any risk tolerability criteria are too authoritative, as individuals should be 
able to determine their personal level of risk tolerability. Achieving the right 
balance of societal autonomy for risk determination and reduction is a 
challenging governance concern. The difficulty is that where there is risk of loss 
of life risk, it is not just the individual property owners, but family and visitors, 
tradespeople, and other service providers present on properties that may be less 
risk taking than the property owners.  
 6.6.1.6 Place attachment  
Inducing detachment from the home, community, and whenua (land) is a 
difficult task for policy makers implementing managed retreat. Dandy et al., 
(2019) recognise that there is growing evidence which suggests that high levels of 
place attachment may constrain decisions to relocate, although it is not a simple 
relationship (Barcus & Brunn, 2009, 2010; Gustafson, 2001). In Matatā, there is 
evidence of high place attachment based on ancestral family ownership and use 
of land, important life events and experiences, inheritance, financial security and 
investment, the quiet, coastal lifestyle, spiritual connections through 
survivorship of the 2005 event, length of residence and community participation: 
[He] bought the land in the early 50s from the council…and then in 
the late 80s he developed it. He bulldozed it flat and made it into 
sections...it was divided up amongst the family. Everybody got a 
piece...we lived there really happily…it was a beautiful lifestyle and I 
still miss it every day. So, I’ve got a really strong attachment to that 
land...how dare the council take my children’s inheritance away from 
them. It’s my tūrangawaewae…placentas were buried there. 
 
Tūrangawaewae are places where we feel especially empowered and 
connected. They are our foundation, our place in the world, our home.  




Other residents of the subdivision recognise the ‘sentimental value.’ When 
asked whether they would move with full compensation, they stated:  
No. Well it’s been in the family for 70 years…It’s the lifestyle too…my 
family is well known…they’re well established…big and important 
events, we’ve had here...This is not just about a piece of land…It’s 
always been about the family. 
Participant 8 also has significant connections to the family home “…there’s 
a huge attachment there, it’s whanau, whare, and whenua (you know, family, 
house, and the land as well) for us…there’s a huge attachment to it.” Even with 
these strong cultural, psychological, and place-based attachments, it is 
interesting that Participants 10 and 11 said they would have moved immediately 
following the event if required. One family had temporarily moved their house 
off the land post-event, waiting to rebuild once permitted. One of the mitigation 
investigations included a partial buyout with a chute to sea: 
They needed us [to relocate]…So, we said, ‘oh well’, because we hadn’t 
built or anything then. We thought alright, taking six [properties], if 
that was going to save 50 odd properties, price us up. So, when they 
valued us up, we valued more than what the dam was, so they said 
‘na we’re building the dam’, so we said, ‘oh well suit yourselves.’   
At that time, another family had indicated interest in the partial buyout as 
they did not consider living next to the bund to be appealing. Social capital 
among residents on the fanhead meant that some were willing to overcome their 
attachment to place to act in the common interest. Validating the importance of 
acting quickly following an event is Participant 11’s reasoning for being willing to 
leave in the first instance: 
Interviewer: Would you have moved at the start? 
Participant 11: I would’ve because at that time I was fearful, I 
realised it was a debris fan and I was thinking, you crazy people, 
what are you going back there for?  
Social memory and experience of the event could have enabled immediate 
retreat for some, and for ‘greater good’ interventions. These families, now 
fighting managed retreat, would have overcome their individual attachments to 
place to relocate at that stage, however, time, rebuilding, distrust, 
disillusionment, and anger at their situation has affected their ability to detach 
from their significant places.  
Participants who are more accepting of managed retreat recognise their 
strong attachment, but feel that there is no other choice, putting their attachment 
aside: 
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• Potential for new development in Matata.̄  
• Improved hazard protection to the built environment from coastal processes 
through a wider coastal reserve area.  
• Passive reserve space created for community with improved links to coast  
• Improved visual amenity to the entrance to Matata ̄(and the gateway to the 
Whakatan̄e District) 
• Ease of future debris clean up on fanhead  
• Contribution to the national and international natural hazard knowledge 
base (particularly using a risk-based approach and applying managed 
retreat under the RMA and in a non-statutory manner). 
• Minimising risk to emergency management personnel  
 
We don’t actually want to do this…It’s a pretty major upheaval…this 
has been our family home…We’ve only got two choices, one, civil 
disobedience, or be part of the process.  
[I] want to be part of the constructive process. So, you couldn’t say 
that we are prepared to go, we reluctantly will go. 
Their ability to do so may be the fact that they did not have to rebuild, they 




While the benefits of eliminating intolerable risk to life and potential 
liabilities of the local authorities are clear in this case, managed retreat also 
produces co-benefits, listed below: 








Many of these benefits will not be realised unless managed retreat is 
successful, and cannot be considered significant enablers to the process, but their 
presence in the Business Case may help influence funding decisions in support 
of retreat. In addition to these co-benefits, in a broader sense, is the application 
of an environmentally sustainable approach to managing risk to life from natural 
hazards, allowing nature to continue on its course, as well as ceasing human 
habitation of an area that is wāhi tapu. Future land management will be 
straightforward, and there will be no unsolicited ‘gift’ for future generations to 
manage.  
6.6.2.2 Recognition of local and indigenous knowledge 
Although Māori knowledge of debris flows was not initially considered to 
avoid risk, the wāhi tapu status of the land has eventually proven to be an enabler 
of managed retreat. There was strong iwi opposition towards the debris dam due 
to potential adverse cultural effects and cost, meaning that it did not eventuate. 
Managed retreat was always the preferred approach: 
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We all said to the district council in 2005 when it happened, leave it 
like it is. Don’t put bulldozers in there and start it up again…they [the 
ancestors] brought down debris to bury themselves. Leave it alone. 
(Participant 7). 
Following the initial opposition to rebuilding and subsequently the debris 
dam, managed retreat should have been reconsidered, rather than moving to the 
flexible ring net which eventuated as being impracticable. In 2017 local iwi 
“repeated their preference for retreat” (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2017, p. 23) and 
representatives from Mataatua District Maōri Council, with their understanding 
of historical events, did the same, citing climate change as having the potential 
to increase the likelihood of more devastating events in future (Ibid p.23). Iwi 
never approved of development on the fanhead; managed retreat provides not 
only a risk reduction benefit but a cultural and spiritual one. Important lessons 
from this case study include understanding local and indigenous knowledge 
prior to development, and respecting mātauranga Māori and sacred land.  
 
 6.6.2.3 Section holders 
Of the 34 properties affected in this case, 18 of them are vacant sections. Four 
of these were not vacant prior to 2005 but are now due to the event and the 
inability to gain consent to rebuild. While a couple of sites are used for camping, 
they are unimproved land. This presents a difficult situation for those who wish 
to build on the fanhead, but the vacant nature of the sections and the 
determination WDC was granted in 2016 are enablers of managed retreat due to 
the lower level of place attachment and financial investment in vacant land. It is 
likely that most retreat uptake will eventuate from the section owners (should 
funding be confirmed). 
6.6.2.4 Independent experts 
While there has been an erosion of trust since the event, WDC staff have 
been aware of this and worked hard to make the process as independent and 
robust as possible, from 2012 onwards. The risk assessment was peer reviewed 
and independent facilitators and experts were brought in to facilitate the CDG 
workshops which for some participants, reflected positively in their acceptance 
of the process. For others, this work has been marred by the impacts of managed 
retreat intervention with significant institutional deficits, uncertainty, and a 
process of learning by doing.  
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6.6.2.5 Social memory 
It can be reasoned that the state of some sections in Matatā (Figure 23) do 
not promote complete loss of social memory of the event and the risks associated 
with living on the Awatarariki fanhead (not including rehabilitated properties 
(Figure 24)). The Environment Court decision for the Awatarariki Stream and 
lagoon restoration consent appeals specifically excluded clearance and removal 
of debris from the Clem Elliot Drive area due to the potential impact on kōiwi. 
The Court was concerned about the works having no clear hazard mitigation 
benefit and enabling construction in an area at risk from future debris flows 
(Boffa Miskell Limited, 2017). Participant 2 posits: 
…there’s never been a consent to clean anything up…it’s just piles of 
boulders and rubbish everywhere…Which probably hasn’t promoted 
attachment in the areas. I always felt that [Judge Smith] made that 
decision for that reason. 
It is clear when visiting the area that the presence of the large boulders 
incites imagery of the event and recall its consequences. However, as noted by 
Participant 3, the social memory of the disaster has largely elapsed; “It’s been so 
long that many people didn’t experience it. Timing is a big thing.” 
6.7 Environmental barriers and enablers  
Some residents are not considering relocation, but those who are have 
recognised land availability as a significant environmental barrier to enable 
relocation, and their ability to maintain community, psychological, and 
livelihood ties and networks. Participant 16 stated they would have been keen on 
a land swap “because land is the hardest thing to access”, however little attention 
Figure 23: Empty Clem Elliot Drive properties (2018) 
Figure 24: Rehabilitated Clem Elliot Drive properties (2018) 
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has been given to relocation options for residents, albeit a small relocation 
subsidy. To avoid increasing vulnerability, individuals must have access to 
habitable housing, resources and services, and measures to restore/recover 
assets, livelihoods, land, and living standards (Weerasinghe, 2014). Participant 16 
recognises that while the offer is better than nothing, they have limited capacity 
to re-settle: 
The indicative price they offered us might’ve seemed like a good price, 
but it would be about $80,000-$90,000 to shift our house...first 
you’ve got to find a piece of land to put the house on…it would 
probably gobble up absolutely everything…we are very worried…it’s 
a major headache. 
The question of ‘managed retreat to where?’ has been left for individuals to 
manage, and there are concerns regarding the impacts on social and economic 
vulnerability, where capacity is limited. Again, this highlights the strategic 
planning deficit, where insufficient attention has been paid towards the capacity 
for relocation from a physical and socio-economic perspective. 
6.8 Summary 
Key lessons from Matatā include understanding local knowledge, 
identifying and assessing natural hazard risks to inform land use planning, 
having a clear division of responsibilities between local authorities for risk 
management and processes for determining project governance structures 
following significant hazard events to ensure thorough oversight and risk 
management. In a post-disaster situation, there is likely to be political propensity 
to promise a return to the status quo, to ‘bounce-back’ from the event, without 
enough insight of what it might mean for the future. Those who re-built in 
Matatā would confirm that in the long run, a speedy recovery is not superior to 
an effective one, having to recover once from disaster, and twice from a 
convoluted process. Cost benefit analyses cannot always factor in long-term costs 
of engineering solutions versus the long-term benefits of managed retreat, and 
engineering innovation carries significant risks, as well as uncertainty for 
consenting regimes.  
Protection works create path dependencies that are hard to veer from once 
paved, as well as increased residual risk. Such pathways make adaptive and 
transformational resilience extremely difficult. In this case, arriving at managed 
retreat was not enabled by a specific action or tool, but the fact that there were 
no other options left, it was a last resort. In hindsight, a significant opportunity 
was lost in Matatā. Immediate post-disaster retreat would have been more 
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efficient and effective, and less harmful to the long-term resilience of the 
community. Overcoming the rebuild mentality for areas of repeat events is a 
challenge, one that could be alleviated with stronger national direction, local 
capacity, and strategic response planning support. Nevertheless, key factors 
enabling managed retreat include the risk assessment determining intolerable 
risk to life, the liability of local authorities requiring them to reduce risk (do 
nothing was not an option) and the regional policy framework determining the 
risk thresholds.   
Gaining consensus on and understanding of the science can be problematic, 
particularly when it fundamentally drives managed retreat. The expert planning 
adviser recognised that if something was to be done differently, provision of 
independent planning and engineering technicians may have improved social 
acceptance towards managed retreat and trust in the science. In terms of 
community engagement, in this case “more touchstones along the way” could 
have improved acceptance and trust between WDC and the community.  
The difficult reality of managed retreat is intensified in this case, with 
displacement following extended stress. Uncertainty and inconsistent decision-
making over an extended period of time breeds distrust, confusion, fatigue and 
sometimes anger, particularly when financial investments and emotional 
stability depend upon confidence in the future. While managed retreat can be a 
sustainable long-term process, there are significant costs if it is not consistently 
and effectively managed. Institutional deficits, procedural inconsistencies, and 
extended uncertainty and recovery are momentous barriers to effective, 
equitable, responsive, and robust governance, damaging organisational trust and 
fundamentally, socio-political acceptance of managed retreat. Without guiding 
policy frameworks, mechanisms, and support, managed retreat remains a risky 
and difficult strategy for local government. 
Strategically planned retreat and risk management is vital. Limited 
relocation options and capacity can undermine the benefits of managed retreat, 
increasing social and economic vulnerability. Furthermore, iwi have advised of 
active geological faults in Matata ̄ and requested inclusion of homes within 20 
metres of these faults in the managed retreat scheme (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2017, 
p. 24) —not to mention other hazards in the district. Due to the extremely slow 
recovery and life risk in Matatā, it has become the priority and addressed 
discretely. In future, strategic planning is required to address the range of risks 
and give effect to the RPS across the district. 
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Chapter 7 In search of New Zealand’s 
stance on managed retreat 
7.1 Introduction  
To develop the policy analysis and case study findings, and contribute to the 
overall aim of the thesis, a questionnaire was employed to explore public 
perceptions of managed retreat policy. Successful managed retreat strategies 
may protect people and assets from harm, but they must be socially and 
politically acceptable to be effective. Further research is required to understand 
the acceptability of managed retreat instruments, public preferences towards the 
level and types of intervention by governing bodies, rights to self-determination, 
and the principles and funding models appropriate to different managed 
retreats. Participants were recruited online to take part in the questionnaire, 
which was advertised via email, social media, a magazine article, and 
organisational newsletters. The questionnaire examined where the costs of 
managed retreat should lie, participants’ reasoning for this and fundamental 
social barriers to managed retreat uptake. Respondents raised further issues 
including the presence of governance constraints and a strong expectation of 
transparency and equitable outcomes. The findings of Chapter 7 contribute to 
the examination of alternative managed retreat governance modes in Chapter 8, 
where opportunities to build capacity for effective, equitable, responsive and 
robust governance are analysed. 
In total, 556 respondents completed the questionnaire. Before analysis, all 
responses were screened for false data, with no cases being eliminated. As 
detailed in Appendix 6, the respondents included New Zealand residents across 
all age groups, with 80.55% owning property and 19.45% not. Before reading the 
information sheet, 49.19% of respondents did not know the meaning of managed 
retreat and 50.81% did. 
7.2 Policy preferences: Managed or unmanaged retreat? 
Respondents were asked to rank the methods that they considered most 
preferred for implementing managed retreat from the following options:  
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 As illustrated in Figure 25, the long-term strategy was ranked as the most 
appropriate approach overall, followed by provision of information, which is 
also referred to as ‘unmanaged retreat.’ While it is understood that different 
approaches will be required across the range of risks (for example, slow on-set or 
immediate risks), this ranking exercise provides insight into not only the form of 
intervention, but the actors facilitating managed, or unmanaged retreat. 
Respondents preferred a pure buyout much more than a buyout with planned 
relocation attached to it, recognising the desire for personal autonomy in choice 
of location among other things (Section 7.4.2.3). While 84 respondents ranked ‘no 
rebuilding’ as their first preference, 143 ranked it as their last preference (the most 
of all options) indicating that reactive retreat (prohibition of rebuilding 
destroyed assets) is the last method of choice for 26% of respondents.  
a) Long-term council & community strategy, including: 
-Avoiding further development in hazard zones 
-Requiring relocation/removal of	existing buildings/infrastructure over time, as risk 
triggers are met 
-Rehabilitating the land to its natural state 
b) Provide communities with scientific evidence on short, medium and long-term risk to 
allow them to move if they wish 
c) Central or local government buys property at market value and owners relocate to 
locations of their choice 
d) When	a structure/building is destroyed by a natural hazard event (that is expected to 
occur again), it	cannot be re-built. 
e) Land swap between high risk	property and nearby available land.	 
High risk land is converted to reserve and property owners relocate and re-establish 
themselves. 
f) Central or local government buys property at market value and a new neighbourhood is 
planned for owners to purchase sites and relocate 
Table 21: Policy preference options 
Figure 25: Policy ranking 
 223 
High property values are often considered a barrier to managed retreat 
(Abel et al., 2011) combined with increased economic ability of owners to 
challenge local authorities (Hayward, 2008, p. 56). Interestingly, respondents’ 
property ownership values did not have a significant effect on the balance of 
preferences for the top two policy preferences (Figure 26). This demonstrates 
that preferences for managed or unmanaged retreat are not necessarily related 
to investment value, but are more likely related to other factors such as age, self-
determination and governance ideologies (see Figure 27).  
Comparing policy preferences and age, Figure 27 demonstrates that age is a 
key factor in this pattern; as age increases, preference for unmanaged retreat 
gradually increases and preference for managed retreat declines. Respondents 
who do not own property in New Zealand showed the lowest first rank for 
unmanaged retreat and the greatest first rank for managed retreat (Figure 26). 
More than half (51.4%) of the respondents who don’t own property in New 
Zealand are under the age of 30, 28.04% between 30-39 years, 13.08% between 40-
49 years and just 7.47% over the age of 50. It is clear that those with ‘less skin in 
the game’ (non-property owners) prefer managed retreat over unmanaged 
retreat, as well as the majority of respondents under the age of 50. This 
demonstrates the private-public tension of managed retreat governance, and the 
reality that longer-term benefits will favour those who are more likely to see 
them in their lifetime. Ellis (2018) argues that due to the disproportionate stake 
younger generations have in the success of climate change and hazard 
adaptation, engagement with young people (and renters) who are 
Figure 26: Policy preferences and property ownership  
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underrepresented is critical. Recent student led climate crisis school strikes 
demonstrate young peoples’ desire for their voices to be heard, for action on both 
climate change mitigation and adaptation (Watts, 2019).  
 
The policy preference findings highlight the need to further investigate the 
governance of managed retreat versus unmanaged retreat, where either 
empowered institutions manage and coordinate retreat, or property owners 
make decisions to relocate autonomously. For many respondents, unmanaged, 
market-led retreat is an attractive option as it maintains personal choice and 
autonomy over property in the face of natural hazard risk: “If I really liked where 
I lived and was willing to accept the risk, that should be ok... I don't normally 
advocate for market mechanisms, but this seems like a decent way to organise 
managed retreat” (Respondent 502). However, as recognised by Turbott and 
Stewart (2006), Montz (1993) and Keys (2015), provision of risk information does 
not have a significant effect on the market value of at-risk properties or people’s 
Figure 27: Policy preferences and age 
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desire to develop or live on at-risk properties. Keys (2015) recognised that 
following hazard events there is often some immediate buyer resistance, 
however this lessens over time. At the coast, desirability of beachfront positions 
continues to override negative influences of risk factors such as periodic flooding 
and coastal erosion (Ibid). While provision of risk information by local 
authorities to enable unmanaged retreat may reduce their liabilities, it is unlikely 
to reduce risk to life, assets and ecosystems, especially not in an anticipatory 
manner. Therefore, relocation via unmanaged retreat is more likely to occur 
following an event, where lives and environmental features may have already 
been lost, and assets destroyed.  
An ethical dilemma associated with unmanaged retreat is that as market 
values eventually decline and insurers retreat, more vulnerable members of 
society will be inclined to purchase at-risk properties as they will be more 
affordable. Wisner (2004) confirms that impoverished people are more likely to 
live in hazard exposed areas. This will not necessarily be a ‘voluntary choice’ as 
it will often be the only choice to obtain economic opportunity (Ibid). Poverty is 
both a cause and consequence of risk, as impoverished people are less able to 
invest in risk-reducing measures and may not be able to afford or attain 
insurance, forcing them to use their already limited resources to buffer losses, 
driving them into further poverty (Ibid). These issues, combined with the 
ineffectiveness of information provision, constrain the utility of unmanaged 
retreat despite individual preference. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 
8, there may be other ways to provide the individual autonomy desired by many, 
to enable more voluntary managed retreat. 
7.3 Who bears the cost?  
As recognised in Chapter 6, the managed retreat funding void presents 
significant difficulties for its application. Respondents were asked to rank the 
groups they believe should bear the costs of managed retreat. Figure 28 
demonstrates that central government was the predominant first preference for 
funding of managed retreat, followed by the regional community via rates, then 
private owners, the community at risk and lastly, the district community. 
Following central government’s lead, private owners came in as the second most 
appropriate source for funding (with 142 #1 ranks) but were also ranked 
significantly by other respondents as the least appropriate source (with 179 #5 
ranks). This acknowledges the polarising views on the allocation of costs for 
managed retreat (and CCA and DRR in general). Property ownership, property 
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value, and age did not have a distinct influence on the range of preferences for 
allocation of cost. Respondents were subsequently asked to explain the 
reasoning	for their cost allocation ranking. The responses were coded according 
to key principles and tabulated according to the first rank chosen by respondents 
(Table 22). 















             
























































































Responsibility 93 - - - 13 
• Buyer beware, caveat emptor, due 
diligence, personal benefit – personal risk 
• Private responsibility with assistance 
from central government  
11 - - - - 
• Authorities approved development, 
therefore their responsibility to 
compensate  
6 26 7 6 3 
• Dependent on whether or not owners of 
knew of the risk when purchasing 
property  
16 52 10 5 - 
National Solidarity - 131 6 - - 
• National issue/capacity/national 
leadership/economies of scale 
• Local issue, local decisions and benefits 1 - - 7 5 
• Cost sharing, with all members bearing 
some portion of the cost. 
9 6 3 3 8 
Other - 2 - - - 
• Forced relocation requires compensation 
• Insurers will cover cost 9 9 - - - 





The majority of respondents who consider private property owners to be the 
most appropriate group to fund managed retreat believe so due to principles of 
‘buyer beware’ or ‘caveat emptor’ with many stating that the benefits of private 
ownership also come with costs and that you cannot ‘privatise the benefit and 
socialise the cost’. One respondent mentioned that they believe in private 
responsibility as they “don't trust the politically appointed government 
representatives to make logical decisions on my behalf” (Respondent 2). Present 
in most of the categories, is a view that there is a need to assess whether owners 
knew of the risk prior to obtaining their property to determine how responsible 
they might be for costs of retreat. Nine respondents referenced the role of the 
insurance industry to assist property owners and 11 highlighted the need for 
central government to provide some support, but that primary responsibility is 
with the property owner. Participants who ranked central government as the 
most appropriate funding source did so based on the principle of economies of 
scale and capacity, natural hazards and climate change adaptation being a 
‘nationwide issue’ and that government is best placed to lead. Fifty-two 
respondents also considered that knowledge of the risk is an important factor to 
be considered. Other respondents in this category highlighted that authorities 
have permitted development in areas of risk and therefore should be held 
somewhat accountable for costs. As with all of the categories, some respondents 
considered that a shared approach across all levels of government and the 
private sector would be appropriate. Respondent 508 argued against selecting 
‘who’ should pay, rather asking key questions: 
…across NZ private owners [are] living in high risk zones for three 
main reasons: 1. our previous knowledge of hazards was poor; 2. the 
risks have increased or changed over time; 3. as in my local area, 
previous regional and district council have knowingly allowed people 
to build in high risk areas and little is done to help them understand 
or manage the risk. I see that the question of who should bear the cost 
needs to be considered against why and how the need for managed 
retreat has arisen. It is not a black and white issue. 
Other comments of interest highlighted principles such as means testing 
and exacerbator pays: 
…a wealthy person who chooses to live in a seaside location or have a 
holiday home and who has the means to relocate, shouldn't get the 
same financial assistance as someone who has their entire equity tied 
up in a family home that is at risk and would be left with no financial 
means of re-establishing in a new location (Respondent 551). 
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Beneficiary should pay to avoid cross subsidisation and inefficient 
allocation of resources, but societal costs should be at central 
government level where appropriate to reflect exacerbator pays 
principle, i.e. we are all, as well as past generation responsible for 
rising seas, not just affected regional or local communities 
(Respondent 417). 
The exacerbator pays (or ‘polluter pays’) principle is defined by the 
Department of Internal Affairs (2011) as reflecting the costs of the actions or 
inactions of others. This is a potentially important principle considering many 
respondents made comments about the liability of society as well as government 
authorities for not addressing or adequately mitigating contributors to global 
climate change. Boston and Lawrence (2018, p. 45) also recognise the importance 
of responsibility principles in this context, stating that “there is a strong case for 
taxing current citizens (e.g. taxpayers and ratepayers) and building up a public 
fund (or funds) which can be deployed to help cover the financial costs of 
adapting to climate change later in the century.” 
Respondent 6 made the comment that as a community, there will be benefits 
of managed retreat which should be taken into account with the allocation of 
costs. Such benefits can include creation of new reserve areas and improved 
natural habitat or new beachfront properties with large setbacks and public 
access, where existing beachfront developments have been relocated. Another 
relevant comment was that ‘managed’ retreat implies an element of force and 
that in this case it is “unreasonable to expect private owners to be expected to 
find all the relocation costs unless they had been given a reasonable expectation 
this could happen when they bought, or can relocate with minimal loss” 
(Respondent 2). In summary, principles that respondents considered important 
in determining the allocation of costs are as follows: 
Table 23: Primary cost allocation principles 
Responsibility 
1. Buyer beware, buyer responsibility to fund 
2. No formal knowledge of risk prior to property purchase = limited responsibility to 
fund  
3. Exacerbator/polluter pays principle (those who have contributed to the risk by 
action and/or inaction are accountable) 
National solidarity 
4. Nation-wide issues, nation-wide costs—shared cost allocation, with all levels of 
society bearing some portion of the cost. 
Need* 
5. Allocation of costs is dependent on the capacity to fund (means testing) 
Local solidarity* 
6. Local issues, local costs 
Other* 
7. Forced managed retreat requires compensation/incentives from the managing 
authority 
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Principles marked with a star (*) were less pervasive, with ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘national solidarity’ dominating the discourse for cost allocation principles. 
These findings are comparable to those uncovered by Rulleau, Rey-Valette, and 
Clément (2016, p. 371) in the South of France, where a principle of national 
solidarity dominates the case for funding managed retreat and “significantly and 
positively affected preferences in favour of a realignment policy.” Rulleau et al., 
(2016, p. 373) also found that principles of justice and solidarity are important to 
inform compensation models, with the two main determinants of preferences 
and willingness to pay based on “ a notion of solidarity towards those who have 
longest been owners and are most attached to their property and a notion of 
responsibility towards those who were informed of the risks.” Principles of 
responsibility and national government support are considered relevant in 
Cooper and McKenna (2007) and are more broadly applied in climate change 
literature (Paavola & Adger, 2006). These principles relate not only to costs, but 
to the governance of managed retreat, whether it is an individual matter and 
responsibility, or a collective problem, requiring policy, regulation and other 
instruments to manage society, or whether it should be left to the market and 
individuals. Developing climate change funding principles further, Boston and 
Lawrence (2018) emphasise that adaptation funding must have two overarching 
goals: cost minimisation and equitable burden sharing. Cost minimisation is 
particularly focused on delivering cost-effective decisions (including managed 
retreat) which reduce costly damage and loss and help to reduce future insurance 
costs, supported by robust planning and regulatory frameworks to minimise 
moral hazard risk (Ibid, p. 44). Similar to the principles of responsibility 
emerging from the questionnaire, equitable burden sharing must ensure that 
people are not discriminated against or suffer disadvantages from circumstances 
under which they have limited or no control, and that cases are ‘treated alike’ but 
that considerations such as ‘need’ and ‘capacity to pay’ can be applied. They also 
highlight the importance of applying the best science and expert advice 
available, minimising procedural costs, ensuring procedural fairness, 
transparency, fiscal sustainability, policy flexibility, and providing sufficient 
policy clarity, consistency, and stability to deliver adequate certainty for affected 
people, businesses, and organisations (Ibid, p. 45). 
As managed retreat costs must fall somewhere, there is a need to determine 
how and to whom they will be allocated. Ellis (2018) argues that to deliver 
equitable outcomes, New Zealand must bring certainty to its funding framework, 
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avoid transfer of risk to the most vulnerable, and address spatial and temporal 
inequalities. There is a range of funding models that could be applied, for 
example, one that spreads cost across local and regional ratepayers and national 
taxpayers such as developed in Matatā, or a long-term managed retreat fund to 
assist property owners with eventual relocation costs, accumulating with the 
specific property regardless of the owner. These models require a willingness of 
authorities and from the public to contribute to what may often be a 
predominantly private benefit. However, the co-benefits of managed retreat that 
will be experienced in future are public benefits.  
To determine the model(s) for allocating managed retreat costs, the 
principles in Table 23 are relevant to consider. Further deliberation will be 
needed upon who pays and how managed retreat is applied, but also, which costs 
are covered publicly and privately. Public costs of managed retreat will inevitably 
include project management, risk assessment, strategic planning, community 
engagement, and replacement of stormwater, roads, infrastructure and public 
amenities. Depending on the funding model and the cost allocation principles 
applied, these costs could extend to replacement of existing utility services, land 
rehabilitation and restoration, as well as loss of asset and land values and private 
relocation or demolition of structures. Public costs could be limited to the bare 
minimum, however, evidence from this questionnaire and experiences in Matatā 
demonstrate that incentives or compensation are often expected where managed 
retreat is forced, particularly when dealing with managed retreat in the short-
term. As a central issue for its application, economic interests are prominent in 
the barriers discourse, examined next.  
7.4 Barriers  
Respondents were asked to “imagine property you own is at high risk of 
being affected by a natural hazard. Describe any factors that would cause you to 
object to managed retreat.” This question was open ended to enable respondents 
to provide examples of key barriers without leading them towards any factors. 
Fourteen themes emerged from the data coding, with many respondents listing 
more than one factor that would cause them to object. Table 24 lists the factors 
coded into key themes, providing a count that represents the number of times 
each theme was present in respondents’ answers (1 count per theme, per 
response). While this data is not representative of the New Zealand population, 
it provides a broad picture of key barriers to managed retreat important to the 
respondents, and correlates with the themes of the international literature 
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review (Table 4) and governance principles (Table 1). Ultimately, these barriers 
signify managed retreat governance deficits. 




1. Economic (general financial loss) 
a) Income loss 
b) Compensation 






Science communication and science–policy interface 
2. Scientific evidence/risk assessment 
a) Different risk tolerance to community/decision-
makers/council liability 
b) Acceptance dependent on likelihood and 
consequence of event 
c) Uncertain risk 
d) A lack of confidence in the science/lack of evidence 















4. Place attachment (general) 
a) Ancestral connections 
b) Māori cultural ties 
c) Community/work/family ties 






5. Loss of autonomy  44 
6. Lack of emotional support 5 
Institutional 
Equitable, effective, responsive and robust governance 
7. Poor consultation 21 
8. Unfair process  
a) Inconsistent decisions  
17 
2 
9. Unrealistic relocation timeframe 16 
10. No trust in authority 16 
11. Risk caused or increased by authorities 6 
Environmental 
12. Limited relocation options (socio-environmental barrier) 60 




7.4.1 Economic barriers 
Table 24 highlights a range of concerns raised by the respondents, with 
financial implications of managed retreat being the most commonly mentioned 
factor. In discussing this theme, respondents referred heavily to the need for 
financial compensation: “My home is my biggest asset. Adequate compensation 
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is essential” (Respondent 59). Others elaborated further, highlighting the 
importance of compensation to enable “purchasing power in a similar location” 
(Respondent 283) or to a “comparable property” (Respondent 239). It was made 
clear by many respondents that ‘agreed’, ‘acceptable’ and ‘sufficient’ 
compensation is expected in order to accept managed retreat. Other financial 
factors mentioned included the cost of relocation, loss of property equity, and 
property value decrease with a mortgage still to pay. These financial matters are 
important to the respondents, often cited as the first or only factor, and are 
recognised as barriers by property owners and non-property owners. Potential 
income loss was raised as a concern by those who work from home businesses, 
own farms or rental properties. Forty-three respondents discussed the financial 
barrier of relocation costs, with many referring to the burden of upheaval. While 
this is not the only barrier to managed retreat, it is the one that many prioritise 
and state first, concerned for their security, and of their families, illustrating the 
dependence on property ownership and investment, but also the vulnerability of 
those with mortgages that may not reflect the realistic value (risk factor) of their 
investment.  
7.4.2 Socio-political-cultural barriers 
7.4.2.1 Science communication, trust and evidence  
In addition to 
economic barriers, 
trust in and validity of 
science are seen as 
essential. Figure 29 
visually represents 
key words used by 
participants in 
addressing why they 
may object to 
managed retreat with 
regard to the validity 
and communication 
of science. Lack of evidence or confidence in the science were significant matters 
raised. Participants highlighted the importance of “trusting the data that ranks 
the risk” (Respondent 447), having “confidence in the science” (Respondent 307) 
as well as “credibility in the council telling me to go” (Respondent 145). There is 
Figure 29: Question 11 word cloud: Scientific evidence and trust 
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recognition that political and individual risk tolerances may differ, highlighting 
tensions between public and private interests. Another argument worthy of 
consideration is the expectation of detailed analysis to avoid blanket provisions 
or a one size fits all approach; “[i]f the defined risk was at anything other than a 
"seriously micro" level, I'd object. Some rate Otaki as a high-risk area because of 
floods—my house is NOT at risk, being on a plateau.” (Respondent 333). Others 
stated that because “assessing natural hazard risk is subjective” (Respondent 331) 
they would be prepared to take the risk or may perceive the risk to be lower than 
what the science determines—“I’d judge it for myself” (Respondent 270). This is 
especially relevant to hazards exacerbated by climate change over time, with 
respondents emphasising that personal risk tolerance will be influenced by the 
temporal nature of risk, recognising the need to adaptively manage land uses: 
The risk factor. For example sea level	rise	taking my property in 50 
years. I wouldn't move. If it was a cliff eroding away in the next 5 
years I would move (#27). 
Differences in opinion of the time frame and the perceived risk. For 
example if the hazard such as flooding that had been experienced a 
number of times and would continue- then retreat may be a good 
option.	Climate	change based hazard- which is said to be possible, has 
shown no past hazard, has no local specific data to support and has 
no time frame. Why would you not use the land while you can- it 
might be 200 years - just build smarter (#537). 
The risk profile may change over time (Such as in the case of sea 
level	rise) (#3). 
Inertia and the level of willingness to increase personal resilience were also 
cited as factors that would affect participants’ acceptance of managed retreat. 
These factors were dominant in Chapter 6 with participants finding it difficult to 
accept the risk analysis when according to the map, they could ‘jump over their 
fence’ and be safe from debris flow. Forty-six respondents consider that managed 
retreat should only be a last resort option, with many indicating their wish for 
mitigation works to be tried and tested first, or for alternative land uses to be 
considered. Some stated that they would object if they had invested in 
“significant, and effective adaptation measures” and “were willing to accept the 
risk” (Respondent 439). Participants also referred to hard engineering measures; 
“[i]t's very simple and relatively low cost to implement solutions that hold the 
beach line” (Respondent 366). Others highlighted that it would depend on the 
“type of natural hazard and how easy it is to predict. I would expect 
council/central government to have done everything possible to mitigate 
potential risk first, before being asked to retreat” (Respondent 42).  
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Further comments of interest include that of Respondent 274: “If my 
building design was with managed retreat in mind, I would like my plan for 
retreat to be taken into account.” This highlights potential self-managed retreat 
occurring within communities as part of individual adaptation, or as a 
consequence of ad hoc relocatable building policies (Chapter 5). Robust 
engagement and policy alignment are necessary to enable an effective approach 
that integrates existing processes. Finally, five respondents referred to the risk 
type as a factor, referring to the ability to predict their occurrence. For example, 
Respondent 433 stated that tsunami risk is too unpredictable to enable the 
certainty required for managed retreat. This is aligned with disaster resettlement 
literature which considers flooding, landslides, high-energy impact volcanic 
eruptions and highly liquefiable soils to be generally applicable to resettlement, 
broadly excluding hurricane and related events, tsunamis and earthquakes as 
they impact vast areas or are highly unpredictable (Correa, Ramirez, & Sanahuja, 
2011, p. 24). Respondent 168 stated that decisions will depend on the “nature” of 
the risk. Climate change will impact the nature of risks, resulting in 
compounding and cascading hazards, creating new hazards (e.g. ‘usteq’—
catastrophic land collapse triggered by the combination of thawing permafrost, 
erosion, and flooding (Bronen, 2019)), and exacerbating the frequency and 
intensity of events. The CCA literature emphasises the applicability of managed 
retreat to adapt to the slow-onset impacts of sea level rise, increased flooding, 
erosion, storm surge, and inundation risks, rising groundwater, and usteq (Abel 
et al., 2011; Agyeman et al., 2009; Bardsley & Niven, 2013; Barnett et al., 2014; 
Bronen, 2015; Bronen, 2019; Harman et al., 2015; Kousky, 2014; Lawrence, Bell, et 
al., 2019; Lawrence, Haasnoot, et al., Reisinger et al., 2015). 
7.4.2.2 Psychological: Place attachment 
Attachment to place is multidimensional and the responses reflected this. 
As the third most common barrier, a range of concerns were raised. Emotional 
attachment featured strongly, whether it was due to family history, 
intergenerational land and memories, cultural ties, sentimental or intrinsic 
values or location: “I have a strong emotional bond to that property” (Respondent 
502), “Even though my head would tell me it's time to go, my heart would be 
saying that I won't get another property on the harbour like the one I have got.” 
(Respondent 497). Farmers and pet owners raised concerns about stock welfare 




the importance of 
networks, including 
their current lifestyles, 
such as community 
connections, work and 
school routines and the 
need to care for elderly 
or dependent family 
members in their 
current locations. All of 
these reasons for 
objection raise valid 
concerns to be considered when attempting to mobilise place.  
Another dimension of place attachment is Māori cultural ties, also present 
in this category, with respondents recognising the importance of maintaining 
ancestral connections and cultural norms associated with places of significance, 
using key words ‘tapu’ ‘noa’ kōiwi’ ‘marae’ and ‘urupa’. Land is a locator and 
connective space for Māori, tūrangawaewae (a place to stand), providing a sense 
of belonging, cultural identity and vital resources. Land holds historical value, 
being an individual or group’s connection to the past, physically and spiritually 
(Fleming, 2016). As will be discussed in Chapter 8, managed retreat of Māori 
owned land, or land with cultural values and interests will require collaborative 
partnerships. 
 Age is an important factor to consider when considering acceptance of 
managed retreat, and it is relevant to place attachment. Eight respondents 
referred to age as a potential barrier; “if I was old and preferred to take the risk 
in my life-time” (435), “if I was retired and had lived there a long time, I wouldn’t 
want to move” (211). A 70+ year old respondent stated that due to their age they 
would “possibly risk staying put” (14). Respondents were asked whether their 
attachment to their property or place of residence is high, medium or low. When 
comparing place attachment against respondents’ age, there is a steady increase 
Figure 30: Question 11 word cloud: Place attachment 
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of high place attachment as age increases and an increase in low attachment as 
age decreases (Figure 31). 
This is an important finding as it corroborates what respondents stated in 
Question 11 (and in Matatā), and highlights that the demography of an area is a 
relevant governance consideration, and a potential tension for efforts to detach 
people from place. A study of place attachment in New Zealand also found that 
the single factor common to all dimensions of attachment is being in an older age 
group. “Older individuals are more attached and in more ways than younger 
individuals, with elderly individuals (those aged 60 and over) more likely to be 
sentimentally attached, have relatives nearby, participate in the community, and 
feel relatively more satisfied with the area they live in” (Schroder, 2008, p. 207). 
Disruption of routine and upheaval at a late stage in life could be extremely 
stressful for those with a strong place attachment. Arrangements that are more 
flexible may need to be made to avoid permanently affecting the overall 
resilience of the community. 
Surveys undertaken in Australia confirmed that those who considered 
relocation away from risky areas were “predominately young to middle-aged 
adults, earning middle range household incomes, predominantly vocationally 
qualified and living within a family structure of a couple with children…core 
members of the community” (King et al., 2014, p. 87). King argues that incentives 
to relocate are more likely to have a stronger impact on younger, more mobile 
members of the community, and that ageing rural settlements could face a 
downward spiral of economic and service contraction as younger members 
migrate to places with greater economic opportunities. Growth and 
Figure 31: Place attachment and age 
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infrastructure planning must align with managed retreat policies to avoid 
increasing vulnerability, as “departure of just 10% of a community may be 
devastating to marginally viable small and rural settlements, where outmigration 
of young families exacerbates an already present economic decline” (Ibid, p. 89).  
7.4.2.3 Psychological: Autonomy and emotional support 
Emphasising both social and institutional barriers to managed retreat, many 
respondents referred to loss of autonomy. These individuals declared that it is 
their decision to stay and accept the risk if they wish to, making clear their need 
to be ‘in control’ of the situation, as well as their objection to being forced to 
abandon their property against their will. In many cases, participants referred to 
the need for strong consultation and democratic transparency, but ultimately, 
choice. Managed retreat exposes the tension between private property 
ownership and the extent that the state should exert control over people and the 
market. As discussed in Section 7.2, respondents ranked a planning method as 
the most appropriate approach to implementing managed retreat, closely 
followed by provision of information, (unmanaged) market-led retreat. This 
demonstrates the differing opinions of the role of the state (and of environmental 
planning) in enabling managed retreat, and an indication of the governance 
modes to examine. These themes will be further assessed in Chapter 8. 
Emotional support was cited as necessary by five participants, due to the 
significant life upheaval required to implement managed retreat, a theme also 
raised by case study participants who are experiencing detachment first-hand 
(Chapter 6). 
7.4.3 Institutional: Equitable, effective, responsive and robust 
governance 
Good governance attributes (Bennett & Satterfield 2018) such as legitimacy, 
effective and diverse information, accountability, transparency, recognition, 
participation, fairness and flexibility are relevant to many of the categories 
discussed (Table 24). Ineffective and inequitable governance are dominant 
barriers, with ‘poor consultation’ specifically mentioned by 21 respondents, as 
well as being linked to the need for ‘consistent decisions.’ Respondent 379 
encapsulates the concerns of many by referring to key reasons for objection 
being “[a]n unfair or draconian approach; lack of consultation; iniquitous 
conditions/support.” Also related to this category is the timeframe for relocation 
and the importance of flexibility (responsive governance). Sixteen participants 
cited timeframes of relocation, including warning and planning time and terms 
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of exit. Respondent 356 stated, “If there was enough time to plan (for me that 
would be about 5 years so I could save to top up the payout and look for another 
job if needed) I wouldn't object.” Others affirmed their objection to ‘knee-jerk’ or 
‘short-term’, ‘reactive’ options with little substantive financial and social 
assistance. Respondent 376 stated “[t]he process around retreat needs to have 
been firmly established over a number of years. Property owner needs to be well 
aware of both known risks, and what options are.” This perspective provides 
insight into the need for robust engagement with the community and planning 
for the long-term to enable sufficient time to implement retreat (where possible). 
This too must be balanced with clear, consistent and continual communication 
to ensure that over the period leading up to retreat, residents don’t feel as they 





they would like 
to be involved in 
the decision-
making process 
(Figure 32).  
 
The preferred method was individual meetings, followed by representation 
via a community group, community workshops, submissions and surveys. 
Thirteen respondents did not consider they would want to be involved and 62 
provided other comments. These comments raised a range of matters from the 
need for technical information sessions to input from the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, and an initiation of the conversation at a 
national level first. A range of responses was made with regard to community 
representation. Some put forward concerns about trusting a community group 
to make decisions about other people’s properties, an issue experienced in 
Matatā. Concerns were also raised regarding community workshops, such as: 
I find community workshops to be intensely irritating as they can be 
highjacked by people with other agendas (Respondent 56). 
I am a representative within a Community Board/Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) Working Party discussing and fact finding upon 
Hazards, risks, red zone future uses—it is valuable to be included—
Figure 32: Community engagement preferences 
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but only if true transparency of agenda is given and only if we are 
listened to (Respondent 519). 
Respondents stated that to be effective, engagement must result in 
unequivocal choices for communities, ‘not years of negotiation and uncertainty’. 
Respondent 346 highlighted the need for specific Māori engagement including 
whanau hui to consider the options and kaumātua support. Another made 
comment on the need for online engagement: “many families who have homes 
here have had people move away for work/study but are still home owners or 
invested in the community” (Respondent 124). For managed retreat at the coast, 
this is a particularly important tool as many holiday home owners may not be 
able to attend all engagement activities in person. Other comments included 
showing current mitigation efforts on individual properties, being physically and 
actively involved in decision-making, and working in collaboration with the 
managing authority. Finally, Respondent 166 stated the need for voting rights to 
a solution, again leading back to a key concern of autonomy.   
Trust in authorities was raised as an engagement issue. Respondents 
discussed the need for ‘true engagement’ where it is not just ‘dissemination of 
information already decided’, to ‘gauge resistance’ and tick the consultation box. 
Respondent 514 stated “[m]any people don't trust councils to make decisions on 
their behalf…there should be some level of communication beyond simple ‘push’ 
communication.” Access to experts and decision-makers as well as advocates was 
also considered important. 
Tracing back to Table 24, 16 respondents specifically referred to an absence 
of trust in authorities as a barrier, referencing potential ‘corruption’, lack of 
‘credibility’, disapproval of ‘logic/rationale/science’, ‘hidden agendas’ and a 
general lack of trust, demonstrating institutional legitimacy constraints. 
Respondent 112 stated objection towards “[d]ubious science proposed by 
bureaucracy with a hidden agenda” highlighting the importance of trust, 
transparency and engagement throughout the decision-making and 
implementation processes to avoid a disconnect between empowered 
institutions and those affected by their decisions. A comment by Respondent 508 
discusses a lack of trust caused by managed retreat in Canterbury:  
Information needs to be from a trusted source and in our 
circumstance that may not be our district or regional council…I do 
not want to have to retreat to later see my land used for someone else's 
gain—vis a vis the Crown's "re-use" of the Red Zone for residential 
development when affected landowners were led to understand that 
the land would not be used for that purpose again. 
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As recognised by Respondent 508, distrust in implementing authorities will 
not engender acceptance of managed retreat, particularly where affected 
landowners are not convinced that the land will be retired and safeguarded via 
legal mechanisms. Three other participants recognised the need to ensure that 
the land would not be re-sold for development.  
Relevant to this category is the perception of risk being contributed to by 
authorities due to “council inaction to seek out risks or even hold draft reports 
without sharing with wider community” (507) or risk being a “result of poor 
management, e.g. inappropriate seawall” (420). Respondents mentioned their 
objection to managed retreat as a ‘threat’ (lacking transparency of what it means), 
‘death by 1000 cuts’ and ‘managed retreat by stealth’ where restrictive rules are 
imposed to stop investment without engaging with the community. Respondent 
27 stated an objection towards unmanaged retreat via information on LIMs such 
as in Kāpiti.  
Respondent 395 discusses the difficulty of providing hazard information in 
terms of the effect it has on property values, including those directly affected and 
surrounding properties. However, as respondents 395 and 509 stated, if 
government valuations were to reflect the risk level rather than sale prices, this 
would enable managed retreat over time and would reduce further investment 
in risky locations, a potential enabler of managed retreat: 
…I appreciate that the CCC can't publicly discuss retreat because of 
the effect on property values…I pointed out that [government] 
valuations don't reflect future property values and the impact of sea-
level rises...I was told that the present system of values only reflects 
actual sale prices. It was agreed that people are buying properties 
with high prices ($500,000) that are actually worthless in the light 
of even slight rises in high tide levels…government valuations of 
properties could contain an element of reduction if there was an 
agreed natural hazard. The CCC attempted to have hazards listed on 
properties LIMs, but were forced to cancel this due to public 
displeasure at the inevitable decrease in sale prices (and THEN in the 
valuations of neighbouring properties) that this would bring (#395). 
 
Two unique comments recognised the importance of covenants on the land 
to avoid development in future and avoiding land acquisition “without correct 
authority given by share/land holders” (Respondent 114). Another respondent 
discussed opposition to land use conversion that would not reduce the hazard 
risk profile, such “as children's playground or sports fields in a place where storm 
surges are likely to cause damage” (Respondent 7). These are all important 
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factors requiring consideration when implementing managed retreat or 
considering options. 
7.4.4 Environmental barriers 
Among economic and social concerns, participants recognised relocation 
options as a potential barrier. This is initially an environmental barrier (if there 
is nowhere to physically relocate to) but it is also influenced by the market and 
planning regime which can act as enablers. Fifty-seven respondents highlighted 
concerns of moving to a lower quality site (which is entirely subjective), the 
ability and viability of finding an appropriate, safe location within or near their 
community, the ability of their house to be relocated, and being forced to live 
somewhere they didn’t want to live or to a location that did not meet their needs. 
This emphasises the need for strategic planning when applying managed retreat, 
to ensure that there is available, safe land for community members to relocate to. 
Anticipatory, deferred residential zoning could enable such provision of land to 
complement managed retreat, using community consultation to determine 
interest in the area, allowing people to begin imagining a new neighbourhood 
and lifestyle to commence the process of detaching from their current place. As 
argued by respondents in this questionnaire, many do not wish to have their 
relocation determined, but providing alternative land supply will ease some of 
the difficulties and provide options. 
7.5 Additional questionnaire comments 
One hundred and fifty-five respondents chose to provide further comments 
at the end of the survey. Of these comments, there were some representing strong 
anti and pro managed retreat views, and general comments about national 
guidance, local decision-making, and resources. The anti-retreat comments are 
valuable as they further develop upon the key barriers to implementing 
managed retreat, demonstrating the emotional response to this approach: 
In my opinion, this is not a well presented survey nor does it reside 
well. The solutions provided are arguably the worst, and to rank 
horrible outcomes next to another, gives the impression that you need 
to choose from the lesser of all of these horrible solutions... no matter 
if a natural hazard occurred, people who are truly connected to their 
property will not relinquish their lands due to anticipation of fear 
(Respondent 114). 
This respondent had not come across the term ‘managed retreat’ before 
participating in this survey and considers that private property rights cannot be 
taken away under any circumstance (Question four). This comment highlights 
the difficulty in gaining any acceptance for managed retreat, particularly from 
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those who do not understand the limits to private property rights in New 
Zealand. Property owners have the right to use land, but under the guidance of 
law and regulation, which is not always readily understood. Babie (2016, p. 612) 
further elucidates this, stating, “planning law is, in itself, property…For 
regulation is part of the inherent choice architecture that, together with the 
choice embodied in the bundle of rights is, in its totality, what property is. Or, put 
another way: regulation is property.” As Respondent 114 considered all managed 
retreat policy options to be highly unfavourable, the statement presents a cogent 
example of the emotional response of anger towards managed retreat, one that 
is likely to be held by many. Other comments emphasised that “managed retreat 
is the highest cost option both financially and socially” (Respondent 366) and 
that: 
Any talk of managed retreat is counterproductive unless there is an 
imminent threat as it is destructive to communities, property prices 
and raises concerns with banks and insurance. The elderly, young 
people with high mortgages and people who cannot afford to move 
are likely to face high emotional and psychological stress and it 
undermines plans for maintenance, planning and hope for the future 
(Respondent 368). 
These statements recognise the costs of managed retreat, especially if it is 
not developed with robust community engagement. It is clear in this comment 
and in many other survey responses that certainty in science is perceived as a 
public prerequisite for acceptance of a retreat strategy. However, science is 
unlikely to ever deliver full certainty: “assumptions in	environmental 
modelling	are virtually unavoidable as models always represent a simplified 
view of a complex reality”(Özkundakci, Wallace, Jones, Hunt, & Giles, 2018, p. 
59).The potential negative impacts of managed retreat on people’s security, 
livelihoods, and emotional wellbeing (Chapter 6), calls for robust, peer reviewed 
assessment of risk, adaptation options and cost-benefit analysis (and MCA) with 
a parallel focus on effective science communication, consistency, and early 
engagement to enable trust. A national methodology for assessing risk (including 
vulnerability) could enable greater consistency, robust decision-making, and 
trust in science. 
Further comments highlighting key barriers to managed retreat included 
the lack of available housing to relocate to, current market values making early 
relocation unachievable, the lack of available properties with certain ‘character’ 
or space, the need for science to be ‘factual’ and ‘unbiased’ towards clients and a 
lack of ‘faith in the system.’ A comment from a Christchurch respondent 
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highlighted the negative impact of a “poorly managed approach” to provision of 
hazard information within the district plan review: 
There wasn’t enough engagement occurring, things weren’t 
communicated properly, it was the [territorial authority] considering 
things but not properly considering consistency nationally and things 
were very rushed…public opposition and the resulting removal of the 
natural hazard section from the plan review was an appropriate 
result given the approach (Respondent 382). 
Communication, national consistency and early, robust engagement are 
important for public acceptance, and as highlighted by Respondent 228, so too is 
trust in local authorities to avoid the sense of being ‘bullied’ into managed 
retreat; “…You can prepare for known risks but to expect agreement to unknown 
will always be difficult and prone to bureaucratic bullying.” A more 
philosophical comment deepens the enquiry into an entrenched barrier of 
managed retreat, New Zealand’s dependence upon property investment to 
ensure economic security: 
…the difficulties of retreat are to do with our assumptions about 
property rights and retirement. In NZ, if you don't own your own 
property, you will be a pauper during retirement. There is a specific 
government expectation that people will own property, and that this 
will help see them through retirement. The government no longer 
puts any serious effort into building housing en masse. People hold 
onto their property rights because they have good reason to believe 
that they will be made desolate without them. This relationship to 
fixed pieces of land is obviously directly 'challenged' by natural 
hazards…Over the next 100 years of climate change, paying everyone 
out market rates to leave their homes may be unsustainable. 
Alternatively, NZ's own history shows us that building housing en 
mass is very achievable and cost effective strategy to get people into 
decent shelter (Respondent 232). 
While there were barriers identified in question 16, enablers were also 
recognised, including the benefit of “compelling evidence, perhaps recent events 
with high risk of repeated events in near future (5-10 yrs) to accept a managed 
retreat”, “[a] collaborative approach where the science is sound and the local 
councils are up front.” Respondents who showed support for managed retreat 
consider that it is the “most cost-effective long-term option” (460) and recognise 
the cost of hard protection: “I’d rather people moved than we spend millions and 
millions on rock walls and temporary measures” (455). Others recognised the 
importance of managed retreat, but also the barriers present in terms of decision-
making processes, timing, and public acceptance: “I support managed retreat, 
but expect authorities to wait too long to put details on LIMs and action the 
staged retreat” (225). “Sooner or later we won’t be able to afford to fund recovery 
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from natural disasters, yes managed risk therefore a good idea but you'll have a 
hard time selling it to kiwis” (112).  
Other general comments discussed the issue of needing to address the loss 
of public land (such as beach access) as private individuals try to mitigate hazard 
risks, the impact of managed retreat policies on development and investment in 
local communities, the ‘precious’ nature of land and ‘high social and economic 
costs of retreat. Two comments stated the need for a better definition of managed 
retreat (as uncovered in Chapter 5) to ensure accurate cognition of what retreat 
scenarios may actually look like, to provide transparency to communities and 
avoid managed retreat as a ‘threat’: 
It's hard to envisage 'managed retreat'—perhaps you could develop a 
scenario or two that you could compare? Almost like a role playing 
game, perhaps in focus groups. But something that provides more 
detail so that some of the context dependent questions can be 
addressed and assumptions stated (Respondent 425). 
Retreat is a term that should not be used or surveyed upon or 
discussed in the communities—without a properly and fully 
explained definition…	I asked MP`s, and Councils before the last 
election what their definition of retreat was—they did not and could 
not define what the retreat looked like or entailed. This is appalling— 
when they are bandying around the word `retreat’ (Respondent 
395). 
Taking this further, Respondents 395 and 519 alert us to equitable 
governance attributes of fairness and justice, relevant to the acceptability of 
managed retreat in practice. In Matatā the community felt that they were being 
picked on as the ‘poor cousin’ compared to mitigation methods proposed in more 
wealthy, neighbouring communities: 
Local authorities, Government and agencies are reluctant to define 
this `retreat.’ For some they mean removal for some they mean 
reinstatement for others they mean annihilation. Make them be 
honest so discussion can be had. Clearly in post disaster Christchurch 
it is annihilation of property rights—remove with inadequate 
consultation or observed cost analysis and retreat of less affluent 
parts of the city…Careful analysis of who/which areas are given 
`retreat` as an option and who is given `recovery` as an option may 
shed light upon the true reasons for land acquisitions in name of 
future proofing—future proofing for who? (Respondent 395). 
We should be able to fight for our communities…and to be funded to 
equally. Those properties without `identified ` hazards may well be 
funded for other deficiencies in planning and strategy—a modern 
day witch hunt to remove people from their land so that the rest of 
the population do not have to contribute is not democratic or good 
Governance—it is discriminatory. It is apparent that less affluent 
parts of cities, towns have retreat given as an option—whereas the 
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more affluent are given `sustainable development’ …I am not buying 
this inequity at all. (Respondent 519). 
Where government intervenes in the market, it must not engender 
inequality. This issue is difficult to manage when incentivised managed retreat 
is more viable in certain areas than others due to lower property values. 
However, managed retreat should be surveyed on a range of values rather than 
purely economic ones. For example, the Hawke’s Bay Coastal Hazards Strategy’s 
(see Chapter 2) use of multi-criteria analysis fed a wide range of values into 
adaptation pathway decisions. In addition to this concern of justice within 
current generations is the equally important notion of intergenerational justice: 
 A narrow interpretation of social justice sees it as being about 
‘‘fairness’’ or ‘‘just deserts’’ or ‘‘equality.’’ A wider interpretation sees 
social justice as being inextricably linked to and influenced by other 
‘‘virtues’’ such as long-term sustainability. There is little advantage in 
having a fair share of very little or nothing…It is wrong to purchase 
justice for the relatively few today at the expense of the many 
tomorrow (Cooper & McKenna, 2007, p. 303). 
Final comments by respondents relate to the institutional barriers for 
managed retreat, highlighting the tensions between public and private interests 
and local and central government interventions and direction: 
A very topical issue across the country in dire need of national 
direction from the government. Councils cannot successfully address 
this issue without higher-level legislative documents in place such as 
an NPS or NES, or meaningful amendments to the RMA which set 
bottom lines (Respondent 281). 
We also urgently need clear national direction and leadership, to 
provide a framework for climate change adaptation/managed retreat, 
including financial support for disadvantaged permanent residents 
who might be under financial stress. National direction would avoid 
multiple regions and districts and countless communities all figuring 
the same thing out for themselves, and would significant assist local 
government in implementing adaptation policies (Respondent 272). 
These calls for national direction are not standalone, corroborating the 
findings of Chapters 5 and 6, demonstrating fundamental barriers to effective, 
equitable, responsive and robust outcomes for managed retreat. As stated by 
Respondent 56, there is a significant capacity deficit for managed retreat 
governance: “I do not believe local government has the resources and skills to 
deal with these issues.” Other respondents are also concerned with the lack of 
consistency across the country, and the ongoing development of at-risk locations 
in New Zealand: 
…I am disappointed that local and central govt continue to allow 
people to build on land so close to the coast. Council may indemnify 
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themselves but I am concerned by shortsightedness of owners 
investing in coastal properties (Respondent 273). 
I think some councils whilst actually acknowledging the problems 
continue to issue consents. We left our seaside home after continual 
inundation by the sea. The council said ours was the property they 
would sacrifice (by using flood gates etc) to save the rest of the area... 
Nothing was entered on the LIM report. 2 years after we left they 
gave consent for a million dollar property to be built there…which of 
course has subsequently been flooded by the sea.... (Respondent 321). 
While these are only the views of some respondents, they indicate that the 
issue is not only existing property at risk, but that in some areas, risk is still 
escalating due to continued development in inappropriate locations. 
Infrastructure is also at risk, providing vital access to homes, services, utilities 
and goods. 
…Much more needs to occur at all levels of government to (a) assess 
the risks, (b) communicate those risks, (c) implement policies to 
curtail development on vulnerable land (e.g. canal based residential 
development), (d) assist communities to understand the meaning of 
new data (e.g. sea levels) and available options. Central government 
needs to provide for future funding required to maintain (whilst still 
possible) and ultimately redesign key infrastructure (e.g. low lying 
roads in Hauraki/Coromandel districts) (Respondent 375). 
These comments consolidate a range of constraints raised throughout the 
thesis, including differing preferences for the governance of retreat, be it 
managed or unmanaged, questions surrounding the allocation of costs across 
private and public scales, the need for clear risk assessment methodology, and 
the requirement for strong national direction and capacity building to better 
understand current and future risks, and to guide and support local authorities 
working with communities in managing these. Chapters 4-7 have recognised that 
arbitrary government interventions, national regulatory framework voids, hard 
protection legacies, and poor funding support have resulted in nationwide 
inconsistencies, and unsupported local strategies demonstrating trial and error, 
generating public contention, and distrust in local government. There is a clear 
tension in New Zealand between individual autonomy and collective action for 
the greater good, necessitating a broader examination of the governance of 
managed retreat. 
7.6 Governance constraints 
Ultimately, many of the challenges arising in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 refer to 
governance deficits in natural hazard and climate change planning. New 
Zealand has not yet decided how managed retreat is to be governed, it is a process 
that is unfolding. Consequently, policy learning is underway at the local level, 
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but institutional barriers hinder fair management of risk. When dealing with 
managed retreat and the significant implications it brings, these barriers breed 
public distrust in authorities, confusion, fatigue, distress, and anger, particularly 
when financial investments and livelihoods depend on confidence in the future. 
Where a legitimation deficit exists, it “undermines public support and 
commitment to programs of change and ultimately undermines the ability of 
power-holders to mobilize resources and promote co-operation and 
partnership” (Stoker, 1998, p. 20).  
Environmental planning in New Zealand is guided by the institutional 
framework which transfers duties and powers to local authorities under a 
devolved governance system (Ericksen, Berke, Crawford, & Dixon, 2003). 
Glavovic et al. (2010) recognise that the ‘promise’ of the RMA in delivering 
sustainable management of resources for natural hazard planning has not been 
realised, which is due to limited local capability and inadequate involvement of 
central government in addressing these needs, among other issues (Ericksen et 
al., 2003). Schneider, Glavovic, and Farrelly (2017, p. 21) state that “successive New 
Zealand governments have exercised dubious climate change leadership at 
best.” These governance constraints are pertinent to the barriers that exist in 
enabling managed retreat, and the ‘good’ governance principles (Table 2) are a 
means to navigate them. The constraints reflect continual inadequacies 
inhibiting the de-centralised governance framework which expects local 
councils to develop high-quality plans to meet collective goals, deliver 
sustainable management of resources, and recognise and provide for matters of 
national importance, particularly (RMA s 6(d)) and (RMA s 7(i)). While it is 
recognised that there are three groups common to all modes of governance, (the 
state, the private sector and civil society) and a greater focus on governance 
beyond government (Kooiman, 2003), the de-centralised, hierarchical mode 
environmental planning in New Zealand exists under necessitates strong 
direction and support from the state, to build the capacity of institutions at the 
local level. However, as recognised in Chapter 2, and to be further explored in 
Chapter 8, hierarchical government is not the only mode available to society in 




Managed retreat is socially, culturally, and politically perplexing. 
Individuals and communities face detachment from their familiar spaces, 
disrupting human routines, security, livelihoods, networks, identity, culture and 
history. The questionnaire uncovered competing interests for retreat 
interventions, including polarising stances between public and private interests, 
particularly with regard to managed and unmanaged retreat. However, there is a 
distinct preference for national solidarity, pertaining to central government 
funding support, should managed retreat be applied. Principles for 
compensation/incentives are strongly connected to the principle of 
responsibility, with means testing and local solidarity present. Economic 
concerns are the most significant barrier expressed by respondents, followed by 
socio-political-cultural barriers of science communication, validity and quality, 
and psychological dimensions of place attachment. Mistrust of authoritative 
actors is apparent throughout the responses, triggered somewhat by expectation 
of self-determination and respondents’ experiences of the Canterbury red zones, 
Kāpiti Coast, and Christchurch district plan reviews, and other local consultation 
and decision-making processes. A desire for personal autonomy over private 
property is strongly evident, particularly the need to make decisions individually 
on managed retreat, which was also evident in Matatā. Effective, equitable, 
responsive and robust governance is a clear imperative, with institutional deficits 
consolidating research findings from previous chapters. To enhance recognition, 
suggestions highlight the need for creative community engagement solutions to 
ensure capture of all members with interests in affected areas, both resident and 
mobile. Fairness and justice are primary concerns throughout questionnaire 
responses, demonstrating a clear demand for equitable governance. 
Perceptions of managed retreat policy support many of the findings of 
Chapters 5 and 6, including the governance constraints of limited national 
direction, local capacity, information, coordination and connections, and 
unsupported nesting. The questionnaire reveals a preference for government 
policy guidance and in particular, funding for managed retreat in New Zealand, 
clearly divergent from current practice, where local government is undergoing 
policy learning to enable managed retreat, funded via ad hoc processes, with the 
exception of arbitrary government interventions (Appendix 10). The findings of 
Chapter 7 enhance understanding of New Zealand’s stance on managed retreat, 
and justify further exploration of its governance, to be examined in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 8 Managed retreats: By whom 
and how? 
8.1 Introduction  
Chapters 5-7 have uncovered that arbitrary government interventions, 
institutional framework voids, hard protection legacies, and poor funding 
support have resulted in nationwide inconsistencies, and unsupported local 
managed retreat strategies demonstrating trial and error, generating public 
contention, and distrust in local government. A process of policy learning is 
underway at the local level, but weak institutional frameworks and policy 
direction, legal uncertainty, jurisdictional constraints, and a lack of capacity 
hinder effective, equitable, responsive and robust risk governance. When 
dealing with managed retreat and the significant implications it brings, these 
limited governance approaches breed public distrust in authorities, confusion, 
fatigue, distress, and anger, particularly when financial security and livelihoods 
depend on confidence in the future.  
Socio-political-cultural, economic, environmental, and institutional 
enablers and barriers are key themes emerging from the international 
scholarship and New Zealand experience (Chapters 2 & 4-7). Whilst segregated 
as categories that drive and deter the implementation of managed retreat, they 
are symbiotic, and illustrative of constraints arising from limits to third-order 
governance principles. The policy analysis, case study, and questionnaire have 
realised significant challenges for managed retreat in New Zealand, highlighting 
tensions (Figure 33) between societal interests and institutional constraints. 
Social demands are not being met, attributed significantly to institutional 
capacity, direction, coordination, information and legitimacy deficits, all of 
which hinder the ability of decision-makers to deliver good outcomes. Private 
property interests escalate tensions, where in a globalised political economy 
driven by the neoliberal agenda, human well-being is expected to be progressed 
via “maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional 
framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, 
unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2007, p. 22). As recognised in 
Chapter 2, the market is not focused on addressing the drivers of vulnerability 
but on individual responsibility and choice (Chapters 6-7), where the needs of 
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society are met through wealth creation and subsequent volunteer assistance to 
the impoverished (Bankoff, 2018). Similar to the Australian experience, reliance 
upon ‘the market’ instead of taking leadership and building institutional capacity 
offers governments an escape from the contests of managed retreat (O’Donnell, 
2019; O’Donnell et al., 2019). What makes it even more challenging is the 
pervasiveness of the capacity deficit in resolving complex, dynamic, and 
contested issues of the Anthropocene. This is present throughout aspects of 
governance, from government hierarchy, across civil society, to private sectors, 
and the science community. As it stands, while existing institutions (and actors) 
may surpass these challenges, it takes significant effort and successful outcomes 
are uncommon. Figure 33 illustrates the key tensions between expectations from 
society of good governance, and the various ways that institutions are 
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On the whole, this research has emphasised the need for stronger 
institutional frameworks and essentially, more hierarchical direction and 
support to build local capacity and overcome institutional barriers to 
implementing managed retreat. This direction can set a clearer framework for 
various types of managed retreat (rather than just hierarchical). This, however, 
can contrast with individual concerns, such as regarding the level of 
governmental intervention in private property, with strong expectations of rights 
to self-determine and individual autonomy. These tensions highlight that to 
progress the enablement of managed retreat, a greater focus on its governance is 
required, to consider opportunities to overcome the institutional barriers 
limiting its potential, and those affecting its socio-political-cultural acceptability. 
Chapter 8 analyses more deeply the governance of managed retreat, 
supported by semi-structured interviews of local government planners across 
New Zealand localities, where authorities are dealing with significant natural 
hazard and climate change risks, and are attempting to facilitate managed retreat 
(Appendix 8). The interviews cover local issues, but fundamentally, 
opportunities to build institutional capacity in ways that may increase socio-
political-cultural acceptability, and more effectively enable managed retreat.  
This thesis demonstrates that managed retreat is an umbrella term, which 
can be applied at a range of spatial and temporal scales and through a variety of 
government and governance interventions. Therefore, it is more appropriately 
addressed in plural, as ‘managed retreats’. To emphasise this, Chapter 8 
examines four ‘retreats’ across a governance spectrum of state intervention to 
societal autonomy (informed by Chapter 2). In this discussion, the types of retreat 
and governance modes, elements and orders are analysed and distinguished, 
contributing to Objective five of the research: to examine opportunities to build 
institutional capacity, and help alleviate the tensions uncovered. 
8.2 Governance framework 
This thesis has investigated barriers and enablers to facilitating managed 
retreats in New Zealand. Remedies for many barriers depend on changes in 
governance. Chapter 2 reviewed the governance literature, recognising that it is 
a complex concept, generally conceptualised as encompassing a range of modes 
situated on a spectrum delineated (not necessarily in opposition) by ‘hierarchy’ 
and ‘market’ (Hysing, 2009; Treib et al., 2005); elements, the instruments which 
enable governing action, and; orders of governance, including interactions such 
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as rules and procedures, and those between actors, and the principles required 
for effective governability (Kooiman, 2003; Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009). 
Governance theory acknowledges that the public sector is not the only 
authoritative actor in dealing with environmental issues. Recently, attention has 
been drawn to more nuanced arguments regarding hybrid forms of interactions 
across the spectrum, joining markets, states, and communities (Driessen et al., 
2012; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
Chapter two (Section 2.3) examined archetypal governance modes with 
reference to the academic literature. In summary, this recognised the high 
capacity but rigid and reactive nature of hierarchy; the benefits of local decision-
making under de-centralised government, but the pitfalls of incapacity and a 
complex operating environment; the flexible, adaptive nature of network 
governance, requiring judicious network leadership and management; and 
finally, the self-organising, far reaching autonomy of self-governance which can 
be self-interested and short-term focused, susceptible to failing to address 
underlying causes of social and environmental problems. Each of which can 
contribute towards the effective operationalisation of managed retreat. The 
governance modes across the spectrum have informed the discussion in Chapter 
8, and the development of a framework by which to practically assess the 
governance of managed (and unmanaged) retreats.  
The framework in Figure 34 helps structure the discussion in Chapter 8, 
revealing the potential for ‘retreats’ across a spectrum of state intervention to 
societal autonomy. Hierarchical government (often functioning in a de-centralised 
structure) encompasses the far-left mode of the spectrum, representing the 
legitimate actions of central and local government, enabled by legislation, 
standards, policy and regulation. Moving along the spectrum is network 
governance (sometimes referred to as co-governance or co-management 
(Kooiman et al., 2008)) where power is shared rather than exclusive, and 
government agencies, the private sector and civil society collaboratively engage 
in negotiated agreements or strategies, sharing knowledge and resources. At the 
far end of the spectrum is self-governance, where civil society is broadly 
influenced by societal structures, such as markets, via voluntary price/cost 
contracts. Individual autonomy is high, and power is diffused. The spectrum is 
fluid in recognition of the hybridity ever-present in reality, as actions rarely 
represent one governance mode, and different risks and contexts require diverse 
governance arrangements.  
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We can see that in New Zealand, managed retreats have evolved to be 
governed across the spectrum from hierarchy to self-governance, with limited 
understanding of who adapts, which climate and hazard risks are being adapted 
to, and how (including autonomy, timing, process and scales) (Smit, Burton, 
Klein, & Street, 1999; Smit, 2000). Chapter 2 provided examples of collaborative 
governance strategies; Chapters 4-6 examined hierarchical governance 
instruments applied via central and local government legislation, policy and 
regulation and; throughout the thesis there has been recognition of unmanaged 
retreat, voluntarily delivered by civil society, with its diverse appetite for risk, 
influenced by the market and insurance sector. Across the spectrum, power may 
be exclusive, shared, diffused, or a combination. Power is an important element 
of retreat governance and its resulting social acceptance, with self-determination 
and autonomy a clear demand for some members of society, as highlighted in 
Figure 34: Retreat governance modes, elements and orders 
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Chapters 6-7. The answer to the question, ‘managed retreat by whom and how?’ 
is central to its facilitation, in New Zealand and abroad. This thesis has revealed 
that thus far, it has not been clarified who is responsible for facilitating retreat, 
allowing its application to evolve through ad hoc government interventions, 
fragmented policy and planning application, and influences of the market. 
Understanding the modes of governance informs which actors are empowered 
and which mechanisms can be applied, to assist in answering the fundamental 
questions of ‘managed retreat by whom, how and to what?’ The line of inquiry 
for Chapter 8 is guided by reflecting upon the governance framework, drawing 
from the systematic assessment of policy and qualitative critique of planning 
practice in New Zealand (Chapters 4-7), to examine capacity building 
opportunities to improve upon the shortcomings of the current regime. With an 
understanding of the various modes within the framework, the elements and 
orders of retreat government and governance are assessed, combining New 
Zealand case studies, international literature, and interview data, with a view to 
informing opportunities to support and enhance prospects for improving the 
enablement and outcomes of managed retreats. The following analyses begin at 
hierarchical state intervention, examining managed and anticipatory managed 
retreat, followed by opportunities for voluntary managed retreat, and finally, 
unmanaged retreat. 







Managed retreat is an encompassing term (Chapters 2, 4 & 5). This thesis is 
focused at a discrete scale—investigating local and regional managed retreat—
the strategic relocation of people, assets, and activities away from natural hazard 
and climate change impact exposures. Unlike pure relocation, the term 
‘managed’ infers a strategic, controlled approach to land use change, a task 
aligned with the planning regime. Managed retreat at this scale can be reactive, 
or anticipatory, and applied over the short, medium or long-term. 
In New Zealand, the question of ‘managed retreat by whom?’ is somewhat 
answered by default, via the devolved resource management hierarchy, where 
central government is expected to provide technical guidance and policies to be 
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applied at the local level. Towards this end of the spectrum, central and local 
government take the lead, and civil society is the recipient of formal rules, 
regulations, policies and procedures developed for the public good (Driessen et 
al., 2012)—subject to statutory requirements for public participation in the New 
Zealand institutional context. De-centralised government is aimed at affording 
citizens and their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. 
It anticipates decisions that have been informed by strong public participation, 
reflecting the diverse values and interests of local communities. However, in 
practice, it does not always meet expectations  (see Section 2.7.2 Kāpiti).  
In theory, managed retreat under de-centralised government involves the 
application of resource management policy and rules to reduce development in 
risky locations, to enable future managed retreat where risk is not yet high and 
there remains time for reasonable use of land (for example, to manage the 
influence of slowly emerging climate change risks), and to regulate or extinguish 
the use rights of existing activities, either before, or after significant natural 
hazard and climate change impacts occur. Managed retreat under de-centralised 
government has the ability to be anticipatory, and legitimate, subject to Schedule 
1 of the RMA, requiring robust community consultation with opportunity for 
judicial review or Environment Court appeal. However, local government 
barriers such as poor leadership, resource constraints and limited jurisdiction 
exist, heightened by central government inadequacies which inhibit the de-
centralised governance framework, impacting the enablement of managed 
retreat in New Zealand and fundamentally, the ability to recognise and provide 
for matters of national importance, priority three of the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and Article 7(1) of the Paris Agreement. 
Notwithstanding broad guidance for managed retreat to reduce coastal risks 
under the NZCPS, key elements and orders of hierarchical managed retreat 
government are currently deficient or hidden from practice.  
As detailed in Chapter 7, the devolved hierarchy which frames 
environmental planning necessitates strong direction and support from the state, 
to build the capacity of institutions at the local level. This research has identified 
that overcoming pressure to maintain the status quo is difficult, but stronger 
national direction for managed retreat could alleviate this, to improve local 
government’s capacity to facilitate managed retreat and overcome unsustainable 
path dependencies. To gain traction on CCA (and mitigation), Palmer (2015, p. 
134) argues that “most important is the provision of an effective policy 
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framework.” Reisinger et al. (2015) similarly emphasise that managed retreat 
requires long-term policy commitment which can be challenging due to short-
term planning and election cycles in New Zealand. This signifies the importance 
of central government direction and capacity building to ensure commitment to 
actions over the long-term. The following discussion considers practical 
opportunities to alleviate these institutional constraints, to enhance the elements 
and orders of hierarchical government to enable managed retreat.  
8.2.1.1 Institutional framework to guide local decision-making 
The affected community of Matatā is still suffering from the demands of 
both absorptive and adaptive resilience, stemming from an unsupported policy 
process and strategic response planning framework void. Environmental 
planners have recognised that this issue is nationally widespread; 
Participant 4: …after the Edgecumbe floods [2017] it [managed 
retreat] was also talked about, but no one in government was 
prepared to actually grasp this and run with it. It was all push back 
and that’s the issue with reactive planning. 
Participant 5: We were told we weren’t allowed to do a risk 
assessment… 
Participant 4: … there was nothing in place to support it. If there had 
been a model in place and there was funding available, then you work 
through that risk assessment…But because there’s no framework 
around that assessment, then the initial short-term fix is what people 
go for.  
Participant 4 agreed that governance actors are stuck in path dependencies 
because there is not a statutory framework providing clear guidance and 
instruments towards more sustainable ways of making decisions. This is a deep 
and far reaching governance capacity deficit, common to managed retreat and 
risk reduction more generally, with complexity, uncertainty, dynamism, and 
contention limiting effective action. Participants 2 and 18 developed this theme 
further, expressing the need for leadership and direction: 
If central government doesn’t really have the heart to push through 
tools that enable managed retreat and lead the way, don’t pretend 
that that is actually on the table. If that’s not really where our society 
wants to go to, take it off the table… don’t pretend that through the 
matters of national importance that somehow you need to be doing 
this… (2). 
There needs to be genuine desire by all parties, central government, 
regional and district councils, infrastructure providers and land 
owners to actually move forward together if managed retreat is going 
to be a genuine widespread policy action to adapt to the impacts of 
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climate change. It’s going to need bold central government leadership 
(18). 
Confirming these statements is the 2017 Stocktake Report from the Climate 
Change Adaptation Technical Working Group (CCATWG) which broadly 
highlights that coordinated national leadership and direction is sought by local 
government to provide a clear adaptation mandate and prioritise action 
(CCATWG, 2017, p. 56). Councils are not fully autonomous as they derive their 
powers from the state, meaning there is a clear role for robust central 
government lawmaking (O’Donnell, 2019). To progress, a national conversation 
with the public and key stakeholders around the acceptability and applicability 
of managed retreat is required. Chapter 7 found that there are polarising views 
surrounding managed versus unmanaged retreat, necessitating broader analysis 
and discussion of retreat governance. If retreat is to continue to be managed by 
environmental planners under the devolved structure, a clear policy framework 
for risk reduction must be developed to guide decision makers and stakeholders 
at the local level; 
It’s not just managed retreat but disaster risk reduction as a concept, 
and I think there’s some policy thinking to the front end of that but 
not at the back end, where the rubber meets the road...we’re trying to 
deal with implementing those policies and that framework isn’t clear 
enough to guide people through (Participant 4). 
When asked what useful national guidance would look like, Participants 2 
and 4 considered that a hierarchy of risk management approaches (including 
managed retreat) with a priority system to determine which risks to focus 
resources on would be useful: 
To me, guidance should suggest you should go to the things of greatest 
consequence – particularly loss of life risk, get rid of those first. 
(Participant 2) 
There needs to be a prioritisation of what you put resources into 
based on national guidance of what those priority levels are for the 
country. (Participant 4) 
Some very clear triggers and direction for when it will occur, how it 
will happen and who is responsible. Taking away some of that 
uncertainty and trying to minimise the argument. (Participant 19) 
This is aligned with Policy 24 of the NZCPS which directs that priority is 
given to the identification of areas at high risk of being affected by coastal 
hazards. The NZCPS 2010 guidance note recognises the time consuming and 
expensive nature of risk assessments as the justification for such prioritisation 
(Department of Conservation, 2017). When asked how national guidance for 
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managed retreat might be delivered, Participants 18, 22, 3 and 5 referred to the 
need for a National Environmental Standard (NES) to ensure efficiency, 
consistency and robust policy creation: 
Central government probably needs to provide more robust 
leadership – probably through a National Environmental Standard... 
when councils are promulgating rules and policies and put it through 
a RMA Schedule 1 process, anyone is able to challenge those 
provisions, and what tends to happen is the council tends to put out 
something in a notified plan or plan change and the final product, 
once it’s been through the appeals process/environment court is often 
quite different to what it started out. It tends to be, not your lower 
socio-economic people in flood plains, but more the affluent, lobby 
group individuals who have money and time to challenge councils 
through the appeals process that end up quite well off in the appeals 
process. We’ve got multi-million-dollar properties and investments in 
the coastal environment…for councils to introduce a rule that there 
should be no new development in ‘X’ environment that would be 
challenged by very wealthy landowners and probably wouldn’t stack 
up – so it’s tricky and heading in a convoluted way, which is why I 
think it’s better for central government to take it through an NES or 
RMA s 360 approach. (Participant 18) 
An NES is helpful because it would explain that ‘this is the trigger’... 
they are easier than NPS because they are actually directing to 
implement ‘X, Y, Z’…we all understand what we have to do, and we 
do it, because it’s a regulation… it’s clear. (Participant 22) 
Participants were firm that general, non-statutory guidance would not be 
preferred as from their experience: 
…most guidance is extremely unhelpful, because it is developed at a 
level completely devoid of the realities on the ground and often is 
theoretical rather than actually providing the practical 
applications…You need guidance developed that is practically 
implementable – that everyone can pick up and see how it applies to 
their context or hazard. Rather than guidance that just says you 
should develop an adaptive, relocatable framework, you should use a 
range of SLR scenarios and here are some planning principles. That 
type of guidance is extremely unhelpful. (Participant 20) 
…guidance isn’t guidance. That sounds strange but having a 
discussion document doesn’t do it. If it’s going to be applied nationally 
it needs to be required to be applied nationally. (Participant 3)  
An NES would ensure national consistency and help deliver more equitable 
outcomes, a growing concern in the managed retreat space. It is considered 
necessary as an NES mandates immediate and consistent policy and standards, 
superseding conflicting guidelines and plans, ensures efficiency in 
implementation and administration, and is legally binding on local government, 
ensuring adequacy. District Councils in the Waikato Region have had a stroke of 
luck with policy consistency due to the use of the same coastal scientist for 
 259 
developing district plan coastal hazard policy, but “that doesn’t mean that’s 
happening in any other region” (Participant 22). Participant 22 considers that 
under the current system, if national level capacity building doesn’t occur “the 
regions need to be really clear about what they expect in their RPS” by 
prescribing methodology to inform risk-based planning decisions about when 
and where managed retreat should occur (Chapter 6), however: 
they don’t, and they don’t want to…When you write an NES or NPS, 
you have a team of people dedicated to it who are answerable to 
government ministers…When the regional council has to do it, they 
have to find the money to implement that change, consult on that 
change, they’ve often got very complex iwi situations that they have 
to deal with. It’s not efficient. It’s more efficient to put something in at 
a national level. 
While Participant 5 recognises that developing an NES would be 
challenging, “a loss of life measure would be really easy to get through, for the 
thresholds, the different levels of risk. That could be done tomorrow. It’s 
generally accepted practice worldwide…” This in itself would be progress for 
enabling managed retreat of communities to reduce high consequence, high 
likelihood risks. But as recognised by many participants, an NES with a set 
methodology to guide local decision-making and in line with principles of good 
governance highlighted in this thesis would be the most efficient approach to 
enabling consistent and equitable managed retreat across New Zealand. The 
Stocktake Report also recognised that having each unit of local government 
“using different assessment and implementation approaches is inefficient and 
creates duplication of effort”(CCATWG, 2017, p. 55). 
Past managed retreats in New Zealand set informal governmental 
intervention precedent, which could inform national guidance where there is 
high risk to life. Appendix 10 is a sample from a larger database of recorded 
managed retreat endeavours in New Zealand from 1910-2018. It provides 
examples where managed retreat has occurred due to a determined high risk to 
human life. At this risk level, the management approach has generally been land 
acquisition, and in all but one case (in 1910 and not including the Mt Cook policy 
which relates to conservation land) central government has provided some form 
of procedural support and funding assistance to enable managed retreat. In this 
manner, an informal precedent for government intervention and funding of 
managed retreat where there is relative certainty of high risk to human life has 
been set. This is pertinent to de-centralised governance as it indicates a level of 
risk intolerability to trigger managed retreat, particularly for known, immediate 
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risks, as well as precedent of central government intervention and funding to 
support managed retreat. Pursuant to Part 2 of the RMA, the health and safety of 
people is simultaneous with the responsibility of sustaining natural and physical 
resources, safeguarding ecosystem services and avoiding, remedying or 
mitigating adverse effects on the environment. Triggers for environmental risks 
such as irreversible harm to natural character are also necessary. For example, 
local ‘coastal squeeze’ (Esteves, 2016) triggers could be informed by the avoidance 
policies for natural character, biodiversity and walking access of the NZCPS 
(Policies 11, 13 & 19). 
National direction  
NES are regulations issued under s 43 RMA that prescribe standards to 
ensure consistent management of activities and resource uses. An NES for 
natural hazards would have benefits of: avoided local plan changes and 
associated submission costs; improved controls to reduce the risks of 
inappropriate development; direction for assessing and managing vulnerable 
activities to improve public health and safety, service provision and community 
resilience; potential for improved environmental outcomes (such as recognition 
and provision for matters of national importance (RMA s 6)); and reduced 
potential for local planning disputes and litigation. Costs would likely include: 
development and administrative expenses to implement the NES; compliance 
costs and; potential for reduced property values and disruption to livelihoods 
(with social and economic implications)	due to standards limiting or affecting 
rights to existing and future land use, development and subdivision. 
To regulate managed retreat, an NES (which would address natural hazard 
and climate change adaptation standards more broadly) would need to include a 
definition, principles, strategic planning requirements, clarification of local 
authority functions, and standards for existing, new, and re-development of 
public and private property for the avoidance, reduction, or cessation of land use 
activities. This would include regulations for the avoidance of new subdivision, 
land use, and development (including infrastructure), managed retreat of public 
lands and assets, intensification/re-development restrictions and relocatable 
building regulations (or time-limited resource consents) including 
implementation and monitoring requirements, and the mechanisms and 
procedures to manage existing use rights according to risk profiles. The NES 
could incorporate a risk management hierarchy to prioritise actions and would 
need to provide methodologies which ascertain how natural hazard and climate 
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change risks must be assessed. The CCATWG (2018) recommendation report 
further develops this need, also recommending consistent methodologies, and 
incorporation of tools to assess compounding and cascading risks, and both 
quantifiable and qualitative losses, including risk and vulnerability of social, 
cultural, economic, environmental and infrastructural dimensions. Nationally-
consistent datasets, climate change projections, and scenarios would also be 
required.  
Guidance on decision triggers could direct action, such as at the coast, 
erosion within a set distance to the seaward point of a structure, where legal 
access to a property is no longer available, when essential services such as 
potable water, sanitation, or power are at risk/no longer available, or when 
coastal squeeze will cause irreversible loss of high tide beach, habitat, or natural 
character. Ideally, regulations would be supplemented with tools and guidance 
materials to demonstrate the approach required and provide processes to follow.  
In recognition of central government’s slow progress developing NPS and 
NES, especially for the management of natural hazard risks, the development of 
a National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (NAP) (proposed under the Climate 
Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Bill 2019 which was informed by 
the CCATWG (2018) report) could potentially fulfil this role instead, extending 
beyond CCA to integrate natural hazard risk management. Based on the 
recommendations provided by Tait and Ungaro (2017), such a plan would inform 
local governments, the private sector and citizens by providing a vision, 
guidance, and set of actions, applying a statutory Adaptation Strategy and Action 
Plan based on a comprehensive national risk assessment and prioritisation 
process (also recommended under the NES approach). This plan would provide 
the strategic direction required for Ministries and local governments to develop 
their own implementation plans, following a defined framework, assisted by a 
funding plan, local training (capacity development) and specific vulnerability 
assessments. As has been experienced internationally, supporting the action 
plan with national legislation is imperative, as well as clarification of roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of private and public sectors (Ibid). To be 
effective, a NAP would benefit from having the same immediacy and power that 
is afforded to NES (s 44A RMA). 
Effective action requires strong connections between science, and directive, 
coordinated governance, however capacity is only demonstrated when actors are 
enabled to undertake action (Wyborn, 2015). Implementation support and 
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resources are essential to give effect to regulatory frameworks and enable 
effective governance. 
8.2.1.2 Implementation capacity 
If managed retreat under de-centralised government is to be effective, it is 
not just about national policy guidance, but support, power, and resources:  
What would be more valuable would be giving planners the backing 
and the resourcing to actually implement it…there’s going to be a huge 
battle when push comes to shove…but backing planners up when it 
comes to the fight would be invaluable. (Participant 19) 
The current devolved system works well if the councils are 
funded…the councils can’t afford the expertise that they need…the 
funding model is wrong, devolving it all to councils is a recipe for 
disaster. (Participant 22) 
This support is vital to enabling managed retreat. For example, the Waikato 
RPS (2016) provides a strong policy directive for identifying where managed 
retreat should occur: “there was very conscious use of the words ‘will’, ‘shall’ and 
‘should’, and actually tackling some of the hard issues and saying this is what we 
want to achieve.” (Participant 19). However, due to the lack of policy and risk 
assessment guidance and funding availability, implementation of this method 
has lagged, because managed retreat remains in the ‘too hard basket’; politically, 
economically, technically, culturally, and administratively. National and 
international imperatives for capacity building are clear (Chapters 2, 5, 6 & 7), 
supported by a growing body of governance scholarship (Armitage, Berkes, & 
Doubleday, 2010; Bennett & Satterfield, 2018; Lebel et al., 2006; Lockwood et al., 
2010; Wyborn, 2015).  
In New Zealand, managed retreat funding is ad hoc, causing local 
government to develop inconsistent strategies. Boston and Lawrence (2018, p. 43) 
recognise that this will create inequities across New Zealand: “without a fair, 
consistent and nationally mandated approach to adaptation funding, affected 
residents are likely to resist locally crafted proposals for managed retreat.” 
Existing funding arrangements are reactive, such as the Natural Disaster Fund 
administered by EQC, the Adverse Events Fund administered by MPI for adverse 
rural effects and the National Civil Defence Plan provision for up to 60% repair 
costs for underground water and sewerage services post-disaster (Ibid). Funding 
for anticipatory action is lacking for managed retreat of private and public assets. 
Boston and Lawrence (2018) recommend that central government establish a 
national Climate Change Adaptation Fund with a statutory mandate to fully, 
partially, or co-fund adaptation-related costs such as managed retreat to enhance 
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capacity for anticipatory governance. It is argued that such a fund is necessary 
for anticipatory action to allow integrated management of all natural hazard 
risks, not just the impacts of climate change. Such a fund could be built up over 
several decades to distribute the burden of managed retreat, among other 
management approaches, across several generations.  
The tripartite funding model proposed for Matatā is an example of a 
potential approach to funding managed retreat which, if applied nationally 
could build local government capacity. If it were enabled through a 
comprehensive funding application process supported by an adaptation fund, 
this would reduce uncertainty and mistrust caused by current planning 
approaches. Such a model would need to consider the cost allocation principles 
discussed in Chapter 7, and principles recommended by Boston and Lawrence 
(2018): long-term cost minimisation, equitable burden sharing, using the best 
available scientific evidence, procedural fairness, flexibility to accommodate 
changing risk profiles, transparency, fiscal sustainability and sufficient policy 
clarity, consistency and stability to bring certainty to the funding framework (see 
Section 7.3). Answering the question of ‘which specific managed retreat costs 
should be funded and to what extent?’ requires further analysis and public 
debate. Much like the question of ‘managed retreat by whom and how?’, ‘who 
pays?’ is unclear at present. As stated by Participant 6, responsibility for funding 
managed retreat may need to include property owners, which would go some 
way in reducing moral hazard risk. Boston and Lawrence (2018) argue that if 
central government is to become a major funding body for adaptation such as 
managed retreat (albeit in a de-centralised governance structure) this would 
require greater influence over long-term spatial planning, something which 
could be enabled under an NES, as well as being facilitated as part of anticipatory 
managed retreat (Section 8.2.2). This would also help reduce moral hazard risk, 
especially for pre-emptive managed retreat (Ibid). 
In this regard, participants were asked about the benefits of a national risk 
assessment to assist in identifying natural hazard and climate change risks using 
a prescribed methodology. Participant 3 considered that this could be useful, but 
again, it would require funding support: 
The risk with that is, you identify a significant risk for a small town 
that can’t afford to do anything and then just hand it to them. Opotiki 
is an example where the regional council assisted them to identify the 
risk and then they put their hands up and go ‘that’s the wrong answer 
– what are we going to do now?’ If you did that at national level, it’s 
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kind of big brother-ish, to then say, we’ve done your risk assessment, 
here you go. 
A significant portion of the costs of managed retreat lie in the identification 
of risk, consultation and analysis of options. Emphasising the importance of the  
principles of ‘need’ and ‘capacity to pay’ (Section 7.3) is the reality that “small 
councils in New Zealand struggle to undertake even basic inundation 
assessments, let alone more comprehensive risk and cost-benefit assessments” 
(Reisinger et al., 2015, p. 302). The limited capacity to undertake strategic 
adaptation planning and consultation makes the necessary preparation, let alone 
implementation of managed retreat unattainable: “there is a desire for better 
data and information on local scale impacts…[but] the costs of obtaining this 
information is a barrier...”(CCATWG, 2017, p. 55). As has been seen in New 
Zealand and abroad, resource constraints lead to self-perpetuating short-term 
fixes rather than long-term integrated solutions (Measham et al., 2011). Funding 
support should be available so councils can identify risks and strategically 
prioritise actions to deliver locally nuanced solutions. “Without some form of 
national cost sharing, the principles of need and ability to pay will almost 
certainly be violated. Equally, it will be hard for poorer communities to find the 
resources necessary to fund proactive measures to mitigate future risks” (Boston 
& Lawrence, 2018, p. 46). However, as recognised by Participant 2, a further 
implementation restraint for managed retreat is that: 
…if you go through that prioritisation … and it’s a retreat scenario, the 
tools aren’t actually there…They are there in the sense that you can 
use a [regional] plan rule and you can do ‘work arounds’ and be 
creative around voluntary managed retreat. 
Among issues of national direction and funding support, there is a lack of 
effective instruments to apply managed retreat of existing uses under the current 
system. The following section considers new opportunities to overcome existing 
institutional deficits. Apart from re-zoning and re-development regulations to 
reduce investment and encourage managed retreat over time, extinguishment of 
existing use rights is the only tool (although it currently has some legal 
uncertainty) to effectively relocate sensitive activities away from risky locations.  
Chapter 6 uncovered the jurisdictional incompatibilities and significant 
public concern with this approach, with private actors wishing to pursue 
legitimate property and business interests, competing against civil society and 
state interests of community safety, liability, and sustainable management of 
resources for current and future generations. Similarly, Chapter 7 highlighted 
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expectations of compensation for ‘managed’ retreat (with varied perceptions of 
quantity and qualifying principles). In Matatā, local government staff recognised 
property owners’ expectation of financial incentives, applying voluntary retreat 
in combination with regulation, attempting to reduce contention and overcome 
the planning mechanism deficit. However, the voluntary and regulatory 
processes were not compatible, and the lack of legal certainty and funding 
hindered equitable management of risk. The national policy framework deficit 
and legal uncertainty regarding statutory powers and interpretation of these 
results in the courts having to fill the vacuum (Chapter 4) illustrating the need 
for managed retreat to be enshrined in legislation (Harvey, Clarke, & Nursey-
Bray, 2012). 
8.2.1.3 Managed retreat instruments 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined existing managed retreat planning instruments, 
revealing the regulatory deficit for managing existing land use activities. Chapter 
6 provided clear evidence of the tensions involved in attempting managed retreat 
without effective mechanisms, hence compulsory acquisition powers for 
territorial authorities have been discussed with participants. Other non-central 
Crown agencies such as Heritage New Zealand and the River Boards have been 
similarly empowered to acquire land (under The Heritage New Zealand Pouhere 
Taonga Act 2014 (s 14(1)) and The River Boards Act 1908 (s 74)) and most 
participants consider it to be a useful tool, avoiding the difficulties of ‘voluntary’ 
retreat (i.e. that which is not perceived to be genuinely voluntary). Participant 2 
highlights that it would be of benefit to high-risk situations to enable effective 
and efficient managed retreat, as well as part of anticipatory managed retreat, 
including progressively buying properties at risk, potentially renting them out 
over the short-term and offering first right of purchase to original property 
owners in future if the risk levels are unexpectedly reduced to an acceptable level 
(depending on the level of risk and if the land is not immediately converted to 
reserve). Whilst compulsory acquisition may be viewed as being imperious, the 
exercise of such powers is subject to legal process as well as judicial review if 
necessary, providing legitimacy and accountability. 
Some councils have been able to achieve managed retreat using negotiation 
or compulsory property acquisition under the Public Works Act 1981 (PWA), 
however this approach requires some form of public work, such as a stop bank, 
and is therefore more correctly termed as managed realignment. Such property 
purchase has been occurring to manage inland flooding across New Zealand as 
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part of catchment management works (for example in Edgecumbe and Lower 
Hutt) however, without a mechanism or budget to acquire land, property 
acquisition is more difficult where no public works are involved. At a 2018 Society 
of Local Government Managers Conference on Climate Change and Coastal 
hazards, it was observed that senior planners also discussed the need for 
compulsory acquisition tools to enable managed retreat (in particular, a panel 
member from Tasman District Council where increasingly extreme events are 
proving difficult to manage).  
Participant 2 acknowledged potential for a more strategic approach to 
managing existing land uses, with an opportunity to align with the proposed 
Urban Development Authority (UDA) powers aimed at improving the supply of 
land for housing to address affordability concerns. Under the proposal, 
government was attempting to clarify ‘urban development’ as a ‘public work’ to 
enable land acquisition under the PWA for urban renewal on the grounds that 
“wider public interest in housing justifies overcoming third party hold-outs” 
(Ministry for Business Innovation and Employment, 2016). As stated by 
Participant 2 “I would put the importance of acquiring land to reduce life risk of 
a higher order of significance than buying land to facilitate a pipe, to get more 
urban development.” As further discussed with Participant 2, rather than using 
the proposed Urban Development Authority singularly for urban renewal, it 
could also encompass management of existing natural hazard risks, to 
sustainably re-allocate and re-organise land use activities through property 
acquisition and strategic planning. Whether or not government would extend its 
approach to encompass a more holistic purpose is unclear, however, the fact that 
it is considered achievable to ‘clarify’ urban development as a public work 
delivers potential for managed retreat to be clarified as a public work. 
Particularly where managed retreat has co-benefits (additional to managing 
significant natural hazard risks) such as restored ecosystem functioning, 
provision of public reserve and protection of amenity values, it is considered that 
there is potential for it to be a ‘public work’.  
Section 18(1)(d) of the PWA requires the minister or authority attempting to 
acquire land to first “make every endeavour to negotiate in good faith with the 
owner in an attempt to reach an agreement for the acquisition of the land.” The 
Productivity Commission’s review of local planning and development to inform 
potential legislative change for UDAs stated that “[i]n many cases the exercise of 
compulsory acquisition powers may be unnecessary where the existence of such 
 267 
powers is sufficient to encourage a negotiated acquisition.” (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2015, p. 282). Whilst negotiated acquisition has a 
number of benefits, the threat of compulsory acquisition is coercive, and not 
dissimilar to ‘voluntary’ retreat that is more forced than voluntary (Canterbury 
and Matatā). Should such powers be enabled, greater consideration of their 
social impacts are needed, including avoiding coercion (there must be intent to 
exercise the compulsory acquisition powers rather than coerce) as well as 
inequity, where it is more achievable to acquire land in poorer areas due to lower 
property values and reduced formal resistance capacity of communities (Lopez 
& Clark, 2013). The adversarial nature of the legal system requires integration 
with the consultative imperative of environmental planning, including 
partnership with Māori, recognising the importance of mode hybridity. 
Participant 5 recognised a further limitation of compulsory acquisition 
powers, highlighting that council having the ability to buy is closely associated 
with the obligation to buy: “if they have the ability to buy, but they don’t buy, 
what happens then?” This is an important consideration, particularly if funding 
is unattainable at the local level, or if political support is lacking. However, if 
managed retreat (particularly where high risk to life, irreversible adverse impacts 
on ecosystems, public access and other matters of national importance are 
concerned) is funded nationally (with support from local rates) and delivered 
locally (under NES/NAP direction) compulsory acquisition would be enabling 
from a strictly procedural perspective, and strategic under UDA renewal. 
However, due to the greater balance of power afforded to local authorities under 
this mode, managed retreat in a more genuinely voluntary manner may be more 
acceptable to New Zealanders who have a preference closer to societal autonomy 
(discussed in Section 8.2.3). 
8.2.1.4 Māori governance 
Iwi authorities are important governance actors in the New Zealand 
institutional context, and land is of special significance to Māori. The Waitangi 
Tribunal argues that compulsory acquisition of Māori land for public works is 
most often a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2015). There are also ethical concerns with the compulsory 
acquisition of settlement land (land re-claimed as cultural redress for historic 
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi). Therefore, any strategy to compulsorily 
acquire Māori land must carefully and collaboratively work towards positive 
partnership opportunities (Ibid, p.284).  
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Managed retreat governance of Māori land is a hybrid arrangement located 
between hierarchy and network governance. Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of 
Waitangi signified a partnership between Māori and Pākehā, with each partner 
responsible for acting towards the other with the utmost good faith (Waitangi 
Tribunal, 2016). The obligations of partnership include the duty to consult Māori, 
who gave kawanatanga (governance) of the country to the Crown in return for a 
guarantee that tino rangatiratanga (full authority) over their land, people, and 
taonga would be protected (Ibid). The Crown must actively protect Māori 
interests and make informed decisions, based on consultation (Environment 
Foundation, 2018). The Minister for the Environment must seek and consider 
comments from iwi authorities when preparing NPS and NES (s 46 RMA) and 
local authorities must consult local tangata whenua when preparing policy 
statements and plans and take into account any relevant iwi management plans. 
IMPs may include preferred hazard management options, risk reduction 
techniques and engagement processes to assist with the transfer of natural 
hazard knowledge (Ibid). For example, the Ngāti Rangitihi IMP states that for 
natural hazard risk management, “the abandonment or relocation of existing 
structures and the use of non-structural solutions should be considered among 
the options.” (Te Mana o Ngāti Rangitihi Trust, 2011, p. 35). IMPs reflect tino 
rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and kaitiakitanga (guardianship), fostering co-
governance of resources. However, this may not be explicitly enabling for 
managed retreat if not detailed in IMPs, but it may develop through engagement 
and collaboration during planning processes. 
Representing a hybrid arrangement, further opportunities for co-
governance with Māori under de-centralised government include joint 
management agreements (JMA), allowing local authorities and iwi authorities to 
jointly perform or exercise any local authority functions, powers or duties. This 
power goes further than consultation, giving an iwi authority an equal share of 
statutory resource management decision-making power. Further investigation of 
how this might be applied for managed retreat is required, but it is considered 
particularly relevant to plan change processes and the allocation of land use 
activities. While these regulatory processes may exist, better understanding of 
their application is needed, as well as opportunities to manage the internal 
governance barriers of multiple land owners in adaptation planning and 
decision-making for Māori land. Iwi and hapū are the source of mat̄auranga 
Maōri which is essential to informing adaptation. Maōri communities are 
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particularly vulnerable to climate change due to reliance on land and natural 
elements for cultural, social and economic well-being, low socio-economic 
conditions in many areas, and physical exposures such as coastal settlement 
patterns (CCATWG, 2018). A range of tools for collaboration with iwi authorities 
exists under the RMA, and collaborative involvement of Māori in decision-
making can be non-statutory, as demonstrated in the following section. 







Whilst there is a need to manage immediate risks to human life, assets and 
ecosystems, it is important that adaptation efforts are made to address escalating 
and longer-term risks. Particularly at the coast, long-term planning is required to 
manage creeping, uncertain, but inevitable risks (see Section 5.2.3). With a focus 
on adaptive decision-making to manage uncertainty, Kwadijk et al., (2010) 
suggested strategies include the concept of ‘adaptation tipping points’ to 
determine the effectiveness of actions under various climate change scenarios 
and the points at which alternative strategies or actions may be required. This 
enables decision-makers to answer key questions such as, what are the initial 
challenges of climate change, when can we expect them, and what might cause 
adaptation strategies to fail? (Ibid, p. 736) Combining the concepts of ‘adaptation 
tipping points’, ‘adaptive policymaking’, and ‘adaptation pathways’, Haasnoot et 
al., (2013) developed the concept of ‘Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways’ (DAPP) 
to guide decision-making under uncertain global and regional changes. Moving 
away from static planning, DAPP enables responsive governance, to anticipate 
how the future will unfold over the long-term, providing a decision strategy and 
sequence of steps, triggered by ‘adaptation tipping points’ with different types of 
actions available to handle vulnerabilities and opportunities over time (Ibid). 
The process can be understood as a series of interlinked pathways, developed on 
the principle that policies and decisions have a shelf life, eventually failing to 
meet objectives, requiring revision as operating conditions change (Haasnoot et 
al., 2013; Kwadijk et al., 2010). Once a decision or action fails to meet objectives, 
or a trigger is met, the pathway can dynamically change to continue to progress 
towards the objectives, or to reassess the objectives entirely. 
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 Further progress has been made with regard to monitoring of the DAPP 
process, including experimental development of potential social-environmental 
triggers (Barnett, 2014), and the importance of taking into account the presence 
of multiple actors in decision-making, implementation, and evaluation to 
support collaborative learning (Hermans, Haasnoot, ter Maat, & Kwakkel, 2017). 
In particular, technical ‘signposts’ (indicators which help determine if conditions 
critical to policy success are still being met) are necessary to monitor the	external 
environment,	but political signposts are also required to monitor progress in the 
implementation of agreed policy actions and achievement	of	policy objectives 
(Ibid). Identifying practical trigger values for these variables requires different 
approaches and collaborative involvement of different types of actors (Ibid, p. 37). 
In the Hawke’s Bay of New Zealand, a collaborative strategy has been 
developed by the local authorities and groups representing mana whenua and 
tangata whenua to manage coastal hazard and climate change risks within a 
DAPP framework (see Chapter 2). The Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy 
2120 represents a hybrid of de-centralised government and network governance, 
offering innovation and flexibility under its non-statutory status, in an adaptive, 
long-term manner, meaning that it is more suited to dealing with uncertain and 
complex problems such as sea level rise. This is essentially a shift along the 
governance spectrum from hierarchy to network governance and enables greater 
integrated management of local institutions, functions, powers, resources, and 
risk than what is possible under regulatory plans:  
RMA planning documents are just one potentially small piece of that 
overall big jigsaw. You have many other pieces that need to come into 
place for a coordinated, strategic relocation of communities. From 
house insurance to community wellbeing, social infrastructure, 
physical 3 waters, roading, which goes way, way beyond RMA 
planning documents… Maybe in our first generation of RMA 
planning documents, we thought these were one of the only tools that 
we could use to achieve big environmental outcomes…RMA planning 
documents nowadays are being designed to deliver what they are 
designed to best deliver on. (Participant 21) 
Under the collaborative strategy, dynamic adaptive pathways have been 
developed that set the actions for the short, medium and long-term. Managed 
retreat is a long-term action for a number of pathways, not present in any of the 
earlier time periods. Whilst this strategic, non-statutory approach has proven the 
power of collaboration and delivers a forward-thinking, flexible, and adaptive 
governance framework, it has limitations which require further attention 
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(Lawrence & Bell et al., 2019). For example, governance capacity is limited if 
actors are unable to undertake action, and there remain implementation 
constraints for adaptive pathways that need to be addressed for it to be effective 
in practice.  
8.2.2.1 Implementation constraints  
The Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy 2120 paves the way for 
determining long-term adaptation actions, however it comes with 
implementation risks. The strategy is non-statutory to allow the flexibility, co-
creation and collaboration that is not as readily achieved under de-centralised 
planning processes. But to give effect to the selected adaptation pathways and 
ensure legitimacy, the strategy actions must be incorporated into local RMA 
plans, and key approaches such as hard protection works will be subject to the 
consenting regime of the RMA and the various politics at play (Ibid). Because the 
consentability of key pathway actions was not assessed in the MCA for pathway 
development, there is a risk that some actions may not be achievable due to 
significant public opposition, adverse environmental effects, and the need to 
have regard to the provisions of the NZCPS and other resource management 
regulations. For example, Policies 25 and 27 of the NZCPS discourage hard 
protection works (25(e)) especially on public land, to protect private assets (27(4)). 
However, Policy 27 (e) does recognise that hard protection structures may be the 
only means to protect infrastructure of national or regional importance and that 
a range of options for areas of significant development, including transition 
mechanisms and timeframes should be assessed. Depending on the outcome of 
resource consent assessments, what may have been extensively developed as 
adaptation pathways with a range of options over time, could result in just one 
(or very limited) action(s) being available, representing more static decision-
making, rather than dynamic adaptive policy pathways. The implementation 
risk in this case recognises the need to incorporate consentability (and feasibility) 
assessments within the decision-making framework for long-term adaptation 
pathways. Otherwise, the collaborative process and resources spent on 
developing the pathways are futile if they cannot be legitimately applied. The 
hybrid nature of anticipatory managed retreat means that pathway decisions 
cannot circumvent statutory requirements. Lapse of consents (s 125 RMA) is 
another potential constraint for long-term decision-making. Implementation via 
RMA planning documents may require creativity to deliver the flexibility 
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required for DAPP, due to the legal context that is accustomed to linear decision 
making frameworks, finality and certainty (Frohlich et al., 2018).  
Further lessons include the impact of pathway simplification, which reduces 
flexibility and responsiveness by applying a single sequence of actions, rather 
than many possible options and pathways to dynamically adapt to 
environmental fluctuation (Lawrence, Bell, et al., 2019). The flexible, adaptive 
nature of network governance requires judicious network leadership and 
management to sustain legitimacy. Monitoring the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements and ongoing political leadership will be vital to deliver a robust 
approach which spans the life of the strategy (Ibid). 
Participant 21 emphasised that a strategy such as the Hawke’s Bay model is 
not a cheap exercise: 
It’s involved a heck of a lot of external resource, but also from the 
three councils, massive amounts of staff time. And not every council, 
not every community for that matter would have that luxury. So, 
they might in their circumstances attempt to roll in bits and pieces 
into their RMA documents because that’s about the only planning 
document processes that they can afford to have on the go. It doesn’t 
make it wrong, it’s just the way that their operating environment is. 
The Hawke’s Bay Strategy has had significant funding, technical, cultural, 
and academic support to deliver pathways and work towards solving complex 
issues in a holistic and collaborative manner. Approximately $1.6 million of 
council funding contributed to the strategy itself (Beaven, 2017). ‘Gratis’ support 
provided by the National Science Challenge ‘Edge Programme’ and other 
partners influenced the process with contemporary academic insights and 
innovation, thus building capacity for this project and future cases applying the 
‘Hawke’s Bay model’, incorporating lessons learnt. This differs from typical 
planning practice where consultants predominantly support large projects, 
instead this approach provides a more diverse co-production of knowledge and 
learning, demonstrating adaptive, responsive governance. Final 
recommendations from the Assessment Panels provide a way forward in 
determining which adaptation approaches are most appropriate and when they 
may occur. The assessment models applied in this strategy are an important 
progression in this policy learning and collaborative decision-making space, as 
well as being able to inform governance discussions. The timing of managed 
retreat across the governance spectrum, and particularly for anticipatory 
managed retreat, can assist in the delivery of equitable governance outcomes.  
 273 
8.2.2.2 Discount rates and value judgements 
In situations where risk is not yet high, but it is increasing over time or 
unclear due to the variability or uncertainty of environmental change, it is more 
difficult to determine when or if managed retreat is appropriate, which presents 
challenges for political discussions as well as effective governance. Regardless of 
this difficulty, “waiting until uncertainties are reduced before making decisions, 
or holding back on making decisions under uncertain conditions, is usually not 
viable or acceptable to those most exposed to the risk.” (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2017a, p. 12). Adaptive planning can provide flexibility in decision-
making, applying technical assessment of key decision pathways in order to most 
effectively manage risk and allocate resources. In the Hawke’s Bay, Infometrics 
applied Real Options Analysis to gain insight into the development of DAPP. 
ROA is an expanded version of cost-benefit analysis that assesses whether there 
is value in waiting for more certainty before an expensive and potentially 
irreversible pathway is implemented, and whether an alternative might suffice 
(Infometrics, 2017). For example, the analysis questions whether it is more 
effective to retreat in the near future, or to construct temporary defences in case 
the effects of climate change are less severe than anticipated (Ibid). This analysis 
is not singularly based on economic costs and benefits, as MCA scores (including 
social, cultural and environmental values) are counted, by dividing them into the 
investment costs to produce a measure of ‘value for money’ (Ibid, p.16). For 
Northern and Southern area units analysed using ROA in the Hawke’s Bay, the 
summary of results includes managed retreat in just one of nine unit pathways 
that are considered ‘best value for money’ (long-term retreat in Clifton) and in 
no pathways is it considered to be the least expected cost, based on discounted 
future values with a base rate of 3% (but managed realignment/partial retreat is 
determined as the least expected cost for two of the units).  
As recognised by Infometrics, preferences may change under different 
discount rates, values of assets, protection costs and climate scenarios. A key area 
of sensitivity in this modelling is the base discount rate because “a lower discount 
rate tends to strengthen the case for moving to managed retreat sooner than 
later” (Infometrics, 2017, p. 3). This is a significant consideration, as the timing of 
options is influenced by a mathematical equation based on value judgements 
about the economic welfare of future generations. Infometrics adopted a 3% 
default rate in their analysis, based on Parker (2009) and the fact that the 
pathways span over 100 years. Infometrics recognised that following The Stern 
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Review (2007), a lower discount rate could be justified when dealing with climate 
change, hence their testing (but not application) of a 1.5% rate for sensitivity. 
Stern recommends a low (1.4%) discount rate on the basis of intergenerational 
justice, “if we know a future generation will be present (that is, apart from 
discounting for the small chance of global annihilation), we suppose that it has 
the same claim on our ethical attention as the current one.” (Stern & Great Britain 
Treasury, 2007, p. 160). The Stern Review assumes the probability of human 
extinction to be 0.1% per year, which implies almost equal weight to all 
generations to enable intergenerational justice. As uncovered in the Hawke’s Bay 
ROA “the more weight one attaches to the economic welfare of future 
generations, the more the optimal path tends towards managed retreat sooner 
rather than later” (Infometrics, 2017, p. 11).  
Final DAPP recommendations of the Hawke’s Bay Assessment Panels do not 
include managed retreat over the next 100 years in the Northern Cell. But in the 
Southern Cell, there are three units where managed retreat may be triggered in 
the long-term (50-100 years) following hard protection, groynes or beach 
nourishment actions. In the case of the Hawke’s Bay, anticipatory managed 
retreat is very much a long-term adaptation strategy for the three units, but had 
a lower discount rate been applied, it is plausible that it would have been more 
applicable to the short-medium term.  
Local authorities are the “trustees of the community’s long-term 
interests…obliged to adopt a long planning horizon” (Reisinger et al., 2015, p. 304). 
Distribution of adaptation costs (and benefits) must be weighed against social, 
environmental, and cultural values that are less quantifiable (Ibid). While each 
analysis and location will be different, greater transparency and debate about the 
social and ethical implications of discount rates is required, to avoid presentist 
bias and clarify how future generations are valued in adaptation pathway 
decisions.  
Fundamental to this ethical question is the influence of cultural values on 
the judgements made to determine discount rates. Kilvington and Saunders 
(2015, p. 22) recognised that some iwi participants of a risk tolerability workshop 
in the Bay of Plenty were less inclined to discount future risk than in the 
predominantly Pākehā workshops, as iwi regarded risk to children or 
grandchildren as equally or more significant than risk encountered in their own 
lifetime. To improve upon pathways planning to enable anticipatory managed 
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retreat, communities need to undertake transparent debate on discount values 
for adaptation.  
As discussed earlier, the governance of anticipatory managed retreat and its 
application of non-statutory instruments relies upon a hybrid approach to 
ensure it can effect change. Boston (2016a) suggests ‘commitment devices’ to bind 
governance actors and organisations to particular courses of actions. 
Incorporation of the strategy actions (particularly policy and regulation) into 
RMA plans would be one such device to formalise and bind the strategic actions 
and provide security in changing political settings, governance arrangements 
and economic conditions. In terms of the instruments to enable implementation, 
once triggered, anticipatory managed retreat could be enabled by the capacity 
building opportunities discussed for hierarchical governance (8.2.1 Managed 
retreat) or in the following Section (8.2.3 Voluntary retreat). 
Strategically managed retreat ensures that property owners are thoroughly 
engaged, have time to come to terms with it, and will experience changes in the 
environment that consolidate the need relocate. Recognition of the different 
levels of incentivisation is something that some respondents in Chapter 7 
advocated for, particularly at the coast where the impacts of sea level rise and 
increased storm extremes are experienced, and therefore more likely to be 
understood. Funding principles to guide incentivised decisions would allow 
negotiations applicable to local contexts. Irrespective of these principles, public 
funds will inevitably be required for planning costs, land rehabilitation and 
restoration, maintenance, and infrastructure removal/realignment.  
The Hawke’s Bay Joint Committee has begun a process to develop a 
‘contributory fund’ with public rates collected (from 2021/2022) for adaptation 
actions deemed to provide a public good, and a targeted rate for those providing 
a private good (Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy Joint Committee, 
2019). At this stage, the proposal for public actions include potential land 
rehabilitation costs of managed retreat, but not private relocation costs. The fund 
is also likely to receive support from central government and other agencies, 
such as utility companies (Ibid). 
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Potentially coercive compulsory land acquisition, illegitimate ‘voluntary’ 
retreat (Matatā and Canterbury), issues with institutional trust, and desires for 
personal autonomy (Chapters 6 & 7) lend towards a more empowering rather 
than controlling managed retreat governance approach, affording greater 
societal autonomy. Replacing the prescriptive 1974 Act, the Local Government 
Act 2002 (LGA) changed the power delegation from ultra vires to empowerment, 
giving local authorities a partial power of general competence. Section 12(2) of 
the LGA affords local authorities this power for the purpose of performing their 
roles, providing them with “full capacity to carry on or undertake any activity or 
business, do any act, or enter into any transaction.” This power provides the 
opportunity to achieve managed retreat via land acquisition, but it has proven 
difficult to achieve in practice. For example, in Matatā, differing community risk 
tolerability, a lack of trust in the authorities, and a lack of funding certainty 
resulted in partial interest in the voluntary offer, necessitating regulation to 
enforce managed retreat to reduce risk to life and Council liability. However, 
there is potential to enhance institutional capacity to manage public and private 
tensions by considering other governance approaches that facilitate more 
autonomous managed retreat. Before delving into the opportunities of this 
mode, it is important to clarify the meaning of voluntary, which also sits on a 
spectrum. By strict definition, voluntary means acting on one’s own free will, 
however the presence of risk inevitably influences individuals’ decisions, and 
therefore does not allow for absolute freedom of choice. Voluntariness exists 
where realistic choices are still available (Kälin, 2013). 
Tauranga City Council (TCC) in the Bay of Plenty already has a process for 
voluntary retreat without regulatory mechanisms. TCC have a ‘Reactive Reserve 
Policy’ which provides funding for property purchase, flood mitigation and 
emergency response actions. The policy states that Council may consider 
purchasing property through the Stormwater Reactive Reserve Fund if it is a 
residential property with documented history of habitable floor flooding 
occurring more than once in the previous ten years, and if the purchase could 
alleviate neighbouring flood risk via a constrained overflow path or ponding 
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area, or if documented flood events have resulted in negative effects to human 
health (Tauranga City Council, 2015). TCC established a $2 million per annum 
rates funded reserve for the policy which allows owners to apply to Council 
voluntarily for support. As of 31 October 2017, six applications have been 
received, on behalf of more than 10 properties. A combination of property 
purchase and stormwater initiatives have been considered, with one property 
acquisition complete (Tauranga City Council, 2017). While this policy is deemed 
‘reactive’, it is a progressive approach to locally funded, entirely voluntary retreat 
where property owners take on the initiative themselves, when they consider it 
to be the appropriate circumstance, and are ready to detach from their property. 
TCC has created its own buyout mechanism, however it only addresses 
stormwater flooding risks.  
This model could be applied to a range of risks, empowering communities 
to voluntarily retreat over time. The limitations of this approach are that it is 
reactive and ad hoc. This means that retreat will occur in a sporadic manner, 
however it allows individual site risks to be taken into account, where risk 
tolerability is determined by property owners, based on their discrete 
vulnerability. While this tool is not strategic, it could be incorporated into a wider 
strategy as a mechanism to achieve voluntary managed retreat where it is 
determined that the community will respond better to empowerment rather 
than control. 
The TCC reserve fund is not a new concept; it is similar to natural hazard 
buyouts applied internationally. Particularly in the US, buyout programmes 
demonstrate the same level of voluntariness. Buyout programs in the US are 
usually funded by the federal or state government, but are managed at state or 
county levels, enabling residents who no longer wish to live in high-risk zones to 
sell their properties and move to safer locations (Freudenburg et al., 2016). The 
federal government guidelines for the buyouts recommend programme 
administrators (e.g. state agencies, tribal agencies, federally recognised tribes 
and local governments who are the eligible sub-applicants) designate priority 
acquisition areas to target residents for the programmes. The buyouts remain 
voluntary as programmes take a ‘willing seller’ approach where areas are 
“identified by the state and then outreach is conducted to identify owners willing 
to sell—or a hybrid approach—the state collaborates with county and local 
governments to identify areas and then reaches out to willing sellers. Other 
programs take a hybrid approach that combines the willing seller method with a 
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targeted risk management strategy” (Ibid, p.24). The US buyout programmes are 
strictly voluntary, but administrators use tools to educate and encourage 
homeowners to consider, seek out and accept them. Incentives are used to enable 
more strategic and whole relocation of communities. For example, New York 
State identifies areas regularly at risk of flooding and property owners in these 
areas can receive the pre-storm ‘fair market value’ plus a ten per cent incentive if 
all property owners in the area decide to participate in the program. A five per 
cent incentive is offered to owners who relocate within the same county (Ibid). 
This incentive helps to overcome the political disincentive to support retreat 
caused by reduced rateable property numbers (Kousky, 2014).  
A voluntary buyout programme for managed retreat would require central 
government leadership and funding (depending on the level of financial 
assistance deemed appropriate), but it could improve upon the established US 
model by ensuring that local authorities strategically plan for voluntary 
managed retreat within local, long-term adaptation/risk management plans that 
deal with the range of hazard risks in an area and align with spatial planning. 
Voluntary retreat typically involves property purchase, however it could also be 
formulated as a relocation subsidy incentive, rather than a compensatory model, 
to allow spreading of costs between private and public actors. Ideally, such a 
programme would have a nationally consistent framework to be implemented at 
the local level. As recognised by Freudenburg et al. (2016) buyout programmes 
could facilitate greater anticipatory governance if at risk communities finalise 
adaptation plans before an event occurs. But even if voluntary managed retreat 
does not occur just in time, at least a strategic plan and framework will be 
established for a more efficient response process, with the potential to avoid the 
path dependency constraints currently experienced. Voluntary retreat is useful 
for dealing with risk that is certain and is more likely to be successful when 
communities have experienced multiple events (Ibid, p.30). Fundamentally, it 
allows property owners to determine the point at which risk is intolerable and 
facilitate detachment in a voluntary manner. Bronen (2015) argues that human 
rights principles are an important foundation for managed retreat, with the right 
to self-determination being the most important. In this context, self-
determination ensures that people have the right to make decisions regarding 
when, how, where, and if relocation occurs (Ibid). Voluntary retreat protects the 
right to self-determination, requiring mutual agreement between governing 
bodies and exposed people and communities. 
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The collaborative nature of voluntary managed retreat can be progressed 
further, by what Bronen (2015, p.5) cites as ‘community-based integrated social-
ecological assessments’ to afford communities the capacity to assess and 
document environmental changes and sociological vulnerabilities, in 
collaboration with technical experts. Particularly for climate change risks, 
instead of governing institutions determining relocation timing and risk 
tolerance via expert risk assessments, collaboration is integrated into 
conventional risk management, whereby those directly affected actively 
participate in risk assessment, capturing the unique nature of a community’s 
vulnerability (May & Plummer, 2011). Therefore, affected people and 
communities can consider and set the social and ecological indicators to assess 
vulnerability by, and subsequently collaboratively determine managed retreat 
triggers (Bronen, 2015). This approach relies on a range of information sources 
and worldviews, inclusive of local and indigenous knowledge. Under this 
approach, both affected persons, groups and institutions cooperate to anticipate 
vulnerability and implement a dynamic, locally nuanced, institutional response 
(Ibid). 
A New Zealand research project involving Māori land in the Horowhenua-
Kāpiti region demonstrates an innovative approach to community based social-
ecological (and economic) assessments, collaborating with iwi and hapū to 
identify culturally informed adaptation strategies, testing strategic, economic, 
environmental and cultural implications of holistic adaptation scenarios (Bryant, 
Allan, & Smith, 2017). Māori land and farm-owners, scientists, and architecture 
students co-designed resource management solutions, converging mātauranga 
Māori and climate change risk knowledge. Through collective learning, 
supported by the incorporation of art and design exhibitions, hui (meetings) and 
wan̄anga (workshops) on the affected land, the project identified possibilities for 
adaptation. Significantly, relationships between atmosphere, land, water, and 
people were identified using both mātauranga Maōri and western science, 
interpreting and aligning these through mappings and exhibitions (Ibid). A 
toolbox of adaptive solutions was collaboratively developed to empower the 
community to adapt autonomously, identifying five site-specific ecosystem 
thresholds. Triggers were designed as landscape signs, diverging from traditional 
quantitative monitoring, towards a qualitative understanding, based on everyday 
reading of the land. The adaptation toolbox comprised nine holistic strategies, 
including coastal dune, wetland, and habitat restoration, protection of arable 
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land, making room for water, diversifying economic activities, developing 
adaptive infrastructure and celebrating the high ground. To make the transition, 
infrastructure will be developed for cultural festivals that might become the basis 
to settle the high ground, and plans will be made for existing and new 
papakainga to be resited on unproductive high ground, above the 5m level (Ibid). 
This project provides a unique model for collaborative, community based 
strategic planning that could be applied nationwide, supported by buyout or 
adaptation funding, to assist communities to adapt together, responsive to the 
Maōri worldview, scientific and local knowledge, and community interests. 
A national buyout or subsidy program is a valuable opportunity to enable 
voluntary managed retreat, and if developed correctly, could address capability 
and capacity gaps, political barriers, and risk tolerability difficulties for local 
government. In particular, such a programme would enable New Zealand to deal 
with the “transition period” (Dahm, 2018) of managing legacy development 
without increasing people’s vulnerability in other ways. In keeping with the 
higher degree of societal autonomy of voluntary managed retreat, (compared 
with national standards) community-based integrated social-ecological 
assessments can empower communities to develop their own strategies and 
thresholds to trigger retreat, when/if it is required. 







Affording the greatest level of societal autonomy on the governance 
spectrum is self-governance, where action is led from the bottom-up, translating 
into unmanaged retreat (or at the broader scale, migration). Self-governance 
encompasses the free market, civil society, and private stakeholders such as the 
insurance industry¾without evading broad ground rules of societal and 
governmental ‘control.’ Left to the market, unmanaged retreat would see that as 
risk increases and natural hazard events become more frequent or damaging, 
property values decrease, and people relocate regardless of policy and 
regulation, if they are able to do so. This approach affords the greatest amount 
of power to property owners in managing their risk, but also potential exposure 
to great harm and social injustice. Where ‘do nothing’ or unmanaged retreat is 
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applied, there are adverse consequences. Particularly in coastal areas, owners 
may attempt to protect their properties, even if this requires illegal action. This 
has occurred in Mōkau, New Zealand and it has left the authorities with no 
option than to leave the illegal sea wall and ignore local attempts to maintain 
it, as it is providing protection in the short-term and capacity to enforce or 
incentivise managed retreat is limited. Property owners believe that the wall 
will continue to protect them, and many do not wish to relocate; a typical 
example of path dependence facilitated by protection. 
The market is unlikely to enable effective, equitable or responsive retreat. 
For example, the dry beach provides public and environmental benefits. Public 
access to the coast	 and the natural character of the coastal environment, 
wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins are matters of national 
importance (RMA s 6). Loss of access to the beach and coastal squeeze due to 
autonomous private protection measures may not be environmentally, 
economically or socially optimal, legal, or equitable (Kousky, 2014). Property 
owners do not bear the full costs of their decisions to live in high risk locations 
under unmanaged retreat (Kousky, 2014). Response to events (which may be 
influenced by compounding and cascading impacts of climate change) and slow-
onset climate induced environmental change is borne by the wider community 
through risk and emergency management and maintenance or repair of public 
utilities and infrastructure supporting those areas. Pilkey and Cooper (2014) 
argue that globally, many natural beaches and their associated public amenity 
and ecosystem functions are at risk of extinction. Due to misplaced reliance on 
hard engineering to remedy (and ultimately sustain) poorly planned 
development, thousands of miles of densely developed beachfront settlements 
(such as those in Florida and Spain) are backed by seawalls, squeezing natural 
beaches and leaving them unable to absorb the impacts of storms (Ibid). “In this 
diminished state, beaches provide a small recreational platform and impaired 
ecosystem function” (Ibid, p. 431). In short, while unmanaged retreat can play a 
role, it displays conflicts with many of the good governance principles revealed 
in this thesis. 
As provisions in most home insurance contracts (and EQC cover) do not 
provide for ‘betterment’, insurers may repair a home which is at risk of future 
flooding but they will not subsidise relocation of the home or the construction of 
a new home on a safer site (Boston & Lawrence, 2018). Therefore, the insurance 
sector is highly reactive and transient, only redistributing risk, rather than 
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lessening it, and eventually many property owners will be unable to maintain 
adequate insurance, thus creating a transfer of risk back to the individual and the 
taxpayer (O'Hare et al., 2015). It is likely that as insurance companies retreat and 
property values decline, that affluent households will be able to relocate, but 
exposed areas may become populated with poorer people, potentially increasing 
the vulnerability of the community. If unmanaged retreat (and other adaptation 
responses) is only delivered by the sum of local actions, it will not only be 
inequitable and sub-optimal, but will fail to challenge the land use legacies that 
create and sustain vulnerability (Waters & Barnett, 2018, p. 710). 
Unmanaged retreat is an inevitable form of risk management, where 
individuals make autonomous decisions based on their level of risk tolerance, to 
protect private interests. While it has its place as a background mode of 
governance, by redistributing risk between populations, it is likely to produce 
inequitable outcomes for current and future generations, and the environment 
where irreversible risks are high or increasing over time. Evidence is emerging 
that climate change litigation due to failures to implement adaptation measures 
may put pressure on councils to act, making ‘do nothing’ choices unlikely 
(Hodder, 2019). Although, regulations to restrict development and deliver 
unmanaged retreat may be seen as reasonable action, particularly if capacity 
deficits for managed retreat remain. 
Without the capacity building discussed for managed or voluntary managed 
retreat, unmanaged retreat will be one of the few options available where local 
government resources are extremely limited, political acceptability is low, and 
risk of escalating vulnerability due to a lack of capability is high. Unmanaged 
retreat will always be influenced by provision of natural hazard and climate 
change information, and land use regulations ‘in the shadows’, and planners can 
develop policy and rules to halt further investment in exposed locations (sending 
the market a signal) and avoid greenfield development in risky locations in the 
first instance. While this is not effective for existing development at risk, in some 
areas it may be the only option until stronger policy frameworks, mechanisms 
and funding support are provided.  
8.3 Governability 
This thesis has identified that there are opportunities to alleviate the 
constraints holding back the enablement of managed retreats in New Zealand. 
Fundamentally, ‘managed retreat’ is a broad concept that cannot be applied in 
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the same way to different risks, and one governance mode will not be able to 
guide it in a way that is appropriate under all circumstances. This thesis, and 
principally this chapter, has examined a range of modes and corresponding 
elements and orders to achieve ‘retreats’ from hierarchy to self-governance, 
reflecting varying levels of societal autonomy and power distribution between 
actors.  
The retreats explored develop our understanding of where opportunities 
exist to enable fit for purpose governance. For managed retreat to better 
contribute to risk management in New Zealand, key opportunities include 
building capacity for de-centralised government, or developing mechanisms to 
deliver strategically planned, voluntary managed retreat, affording greater 
autonomy to those affected. While the level of autonomy differs between these 
forms of retreat (with one resulting in managed retreat via regulation or 
compulsory acquisition if negotiation cannot be achieved, and the other 
delivering genuinely voluntary managed retreat) they require national funding 
support (not exclusively) and strategic policy guidance, reflecting international 
CCA literature (Bronen & Chapin, 2013; McLeman, 2018; Weerasinghe et al., 
2014), DRR practice (US buyouts, UK Pathfinder, Kiribati climigration (Caramel, 
2014)) and more consistent messaging from New Zealand law, politicians, and 
practitioners.  
In terms of public assets, managed realignment of infrastructure under de-
centralised governance already has legal (PWA) mechanisms available to it, but 
it would also benefit from funding assistance to enable adaptation, particularly 
in areas with limited rating bases but important infrastructural connections. 
Given the long lifetime of infrastructure, adaptation must be factored into new 
and renewal infrastructure decisions. At present, there is limited evidence of 
adaptation planning for infrastructure (Chapter 5 and CCATWG, 2017) but a 
growing recognition of vulnerability (Local Government New Zealand, 2019).  
For slow-onset risks, where there is risk to life and property that is increasing 
over time, there are opportunities for anticipatory managed retreat, applying 
adaptive pathways, which is more closely aligned to network governance, but 
with support from the capacity building under either managed or voluntary 
managed retreat (to enable legitimate implementation of pathways). This reflects 
the understanding that “empirically, only hybrid forms may be found since one 
mode of governance always entails elements of other modes of governance” 
(Treib et al., 2005, p. 5). Managed retreat of new and re-development is achievable 
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under the planning system, however policy guidance from an NES/NAP would 
ensure a consistent, effective, and enforceable approach nationwide (such as 
discussed in Chapter 5).  
Anticipatory action is preferable, but reactive managed retreat will be 
required in circumstances where wildcards emerge, and risk thresholds are 
rapidly exceeded. The process and outcomes of the Canterbury red zones 
(Chapter 2) provide lessons for improvement, should it be required. In particular, 
these include following the correct procedures and consultation requirements of 
disaster recovery legislation rather than resorting to coercive retreat. However, if 
a national voluntary managed retreat scheme is enabled for pre-emptive action, 
that system would facilitate reactive voluntary retreat in response to disasters. 
Having such a framework in place would make disaster recovery more efficient, 
providing an effective response, delivering certainty and national consistency. 
Figure 35 summarises the opportunities explored to build capacity and enable fit 
for purpose governance (highlighted in red). 
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Anticipatory managed retreat 
o Adaptation pathways facilitated by regional & 
district plan regulation, or by negotiated property 
purchase (with potential to lease-back where there 
is uncertainty of risk escalation). 
Voluntary managed retreat 
 
 
Unmanaged autonomous retreat 
• Build capacity for Anticipatory MR via adaptation fund or voluntary buyout/subsidy scheme. If applying 
the adaptation fund model, this will also depend on capacity building of de-centralised governance in terms 
of an NES/NAP for natural hazards with risk assessment methodology and policy direction. 
Existing development: Reactive retreat 
Managed retreat 
o Compulsory land acquisition via special legislation 
(e.g. CER Act) with spatial planning/re-zoning   
o Regional plan rules to limit re-building of 
damaged or destroyed assets from repeat events 
(asset loss compensation from insurance). 
*Flexibility depending on the risk and hazard type, 
e.g. a setback/in-site relocation of asset   
o Refusal of building consent under s 71 BA (but a 
potentially weak approach if s 72 waiver can be 
granted) 
o Prohibition of building occupation or forced 
demolition under s129 BA 
• NES/NAP to direct consistent policy approach, and 
national risk assessment methodology. 
Voluntary managed retreat 
o General competency powers (Local Government 
Act)  
o ‘Third source of power’ (State) 
• National voluntary buyout/subsidy scheme 
administered locally and supported by an adaptation 
fund for strategic retreat 
Unmanaged autonomous retreat  
(Operating in background) 
Market-based decisions influenced by: 
o Insurance retreat/payout 
o Provision of information (LIM/ 
Building Act/ District Plan/ 
Education) 
o Service withdrawal or failure: 
Infrastructure and asset management 
planning and funding  
o Personal risk tolerance 
o Social memory 
 
New and re-development: Pre-emptive  retreat 
Managed retreat 
o District plan rules and zoning (e.g. ‘closing’ of 
residential zones, relocatable building design and 
monitoring, avoidance of re-development and 
intensification in at-risk areas). 
o Resource consent review: relocatability conditions 
o Provision of information (LIM/District Plan/ 
Education) 
• NES/NAP to direct consistent policy approach, 
relocatability requirements, and national risk 
assessment methodology. 
Voluntary managed retreat 
 
Unmanaged autonomous retreat  
(Operating in background) 
Market based decisions influenced by: 
o Insurance retreat 
o Provision of information (LIM/District 
Plan/ Education) 
o Gradual service withdrawal or failure: 
Infrastructure and asset management 
planning and funding  


















The illustrative governance spectrum has helped frame opportunities to 
build capacity for managed retreats and manage the underlying tensions 
revealed, examining managed, anticipatory, and voluntary retreat, combined 
with practical instruments to deliver fit for purpose governance. Governance 
includes both the structure and capacity for governability (Kooiman, 2003), 
including the modes, elements, and orders of governance; the interactions and 
principles required for effective governability (Kooiman, 2003; Kooiman & 
Jentoft, 2009). The opportunities raised help recognise the potential to enable 
good governance and essentially, good outcomes. It has also been recognised 
throughout this chapter that across the governance spectrum, political power 
and short-term cycles remain. While political risk and acceptance is likely to be 
improved with greater institutional capacity and direction, early alignment, local 
leadership and commitment devices will be required to ensure politically risky 
approaches such as managed retreat are not only available, but attainable.  
The thesis identified how good environmental governance has four 
principal objectives; to be effective, equitable, responsive, and robust (Bennett 
and Satterfield 2018). This research has helped reinforce the importance of these 
principles to achieve managed retreats (Chapters 2, 5, 6, 7 & 8) in a manner that is 
not only operational, but socially acceptable. To be effective, governance 
structures must have clear direction, coordination, capacity (capability and 
resources), information, transparency, and a focus on efficacy (Ibid). If the 
opportunities discussed are in place, all forms of managed retreat examined, 
(excluding unmanaged retreat due to its lack of direction and coordination) have 
this potential. The second principle, equitable governance requires respect of 
values, public participation, fair distribution of costs and benefits and access to 
justice (Ibid). As discussed, unlike managed, anticipatory and voluntary retreat, 
unmanaged retreat is unlikely to enable fair outcomes or protection of public 
goods and values. However, the former modes still require judicious 
management to deliver equitable outcomes. Responsive governance expects 
attributes of adaptation, anticipation, innovation, learning and flexibility. The 
three managed retreats discussed have capacity for anticipatory action, adaptive 
management, and flexibility via negotiation and locally nuanced solutions. 
Anticipatory managed retreat in particular provides adaptive actions for long-
term change.  
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Finally, robust governance requires legitimacy (which is possible across the 
governance spectrum) connections between and within organisations to support 
learning, nesting whereby decision-making is conferred to the lowest level 
possible with state or outside support, and polycentric structures. Again, the 
three forms of managed retreat are more able to deliver on these attributes, 
provided the direction, coordination, information, and capacity building is 
undertaken—demonstrating the interdependencies of the attributes for good 
outcomes. 
With the opportunities examined, managed, anticipatory and voluntary 
retreat have potential to produce effective, equitable, responsive and robust 
outcomes. Empirical governance modes are hybrids and Pahl-Wostl (2009) 
argues that rather than one governance mode dominating, a more diverse system 
has greater adaptive capacity and is therefore likely to produce more sustainable 
environmental governance. Examples of hybridity include the dependence of 
anticipatory managed retreat governance on the commitment devices provided 
by regulation, compulsory acquisition, or voluntary buyouts, as well as national 
legislation and local regulation which continue to operate in the shadows of all 
governance modes. Depending on the level of societal autonomy preferred by 
New Zealand, capacity building must occur to better enable managed or 
voluntary managed retreat, and anticipatory managed retreat for slow-onset 
risks and conditions of uncertainty. Unmanaged retreat will continue to operate 
organically, with changes in the market and insurance sectors driving retreats as 
property values adjust. Figure 36 broadly illustrates what managed retreats could 
encompass under these three modes, with conditions of increasing uncertainty 
requiring long-term, anticipatory managed retreat. 
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Managed retreats are fundamentally focused on sustainable allocation of 
land uses and providing space for natural processes. Ideally, adaptation planning 
should occur at a level higher than property or discrete community scales, via a 
strategic adaptation plan/long-term strategy. An example of the support for this 
approach is provided by Participant 21 who stated:  
…there needs to be a high-level strategy in the first instance, for 
general direction...Because it is not only about relocating homes, it is 
about providing the infrastructure and the servicing. And if it’s 
relocating homes, not all of the community members will move 
together, some will disperse... My view is that there needs to be some 
sort of high-level strategy/coordinated plan of attack and then that 
strategy may provide discrete roles for RMA plans, rezoning, 
structure plans…The high-level strategy might call on other agencies, 
not just local government.  
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The need for a high-level plan may go further than a strategy for a select 
piece of vulnerable land such as the coast, to encompass an entire region, as part 
of a long-term spatial plan with integrated policy making, and a focus on 
sustainable development and inclusivity (Haughton, Allmendinger, Counsell, & 
Vigar, 2010). Gurran (2012) and O’Donnell et al. (2019) define this as ‘integrated 
planning’, where strategies intersect broad portfolios such as strategic land and 
resource use, adaptation, transport, infrastructure, financial, and growth 
planning over the long-term. Such an approach could help address spatial 
adaptation inequities at regional scales that may arise under exclusive local 
solutions (Ellis, 2018). However, in New Zealand (and abroad) we are often 
dealing with legacy development issues that need addressing more urgently than 
that which can be provided by broad spatial, multi-sectoral, collaborative 
processes. Therefore, depending on the local context, it is likely that in some 
cases managed retreats may need to occur immediately, via land acquisition as 
part of a specific local adaptation plan, or it may be that the local authorities are 
unable to build the leadership, trust, political backing, or funding required for 
collaborative planning. Regardless of this, capability building is required to 
enable managed/voluntary and anticipatory retreats that facilitate prevention 
and avoidance of irreversible harm to human life, ecosystems and assets. Key 
opportunities exist for enabling more anticipatory adaptation to build resilience 
in New Zealand. Greater analysis and public deliberation are needed, 
particularly in relation to preferences between voluntary and managed retreat, 
and cost allocation principles. 
New Zealand is in need of a governance framework which clearly outlines 
the roles and responsibilities of actors, directs policy making, and delivers 
mechanisms to facilitate, strategically plan, and assist in the funding of managed 
retreats, depending on the contextual, ethical principles deemed appropriate.	
Retreat interventions must ensure that people and communities are subject to a 
common rule to allow ethically robust intervention (Rostbøll, 2016). This thesis 
has revealed that ‘managed retreat’ is a broad term in both theory and practice, 
which can be applied to manage a range of hazards, scales, levels of risk, and 
uncertainty. There will not be a one-size fits all solution, not one form of 
‘managed retreat.’ However, the best outcomes will be coordinated and 
nationally consistent, with risks and burdens distributed fairly. Without a 
framework and instruments for undertaking managed retreats, local authorities 
(and individuals acting alone) will not deliver fair or efficient outcomes. In the 
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meantime, strong local leadership is required to overcome these barriers (Bronen 
& Chapin, 2013; Sipe & Vella, 2014).  
8.4 Summary 
The tensions revealed reflect Campbell’s (2016) ‘Planners Triangle’ which 
illustrates fundamental planning priorities: equity, environmental protection, 
and economic development, and their associated resource, development and 
property contests, which require continual balancing efforts in perpetuity. This 
research identifies these tensions as inherent to managed retreats and examines 
new opportunities to provide governance actors with the capacity to manage 
them. To improve current practice, effective, equitable, responsive and robust 
governance requires more supportive relationships between central and local 
government actors. New Zealand needs a policy framework which clearly 
outlines the roles and responsibilities of actors, sets consistent methodologies for 
ascertaining risk (including vulnerability)—or a framework for empowering and 
supporting communities to collaboratively set adaptation thresholds—and 
delivers mechanisms to facilitate and fund managed (and anticipatory) or 
voluntary retreat.	This concurs with Waters and Barnett (2018, p. 5), who argue 
that while there is widespread understanding of the need for participatory 
planning, public input into key questions, such as ‘managed retreats by whom 
and how?’ is lacking:  
Public preferences for governance in this sense are important, not least 
to avoid elite capture, but more fundamentally because the public are 
the majority stakeholder in any governance regime. They are also the 
largest holder of risk, arbiters of legitimacy, and in democracies, the key 
actors in the implementation of policy. 
The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that while we can make 
some progress, pertinent governance questions remain regarding the extent of 
state intervention, how managed retreats should be applied, cost allocation 
principles to be employed, and in answering the question of ‘when?’, informing 
risk tolerability decisions and relocation triggers. Answers to these questions are 
likely to be more robust if informed by a national debate with New Zealand 
citizens, stakeholders and governance actors. Uncertainty of institutional 
responsibility and public appetite for intervention are significant barriers to 
effective, equitable, responsive, and robust governance. By applying the 
governance framework, Chapter 8 has examined a range of opportunities to 
alleviate these constraints, but to move forward and deliver fit for purpose 
governance, greater public input and national support are primary imperatives. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and 
recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
This research responds to the objectives set out in Chapter 1, investigating 
managed retreat theory and practice, and the various opportunities to develop 
its application. Designing and using a governance framework provided a means 
to identify and examine the differing elements and orders of managed retreat 
interventions, and the common threads of third-order governance deficits that 
emerged as barriers in chapters 2 & 4-7. This led to deeper analysis of governance 
modes in Chapter 8, where new opportunities were considered to deliver 
managed retreats, synthesising the research findings and international 
scholarship. Important contributions of the research include the discovery of the 
significant constraints disabling the use and acceptance of managed retreats in 
New Zealand, and new opportunities to strategically pursue interventions in a 
more effective, equitable, responsive, and robust manner. Application of the 
governance framework also contributes to scholarship on the governance of 
managed retreats, providing a foundation to consider and evaluate governance 
modes which better align to the nature of the problem. This research strongly 
emphasises that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach—retreats can occur on a 
range of scales, be applied to reduce different risks (including the compounding, 
cascading, and slow emerging influences of climate change) and timeframes, via 
multiple governance modes, instruments and interactions. Chapter 8 frames this 
diversity to provide guidance on the circumstances differing governance modes 
and instruments are useful, and opportunities to build capacity to manage public 
and private tensions.  
An additional contribution is to the research and policy environment of New 
Zealand, being part of a collaborative National Science Challenge where findings 
have been shared with researchers and practitioners as the research has evolved. 
This has included delivering presentations to local authorities to further their 
understanding of the legislative, policy, and social barriers and enablers, as well 
as disseminating important lessons from current practice and theory. With 
practice continually evolving via policy learning in New Zealand, provision of up 
to date findings on case study research has proven to be useful to planners and 
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researchers navigating this contested and complex field. Practical 
recommendations to overcome the constraints holding back the enablement of 
managed retreats are a significant contribution of the research that will be 
further developed and disseminated. A national discussion is recommended to 
assess the suitability of the government-governance modes and the level of 
autonomy to be afforded, with regard to the management of private property. 
Further details of the findings and recommendations now follow. 
9.2 The functions and practices of environmental planning: 
Objectives 1-4 
The aim of this research is to critically analyse the functions and practices of 
environmental planning in enabling managed retreat(s) in New Zealand. 
Contributing to Objectives one and three, Chapter 2 clarified the scalar 
boundaries and scope of various retreat terminology and delivered the 
conceptual foundation for the research, using this to examine broad instruments, 
institutional arrangements, and barriers and enablers of managed retreats, 
further recognised as being comparable to the New Zealand experience 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7). Chapter 4 examined the formal institutional framework and 
its key enabling instruments and actors. Extending the inquiry and responding 
to Objectives two and three, Chapter 5 critiqued New Zealand planning 
instruments to determine the nature and direction of managed retreat policy and 
regulation.  
‘Managed retreat’ is often referred to in the singular, but as discovered in the 
international literature and policy analysis, it is an ‘umbrella term’ encompassing 
a range of diverse methods. A lack of consistent terminology and definition 
contributes to reduced transparency across New Zealand. In this regard, further 
work is required to define managed retreat in New Zealand planning policy to 
enable a clear understanding of the approach, and to avoid perceptions of 
‘managed retreat by stealth’ (Chapter 7).  
Managed retreats may have made their way into the policy arena, but there 
are few circumstances where a comprehensive and coordinated strategy is 
enabled (Chapter 5). For example, a lack of implementation support exists for 
relocatable building policies enabling future managed retreat, and in the 
enforcement of extinguishing existing use rights (Chapter 6). It is expected that 
these concerns could be dealt with by assessment criteria and consent conditions 
under NES direction. Among implementation and transparency concerns is the 
largely restrictive use of the approach to manage coastal risks alone, constituting 
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a failure to recognise its versatility and suitability in other risk contexts. It is 
plausible that this dominance stems from the NZCPS, the only NPS referring to 
‘managed retreat’, highlighting the influence of national guidance. Another 
missed opportunity is the lack of attention towards infrastructure retreat in 
policy and plans. Overall, local policy direction for managed retreats is currently 
weak, stemming from institutional barriers uncovered in Chapters 6-8. 
The governance framework is a means to understand the structure, aims, 
and instruments of governing actions across the spectrum, and to evaluate 
governance processes and outcomes, applying the third-order principles. Key 
attributes of the governance principles have cause-effect relationships with the 
socio-political-cultural, economic, environmental, and institutional enablers and 
barriers. For example, reduced institutional capacity and direction limits the 
effectiveness of managed retreat interventions, which in turn hinders social and 
political acceptability. The research has found that barriers often emerge where 
there are third-order governance deficits, hindering governability. Appendix 11 
summarises the primary barriers and enablers uncovered in this research, 
synthesising the literature review, policy analysis, case study, questionnaire and 
policy interview data. Text highlighted in green demonstrates information 
additional to the literature review, and in blue, emphasising correlations 
between the literature and thesis findings.  
The social demand for good governance, principally, equitable outcomes, 
was revealed throughout the thesis (Chapters 2, 4, 6 & 7). To deliver this, 
community engagement must incorporate the desires, concerns, needs, 
knowledge, and values of communities into policy development, strategic 
planning, decision-making, implementation and assessment (Smith et al., 2016). 
In particular, effective community engagement is vital for managed retreats, to 
achieve understanding and acceptance of the knowledge sources that determine 
the risk, trust in authorities managing the process, and fundamentally, to 
facilitate decision-making. Having knowledge diversity; sharing and integrating 
local, indigenous, and scientific knowledge is vital to inform adaptation 
planning. Indigenous legends, known as pūrākau, can capture vital 
environmental knowledge, alerting us to environmental dangers and past events. 
Indigenous knowledge that has long been overlooked should be afforded greater 
recognition and integrated into adaptation planning processes, supported by 
genuine partnerships with local iwi (Nursey-Bray, Palmer, Smith, & Rist, 2019). 
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Additionally, clear science communication is vital to inform people of the 
risks, and the consequences of remaining. Consistent national methodologies to 
enable robust local risk assessment are necessary, but it has also been recognised 
that provision of independent planning and risk assessment technicians for 
residents, or community-based social-ecological assessments may be required to 
improve transparency, trust, and local empowerment in the determination of 
risk (Chapters 6 & 8). 
Managed retreat can be an enduring and fraught journey to embark upon, 
from scoping, to risk assessment, engagement, options analysis, negotiations, and 
implementation. Extended uncertainty of the process and outcomes of managed 
retreat, including implications for cultural identity, livelihoods, networks and 
personal autonomy can have detrimental impacts on people and communities, 
as well as affecting organisational trust. Effective, responsive, and robust 
processes, with regular touchstones, meetings, updates and support are 
imperative to avoid extended community uncertainty and disillusionment with 
the process. As demonstrated in many cases, communities often desire 
unequivocal options that deliver short-term certainty (Chapters 2, 6 & 7), and for 
many, managed retreats can be difficult to imagine. In addition to scenario 
planning tools already developed for decision-makers (Lawrence & Haasnoot, 
2017) community-based ‘serious games’ (Flood, Cradock-Henry, Blackett, & 
Edwards, 2018) could benefit communities coming to terms with what it might 
mean for them, to build certainty and understanding of the process and 
outcomes. Local politicians are also part of the community, and early political 
alignment can foster greater political acceptance (Chapter 6).  
9.3 Opportunities to build governance capacity: Objective 5 
De-centralised government: Managed retreat 
This research has demonstrated that the application of managed retreats is 
inconsistent. Influences of agency function, public contestation, policy learning, 
and political will alter its course and application, resulting in uneven treatment 
of people and communities. Relevant to this inconsistency is the problem of 
institutional integration and jurisdiction. Planning processes are often siloed and 
non-strategic, representing an inefficient use of resources. Institutional and 
resource constraints have resulted in weak local policy direction, continuation of 




Governance actors are affected by path dependencies due to a failure of the 
law to provide clear decision support guidance and tools to implement managed 
retreat, making it difficult to overcome presentist and optimism biases. Among 
constraints arising from the national policy vacuum, getting consensus on the 
level of risk can be problematic, particularly where it fundamentally drives 
managed retreat of private property. Without standard methodologies for 
assessing natural hazard and climate change risks, it is difficult to determine 
when and why managed retreat (and other risk management approaches) should 
occur. To build capacity for managed retreat (and natural hazard risk 
management more broadly), a national risk assessment methodology, as part of 
an NES for natural hazards is recommended to guide and enable locally 
informed risk assessment and reduction, incorporating vulnerability. 
Additionally, managed retreat is not singularly focused on strategically reducing 
risks to human life and property, but making space for nature and protecting the 
intrinsic value and services of ecosystems. As such, criteria for assessing 
tolerability of risk to ecosystems and other matters of national importance are 
necessary.  
Enabling instruments 
Managed retreat challenges development decisions of the past, but the RMA 
delivers only limited capacity to operate retrospectively. One of the greatest 
barriers to implementing managed retreat is the political challenge of existing 
use rights. Significantly, the research establishes that there is a lack of effective 
instruments to apply managed retreat of existing land uses under the current 
system. If managed retreat is to be applied under the planning regime, it requires 
both national guidance and implementation support, to enable legitimate 
strategies and foster cooperation. Compulsory acquisition powers (undertaken 
by genuine negotiation in the first instance) would enable territorial authorities 
to reduce risk in primary hazard zones (including the influences of climate 
change), supported by community tested risk tolerance thresholds and robust 
community engagement. However, this research has uncovered that New 
Zealanders at risk may have an expectation to ‘choose’ or ‘vote for’ managed 
retreat, that it should be selected by the individuals at risk. This is not dissimilar 
to international experience (Shishmaref, Chapter 2; Hino et al., 2017). Applying 
this power of compulsory acquisition first necessitates a degree of national 
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leadership in making the case for change, and to determine governance mode 
acceptability and distribution of decision-making power (Section 9.3.2-4). 
Funding capacity 
Managed retreat funding is currently ad hoc, causing local government to 
develop inconsistent strategies. Boston and Lawrence (2018, p. 43) recognise that 
this will create inequities across New Zealand and recommended a national 
Climate Change Adaptation Fund. This research helps provide the evidence base 
that such a fund is also necessary for action to manage significant natural hazard 
risks, not just the impacts of climate change. The funding model would need to 
consider the cost allocation principles (particularly national solidarity and 
responsibility) discussed in Chapter 7 and those recommended by Boston and 
Lawrence (2018). To answer the question of which specific managed retreat costs 
should be funded, and to what extent, requires further economic analysis in the 
first instance. 
9.3.1 Recommendations: De-centralised government 
The problems discussed thus far highlight the need for substantive increase 
in local government capacity. Not only is the substance of regulation lacking, but 
implementation support constrains the enablement of managed retreat in New 
Zealand. The lack of national imperative to engage with managed retreat 
significantly hinders its use.  
The following recommendations are made to address these shortcomings: 
1. National Environmental Standard for natural hazard 
and climate change risk management including: 
a) A definition of managed retreat, recognising its broad, 
strategic nature, and anticipatory and reactive potential for 
natural hazard risk reduction and climate change 
adaptation. *Informing the standardisation of plan 
definitions under the forthcoming national planning 
standards. 
b) Guiding principles, strategic planning (and response 
planning) requirements, clarification of local authority 
functions, and standards for existing, new, and re-
development of public and private property and assets, for the 
avoidance, reduction, or cessation of land use activities and 
subdivision. 
c) Standard methodologies for risk assessments to: 
i) Determine how natural hazard and climate change risks 
are to be locally assessed (including guidance for developing 
decision trigger values); 
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ii) Prioritise actions according to a risk management 
hierarchy; 
iii) Incorporate assessment of national climate change 
projections, compounding and cascading risks, quantifiable 
and qualitative losses, including risk, and social, cultural, 
economic, environmental, and infrastructural dimensions of 
vulnerability (CCATWG, 2018); 
iv) Provide baseline triggers to avoid adverse environmental 
impacts e.g. to avoid coastal squeeze that will cause 
irreversible loss of high tide beach, habitat, and/or natural 
character. 
Rather than duplicating efforts, if a National Adaptation Plan holds greater 
currency in government than an NES, these same recommendations could apply. 
However, the immediacy and power of NES is of assistance to achieving effective 
governance. Nonetheless, the policy framework must be supplemented with 
instruments, funding support, and guidance materials to demonstrate the 
approach required and provide a process to follow, including procedures for 
strategic disaster response planning: 
2. Mechanisms/powers for territorial authorities to 
undertake managed retreat of existing land use activities 
(e.g. compulsory acquisition powers).  
3. Strategic planning:  
a) A greater focus on strategic planning and integration is 
required to balance growth (and decline), infrastructure 
planning, tourism, asset management, reserves, conservation 
planning and risk management. Managed retreat planning 
must include provision of accessible land, rehabilitation, and 
adequate community services to mitigate impacts on 
receiving and relocating communities. 
4. National Fund (with guiding principles) to: 
a) Financially support managed retreat strategies for risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation 




9.3.2 Alternative governance opportunities 
To effectively enable managed retreat, the current institutional framework 
requires stronger policy direction and instruments, a more strategic and 
integrated planning approach, and funding support. But this research has 
recognised significant tensions between public and private interests and 
expectations of individual autonomy and responsibility.  
In this regard, instruments to deliver strategically planned, voluntary 
managed retreat can be designed to bring greater autonomy to people and 
communities. To be effective and robust, a voluntary buyout or subsidy 
programme requires central government leadership and an institutional 
framework to inform, direct, and coordinate action, providing administrative 
and resource capacity at the local level. To ensure responsive action, local 
authorities will need to strategically plan for voluntary managed retreat within 
local, long-term risk management and adaptation plans that deal with the range 
of natural hazard and climate change risks in an area. Ideally, adaptation plans 
are finalised before events occur to enable anticipatory, or efficient, reactive 
retreat. To be equitable, such a programme would have a nationally consistent 
framework to be implemented at the local level, prioritising voluntary retreat 
zones based on the highest levels of physical, social and environmental 
vulnerabilities. Policy direction from the NES recommendations discussed could 
inform risk assessment and application of the zones, or these may be derived 
instead from collaborative, community based risk assessments, to fully embrace 
network governance and enhance third-order governance principles of 
recognition and participation (Chapter 8).  
While the level of individual autonomy differs across the governance 
spectrum, each require fit for purpose institutional frameworks and resourcing. 
With the capacity building recommended, managed, anticipatory, and voluntary 
retreat have potential to produce good outcomes. Depending on the level of 
societal autonomy preferred by the New Zealand public, and the expected 
degree of state duty of care, capacity building must occur to better enable either 
managed retreat or voluntary managed retreat, as well as anticipatory managed 
retreat for slow-onset risks. Self-governance (unmanaged retreat) will continue 
to operate organically, with changes in the market and insurance sectors 
supporting managed or voluntary retreat as property values adjust. 
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9.3.3 Pertinent governance questions: Managed retreat by whom, 
how, when, and who pays?  
The governance framework is a device to examine the structure and capacity 
for governance, providing a means to answer to the question of managed retreat 
by whom and how? Across the spectrum, differing governance modes and their 
corresponding elements and first and second orders deliver a frame to determine 
the instruments and therefore, approaches that may be expected under each 
mode, the governing actors involved, and the likely level of societal autonomy 
and power sharing. The framework also provides opportunities to consider 
hybrid modes which relate to contextual realities. Importantly, the third-order 
principles are useful for evaluating the governance process, and throughout the 
thesis, have assisted in illuminating key barriers and enablers to implementation 
and opportunities to overcome these (Chapters 2, 5, 6 and 7).  
However, further questions essential to the enablement of managed retreat 
include socio-political choices about which activities, assets, and values shall be 
retreated, when, and who pays? Such difficult decisions cannot be made “fairly, 
justly or effectively within small, time and group-bound forums alone. Local 
voices must be heard in decision-making, but local councils cannot be left to 
wrestle with difficult temporal spatial and procedural justice questions unaided” 
(Hayward, 2008, p. 59). This thesis is not designed to solve these complex, value-
based questions, but the framework developed provides avenues to interrogate 
them further. 
Justification for state interventions imposed on local communities, and the 
point at which tax payers should contribute to local managed retreats are at the 
heart of the state intervention vs autonomy tension. There may be circumstances 
that society considers it appropriate for the state to intervene and compulsorily 
acquire property, for example, if there is a significant, imminent risk to human 
life and assets or a disaster. The state has demonstrated informal precedent of 
this in the past. The questions of ‘when and who pays?’ relate not only to risk 
tolerability, but to social equity values and expected degree of state ‘duty of care’. 
The framework presents various arrangements of governing actors, interactions 
and levels of autonomy, which opens up space for debate about what the 
expected responsibilities of actors are, to assist in determining the values 
necessary to unravelling questions of managed retreat ‘when’ and ‘who pays?’ 
Further political and economic research is needed to determine values specific 
to New Zealand, to assist in answering these questions, and in delivering the ‘art 
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of governance’—managing trade-offs between notions of national solidarity and 
responsibility, and possible implications such as moral hazard or inertia risks.  
The opportunities discussed for building governance capacity broadly 
represent what Bovens and ‘t Hart (1996) argue to be an ‘optimist governance 
philosophy’ based upon resolving functional and procedural barriers to 
governance, and aspects of ‘realist governance philosophy’, where it is 
recognised that inherent tensions, complexities, and power plays restrain action. 
While the governance framework addresses power sharing with regard to the 
intervening authority, it must also be recognised that political power and vested 
interests will continue to constrain the governability of managed retreats and 
impact upon decision-making processes and outcomes. Building institutional 
direction and capacity for managed retreat will go some way in tempering 
existing constraints, including limiting political power which aims to protect 
private property rights at the expense of temporally and procedurally equitable 
decision-making (Hayward, 2008, p. 57). However, it will inevitably encounter 
local contention, and to progress, will continue to require strong local leadership, 
and political will in government to discontinue ‘wait and see’ tactics and reliance 
upon the market or future generations. 
In recognition of the tensions, values, and interests surrounding managed 
retreat, ‘realist’ governance perspectives attempt to balance competing values 
and interests to prevent them from escalating (Biesbroek, Termeer, 
Klostermann, & Kabat, 2014). Hence the following recommendations are made to 
begin this socio-political debate more formally, to better understand preferences 
for and tensions between the modes of managed retreats, and to reveal 
expectations and duties of the state and individuals in reducing natural hazard 
and climate change risk. Finally, applying the ‘pessimist’ philosophical lens, it is 
important to recognise that increasing capacity and managing tensions is not 
representative of transformational resilience (Section 2.2). It is difficult to 
overcome the structural constraints of neoliberalism and capitalism, which 
continue to increase individual and societal vulnerability (Ibid). Managed retreat 
will not transform the fundamental structure of the governance system however, 
it is a vital component of successful adaptation to build resilience. This research 
examines how we can mitigate the influence of barriers to adapt, and provide 
opportunities for more effective, equitable, responsive and robust outcomes, 
whilst acknowledging the complex and pervasive restraints of transformational 
change.  
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9.3.4 Recommendations: Governance debate 
The following recommendations are made to develop managed retreat 
governance in New Zealand: 
5. National inquiry and discussion on retreat governance 
to determine: 
a) Preferences for and implications of retreat governance modes, 
intervening actors, and instruments across the spectrum 
b) Preferences for standard risk assessment methodologies or 
collaborative, community social-ecological assessment models  
c) Cost allocation principles including; which costs of managed 
retreat are funded, who bears the cost (including discount values), 
and which principles should be applied to determine the level of 
financial incentive for retreat. 
9.4 Recommendations for future research 
Further research is required to continue to develop this field. This research 
examines the question of managed retreats ‘by whom, and how?’ and it has 
identified gaps in understanding of managed retreats at ‘what point?’, ‘for 
whom?’, and ‘who pays?’ Further gaps include understanding how best to use 
land that has been retreated from, and how to ensure its protection from 
inappropriate development in perpetuity. Engaging with mātauranga Māori can 
provide early indicators of natural hazard exposure, and greater appreciation of 
Māori sensitivities towards managed retreat is required. This must include 
examination of whether it is an acceptable approach (which is not expected to be 
unanimous nationwide), how to manage relocation of people, cultural assets and 
values according to tikanga Māori (if possible), and assessing Māori risk 
tolerability towards cultural lands, resources and future generations. 
Understanding of how risk and adaptation policy can realise Treaty obligations 
and support Māori communities is vital. Making use of new, potentially enabling 
instruments must also be canvassed, such as the Urban Development Authority 
powers being surveyed by government.  
This is interdisciplinary work beckoning research from planners, social 
scientists, iwi, infrastructure managers, engineers, economists, scientists, and 
lawyers. To enable truly transformational change, attention is required to 
address social, economic, cultural, and environmental drivers of vulnerability, 
reconsider perpetual property rights, and fundamentally move beyond binaries 
of ‘Man v Nature’, to make progress on longer-term resilience and sustainability 
goals. 
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9.5 Final words 
This research reveals the complexity of managed retreats, which are shaped 
and restrained by diverse barriers, and require new arrangements of the law, 
planning, and funding mechanisms, and potentially, alternative governance 
modes.  
Resilience thinking is useful in altering perspectives aiming to control 
change in systems that are presumed to be stable, to managing the capacity of 
social–ecological systems to cope with, adapt to, and shape change (Berkes et al., 
2003; Pisano, 2012; Smit & Wandel, 2006). Managed retreats are an important 
adaptation strategy, but to enhance their contribution to resilience we need to 
acknowledge the governance contexts and challenges. Attending to the 
constraints revealed as recommended by this research, is a means to help ensure 
more equitable outcomes. By deliberately progressing towards forms of 
governance that are effective, equitable, responsive, and robust, we can reduce 
the burden of environmental change in New Zealand, both now and in the 
future. 
Detachment from place is a significant undertaking, requiring effective and 
robust planning and community engagement, immense care, sensitivity, 
flexibility, empowerment, and time. But the perils of loss of life, loss of amenity, 
habitat and natural character, and increasing maintenance and emergency 
management costs over the long-term are inherent, and demand attention. 
Managed retreats challenge the presentist bias, beckoning people and 
communities to think beyond their time, to remedy unsustainable land use 
legacies and forge a more resilient future.  
 
It is not the strongest of the species that survive, 
nor the most intelligent, but the ones  
most responsive to change. 
 
Megginson (1963) interpretation of  
Darwin (1859) ‘On the  











Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways - a decision strategy of interlinked 
pathways which guide decision-making under uncertainty, to anticipate 
how the future may unfold over the long-term, but which allow for 
dynamic decision-making with a range of potential actions to handle 
vulnerabilities and opportunities as they emerge over time (Haasnoot et 
al., 2013). 
Governance - the organisation and guidance of society, functioning under 
diverse modes, elements, and orders. 
Institutions - agreements, rules, rights, laws and decision-making procedures 
and programmes. Institutions include both formal rules and procedures 
and informal rules such as norms and culture (Kooiman et al., 2008).  
Managed retreat - the strategic relocation of people, assets, and activities to 
reduce natural hazard risk and/or adapt to the impacts of climate change 
Managed realignment - a planned process of establishing new defence lines for 
river corridors or coastlines, often set back from the existing position, to 
improve the sustainability of the defence and/or contribute to other aims 
such as habitat creation, tourism, and blue carbon sequestration. 
Nesting - tasks are assigned to appropriate governance levels. Authority and 
responsibility for making decisions are devolved to the lowest level 
possible and are supported by adequate state or other outside support 
and oversight (Bennett & Satterfield, 2018). 
Polycentric - system of several centres of decision-making that are formally 
independent of each other, operating across jurisdictions and scales 
towards a common goal (Bennett & Satterfield, 2018). 
Presentist bias - limited consideration and representation of future interests in 
present decisions  
Residual risk - risk remaining after risk reduction measures 
Resilience - the ability of a system to absorb, adapt to, or transform with the 
effects of disturbance 
Unmanaged retreat -  autonomous and involuntary relocation or abandonment 
under the influence of risk, economic, insurance and regulatory factors  
Usteq - catastrophic land collapse triggered by the combination of thawing 




Te Reo Māori: 
Hui - gathering, meeting, assembly 
Iwi - tribe 
Kaumātua - elder - a person of status within the	whānau. 
Kāwanatanga - government, dominion, rule 
Kōiwi - human bone, corpse 
Marae - formal greeting and discussion place  
Mātauranga Māori - the body of knowledge originating from Māori ancestors, 
including the Māori world view and perspectives, Māori creativity and 
cultural practices 
Mana whenua - territorial rights, power from the land, authority over land or 
territory 
Noa - to be free from the extensions of tapu, ordinary 
Pūrākau - myth, ancient legend, story 
Taniwha - water spirit, monster, dangerous water creature, powerful creature, 
chief, powerful leader 
Tapu – sacred 
Tangata whenua - local people, hosts, indigenous people - people born of the 
land 
Tino rangatiratanga - self-determination, sovereignty, autonomy 
Tūrangawaewae - domicile, place where one has rights of residence and 
belonging through kinship 
Urupā - burial ground 
Wāhi tapu - sacred place, sacred site - a place subject to long-term ritual 
restrictions on access or use 
Whare - house 
Whenua - land 
Whānau - extended family, family group 
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University of Waikato undertaking a Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Planning. I am 
researching natural hazard planning within New Zealand, with a focus on the concept of 
managed retreat. The key aim of my research is to investigate how to build community 
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- Decline to answer any question(s) 
- Withdraw up to a month after the interview  
- Ask any questions about the research at any time 
- Decline to be audio recorded 
- Request that any material be erased 
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Zealand, absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed. 
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working professionals in this area in New Zealand, absolute anonymity cannot be 
guaranteed. 
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I (your name) _______________________________________agree to participate in this research and 
acknowledge receipt of a copy of this consent form and the research project information 
sheet. I understand my rights as a participant in this research and that my identity will 
remain confidential and anonymity guaranteed unless I state otherwise. I have had 
adequate opportunity to discuss the above information and I am satisfied with the answers 
that have been provided.  
 
 
Participant Signature       Date 
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Name:     Address:                Phone number:                              Email:  
 
I agree to abide by the conditions set out in the information sheet and I ensure no harm will 
be done to participants due to this research 
  
Researcher Signature       Date 
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences. Any questions about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent 
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Managed retreat survey 
University of Waikato 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
 
Mobility of place and space: a critical analysis of managed retreat to build community 
resilience to nature’s challenges 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this research. I am a full-time student at the 
University of Waikato undertaking a Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Planning. I 
am researching natural hazard planning within New Zealand, with a focus on	managed 
retreat; the strategic relocation of	people, assets, and activities away from natural hazard 
risk. The key objective of my research is to examine the nature and effect of managed 
retreat within the New Zealand context. 
 
I am undertaking surveys of the	general New Zealand public	to determine public 
perceptions to managed retreat. By undertaking the survey, you are confirming that you 
have read this information sheet	and have given me consent to use the results of the survey 
in my research. This research has been approved by the Waikato University Social Science 
Ethics Committee and adheres to the Ethical Conduct in Human Research and Related 
Activities Regulations. 
 
The survey should not take longer than 9 minutes to complete. If you choose to participate 
in the 	survey, you have the right to: 
-						 Refuse to answer any question(s) 
-						 Ask any questions about the research at any time 
 
With respect to confidentiality, your name and identity will not be attributed to any survey 
responses as it is anonymous. I will solely have access to the survey responses, which will 
be password protected.	 The results of my research will be used as a component of a 
research thesis to fulfil the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental 
Planning, which will be publicly available.	 Up to four copies of my thesis will be produced: 
three hard copies and one that will be available online. The findings of this research may 
also be used in presentations, conferences and journal publications. All records held by 
myself for the purpose of this Doctoral thesis will be destroyed five years following the 
completion of the thesis.	 
 
If you wish	to take part in this	research, scroll down to begin.	 
If you have any questions or comments about the survey	or my research in general, please 





Christina Hanna - cjh41@students.waikato.ac.nz  




Appendix 2: International example key terms summary 
Nation Location Time 
period 
Key term Hazard type Leadership Status Reference 







RC & independent 
consultant 
Stage 1 complete, Stage 
2 in progress 
(Carpenter  & Klinac, 2015) 
(Blackett et al., 2007) 
Urenui Beach, Taranaki 2002-
ongoing 







(Blackett et al., 2007) (Lee, 
2016) 




Initially failed due to 
public backlash but 
recently ongoing 
(Merestone Planning and 
Resource Management, 2011; 
Sharpe, 2011) – updated with 
(Lawrence & Bell, et al., 2019) 





public backlash to 
policy 
(Allan & Fowler, 2014; Kāpiti 
Coast District Council, 2010) 







Ongoing (Whakatāne District Council, 
2016) 








people remain in the 
red zone) 
(Blundell, 2014; MacDonald & 
Carlton, 2016) 
Riverlink – Hutt City 2015- Acquisition 
Purchase 
 
Flooding RC & DC Ongoing (Greater Welington Regional 
Council, 2015b).  




Flooding Community Complete (Becker, Saunders, Hopkins, 
Wright, & Kerr, 2008) 









(Vandenbeld, 2013) (Atlas 
Communications & Media Ltd, 
2011) 
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Little Waihi village, on the 
shore of Lake Taupo 
1910 Relocation Landslide Unknown Complete—majority of 
village relocated 
(Taig et al., 2012). 




Shire Council Failed—significant 
public backlash to 
policy however new 
work in progress 
(Bardsley & Niven, 2013) 
Grantham 2011 Relocation 
Acquisition 
Land swap  
River flooding The Lockyer 
Valley Regional 
Council (LVRC) 








District & City 
Councils 
Failed (Bardsley & Niven, 2013) 








City government & 
AECOM 
Ongoing (Bronen, 2015; Marino, 2012; 
Mele & Victor, 2016) 




Ongoing (Davenport & Robertson, 2016; 
Lowlander Center, 2016) 





? Ongoing (Bronen, 2015; Semuels, 2015) 
Staten Island 2014- Land acquisition Coastal 
inundation 
NY State Ongoing  (Wagner, Merson, & Wentz, 
2016) 
FEMA: Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program 1988, Flood 
Mitigation Assistance 1994, 
Pre-Disaster Mitigation 
2000 , Repetitive Flood 
Claims  2004, Severe 
Repetitive Loss 2004 
1988- Property 
acquisition (x5) 




Ongoing (Robinson, 2013) 
Allenville, Arizona 1980s Relocation 
Resettlement 




Complete (Perry & Lindell, 1997) 




Volcanic lahar  Department of 





loss of community and 
livelihood options; 38% 
houses provided are 
occupied 




China Shangnan County (16 
villages) 






Between 2011 &2015 
7,991 people have been 
resettled across the 
region.  
(Lei et al., 2015) 






Not commenced (Wyett, 2013) 
Japan Great East Japan 2011- Relocation Earthquake Japanese 
Government 
Ongoing (Ranghieri & Ishiwatari, 2014) 
















Agency & RSPB - 
Rewilding England 
Complete (ABP Marine Environmental 
Research Ltd, 2004) 
Blackwater Estuary - 





















Complete (DEFRA, 2002; Rupp-
Armstrong, 2007) 







Complete (Abel et al., 2011; DEFRA, 2002) 
Thorngumbald/ Paull 









Complete (DEFRA, 2002; Esteves, 2013; 
Rupp-Armstrong, 2007) 











programme (5 pilot 
tests) 
Complete (DEFRA, 2011) 












Local NGO Shelter 
Associates 











Ongoing (Edwards, 2013) 
 
 




Managed retreat/retreat/planned retreat 8 
Managed realignment 8 
Abandon 2 
Buy/buy-out 2 
Purchase offer/purchase 3 
Adaptation/ Adaptive management 2 
Migration 1 







Appendix 3: Broad interview questions 
Planning staff, experts, iwi representative and politicians 
BACKGROUND 
1. Please explain your involvement in the managed retreat strategy  
2. Would you say managed retreat has been a last resort option? Why? 
COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS & ACCEPTANCE 
3. What were public and political reactions towards managed retreat? 
• Did it take time to gain political and public acceptance of MR? 
4. What approaches, tools or incentives were most effective in gaining 
acceptance for managed retreat? 
5. Do you consider the community’s trust in Council to be strong or weak 
– how does this affect the process? 
6. Do you consider that the process has been sufficiently fair, inclusive, 
and transparent?  
BARRIERS, ENABLERS & LEARNINGS 
7. What have been the greatest barriers to implementing managed 
retreat? 
8. What have been the greatest enablers? 
9. What have been the key lessons learnt to date? 
• Had the decision to retreat been determined earlier, instead of mitigation, do 
you think the community would be better off? 
• Is there room for improvement in the coordination of hazard management 
between regional and district councils? Should this have been a collaborative 
project?  
10. Do you consider there to be any ways of getting around these 
challenges for other retreat projects? E.g. managed retreat implementation 
guidance from central government? 
GOVERNANCE 
11. What do you consider the role of planning to be in enabling and 
implementing managed retreat?  
12. Do you consider that Councils should have legislative powers to 
compulsorily acquire land to enable retreat from high risk hazard 
areas? 
13.   Should there be a national fund for managed retreat from high-risk 
natural hazards? 
14. What are your thoughts on the extinguishment of existing use rights? 
Do you think it is an appropriate mechanism to enable retreat, or only 















1. Did you experience the 2005 event? 
PLACE ATTACHMENT 
2. Do you consider that you have a high, medium or low attachment 
to your place of residence? Explain whether this attachment has 
changed over time 
 
TRUST 
3. Do you have trust in the scientific evidence and accept that there 
is intolerable risk to life? 
4. Do you have trust in District Council to make the right decisions? 
Has this changed throughout the process? 
 
GOVERNANCE/PROCESS 
5. How has the process affected you, your family and the wider 
Matatā community? 
6. Had the decision to retreat been determined earlier, instead of 
mitigation, do you think the community would be better off? 
7. When was managed retreat first considered and how did it 
emerge as an option? 
8. When did you find out about the voluntary retreat package and 
how was it presented to you?  
9. Do you consider that the process has been sufficiently fair, 
inclusive, and transparent? Why/why not? 















Appendix 4: Questionnaire sample group 
Community Boards 
Ahuriri Community Board  Otorohanga Community Board 
Albert-Eden Local Board Oxford-Ohoka Community Board 
Banks Peninsula Community Board Paekakariki Community Board 
Bay of Islands-Whangaroa  Community Board Papakura Local Board 
Bluff Community Board Papanui-Innes Community Board 
Cambridge Community Board 
Paraparaumu/Raumati Community 
Board 
Clifton Community Board Patea Community Board 
Coastal-Burwood Community Board members Petone Community Board 
Coromandel-Colville Community Board 
Pleasant Point Temuka Community 
Board 
Cromwell Community Board Puketāpapa Local Board 
Dannevirke Community Board Raglan Community Board 
Devonport-Takapuna Local Board  Raglan Community Board  
Eastbourne Community Board Rangiora-Ashley Community Board 
Edendale-Wyndham Community Board Rangitāiki Community Board 
Egmont Plains Community Board Ratana Community  Board 
 Eketahuna Community Board Riverton-Aparima Community Board 
Eltham Community Board Rodney Local Board 
Fairlie Community Board Rotorua Lakes Community Board 
Featherston Community Board Ruapehu National Park Community Board 
Fendalton-Waimairi-Harewood Community 
Board Saddle Hill Community Board 
Foxton Community Board Spreydon-Cashmere Community Board 
Franklin Local Board Stewart Island Community Board 
Geraldine Community Board Strath Taieri Community Board 
Golden Bay Community Board Tahape Community  Board 
Great Barrier Local Board 
Taihape Community Board 
Community Board 
Greytown Community Board Tairua-Pauanui Community Board 
Halswell-Hornby-Riccarton Community 
Board  Taneatua Community Board 
Hanmer Springs Community Board Tāneatua Community Board 
Hastings Rural Community Board Taupiri Community Board 
Hawera-Tangahoe Community Board Taupiri Community Board 
Henderson-Massey Local Board Tawa Community Board 
Hibiscus and Bays Local Board Te Anau Community Board 
Howick Local Board Te Awamutu Community Board 
Huntly Community Board   Te Hiku Community Board 
Inangahua Community Board Te Puke Community Board 
Inglewood Community Board Tekapo Community Board 
Kaiapoi-Tuahiwi Community Board Teviot Community Board 
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Kaikohe - Hokianga Community Board Thames Community Board 
Kaipātiki Local Board Tirau Community Board 
Kaitake Community Board Tuatapere Community Board 
KatiKati Community Board Turangi Tongariro Community Board 
Kawhia Community Board Twizel Community Board 
Lawrence-Tuapeka Community Board Upper Harbour Local Board 
Linwood-Central-Heathcote Community 
Board Vincent Community Board 
Makara-Ohariu Community Board Waiheke Local Board 
Maketu Community Board Waihemo Community Board 
Malvern Community Board Waihi Beach Community Board 
Mangere-Otahuhu Local Board Waikanae Community Board 
Maniototo Community Board Waikouaiti Coast Community Board 
Manurewa Local Board Waimarino-Waiouru Community Board 
Martinborough Community Board Wainuiomata Community Board 
Mataura Community Board Waitākere Ranges Local Board 
Maungakiekie-Tāmaki Local Board Waitara Community Board 
Mercury Bay Community Board Waitematā Local Board 
Methven Community Board Wallacetown Community Board 
Mosgiel-Taieri Community Board Wanaka Community Board 
Motueka Community Board Wanganui Rural Community Board 
Murupara Community Board West Harbour Community Board 
Ngaruawahia Community Board West Otago Community Board 
Omokoroa Community Board Whakatāne-Ōhope Community Board 
Onewhero-Tuakau Community Board Whangamata Community Board 
Opotoki - Coast Community Board Whau Local Board 
Ōrākei Local Board Winton Community Board 
Otago Peninsula Community Board Woodend-Sefton Community Board 
Ōtara-Papatoetoe Local Board  
Otautau Community Board  
Technical communities with wide reach 
AgResearch Maori Women's Welfare league 
Auckland Council Mental Health NZ 
BECA Ministry of Health 
Coastal Restoration Trust of New Zealand - 
Tahuna Ora MSD 
Community Housing Aotearoa New Zealand Civil Defence 
DIA New Zealand Community Trust 
DOC New Zealand Property Council 
Earthquake Commission NZ Coastal Society 
Environment Canterbury NZ Maori Council  
Federation of Maori Authorities Inc. NZPI Emerging Planners 
GNS Science Property Council 'Property Voice' 
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Engineering NZ Rebuild ChCH 
Landcare NZ SOLGM 
LGNZ Te Puni Kokiri 
LINZ  Waikato Regional Council 
Community groups - Facebook 
Akaroa Noticeboard Rotary of Tuakau 
Cambridge NZ Grapevine Sunny Otkai Community Group 
Coastal Ratepayers United T3 resilience group in Thames 
Culverdan Noticeboard Taihape Community Noticeboard 
Dannevirke Community Page Tapanui West Coast Otago 
Environmental Planning - UOW Tararua Buy, Sell, info 
Fairlie Community Council Hub Taupo Noticeboard 
Hanmer Springs Discussion Board Te Awamutu Community Group 
Hawera / Stratford /Eltham Temuka pay it forward 
Huntly Notice Board Thames to Coromandel Community Grapevine 
Lawrence Noticeboard The Franz Josef Collective 
Malvern Residents' Handbook The Kawhia Connection 
Methven Noticeboard The Paihia Noticeboard 
New Plymouth Community The People's Choice in Christchurch Local Government 
NZ Boards - The Online Kiwi Community Twizel Community Care Trust 
NZ House Surveys Upper Hutt Community Page 
Otorohanga Community Connection Whakatāne Community Hub 
Patea Community Noticeboard Whanganui Community Foundation 
Rangitikei Community Noticeboard  













Appendix 5: Case study document review 
1. Awatarariki Debris Flow Risk Management: Project Update	– August 
2017 The purpose of this report was to present the Indicative Business 
Case associated with the Awatarariki Fanhead retreat package to the 
Projects and Services Committee. 
2. Indicative Business Case - Debris Flow Risk: A way forward for the 
Awatarariki Fanhead	August 2017	This Indicative Business Case outlines 
options for investing in a managed intervention to prevent a predictable 
disaster. 
3. Report on Draft Indicative Business Case - Debris Flow Risk: A way 
forward for the Awatarariki Fanhead	December 2016 
4. Mitigation of debris flow risk - Awatarariki fanhead Matatā - Update 
Report to Council - 10 November 2016 
5. TPG Base Value Methodology	– Property Group Ltd October 2016 
6. Mitigation of debris flow risk - Awatarariki fanhead, Matatā - update	July 
2016 
7. Awatarariki Acquisition Strategy	- The Property Group Limited July 2016 
8. Awatarariki debris flow fan risk to life and retreat zone extent - Peer 
Review: M.J. McSaveney, T.R.H. Davies 2015 
9. Awatarariki Fanhead Update - Policy Committee, 8 October 2015	 
10. Supplementary Risk Assessment - Debris Flow Hazard - Matatā	Tonkin 
and Taylor July 2015 
11. Policy Committee Report - 2 July 2015	 
12. Awatarariki fanhead strategy	– December 2013 
13. Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment -	Whakatāne and Ōhope 
Escarpment	 
14. Managing Landslide Hazards from the Whakatāne and Ōhope 
Escarpment Summary 
15. Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment - Matatā	Escarpment 
16. Managing Debris Flow and Landslide Hazards from the 
Matatā	Escarpment Summary	 
17. Landslide and Debris Flow Hazard Management - Issues and Options	 
18. Review of Awatarariki Catchment Debris Control Project - Final Report 
from Alan Bickers	– June 2012  
19. Review of Awatarariki Catchment Debris Control Project - Summary 
20. Tonkin & Taylor Ltd, (August 2005); “The Matatā Debris Flows – 
Preliminary Infrastructure and Planning Options Report”. 
21. 22 AECOM, (25 February 2011); “Awatarariki Stream Debris Flow Control 
System – Peer Review of Resource Consent Application Technical 
Approval”. 23 AECOM, (23 June 2010); Awatarariki Stream Debris Flow 




Appendix 6: Case study interviewees (Matatā) 
Participant Job title 
1 Expert Advisor 
2 Planning Advisor 
3 District Planner 
4 Manager 
5 Regional Planner 
6 Councillor 
7 Rangitihi Kaumātua 
 
Participant Job title 
8 Property owner  
9 Property owner  
10 Property owner  
11 Property owner  
12 Property owner  
13 Property owner  
14 Property owner  
15 Property owner  
16 Property owner  















Appendix 8: Questionnaire  
Managed Retreat	Survey 
 




2.	HAVE YOU EVER EXPERIENCED A NATURAL HAZARD EVENT BEFORE? 
No 
Yes: briefly describe the hazard type(s) (e.g. earthquake) and any damage or loss experienced (e.g. house 
destroyed). 
3.	WHEN	DID YOU EXPERIENCE THE HAZARD EVENT(S)?	(YOU MAY	SELECT MORE THAN 
ONE TIME PERIOD) 
<1 year ago 
1-2 years ago 
3-4 years ago 
5-6 years ago 
7-8 years ago 
9-10 years ago 
>10 years ago 
N/A 
4.	DO YOU CONSIDER THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
Cannot be taken away under any circumstance 
Can be surrendered to benefit the public if the property owner is compensated 
Can be surrendered to benefit the public under special circumstances, without compensation 
Can be taken away if property becomes unsafe to live on or use 
Other (please specify) 
5.	IF PROPERTY YOU OWNED WAS AT HIGH RISK OF BEING AFFECTED BY A NATURAL 
HAZARD WITHIN	10 YEARS, WHEN WOULD YOU CONSIDER RELOCATING? 
As soon as possible -	retreat to avoid damage and loss 
At the latest possible time before a hazard event - retreat once an unacceptable level of risk is reached 
Following a hazard event – retreat rather than attempt to rebuild in the same location 
Never 
Other (please specify) 
6.	IF PROPERTY YOU OWNED WAS AT HIGH RISK OF BEING AFFECTED BY A NATURAL 
HAZARD WITHIN	50	YEARS, WHEN WOULD YOU CONSIDER RELOCATING? 
As soon as possible - retreat to avoid damage and loss 
At the latest possible time before a hazard event - retreat once an unacceptable level of risk is reached 
Following a hazard event – retreat rather than attempt to rebuild in the same location 
Never 
Other (please specify) 
7.	WHAT LEVEL OF TRUST DO YOU HAVE IN NATURAL HAZARD AND CLIMATE CHANGE 




Other (please specify) 
8.	RANK THE FOLLOWING METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING MANAGED RETREAT,	(1 BEING 
MOST APPROPRIATE AND 6 BEING THE LEAST APPROPRIATE): 
 
Provide communities with scientific evidence on short, medium and long-term risk to allow them to move 
if they wish 
 
Long-term council & community strategy, including: 
Avoiding further development in hazard zones 
Requiring relocation/removal of	existing buildings/infrastructure over time, as risk triggers are met 
Rehabilitating the land to its natural state 
 
Central or local government buys property at market value and owners relocate to locations of their 
choice 
Central or local government buys property at market value and a new neighbourhood is planned for 
owners to purchase sites and relocate 
 
Land swap between high risk	property and nearby available land.	 
High risk land is converted to reserve and property owners relocate and re-establish themselves. 
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When	a structure/building is destroyed by a natural hazard event (that is expected to occur again), 
it	cannot be re-built. 
9.	RANK THE FOLLOWING GROUPS THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BEAR THE COST OF 
MANAGED RETREAT	(1 BEING MOST APPROPRIATE, 5 BEING THE LEAST 
APPROPRIATE). 
Private owners whose property is at risk 
 
Central government (via taxes) 
 
Regional community (via regional rates) 
 
District community (via district rates) 
 
The community at risk (via targeted rates calculated on the risk reduction received and the benefits 
gained) 
10.	BRIEFLY EXPLAIN YOUR REASONING	FOR QUESTION 9 
 
11.	IMAGINE PROPERTY YOU OWN IS AT HIGH RISK OF BEING AFFECTED BY A NATURAL 
HAZARD. DESCRIBE ANY FACTORS THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU TO OBJECT TO MANAGED 
RETREAT: 
 
12.	IF PROPERTY YOU OWNED WAS	AT RISK OF BEING AFFECTED BY A NATURAL HAZARD, 
HOW WOULD YOU WANT	TO BE INVOLVED	IN THE RISK REDUCTION	PROCESS?	(YOU MAY 
SELECT MORE THAN ONE ANSWER) 
Community workshops 
One on one meetings on your property with	council 
Answer surveys to voice your opinion 
Make submissions to council 
Be represented through	a community group working collaboratively with the relevant	authorities 
I wouldn't want to be involved 
Other (please specify) 
13.	DO YOU OWN PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND? 
Yes, property value <$100,000 
Yes, property value $100,000 - $300,000 
Yes, property value $300,000 - $500,000 
Yes, property value $500,000 - $700,000 
Yes, property value $700,000 - $900,000 
Yes, property value $900,000 - $1,100,000 
Yes, property value >$1,100,000 
No 
14.	WOULD YOU CONSIDER YOUR ATTACHMENT TO YOUR PROPERTY OR PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE AS HIGH, MEDIUM OR LOW? 
High      Medium     Low 







> 70 yrs 
 
16.	IF YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS PLEASE ENTER THEM BELOW.	 







Appendix 9: National interviewee list 
Participant Job title 
2 Planner, Boffa Miskell 
3 Planner, Whakatāne District Council 
4 Manager, Whakatāne District Council 
5 Planner, Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
18 Manager, Northland Regional Council 
19 Policy Advisor, Waikato Regional Council  
20 Project Leader, Tauranga City Council 
21 Manager, Hawke’s Bay Regional Council 


































Appendix 10: Government interventions  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 11: Barriers and enablers  
Key: 
Green text: Information additional to the literature review 
Blue text: Correlations between the literature and New Zealand experience. 
 
Table 26: Primary managed retreat barriers and enablers 
Enablers    Barriers Sources 
Socio-political-cultural (Abel et al., 2011; 
Agyeman et al., 2009; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; DEFRA, 2002; 
Esteves, 2013; Fazeya et 
al., 2016; Fletcher et al., 
2013; Fried, 1963; 
Hayward, 2008; Hino 
et al., 2017; Hogg et al., 
2016; Lei et al., 2015; 
Linham & Nicholls, 
2010, 2012; Mortreux 
& Barnett, 2009; Ryan 
et al., 2012; Townend 
& Pethick, 2002; 
Turbott & Stewart, 
2006; Usamah & 





Byron Bay, AUS 
Kāpiti, NZ 











Prevention of risk to life and assets May be viewed unfavourably by 
affected property owners and 
politicians  
Can increase adaptive capacity & 
resilience of communities 
Disruption to attachment of place 
(ancestral, cultural, livelihood, 
community and mobility 
ties),culture, and sense of identity 
Opportunity for collaboration 
between community and decision-
makers 
May result in community division 
(for receiving and retreating 
communities) and political 
contestation 
Protection of wider community 




May result in loss of social 
networks, distress, uncertainty, 
feelings of lost control, and may 
increase vulnerability  
Can be a flexible option for 
managing uncertainty, action may 
not be required until a certain 
threshold is met (e.g. DAPP) 
Existing use rights and the 
expectation of permanent use of 
land when land may not be 
permanent. This is worsened by 
increasing property values, 
particularly in coastal areas, 
however, this may eventually be 
mitigated by insurance retreat and 
risk reflective pricing. 
Reduction of social discomfort 
from emergency 
People directly affected may have a 
sense of loss 
Community empowerment and 
agency 
Visible and hidden power within 
the community can influence 
decisions (e.g. wealthy property 
owners exerting political and legal 
pressure to protect properties) 
Efficient strategy for managing 
risk with potential for anticipatory 
risk reduction 
Incremental protection measures 
can decrease the feasibility of 
retreat - path dependency, escalator 
effect, safe development paradox, 
levee effect 
Livelihood incompatibilities or 
inadequacies – ‘like for like’ 
property expectation 
 
Recent social memory of disasters 
Diverse risk tolerability between 
public and private sectors and civil 
society.  
Enablers Barriers Sources 
Environmental (Abel et al., 2011; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; DEFRA, 2002; 
Linham & Nicholls, 
2010; McNamara & 
Jacot des Combes, 2015; 
Sipe & Vella, 2014) 
Protection of environmental and 
amenity values, including carbon 
sequestration benefits of wetlands 
(managed realignment). 
Abandonment/relocation resulting 
in low-quality environment if 
restoration is not staged and 
adequately funded, or the 
institutional enablers are not in 
place 













Lack of available land 
Economic (Abel et al., 2011; 
Bardsley & Niven, 
2013; Cooper, 2003; 
Cooper & McKenna, 
2008; DEFRA, 2002; 
Gibbs, 2016; Hino et al., 
2017; Linham & 
Nicholls, 2012; Roca & 
Villares, 2012; 
Townend & Pethick, 






Hawke’s Bay, NZ 
Muriwai, NZ 




One-off cost with limited 
maintenance expenditure 
Potentially significant costs; risk 
assessment, strategic planning, 
stakeholder and community 
engagement, collaboration, 
relocation, funding, restoration and 
resettlement. 
Reduction of future emergency 
management and hard protection 
expenses 
 
Potentially higher risk management 
costs for individual property owners 
directly affected than other methods 
(but long-term, public benefits).  
Potential for reduced property 
values, equity, income loss and 
market uncertainty 
Authorities who re-zone land to 
afford space for ecosystems may 
become liable for consequent 
decrease in property values, even if 
risks to properties are expected to 
increase on that land in future. 
Numbers of coastal residents and 
value of properties at risk may have 
thresholds where retreat becomes 
less likely.  
Moral hazard and precedent risks of 
incentivisation.  
Institutional (Bronen, 2015; Bronen 
& Chapin, 2013; 
Linham & Nicholls, 
2010; McNamara & 
Jacot des Combes, 2015; 








Hawke’s Bay, NZ 
Local leadership Insufficient institutional direction, 
coordination, capacity, information, 
transparency, and supported 
nesting  
Flexible, adaptive governance Inequitable processes and outcomes 
(e.g. poor consultation, unrealistic 
relocation timeframes, extended 
uncertainty, inconsistent and unfair 
processes) 
Knowledge and respect of local and 
indigenous space and place 
Flawed science and science 
communication 
Organisational support and capacity 
building 
 (i.e. NZCCRI for Riverlink, National 
Science Challenge support Hawke’s 
Bay, Department of Fisheries 
support in Vunidogoloa village, Fiji 
& MCDEM support Franz Josef). 
 
Lack of institutional trust and 
legitimacy 
Limited national leadership under 
de-centralised government 
Deficient strategic disaster response 
frameworks 
Effective governance, transparency 
and legitimacy 
Political certainty – demonstrating 
short-term progress of long-term 
strategies 
 
